MODERN PHILOSOPHY INTRODUCTION
IF we cast a glance back over the period
just traversed, we find that in it
a turning-point
had been reached, that the Christian
religion
had placed its absolute content in
the mind
and will of man, and that it was thus,
as
a divine and supersensuous content,
separated
from the world and shut up within itself
in the centre-point of the individual.
Over
against the religious life an external
world
stood as a natural world - a world
of heart
or feeling, of desire, of human nature
-
which had value only in as far as it
was
overcome. This mutual independence
of the
two worlds had much attention bestowed
on
it throughout the Middle Ages; the
opposition
was attacked on all quarters and in
the end
overcome. But since the relation of
mankind
to the divine life exists upon earth,
this
conquest at first presented the appearance
of bringing with it the destruction
of the
church and of the eternal through the
sensuous
desires of man. The eternal truth was
likewise
grafted upon the dry, formal understanding,
so that we might say that the separation
of self-consciousness has in itself
disappeared,
and thereby a possibility has been
given
of obtaining reconciliation. But because
this implicit union of the Beyond and
the
Here was of so unsatisfactory a nature
that
the better feelings were aroused and
forced
to turn against it, the Reformation
made
its appearance, partly, no doubt, as
a separation
from the Catholic Church, but partly
as a
reformation from within. There is a
mistaken
idea that the Reformation only effected
a
separation from the Catholic Church;
Luther
just as truly reformed the Catholic
Church,
the corruption of which one learns
from his
writings, and from the reports of the
emperors
and of the empire to the Pope; if further
evidence be required, we need only
read the
accounts given even by the Catholic
bishops,
the Fathers of the councils at Constance,
Basle, &c., of the condition of
the Catholic
priesthood and of the Roman Court.
The principle
of the inward reconciliation of spirit,
which
was in itself the very Idea of Christianity,
was thus again estranged, and appeared
as
a condition of external, unreconciled
alienation
and discord; this gives us an example
of
the slow operation of the world-spirit
in
overcoming this externality. It eats
away
the inward substance, but the appearance,
the outward form, still remains; at
the end,
however, it is an empty shell, the
new form
breaks forth. In such times this spirit
appears
as if it - having so far proceeded
in its
development at a snail's pace, and
having
even retrograded and become estranged
from
itself - had suddenly adopted seven-leagued
boots.
Since thus the reconciliation of self-consciousness
with the present is implicitly accomplished,
man has attained to confidence in himself
and in his thought, in sensuous nature
outside
of and within him; he has discovered
an interest
and pleasure in making discoveries
both in
nature and the arts. In the affairs
of this
world the understanding developed;
man became
conscious of his will and his achievements,
took pleasure in the earth and its
soil,
as also in his occupations, because
right
and understanding were there present.
With
the discovery of gunpowder the individual
passion of battle was lost. The romantic
impulse towards a casual kind of bravery
passed into other adventures, not of
hate
or revenge, or the so-called deliverance
from what men considered the wrongs
of innocence,
but more harmless adventures, the exploration
of the earth, or the discovery of the
passage
to the East Indies. America was discovered,
its treasures and people - nature,
man himself;
navigation was the higher romance of
commerce.
The present world was again present
to man
as worthy of the interests of mind;
thinking
mind was again capable of action. Now
the
Reformation of Luther had inevitably
to come
- the appeal to the sensus communis
which
does not recognize the authority of
the Fathers
or of Aristotle, but only the inward
personal
spirit which quickens and animates,
in contradistinction
to works. In this way the Church lost
her
power against it, for her principle
was within
it and no longer lacking to it. To
the finite
and present due honour is accorded;
from
this honour the work of science proceeds.
We thus see that the finite, the inward
and
outward present, becomes a matter of
experience,
and through the understanding is elevated
into universality; men desire to understand
laws and forces, i. e., to transform
the
individual of perceptions into the
form of
universality. Worldly matters demand
to be
judged of in a worldly way; the judge
is
thinking understanding. The other side
is
that the eternal, which is in and for
itself
true, is also known and comprehended
through
the pure heart itself; the individual
mind
appropriates to itself the eternal.
