Section One:
Modern Philosophy in its First Statement
THE first two philosophers whom we
have
to consider are Bacon and Boehme; there
is
as complete a disparity between these
individuals
as between their systems of philosophy.
None
the less both agree that mind operates
in
the content of its knowledge as in
its own
domain, and this consequently appears
as
concrete Being. This domain in Bacon
is the
finite, natural world; in Boehme it
is the
inward, mystical, godly Christian life
and
existence; for the former starts from
experience
and induction, the latter from God
and the
pantheism of the Trinity.
Modern Philosophy in its First Statement
A. BACON.
There was already being accomplished
the
abandonment of the content which lies
beyond
us, and which through its form has
lost the
merit it possessed of being true, and
is
become of no significance to self-consciousness
or the certainty of self and of its
actuality;
this we see for the first time consciously
expressed, though not as yet in a very
perfect
form, by Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam,
Viscount
St. Albans. He is therefore instanced
as
in the fore-front of all this empirical
philosophy,
and even now our countrymen like to
adorn
their works with sententious sayings
culled
from him. Baconian philosophy thus
usually
means a philosophy which is founded
on the
observation of the external or spiritual
nature of man in his inclinations,
desires,
rational and judicial qualities. From
these
conclusions are drawn, and general
conceptions,
laws pertaining to this domain, are
thus
discovered. Bacon has entirely set
aside
and rejected the scholastic method
of reasoning
from remote abstractions and being
blind
to what lies before one’s eyes. He
takes
as his standpoint the sensuous manifestation
as it appears to the cultured man,
as the
latter reflects upon it; and this is
conformable
to the principle of accepting the finite
and worldly as such.
Bacon was born in London in 1561. His
progenitors
and relatives held high office in the
state,
and his father was Keeper of the Great
Seal
to Queen Elizabeth. He in his turn,
having
been educated to follow the same vocation,
at once devoted himself to the business
of
the State, and entered upon an important
career. He early displayed great talent,
and at the age of nineteen he produced
a
work on the condition of Europe (De
statu
Europæ). Bacon in his youth attached
himself
to the Earl of Essex, the favourite
of Elizabeth,
through whose support he, who as a
younger
son had to see his paternal estate
pass to
his elder brother, soon attained to
better
circumstances, and was elevated to
a higher
position. Bacon, however, sullied his
fame
by the utmost ingratitude and faithlessness
towards his protector; for he is accused
of having been prevailed upon by the
enemies
of the Earl after his fall to charge
him
publicly with High Treason. Under James
I.,
the father of Charles I., who was beheaded,
a weak man, to whom he recommended
himself
by his work De augmentis scientiarum,
he
received the most honourable offices
of state
by attaching himself to Buckingham:
he was
made Keeper of the Great Seal, Lord
Chancellor
of England, Baron Verulam. He likewise
made
a rich marriage, though he soon squandered
all his means, and high though his
position
was, he stooped to intrigues and was
guilty
of accepting bribes in the most barefaced
manner. Thereby he brought upon himself
the
ill-will both of people and of nobles,
so
that he was prosecuted, and his case
was
tried before Parliament. He was fined
£40,000,
thrown into the Tower, and his name
was struck
out of the list of peers; during the
trial
and while he was in prison he showed
the
greatest weakness of character. He
was, however,
liberated from prison, and his trial
was
annulled, owing to the even greater
hatred
of the king and his minister Buckingham,
under whose administration Bacon had
filled
these offices, and whose victim he
appeared
to have been; for he fell earlier than
his
comrade Buckingham, and was deserted
and
condemned by him. It was not so much
his
innocence as the fact that those who
ruined
him had made themselves hated to an
equal
degree through their rule, that caused
the
hatred and indignation against Bacon
to be
somewhat mitigated. But he neither
recovered
his own sense of self-respect nor the
personal
esteem of others, which he had lost
through
his former conduct. He retired into
private
life, lived in poverty, had to beg
sustenance
from the king, occupied himself during
the
remainder of his life with science
only,
and died in 1626. (1)
Since Bacon has ever been esteemed
as the
