Introduction B. Relation of Philosophy to
Other Departments of Knowledge.
3. Commencement of Philosophy and of
its
History.
Now that we have thus defined the Notion
of Philosophy to be the Thought which,
as
the universal content, is complete
Being,
it will be shown in the history of
Philosophy
how the determinations in this content
make
their appearance little by little.
At first
we only ask where Philosophy and its
History
begin.
a. Freedom of Thought as a first condition.
The general answer is in accordance
with
what has been said. Philosophy begins
where
the universal is comprehended as the
all-embracing
existence, or where the existent is
laid
hold of in a universal form, and where
thinking
about thought first commences. Where,
then,
has this occurred? Where did it begin?
That
is a question of history. Thought must
be
for itself, must come into existence
in its
freedom, liberate itself from nature
and
come out of its immersion in mere sense-perception;
it must as free, enter within itself
and
thus arrive at the consciousness of
freedom.
Philosophy is properly to be commenced
where
the Absolute is no more in the form
of ordinary
conception, and free thought not merely
thinks
the Absolute but grasps its Idea. That
is
to say where Thought grasps as Thought,
the
Being (which may be Thought itself),
which
it recognizes as the essence of things,
the
absolute totality and the immanent
essence
of everything, and does so as an external
being. The simple existence which is
not
sensuous and which the Jews thought
of as
God (for all Religion is thinking),
is thus
not a subject to be treated of by Philosophy,
but just such a proposition as that
"The
existence or principle of things is
water,
fire or thought."
Thought, this universal determination
which
sets forth itself, is an abstract determinateness;
it is the beginning of Philosophy,
but this
beginning is at the same time in history,
the concrete form taken by a people,
the
principle of which constitutes what
we have
stated above. If we say that the consciousness
of freedom is connected with the appearance
of Philosophy, this principle must
be a fundamental
one with those with whom Philosophy
begins;
a people having this consciousness
of freedom
founds its existence on that principle
seeing
that the laws and the whole circumstances
of the people are based only on the
Notion
that Mind forms of itself, and in the
categories
which it has. Connected with this on
the
practical side, is the fact that actual
freedom
develops political freedom, and this
only
begins where the individual knows himself
as an independent individual to be
universal
and real, where his significance is
infinite,
or where the subject has attained the
consciousness
of personality and thus desires to
be esteemed
for himself alone. Free, philosophic
thought
has this direct connection with practical
freedom, that as the former supplies
thought
about the absolute, universal and real
object,
the latter, because it thinks itself,
gives
itself the character of universality.
Thinking
means the bringing of something into
the
form of universality; hence Thought
first
treats of the universal, or determines
what
is objective and individual in the
natural
things which are present in sensuous
consciousness,
as the universal, as an objective Thought.
Its second attribute is that in recognizing
and knowing this objective and infinite
universal,
I, at the same time, remain confronting
it
from the standpoint of objectivity.
On account of this general connection
between
political freedom and the freedom of
Thought,
Philosophy only appears in History
where
and in as far as free institutions
are formed.
Since Mind requires to separate itself
from
its natural will and engrossment in
matter
if it wishes to enter upon Philosophy,
it
cannot do so in the form with which
the world-spirit
commences and which takes precedence
of that
separation. This stage of the unity
of Mind
with Nature which as immediate is not
the
true and perfect state, is mainly found
in
the Oriental conception of existence,
therefore
Philosophy first begins in the Grecian
world.
b. Separation of the East and its Philosophy.
Some explanations have to be given
regarding
this first form. Since Mind in it,
as consciousness
and will, is but desire, self-consciousness
still stands upon its first stage in
which
the sphere of its idea and will is
finite.
As intelligence is thus finite too,
its ends
are not yet a universal for themselves;
but
if a people makes for what is moral,
if laws
and justice are possessed, the character
of universality underlies its will.
This
presupposes a new power in Mind with
which
it commences to be free, for the universal
will as the relation of thought to
thought
or as the universal, contains a thought
which
is at home with itself. If a people
desire
to be free, they will subordinate their
desires
to universal laws, while formerly that
which
was desired was only a particular.
Now finitude
of the will characterizes the orientals,
because with them the will has not
yet grasped
itself as universal, for thought is
not yet
free for itself. Hence there can but
be the
relation of lord and slave, and in
this despotic
sphere fear constitutes the ruling
category.
Because the will is not yet free from
what
is finite, it can therein be comprehended
and the finite can be shown forth as
negative.
This sensation of negation, that something
cannot last, is just fear as distinguished
from freedom which does not consist
in being
finite but in being for itself, and
this
cannot be laid hold of. Religion necessarily
has this character, since the fear
of the
Lord is the essential element beyond
which
we cannot get. "The fear of the
Lord
is the beginning of wisdom" is
indeed
a true saying; man must begin with
this in
order to know the finite ends in their
negative
character. But man must also have overcome
fear through the relinquishment of
finite
ends, and the satisfaction which that
Religion
affords is confined to what is finite,
seeing
that the chief means of reconciliation
are
natural forms which are impersonated
and
held in reverence.
The oriental consciousness raises itself,
indeed, above the natural content to
what
is infinite; but it only knows itself
as
accidental in reference to the power
which
makes the individual fear. This subordination
may take two forms and must indeed
from one
extreme pass to the other. The finite,
which
is for consciousness, may have the
form of
finitude as finite, or it may become
the
infinite, which is however an abstraction.