This
is the Lutheran faith without any other
accessories
- works, as they were called. Everything
had value only as it was grasped by
the heart,
and not as a mere thing. The content
ceases
to be an objective thing; God is thus
in
spirit alone, He is not a beyond but
the
truest reality of the individual.
Pure thought is likewise one form of
inwardness;
it also approaches absolute existence
and
finds itself justified in apprehending
the
same. The philosophy of modern times
proceeds
from the principle which ancient philosophy
had reached, the standpoint of actual
self-consciousness
- it has as principle the spirit that
is
present to itself; it brings the standpoint
of the Middle Ages, the diversity between
what is thought and the existent universe,
into opposition, and it has to do with
the
dissolution of this game opposition.
The
main interest hence is, not so much
the thinking
of the objects in their truth, as the
thinking
and understanding of the objects, the
thinking
this unity itself, which is really
the being
conscious of a pre-supposed object.
The getting
rid of the formal culture of the logical
understanding and the monstrosities
of which
it was composed, was more essential
than
the extension of it: investigation
in such
a case becomes dissipated and diffused,
and
passes into the false infinite. The
general
points of view which in modern philosophy
we reach are hence somewhat as follows
:
—
1. The concrete form of thought which
we
have here to consider on its own account,
really appears as subjective with the
reflection
of implicitude, so that this has an
antithesis
in existence; and the interest is then
altogether
found in grasping the reconciliation
of this
opposition in its highest existence,
i. e.,
in the most abstract extremes. This
highest
severance is the opposition between
thought
and Being, the comprehending of whose
unity
from this time forward constitutes
the interest
of all philosophies. Here thought is
more
independent, and thus we now abandon
its
unity with theology; it separates itself
therefrom, just as with the Greeks
it separated
itself from mythology, the popular
religion,
and did not until the time of the Alexandrians
seek out these forms again and fill
the mythological
conceptions with the form of thought.
The
bond remains, but for this reason it
is clearly
implicit: theology throughout is merely
what
philosophy is, for this last is simply
thought
respecting it. It does not help theology
to strive against philosophy, or to
say that
it wishes to know nothing about it,
and that
philosophic maxims are thus to be set
aside.
It has always to do with the thought
that
it brings along with it, and these
its subjective
conceptions, its home and private metaphysics,
are thus frequently a quite uncultured,
uncritical
thought - the thought of the street.
Theme
general conceptions are, indeed, connected
with particular subjective conviction,
and
this last is said to prove the Christian
content to be true in a sense all its
own;
but theme thoughts which constitute
the criterion
are merely the reflections and opinions
which
float about the surface of the time.
Thus,
when thought comes forth on its own
account,
we thereby separate ourselves from
theology;
we shall, however, consider one other
in
whom both are still in unity. This
individual
is Jacob Boehme, for since mind now
moves
in its own domains, it is found partly
in
the natural and finite world, and partly
in the inward, and this at first is
the Christian.
While earlier than this, moreover,
the spirit,
distracted by outward things, had to
make
its influence felt in religion and
in the
secular life, and came to be known
in the
popular philosophy so-called, it was
only
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
that the genuine Philosophy re-appeared,
which seeks to grasp the truth as truth
because
man in thought is infinitely free to
comprehend
himself and nature, and along with
that seeks
to understand the present of rationality,
reality, universal law itself. For
this is
ours, since it is subjectivity. The
principle
of modern philosophy is hence not a
free
and natural thought, because it has
the opposition
of thought and nature before it as
a fact
of which it is conscious. Spirit and
nature,
thought and Being, are the two infinite
sides
of the Idea, which can for the first
time
truly make its appearance when its
sides
are grasped for themselves in their
abstraction
and totality. Plato comprehended it
as the
bond, as limiting and as infinite,
as one
and many, simple and diverse, but not
as
thought and Being; when we first thinkingly
overcome this opposition it signifies
comprehending
the unity. This is the standpoint of
philosophic
consciousness generally; but the way
in which
this unity must be thinkingly developed
is
a double one. Philosophy, hence falls
into
the two main forms in which the opposition
is resolved, into a realistic and an
idealistic
system of philosophy, i. e., into one
which
makes objectivity and the content of
thought
to arise from the perceptions, and
one which
proceeds to truth from the independence
of
thought.
a. Experience constitutes the first
of these
methods, viz. Realism. Philosophy now
signified,
or had as its main attribute, self-thought
and the acceptance of the present as
that
in which truth lay, and which was thereby
knowable. All that is speculative is
pared
and smoothed down in order to bring
it under
experience. This present is the existent
external nature, and spiritual activity
as
the political world and as subjective
activity.