man who directed knowledge to its true
source,
to experience, he is, in fact, the
special
leader and representative of what is
in England
called Philosophy, and beyond which
the English
have not yet advanced. For they appear
to
constitute that people in Europe which,
limited
to the understanding of actuality,
is destined,
like the class of shopkeepers and workmen
in the State, to live always immersed
in
matter, and to have actuality but not
reason
as object. Bacon won great praise by
showing
how attention is to be paid to the
outward
and inward manifestations of Nature,
and
the esteem in which his name is thus
held
is greater than can be ascribed directly
to his merit. It has become the universal
tendency of the time and of the English
mode
of reasoning, to proceed from facts,
and
to judge in accordance with them. Because
Bacon gave expression to the tendency,
and
men require to have a leader and originator
for any particular manner of thinking,
he
is credited with having given to knowledge
this impulse towards experimental philosophy
generally. But many cultured men have
spoken
and thought regarding what concerns
and interests
mankind, regarding state affairs, mind,
heart,
external nature, &c., in accordance
with
experience and in accordance with a
cultured
knowledge of the world. Bacon was just
such
a cultured man of the world, who had
seen
life in its great relations, had engaged
in state affairs, had dealt practically
with
actual life, had observed men, their
circumstances
and relations, and had worked with
them as
cultured, reflecting, and, we may even
say,
philosophical men of the world. He
thus did
not escape the corruption of those
who stood
at the helm of the state. With all
the depravity
of his character he was a man of mind
and
clear perception; he did not, however,
possess
the power of reasoning through thoughts
and
notions that are universal. We do not
find
in him a methodical or scientific manner
of regarding things, but only the external
reasoning of a man of the world. Knowledge
of the world he possessed in the highest
degree: “rich imagination, powerful
wit,
and the penetrating wisdom which he
displays
upon that most interesting of all subjects,
commonly called the world. This last
appears
to us to have been the characteristical
quality
of Bacon’s genius. . . It was men rather
than things that he had studied, the
mistakes
of philosophers rather than the errors
of
philosophy. In fact he was no lover
of abstract
reasoning;” and although it pertains
to philosophy,
we find as little as possible of it
in him.
“His writings are indeed full of refined
and most acute observations, but it
seldom
requires any effort on our part to
apprehend
their wisdom.” Hence mottoes are often
derived
from him. “His judgments,” however,
“are
commonly given ex cathedra, or, if
he endeavours
to elucidate them, it is by similes
and illustrations
and pointed animadversions more than
by direct
and appropriate arguments. General
reasoning
is absolutely essential in philosophy;
the
want of it is marked in Bacon’s writings.”
(2) His practical writings are specially
interesting; but we do not find the
bright
flashes of genius that we expected.
As during
his career in the state he acted in
accordance
with practical utility, he now, at
its conclusion,
likewise applied himself in a practical
way
to scientific endeavours, and considered
and treated the sciences in accordance
with
concrete experience and investigation.
His
is a consideration of the present,
he makes
the most of, and ascribes value to
it as
it appears; the existent is thus regarded
with open eyes, respect is paid to
it as
to what reigns preeminent, and this
sensuous
perception is reverenced and recognized.
Here a confidence on the part of reason
in
itself and in nature is awakened; it
thinkingly
applies itself to nature, certain of
finding
the truth in it, since both are in
themselves
harmonious.
Bacon likewise treated the sciences
methodically;
he did not merely bring forward opinions
and sentiments, he did not merely express
himself regarding the sciences dogmatically,
as a fine gentleman might, but he went
into
the matter closely, and established
a method
in respect of scientific knowledge.
It is
only through this method of investigation
introduced by him that he is noteworthy
—
it is in that way alone that he can
be considered
to belong to the history of the sciences
and of philosophy. And through this
principle
of methodical knowledge he has likewise
produced
a great effect upon his times, by drawing
attention to what was lacking in the
sciences,
both in their methods and in their
content.
