Olav Gundersen: C o n d i l l a c :
Be t w e e n L o c k e a
n d H e r d e r
Condillac and freedom: his place in the history
of ideas
The philosophy of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac
contains a theory of how the mind acquires
self-control, freedom, and autonomy. This
freedom is connected with the natural gestures
and bodily expressions that constitute the
basis for the development of a verbal language.
On the one hand this constitutes a break
with the theories of Descartes and Locke,
who consider the mind as a free and pre-established
entity existing prior to the reception of
the first sense impressions. On the other
hand his theories are an anticipation of
Herder's break with the theory of language
within «the way of ideas». Contrary to the
idea-paradigm's theory that language has
meaning by representing ideas existing in
the mind prior to language, language has
meaning by being bodily actions in social
space. Condillac is placed between Locke
and Herder by the fact that large portions
of Condillac's Essai simply are resumés of
the corresponding parts of Locke's Essay.
Apart from the dates of birth and death,
and the mentioning of his most well-known
works, on the whole the only thing The Blackwell
Companion to the Enlightenment says of Condillac
is that «He helped to popularize Locke's
philosophy in France» (Yolton 1995, p. 105).
This is in accord with the subtitle to the
English translation of his Essai, which appeared
in 1756, 10 years after the original French
publication, and which runs: «A Supplement
to Mr. Locke's Essay».
Johann Gottfried Herder's «Treatise of the
Origin of Language» (1770) is a polemical
attack on Condillac's Essai, incorporating
and transforming many of the latter's theories
and examples. It was written during Herder's
stay in Strassbourg in 1769, where he read
``Part II'' of Condillac's Essai (See Aarsleff
1982, p. 198).
In other words it is possible for an historian
of ideas to find a clear line of ``causal''
development. But according to Foucault, following
such a line of continuous development is
for the vulgar academic (Foucault 1970, p.
125ff.).
Foucault, Derrida, and Condillac: the double
origin of language When Foucault describes
the theory of language in what he calls the
episteme of representation, Condillac plays
a very central part. This episteme has two
characteristic features: Firstly there exists
a pre-established, cartesian mind which constructs
a verbal language taking for given the mental
language of ideas (Foucault 1970, p. 63ff.:
«Duplicated representation»). And secondly
external verbal language is a tool used in
analyzing the mental language of ideas. {1}
The internal language of mental ideas is
the foundation for the mind's construction
of the external, verbal language. But on
the other hand it is only through the construction
of the external, verbal language that we
reach clarity in the internal language of
ideas. The external, verbal language is a
presupposition for the internal mental one,
and vice versa. But because the mental language
without further ado is presupposed as already
formed, there really is no theory of the
sign within the episteme of representation.
This double origin is also what Derrida focuses
on in his «introduction» to Condillac in
The Archeology of the Frivolous. Derrida
classifies Condillac as a «metaphysician»
since in his theory the last is the first
--- or the other way round (Derrida 1980,
ch. 1: «The Second First --- Metaphysics»).
The archeology of the frivolous, then, is
the excavation of the relationship between
the two theses of Condillac's Essai:
Condillac criticizes language for frivolous
idleness in the case when each and every
linguistic expression is not well founded
through being connected in a non-equivocal
way to determinate impressions or ideas.
This is a theory that he adopts unchanged
from Descartes and Locke.
We must ascend to the origin of our ideas,
we must unfold their formation, and trace
them to the limits which nature has prescribed,
to the end that we may fix the extent and
boundaries of our knowledge, and new model
as it were the whole frame of the human understanding.
(Essai, Intro. p. 6){2} Simultaneously he
insists on the theory that language is a
necessary presupposition for the mind's having
ideas, for the connection of the ideas with
each other, and finally for the mind reaching
clarity and distinctness about them. This
he characterizes as his own epoch-making
discovery. What, according to the previous
thesis should come before language, as its
foundation, according to this second thesis
presupposes language as a condition.
[... ] I am convinced that the use of signs
is the principle which unfolds all our ideas
as they lye in the bud. (Essai, Intro., p.
11) [... ] we evidently see in what manner
good sense, wit, reason and their contraries
equally result from the same principle, which
is the connexion of ideas one with the other;
and that tracing things still higher, we
see that this connexion is produced by the
use of signs. This is the principle we lay
down. (I. ii. xi, § 107, p. 102) {3}
After the printing of my Essai, from which
the largest part of this work is drawn, I
have completed the demonstration of the necessity
of signs in my Grammar and in my Logic.