The way to truth was to begin from
this hypothesis,
but not to remain with it in its external
self-isolating actuality, but to lead
it
to the universal.
i. The activities of that first method
operate,
to begin with, on physical nature,
from the
observation of which men derive universal
laws, and on this basis their knowledge
is
founded; the science of nature, however,
only reaches to the stage of reflection.
This kind of experimental physics was
once
called, and is still called philosophy,
as
Newton's Principia philosophić naturalis
(Vol. I. p. 59) show. This work is
one in
which the methods of the finite sciences
through observation and deduction are
alone
present - those sciences which the
French
still call the sciences exactes. To
this,
the understanding of the individual,
piety
was opposed, and hence in this respect
philosophy
was termed worldly wisdom (Vol. I.
p. 60).
Here the Idea in its infinitude is
not itself
the object of knowledge; but a determinate
content is raised into the universal,
or
this last in its determinateness for
the
understanding is derived from observation,
just as is, for instance, done in Keppler's
Laws. In Scholastic philosophy, on
the other
hand, man's power of observation was
set
aside, and disputations respecting
nature
at that time proceeded from abstruse
hypotheses.
ii. In the second place, the spiritual
was
observed as in its realization it constitutes
the spiritual world of states, in order
thus
to investigate from experience the
rights
of individuals as regards one another,
and
as regards rulers, and the rights of
states
against states. Before this popes anointed
kings, just as was done in Old Testament
times to those appointed by God; it
was in
the Old Testament that the tithe was
commanded;
the forbidden degrees of relationship
in
marriage were also adopted from the
Mosaic
laws. What was right and permissible
for
kings was demonstrated from Saul's
and David's
histories, the rights of priesthood
from
Samuel - in short, the Old Testament
was
the source of all the principles of
public
law, and it is in this way even now
that
all papal bulls have their deliverances
confirmed.
It may easily be conceived how much
nonsense
was in this manner concocted. Now,
however,
right was sought for in man himself,
and
in history, and what had been accounted
right
both in peace and in war was explained.
In
this way books were composed which
even now
are constantly quoted in the Parliament
of
England. Men further observed the desires
which could be satisfied in the state
and
the manner in which satisfaction could
be
given to them, in order thus from man
himself,
from man of the past as well as of
the present,
to learn what is right.
b. The second method, that of Idealism,
proceeds from what is inward; according
to
it everything is in thought, mind itself
is all content. Here the Idea itself
is made
the object; that signifies the thinking
it
and from it proceeding to the determinate.
What Realism draws from experience
is now
derived from thought ŕ priori; or the
determinate
is also comprehended but not led back
to
the universal merely, but to the Idea.
The two methods overlap one another,
however,
because experience on its side desires
to
derive universal laws from observations,
while, on the other side, thought proceeding
from abstract universality must still
give
itself a determinate content; thus
a priori
and a posteriori methods are mingled.
In
France abstract universality was the
more
predominant; from England experience
took
its rise, and even now it is there
held in
the greatest respect; Germany proceeded
from
the concrete Idea, from the inwardness
of
mind and spirit.
2. The questions of present philosophy,
the opposites, the content which occupies
the attention of these modern times,
are
as follows: —
a. The first form of the opposition
which
we have already touched upon in the
Middle
Ages is the Idea of God and His Being,
and
the task imposed is to deduce the existence
of God, as pure spirit, from thought.
Both
sides must be comprehended through
thought
as absolute unity; the extremest opposition
is apprehended as gathered into one
unity.