He set forth the general principles
of procedure
in an empirical philosophy. The spirit
of
the philosophy of Bacon is to take
experience
as the true and only source of knowledge,
and then to regulate the thought concerning
it. Knowledge from experience stands
in opposition
to knowledge arising from the speculative
Notion, and the opposition is apprehended
in so acute a manner that the knowledge
proceeding
from the Notion is ashamed of the knowledge
from experience, just as this again
takes
up a position of antagonism to the
knowledge
through the Notion. What Cicero says
of Socrates
may be said of Bacon, that he brought
Philosophy
down to the world, to the homes and
every-day
lives of men (Vol. I. p. 389). To a
certain
extent knowledge from the absolute
Notion
may assume an air of superiority over
this
knowledge; but it is essential, as
far as
the Idea is concerned, that the particularity
of the content should be developed.
The Notion
is an essential matter, but as such
its finite
side is just as essential. Mind gives
presence,
external existence, to itself; to come
to
understand this extension, the world
as it
is, the sensuous universe, to understand
itself as this, i. e., with its manifest,
sensuous extension, is one side of
things.
The other side is the relation to the
Idea.
Abstraction in and for itself must
determine
and particularize itself. The Idea
is concrete,
self-determining, it has the principle
of
development; and perfect knowledge
is always
developed. A conditional knowledge
in respect
of the Idea merely signifies that the
working
out of the development has not yet
advanced
very far. But we have to deal with
this development;
and for this development and determination
of the particular from the Idea, so
that
the knowledge of the universe, of nature,
may be cultivated — for this, the knowledge
of the particular is necessary. This
particularity
must be worked out on its own account;
we
must become acquainted with empirical
nature,
both with the physical and with the
human.
The merit of modern times is to have
accomplished
or furthered these ends; it was in
the highest
degree unsatisfactory when the ancients
attempted
the work. Empiricism is not merely
an observing,
hearing, feeling, etc., a perception
of the
individual; for it really sets to work
to
find the species, the universal, to
discover
laws. Now because it does this, it
comes
within the territory of the Notion
— it begets
what pertains to the region of the
Idea;
it thus prepares the empirical material
for
the Notion, so that the latter can
then receive
it ready for its use. If the science
is perfected
the Idea must certainly issue forth
of itself;
science as such no longer commences
from
the empiric. But in order that this
science
may come into existence, we must have
the
progression from the individual and
particular
to the universal — an activity which
is a
reaction on the given material of empiricism
in order to bring about its reconstruction.
The demand of a priori knowledge, which
seems
to imply that the Idea should construct
from
itself, is thus a reconstruction only,
or
what is in religion accomplished through
sentiment and feeling. Without the
working
out of the empirical sciences on their
own
account, Philosophy could not have
reached
further than with the ancients. The
whole
of the Idea in itself is science as
perfected
and complete; but the other side is
the beginning,
the process of its origination. This
process
of the origination of science is different
from its process in itself when it
is complete,
just as is the process of the history
of
Philosophy and that of Philosophy itself.
In every science principles are commenced
with; at the first these are the results
of the particular, but if the science
is
completed they are made the beginning.
The
case is similar with Philosophy; the
working
out of the empirical side has really
become
the conditioning of the Idea, so that
this
last may reach its full development
and determination.
For instance, in order that the history
of
the Philosophy of modern times may
exist,
we must have a history of Philosophy
in general,
the process of Philosophy during so
many
thousand years; mind must have followed
this
long, road in order that the Philosophy
may
be produced. In consciousness it then
adopts
the attitude of having cut away the
bridge
from behind it; it appears to be free
to
launch forth in its other only, and
to develop
without resistance in this medium;
but it
is another matter to attain to this
ether
and to development in it. We must not
overlook
the fact that Philosophy would not
have come
into existence without this process,
for
mind is essentially a working upon
something
different.
1. Bacon’s fame rests on two works.
In the
first place, he has the merit of having
in
his work De augmentis scientiarum presented
to us a systematic encyclopedia of
the sciences,
an outline which must undoubtedly have
caused
a sensation amongst his contemporaries.