The man who lives in fear, and he who
rules
over men through fear, both stand upon
the
same platform; the difference between
them
is only in the greater power of will
which
can go forth to sacrifice all that
is finite
for some particular end. The despot
brings
about what his caprice directs, including
certainly what is good, not as law,
but as
arbitrary will: the passive will, like
that
of slavery, is converted into the active
energy of will, which will, however,
is arbitrary
still. In Religion we even find self-immersion
in the deepest sensuality represented
as
the service of God, and then there
follows
in the East a flight to the emptiest
abstraction
as to what is infinite, as also the
exaltation
attained through the renunciation of
everything,
and this is specially so amongst the
Indians,
who torture themselves and enter into
the
most profound abstraction. The Indians
look
straight before them for ten years
at a time,
are fed by those around, and are destitute
of other spiritual content than that
of knowing
what is abstract, which content therefore
is entirely finite. This, then, is
not the
soil of freedom.
In the East, Mind indeed begins to
dawn,
but it is still true of it that the
subject
is not presented as a person, but appears
in the objectively substantial, which
is
represented as partly supersensuous
and partly,
and even more, material, as negative
and
perishing. The highest point attainable
by
the individual, the everlasting bliss,
is
made an immersion into substance, a
vanishing
away of consciousness, and thus of
all distinction
between substance and individuality
- hence
an annihilation. A spiritually dead
relation
thus comes into existence, since the
highest
point there to be reached is insensibility.
So far, however, man has not attained
that
bliss, but finds himself to be a single
existent
individual, distinguished from the
universal
substance. He is thus outside the unity,
has no significance, and as being what
is
accidental and without rights, is finite
only; he finds himself limited through
Nature
- in caste for instance. The will is
not
here the substantial will; it is the
arbitrary
will given up to what is outwardly
and inwardly
contingent, for substance alone is
the affirmative.
With it greatness, nobility, or exaltitude
of character, are certainly not excluded,
but they are only present as the naturally
determined or the arbitrary will, and
not
in the objective forms of morality
and law
to which all owe respect, which hold
good
for all, and in which for that same
reason
all are recognized. The oriental subject
thus has the advantage of independence,
since
there is nothing fixed; however undetermined
is the substance of the Easterns, as
undetermined,
free and independent may their character
be. What for us is justice and morality
is
also in their state, but in a substantial,
natural, patriarchal way, and not in
subjective
freedom. Conscience does not exist
nor does
morality. Everything is simply in a
state
of nature, which allows the noblest
to exist
as it does the worst.
The conclusion to be derived from this
is
that no philosophic knowledge can be
found
here. To Philosophy belongs the knowledge
of Substance, the absolute Universal,
that
whether I think it and develop it or
not,
confronts me still as for itself objective;
and whether this is to me substantial
or
not, still just in that I think it,
it is
mine, that in which I possess my distinctive
character or am affirmative: thus my
thoughts
are not mere subjective determinations
or
opinions, but, as being my thoughts,
are
also thoughts of what is objective,
or they
are substantial thoughts. The Eastern
form
must therefore be excluded from the
History
of Philosophy, but still, upon the
whole,
I will take some notice of it. I have
touched
on this elsewhere, for some time ago
we for
the first time reached a position to
judge
of it. Earlier a great parade was made
about
the Indian wisdom without any real
knowledge
of what it was; now this is for the
first
time known, and naturally it is found
to
be in conformity with the rest.
c. Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece.
Philosophy proper commences in the
West.
It is in the West that this freedom
of self-consciousness
first comes forth; the natural consciousness,
and likewise Mind disappear into themselves.
In the brightness of the East the individual
disappears; the light first becomes
in the
West the flash of thought which strikes
within
itself, and from thence creates its
world
out of itself. The blessedness of the
West
is thus so determined that in it the
subject
as such endures and continues in the
substantial;
the individual mind grasps its Being
as universal,
but universality is just this relation
to
itself This being at home with self,
this
personality and infinitude of the "I"
constitutes the Being of Mind; it is
thus
and can be none else. For a people
to know
themselves as free, and to be only
as universal,
is for them to be; it is the principle
of
their whole life as regards morality
and
all else. To take an example, we only
know
our real Being in so far as personal
freedom
is its first condition, and hence we
never
can be slaves. Were the mere arbitrary
will
of the prince a law, and should he
wish slavery
to be introduced, we would have the
knowledge
that this could not be. To sleep, to
live,
to have a certain office, is not our
real
Being, and certainly to be no slave
is such,
for that has come to mean the being
in nature.
Thus in the West we are upon the soil
of
a veritable Philosophy.
Because in desire I am subject to another,
and my Being is in a particularity,
I am,
as I exist, unlike myself; for I am
"I,"
the universal complete, but hemmed
in by
passion. This last is self-will or
formal
freedom, which has desire as content.
Amongst
the Greeks we first find the freedom
which
is the end of true will, the equitable
and
right, in which I am free and universal,
and others, too, are free, are also
"I"
and like me; where a relationship between
free and free is thus established with
its
actual laws, determinations of the
universal
will, and justly constituted states.
Hence
it is here that Philosophy began.
In Greece we first see real freedom
flourish,
but still in a restricted form, and
with
a limitation, since slavery was still
existent,
and the states were by its means conditioned.
In the following abstractions we may
first
of all superficially describe the freedom
of the East, of Greece, and of the
Teutonic
world. In the East only one individual
is
free, the despot; in Greece the few
are free;
in the Teutonic world the saying is
true
that all are free, that is, man is
free as
man. But since the one in Eastern countries
cannot be free because that would necessitate
the others also being free to him,
impulse,
self-will, and formal freedom, can
there
alone be found. Since in Greece we
have to
deal with the particular, the Athenians,
and the Spartans, are free indeed,
but not
the Messenians or the Helots. The principle
of the "few" has yet to be
discovered,
and this implies some modifications
of the
Greek point of view which we must consider
in connection with the History of Philosophy.
To take these into consideration means
simply
to proceed to the dividing up of Philosophy.
|
Evans Experientialism 