Other subjects which engage our attention
are connected with the same general
aim,
namely, the bringing about of the inward
reconciliation in the opposition which
exists
between knowledge and its object.
b. The second form of opposition is
that
of Good and Evil - the opposition of
the
assertion of independent will to the
positive
and universal; the origin of evil must
be
known. Evil is plainly the "other,"
the negation of God as Holiness; because
He is, because He is wise, good, and
at the
same time almighty, evil is contradictory
to Him; an endeavour is made to reconcile
this contradiction.
c. The third form of opposition is
that
of the freedom of man and necessity.
i. The individual is clearly not determined
in any other way than from himself,
he is
the absolute beginning of determination;
in the 'I,' in the self, a power of
decision
is clearly to be found. This freedom
is in
opposition to the theory that God alone
is
really absolutely determining. Further,
when
that which happens is in futurity,
the determining
of it through God is regarded as Providence
and the foreknowledge of God. In this,
however,
a new contradiction is involved, inasmuch
as because God's knowledge is not merely
subjective, that which God knows likewise
is.
ii. Further still, human freedom is
in opposition
to necessity as the determinateness
of nature;
man is dependent on nature, and the
external
as well as the inward nature of man
is his
necessity as against his freedom.
iii. Considered objectively, this opposition
is that between final causes and efficient
causes, i. e., between the acts of
freedom
and the acts of necessity.
iv. This opposition between the freedom
of man and natural necessity has finally
likewise the further form of community
of
soul and body, of commercium animi
cum corpore,
as it has been called, wherein the
soul appears
as the simple, ideal, and free, and
the body
as the manifold, material and necessary.
These matters occupy the attention
of science,
and they are of a completely different
nature
from the interests of ancient philosophy.
The difference is this, that here there
is
a consciousness of an opposition, which
is
certainly likewise contained in the
subjects
with which the learning of the ancients
was
occupied, but which had not come to
consciousness.
This consciousness of the opposition,
this
'Fall,' is the main point of interest
in
the conception of the Christian religion.
The bringing about in thought of the
reconciliation
which is accepted in belief, now constitutes
the whole interest of knowledge. Implicitly
it has come to pass; for knowledge
considers
itself qualified to bring about in
itself
this recognition of the reconciliation.
The
philosophic systems are therefore no
more
than modes of this absolute unity,
and only
the concrete unity of those opposites
is
the truth.
3. As regards the stages which were
reached
in the progress of this knowledge we
have
to mention three of the principal.
a. First of all we find the union of
those
opposites stated; and to prove it genuine
attempts are made, though not yet determined
in purity.
b. The second stage is the metaphysical
union; and here, with Descartes, the
philosophy
of modern times as abstract thought
properly
speaking begins.
i. Thinking understanding seeks to
bring
to pass the union, inasmuch as it investigates
with its pure thought-determinations;
this
is in the first place the standpoint
of metaphysics
as such.
ii. In the second place, we have to
consider
negation, the destruction of this metaphysics
- the attempt to consider knowledge
on its
own account, and the determinations
which
proceed from it.
c. The third stage is that this union
itself
which is to be brought about, and which
is
the only subject of interest, comes
to consciousness
and becomes an object. As principle
the union
has the form of the relationship of
knowledge
to the content, and thus this question
has
been put: 'How is, and how can thought
be
identical with the objective?' With
this
the inward element which lies at the
basis
of this metaphysic is raised into explicitude
and made an object; and this includes
all
modern philosophy in its range.
4. In respect to the external history
and
the lives of the philosophers, it will
strike
us that from this time on, these appear
to
be very different from those of the
philosophers
of ancient times, whom we regarded
as self-sufficing
individualities. It is required that
a philosopher
should live as he teaches, that he
should
despise the world and not enter into
connection
with it; this the ancients have accomplished,
and they are such plastic individualities
just because the inward spiritual aim
of
philosophy has likewise frequently
determined
their external relations and conditions.
The object of their knowledge was to
take
a thoughtful view of the universe;
they kept
the external connection with the world
all
the further removed from themselves
because
they did not greatly approve of much
therein
present; or, at least, it ever proceeds
on
its way, according to its own particular
laws, on which the individual is dependent.