It
is important to set before men’s eyes
a well
arranged picture such as this of the
whole,
when that whole has not been grasped
in thought.
This encyclopedia gives a general classification
of the sciences; the principles of
the classification
are regulated in accordance with the
differences
in the intellectual capacities. Bacon
thus
divides human learning according to
the faculties
of memory, imagination, and reason,
for he
distinguishes what pertains (1) to
memory;
(2) to imagination; (3) to reason.
Under
memory he considered history; under
imagination,
poetry, and art; and finally, under
reason,
philosophy. (3) According to his favourite
method of division these again are
further
divided, since he brings all else under
these
same heads; this is, however, unsatisfactory.
To history belong the works of God
— sacred,
prophetic, ecclesiastical history;
the works
of men — civil and literary history;
and
likewise the works of nature, and so
on.
(4) He goes through these topics after
the
manner of his time, a main characteristic
of which is that anything can be made
plausible
through examples, e. g., from the Bible.
Thus, in treating of Cosmetica, he
says in
regard to paint that “He is surprised
that
this depraved custom of painting has
been
by the penal laws both ecclesiastical
and
civil so long overlooked. In the Bible
we
read indeed of Jezebel that she painted
her
face; but nothing of the kind is said
of
Esther or Judith.” (5) If kings, popes,
etc.,
are being discussed, such examples
as those
of Ahab and Solomon must be brought
forward.
As formerly in civil laws — those respecting
marriage, for instance — the Jewish
forms
held good, in Philosophy, too, the
same are
still to be found. In this work theology
likewise appears as also magic; there
is
contained in it a comprehensive system
of
knowledge and of the sciences.
The arrangement of the sciences is
the least
significant part of the work De augmentis
scientiarum. It was by its criticism
that
its value was established and its effect
produced, as also by the number of
instructive
remarks contained in it; all this was
at
that time lacking in the particular
varieties
of learning and modes of discipline,
especially
in as far as the methods hitherto adopted
were faulty, and unsuitable to the
ends in
view: in them the Aristotelian conceptions
of the schools were spun out by the
understanding
as though they were realities. As it
was
with the Schoolmen and with the ancients,
this classification is still the mode
adopted
in the sciences, in which the nature
of knowledge
is unknown. In them the idea of the
science
is advanced beforehand, and to this
idea
a principle foreign to it is added,
as a
basis of division, just as here is
added
the distinction between memory, imagination
and reason. The true method of division
is
found in the self-division of the Notion,
its separating itself from itself.
In knowledge
the moment of self-consciousness is
undoubtedly
found, and the real self-consciousness
has
in it the moments of memory, imagination
and reason. But this division is certainly
not taken from the Notion of self-consciousness,
but from experience, in which self-consciousness
finds itself possessed of these capacities.
2. The other remarkable feature in
Bacon
is that in his second work, his Organon,
he sought at great length to establish
a
new method in learning; in this regard
his
name is still held greatly in honour
by many.
What chiefly distinguishes his system
is
his polemical attitude towards scholastic
methods as they had hitherto existed,
towards
syllogistic forms. He calls these methods
anticipationes naturæ; in them men
begin
with pre-suppositions, definitions,
accepted
ideas, with a scholastic abstraction,
and
reason further from these without regarding
that which is present in actuality.
Thus
regarding God and His methods of operating
in nature, regarding devils, &c.,
they
make use of passages from the Bible,
such
as “Sun, stand thou still,” in order
to deduce
therefrom certain metaphysical propositions
from which they go further still. It
was
against this a priori method that Bacon
directed
his polemic; as against these anticipations
of nature he called attention to the
explanation,
the interpretation of nature. (6) “The
same
action of mind,” he says, “which discovers
a thing in question, judges it; and
the operation
is not performed by the help of any
middle
term, but directly, almost in the same
manner
as by the sense. For the sense in its
primary
objects at once apprehends the appearance
of the object, and consents to the
truth
thereof.” (7) The syllogism is altogether
rejected by Bacon. As a matter of fact,
this
Aristotelian deduction is not a knowledge
through itself in accordance with its
content:
it requires a foreign universal as
its basis,
and for that reason its movement is
in its
form contingent. The content is not
in unity
with the form, and this form is hence
in
itself contingent, because it, considered
on its own account, is the movement
onwards
in a foreign content. The major premise
is
the content existent for itself, the
minor
is likewise the content not through
itself,
for it goes back into the infinite,
i. e.,
it has not the form in itself; the
form is
not the content. The opposite may always
be made out equally well through the
syllogism,
for it is a matter of indifference
to this
form what content is made its basis.
“Dialectic
does not assist in the discovery of
the arts;
many arts were found out by chance.”
(8)
It was not against this syllogism generally,
i. e., not against the Notion of it
(for
Bacon did not possess this), but against
deduction as it was put into operation,
as
it was to the scholastics — the deduction
which took an assumed content as its
basis
— that Bacon declaimed, urging that
the content
of experience should be made the basis,
and
the method of induction pursued. He
demanded
that observations on nature and experiments
should be made fundamental, and pointed
out
the objects whose investigation was
of special
importance in the interests of human
society,
and so on. From this there then resulted
the establishment of conclusions through
induction and analogy. (9) In fact
it was
only to an alteration in the content
that,
without being aware of it, Bacon was
impelled.
For though he rejected the syllogism
and
only permitted conclusions to be reached
through induction, he unconsciously
himself
drew deductions; likewise all these
champions
of empiricism, who followed after him,
and
who put into practice what he demanded,
and
thought they could by observations,
experiments
and experiences, keep the matter in
question
pure, could neither so do without drawing
deductions, nor without introducing
conceptions;
and they drew their deductions and
formed
their notions and conceptions all the
more
freely because they thought that they
had
nothing to do with conceptions at all;
nor
did they go forth from deduction to
immanent,
true knowledge. Thus when Bacon set
up induction
in opposition to the syllogism, this
opposition
is formal; each induction is also a
deduction,
which fact was known even to Aristotle.
For
if a universal is deduced from a number
of
things, the first proposition reads,
“These
bodies have these qualities;” the second,
“All these bodies belong to one class;”
and
thus, in the third place, this class
has
these qualities. That is a perfect
syllogism.
Induction always signifies that observations
are instituted, experiments made, experience
regarded, and from this the universal
determination
is derived.
We have already called to mind how
important
it is to lead on to the content as
the content
of actuality, of the present; for the
rational
must have objective truth. The reconciliation
of spirit with the world, the glorification
of nature and of all actuality, must
not
be a Beyond, a Futurity, but must be
accomplished
now and here. It is this moment of
the now
and here which thereby comes into self-consciousness.
But those who make experiments and
observations,
do not realize what they are really
doing,
for the sole interest taken by them
in things,
is owing to the inward and unconscious
certainty
which reason has of finding itself
in actuality;
and observations and experiments, if
entered
upon in a right way, result in showing
that
the Notion is the only objective existence.
The sensuous individual eludes the
experiments
even while it is being operated upon,
and
becomes a universal; the best known
example
of this is to be found in positive
and negative
electricity in so far as it is positive
and
negative. There is another shortcoming
of
a formal nature, and one of which all
empiricists
partake, — that is that they believe
themselves
to be keeping to experience alone;
it is
to them an unknown fact that in receiving
these perceptions they are indulging
in metaphysics.
Man does not stop short at the individual,
nor can he do so. He seeks the universal,
but thoughts, even if not Notions likewise,
are what constitute the same. The most
remarkable
thought-form is that of force; we thus
speak
of the force of electricity, of magnetism,
of gravity. Force, however, is a universal
and not a perceptible; quite uncritically
and unconsciously the empiricists thus
permit
of determinations such as these.
3. Bacon finally gives the objects
with
which Philosophy mainly has to deal.