The individual likewise participates
in the
present interests of external life,
in order
to satisfy his personal ends, and through
them to attain to honour, wealth, respect,
and distinction; the ancient philosophers,
however, because they remained in the
Idea,
did not concern themselves with things
that
were not the objects of their thought.
Hence
with the Greeks and Romans the philosophers
lived in an independent fashion peculiar
to themselves, and in an external mode
of
life which appeared suitable to and
worthy
of the science they professed; they
conducted
themselves independently as private
persons,
unfettered by outside trammels, and
they
may be compared to the monks who renounced
all temporal goods.
In the Middle Ages it was chiefly the
clergy,
doctors of theology, who occupied themselves
with philosophy. In the transition
period
the philosophers showed themselves
to be
in an inward warfare with themselves
and
in an external warfare with their surroundings,
and their lives were spent in a wild,
unsettled
fashion.
In modern times things are very different;
now we no longer see philosophic individuals
who constitute a class by themselves.
With
the present day all difference has
disappeared;
philosophers are not monks, for we
find them
generally in connection with the world,
participating
with others in some common work or
calling.
They live, not independently, but in
the
relation of citizens, or they occupy
public
offices and take part in the life of
the
state. Certainly they may be private
persons,
but if so, their position as such does
not
in any way isolate them from their
other
relationship. They are involved in
present
conditions, in the world and its work
and
progress. Thus their philosophy is
only by
the way, a sort of luxury and superfluity.
This difference is really to be found
in
the manner in which outward conditions
have
taken shape after the building up of
the
inward world of religion. In modern
times,
namely, on account of the reconciliation
of the worldly principle with itself,
the
external world is at rest, is brought
into
order - worldly relationships, conditions,
modes of life, have become constituted
and
organized in a manner which is conformable
to nature and rational. We see a universal,
comprehensible connection, and with
that
individuality likewise attains another
character
and nature, for it is no longer the
plastic
individuality of the ancients. This
connection
is of such power that every individuality
is under its dominion, and yet at the
same
time can construct for itself an inward
world.
The external has thus been reconciled
with
itself in such a way that both inward
and
outward may be self-sufficing and remain
independent of one another; and the
individual
is in the condition of being able to
leave
his external side to external order,
while
in the case of those plastic forms
the external
could only be determined entirely from
within.
Now, on the contrary, with the higher
degree
of strength attained by the inward
side of
the individual, he may hand the external
over to chance; just as he leaves clothing
to the contingencies of fashion, not
considering
it worth while to exert his understanding
upon it. The external he leaves to
be determined
by the order which is present in the
particular
sphere in which his lot is cast. The
circumstances
of life are, in the true sense, private
affairs,
determined by outward conditions, and
do
not contain anything worthy of our
notice.
Life becomes scholarly, uniform, commonplace,
it connects itself with outwardly given
relationships
and cannot represent or set itself
forth
as a form pertaining only to itself.
Man
must not take up the character of showing
himself an independent form, and giving
himself
a position in the world created by
himself.
Because the objective power of external
relationships
is infinitely great, and for that reason
the way in which I perforce am placed
in
them has become a matter of indifference
to me, personality and the individual
life
generally are equally indifferent.
A philosopher,
it is said, should live as a philosopher,
i. e., should be independent of the
external
relationships of the world, and should
give
up occupying himself with and troubling
himself
concerning them. But thus circumscribed
in
respect of all necessities, more especially
of culture, no one can suffice for
himself;
he must seek to act in connection with
others.
The modern world is this essential
power
of connection, and it implies the fact
that
it is clearly necessary for the individual
to enter into these relations of external
existence; only a common mode of existence
is possible in any calling or condition,
and to this Spinoza forms the solitary
exception.
Thus in earlier times bravery was individual;
while modern bravery consists in each
not
acting after his own fashion, but relying
on his connection with others - and
this
constitutes his whole merit. The calling
of philosopher is not, like that of
the monks,
an organized condition. Members of
academies
of learning are no doubt organized
in part,
but even a special calling like theirs
sinks
into the ordinary commonplace of state
or
class relationships, because admission
thereinto
is outwardly determined. The real matter
is to remain faithful to one's aims.
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