These
objects contrast much with that which
we
derive from perception and experience.
“In
the summary which Bacon gives of what
he
conceives ought to be the objects of
philosophical
inquiry, are the following; and we
select
those which he principally dwells upon
in
his works: ‘The prolongation of life;
the
restitution of youth in some degree;
the
retardation of old age, and the altering
of statures; the altering of features;
versions
of bodies into other bodies; making
of new
species; impression of the air and
raising
tempests; greater pleasures of the
senses,
&c.’” He likewise deals with objects
such as these, and he seeks to direct
attention
upon whether in their regard the means
could
not be found to carry out their ends;
in
such powers we should be able to make
some
progress. “He complains that such investigations
have been neglected by those whom be
designates
ignavi regionum exploratores. In his
Natural
History he gives formal receipts for
making
gold, and performing many wonders.”
(10)
Bacon thus does not by any means take
the
intelligent standpoint of an investigation
of nature, being still involved in
the grossest
superstition, false magic, &c.
This we
find to be on the whole propounded
in an
intelligent way, and Bacon thus remains
within
the conceptions of his time. “The conversion
of silver, quicksilver, or any other
metal
into gold is a thing difficult to believe,
yet it is far more probable that a
man who
knows clearly the natures of weight,
of the
colour of yellow, of malleability,
and extension,
of volatility and fixedness, and who
has
also made diligent search into the
first
seeds and menstruums of minerals, may
at
last by much and sagacious endeavour
produce
gold, than that a few grains of an
elixir
may so do. . . . So again a man who
knows
well the nature of rarefaction, of
assimilation,
and of alimentation, shall by diets,
bathings,
and the like prolong life, or in some
degree
renew the vigour of youth.” (11) These
assertions
are thus not as crude as they at first
appear.
In dealing with Medicine Bacon speaks
amongst
other things of maceration (Malacissatio
per exterius) (12) and so forth.
Bacon emphasizes what has reference
to the
formal aspect of investigation. For
he says,
“Natural philosophy is divided into
two parts,
the first consists in the investigation
of
causes; the second in the production
of effects;
the causes to be investigated are either
final or formal causes, or else material
or efficient causes. The former constitutes
metaphysics; the latter physics. This
last
Bacon looks upon as a branch of philosophy
very inferior in point of dignity and
importance
to the other and accordingly to ascertain
the most probable means of improving
our
knowledge of metaphysics is the great
object
of his Organon." (13) He himself
says:
“It is a correct position that ‘true
knowledge
is knowledge by causes. And causes,
again,
are not improperly, distributed into
four
kind: the material, the formal, the
efficient,
and the final.’” (14) (Vol. I. p. 174,
Vol.
II. p. 138.)
But in this connection an important
point
is that Bacon has turned against the
teleological
investigation of nature, against the
investigation
into final causes. “The investigation
of
final causes is useless; they corrupt
rather
than advance the sciences except such
as
have to do with human action.” (15)
To Bacon
the important matter is to investigate
by
the study of causæ efficientes. To
the consideration
of final causes such assertions as
these
belong: “That the hairs of the eyelids
are
for a protection to the eyes; that
the thick
skins and hides of living creatures
are to
defend them from heat and cold; that
the
trees have leaves so that the fruit
may not
suffer from sun and wind”
(16): the hair is on the head on account
of warmth; thunder and lightning are
the
punishment of God, or else they make
fruitful
the earth; marmots sleep during the
winter
because they can find nothing to eat;
snails
have a shell in order that they may
be secure
against attacks; the bee is provided
with
a sting. According to Bacon this has
been
worked out in innumerable different
ways.
The negative and external side of utility
is turned round, and the lack of this
adaptation
to end is likewise drawn within the
same
embrace. It may, for example, be said
that
if sun or moon were to shine at all
times,
the police might save much money, and
this
would provide men with food and drink
for
whole months together. It was right
that
Bacon should set himself to oppose
this investigation
into final causes, because it relates
to
external expediency, just as Kant was
right
in distinguishing the inward teleology
from
the outward. As against the external
end,
there is, in fact, the inward end,
i. e.
the inward Notion of the thing itself,
as
we found it earlier in Aristotle (Vol.
II.
pp. 166-163). Because the organism
possesses
an inward adaptation to its ends, its
members
are indeed likewise externally adapted
as
regards one another; but the ends,
as external
ends, are heterogeneous to the individual,
are unconnected with the object which
is
investigated. Speaking generally, the
Notion
of nature is not in nature itself,
which
would mean that the end was in nature
itself;
but as teleological, the Notion is
something
foreign to it. It does not have the
end in
itself in such a way that we have to
accord
respect to it — as the individual man
has
his end in himself and hence has to
be respected.
But even the individual man as individual
has only a right to respect from the
individual
as such, and not from the universal.
He who
acts in the name of the universal,
of the
state, as a general does for instance,
does
not require to respect the individual
at
all; for the latter, although an end
in himself,
does not cease to be relative. He is
this
end in himself, not as excluding himself
and setting himself in opposition,
but only
in so far as his true reality is the
universal
Notion. The end of the animal in itself
as
an individual is its own self-preservation;
but its true end in itself is the species.
Its self-preservation is not involved
in
this; for the self-preservation of
its individuality
is disadvantageous to the species,
while
the abrogation of itself is favourable
thereto.
Now Bacon separates the universal principle
and the efficient cause, and for that
reason
he removes investigation into ends
from physics
to metaphysics. Or he recognizes the
Notion,
not as universal in nature, but only
as necessity,
i. e. as a universal which presents
itself
in the opposition of its moments, not
one
which has bound them into a unity —
in other
words he only acknowledges a comprehension
of one determinate from another determinate
going on into infinity, and not of
both from
their Notion. Bacon has thus made investigation
into the efficient cause more general,
and
he asserts that this investigation
alone
belongs to physics, although be allows
that
both kinds of investigation may exist
side
by side. (17) Through that view he
effected
a great deal, and in so far as it has
counteracted
the senseless superstition which in
the Germanic
nations far exceeded in its horrors
and absurdity
that of the ancient world, it has the
very
merit which we met with in the Epicurean
philosophy. That philosophy opposed
itself
to the superstitious Stoics and to
superstition
generally — which last makes any existence
that we set before ourselves into a
cause
(a Beyond which is made to exist in
a sensuous
way and to operate as a cause), or
makes
two sensuous things which have no relation
operate on one another. This polemic
of Bacon’s
against spectres, astrology, magic,
&c.,
(18) can certainly not be regarded
exactly
as Philosophy like his other reflections,
but it is at least of service to culture.
He also advises that attention should
be
directed to formal causes, the forms
of things,
and that they should be recognized.
(19)
“But to give an exact definition of
the meaning
which Bacon attaches to the phrase
formal
causes is rather difficult; because
his language
upon this subject is uncertain in a
very
remarkable degree.” (20) “It may be
thought
that he understood by this the immanent
determinations
of things, the laws of nature; as a
matter
of fact the forms are none else than
universal
determinations, species, &c.” (21)
He
says: “The discovery of the formal
is despaired
of. The efficient and the material
(as they
are investigated and received, that
is as
remote causes, without reference to
the latent
process leading to the forms) are but
slight
and superficial, and contribute little,
if
anything, to true and active science.
For
though in nature nothing really exists
beside
individual bodies, performing pure
individual
acts according to a fixed law, yet
in philosophy
this very law, and the investigation,
discovery
and explanation of it, is the foundation
as well of knowledge as of operation.
And
it is this law, with its clauses, that
I
mean when I speak of Forms . . . Let
the
investigation of Forms which are eternal
and immutable constitute metaphysics.
Whosoever
is acquainted with Forms embraces the
unity
of nature in substances the most unlike.”
(22) He goes through this in detail,
and
quotes many examples to illustrate
it, such
as that of Heat. “Mind must raise itself
from differences to species. The warmth
of
the sun and that of the fire are diverse.
We see that grapes ripen by the warmth
of
the sun. But to see whether the warmth
of
the sun is specific, we also observe
other
warmth, and we find that grapes likewise
ripen in a warm room; this proves that
the
warmth of the sun is not specific.”
(23)
“Physic,” he says, “directs us through
narrow
rugged paths in imitation of the crooked
ways of nature. But he that understands
a
form knows the ultimate possibility
of superinducing
that nature upon all kinds of matter;
that
is to say, as he himself interprets
this
last expression, is able to superinduce
the
nature of gold upon silver,” that is
to say
to make gold from silver, “and to perform
all those other marvels to which the
alchymists
pretended. The error of these last
consisted
alone in hoping to arrive at these
ends by
fabulous and fantastical methods;”
the true
method is to recognize these forms.
“One
leading object of the Instauratio Magna
and
of the Novum Organon is to point out
the
necessity of ascertaining the formal
causes
and logical rules.” (24) They are good
rules,
but not adapted to attain that end.
This is all that we have to say of
Bacon.
In dealing with Locke we shall have
more
to say of these empirical methods which
were
adopted by the English.
Notes.
1. Buhle: Gesch. D. neuern Philos.
Vol.
II. Section II. pp. 950-954; Brucker.
Hist.
Crit. Phil. T. IV. P. II. pp. 91-95.
2. The Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.,
April,
1817, p. 53.
3. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
II.
c. 1 (Lugd. Batavor, 1652. 12), pp.
108-110
(Operum omnium, pp. 43, 44, Lipsiæ,
1694).
4. Ibidem, c. 2, p. 111 (Operum, p.
44);
c. 4, pp. 123, 124 (p. 49); c. 11,
pp. 145-147
(pp. 57, 58).
5. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
IV.
c. 2, pp. 294, 295 (p. 213) (Ellis
and Spedding's
translation, Vol. IV. p. 394).
6. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor.
11-34,
pp. 280-282 (Operum).
7. Bacon. De augm. scient. V. c. 4,
p. 358
(p. 137). (Ellis and Spedding's translation.
Vol. IV. p. 428.
8. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
V. c.
2, pp. 320, 321 (pp. 122, 123).
9. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor.
105,
p. 313; De augmentis scientiarum, V.
c. 2,
pp. 326, 327 (pp. 124, 125).
10. The Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.,
April,
1817, pp. 50, 51: cf. Bacon silva silvarum
sive historia naturalis, Cent. IV.,
Sect.
326, 327 (Operum, pp. 822, 823).
11. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
III.
c. 5, pp. 245, 246 (p. 95).
12. Ibid. IV. c. 2, p. 293 (p. 112).
13. The Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.,
April,
1817, pp. 51, 52; cf. Bacon. De augmentis
scientiarum, III. c. 3, 4, pp. 200-206
(pp.
78-80).
14. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor.
2. (Ellis and Spedding's translation,
Vol.
IV. p. 119.)
15. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor.
2; cf. the Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.
April,
1817, p. 52.
16. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
III,
c. 4; p. 237 (p. 92).
17. Bacon. De augm. scient. III. c.
4, p.
239 (p. 92).
18. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
I.
p. 46 (p. 19); III. c. 4, pp. 211-213
(pp.
82, 83); Novum Organon, L. I. Aphor.
85,
p. 304.
19. Bacon. De augmentis scientiarum,
III,
c. 4, pp. 231-234 (pp. 89, 90).
20. The Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.
April,
1817, p. 52.
21. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor.
17, pp. 345, 346.
22. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor.
II. pp. 325, 326. (Tennemann, Vol.
X. pp.
35, 36); Lib. I. Aphor. 51, p. 286;
L. II.
Aphor. 9; Aphor. 3, p. 326.
23. Bacon. Novum Organon, L. II. Aphor.
35, p. 366.
24. The Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII.
April,
1817, p. 52. Cf. Bacon. De auginentis
scientiarum,
III. c. 4, p. 236 (p. 91).
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