(De l'art de penser, here cited from Aarsleff
1982, p. 154-5)
In the first part, we have seen that words
are absolutely necessary for us to formulate
ideas of any kind. (Logic, II. ii, p. 388)
Herder's critique
Herder criticizes Condillac for the first
of the two features which, according to Foucault,
characterize the episteme of representation,
i. e. the presupposition of a mind already
in possession of an internal or mental language
when attempting to explain in general how
language is possible. According to Herder
it is easy to produce a theory of language
when the mental theory-language is already
presumed. For in that case one can, with
``will and consciousness'', define the various
linguistic elements of the external, verbal
language with the help of this already functioning
internal, mental language of ideas. {4} Herder
fits nicely in Foucault's theory of succeeding
epistemes in The Order of Things by embodying
the modern episteme, the one succeeding that
of representation. This episteme «of the
human existence» is characterized by language
not presupposing a pre-existing mind. On
the contrary the mind now becomes dependent
on the historical existence of language.
Thought (in the previous episteme: the idea)
no longer precedes language, on the contrary,
language precedes thought.
In attempting to answer the question on the
origin of language, Herder pushes both the
origin of language and the origin of thought
back into an unreachable, prehistoric and
common first point. Language develops from
action, language is action, and language-action
and thought are two aspects of the same thing.
The ground for this is found in the concept
of «domain of action», which is designed
to avoid the connotations of strict causal
responses inherent in the traditional concept
of instinct. Man's lack of instincts is not
something completely other than the instincts
of animals, as Herder opts for a continuum
between instincts and reason. Animals are
restricted to the «domain of action» through
very specialized senses, but their movements
are not a result of causal determination.
Similarly man's reason is not a special faculty
of the soul not found in animals. It is simply
that in man the domain of action is unbounded:
man's senses are unspecialized and flexible.
Thus from the origin, this prehistoric first
and common point of departure for language
and thought, forces man to «choose» his actions.
This choice is in one and the same instant
identical with both reflective thought and
language. To actualize this flexible power
in different directions is to develop reason
and language (Herder 1770E, p. 107ff.) And
since the first words are actions, Herder,
though not mentioned by Foucault in The Order
of Things, is an instance or exemplar of
the theory of language within the modern
episteme of humanity, by proclaiming the
verb to be the most fundamental and originary
linguistic element (Herder 1770E, p. 132-133).
{5}
In the beginning was man and his lack of
instincts, according to Herder. Therefore
man must, on his own, develop his repertoire
of actions. Actions express their own meaning,
they are meaningful as actions without representing
anything extrinsic to action itself. Little
by little a verbal language is developed,
at first as a substitute for bodily action.
These sounds have meaning in the same way
as the actions they substitute, but after
a while they take on the role as names of
the substituted actions, in other words they
become verbs. Nouns, names of (``non-acting'')
substances, are the fruit of the very last
and most advanced development of language.
The development of language(/action) is development
of reason and thought. {6} Therefore language
can not possibly be arbitrary for Herder.
The fact that different peoples and different
cultures have different languages is no argument
against this, since the will of an individual
living inside a culture with a determinate
language has no control or power over its
language. {7} The power to will something,
for instance to will to give a certain sound
a certain meaning through a definition, presupposes
the existence of a language in which one
exercises one's will.
For Herder meaning in language is identical
to the meaning of action in social space.
There is no need to postulate mental ideas
as entities which actions are to be public
pictures of. Actions express meaning without
any pictorial relation. To acquire competence
as a participant in the linguistic-social
practice is to acquire the power of thought
and reflexion. Freedom is not a foundation
for language but is inherent in the competence
we reach as we become participants in language
as a social practice.
Locke's pre-established mind
Locke's Essay appeared in 1690, and he is
certainly as central, if not more, a representative
of the episteme of representation as Condillac.
The point on which Locke differs from Condillac,
and where Condillac finds it necessary to
supplement Locke, is on the role of language
in relation to mental ideas. According to
Locke the human mind is capable of a clear
and distinct knowledge from the outset, prior
to the use of a verbal language. The mind
is capable of analyzing and synthesizing
ideas, of abstracting and generalizing them,
prior to the translation of them into an
external language. It is in relation to the
pre-established mental language of ideas
that external, verbal language is arbitrary.
The mind and the will utilize the ideas prior
to language so as to give language meaning
arbitrarily by deciding which ideas are to
be related to which sounds:
Thus we may conceive how Words, which were
by Nature, so well adapted to that purpose,
came to be made use of by Men, as the Signs
of their Ideas; not by any natural connexion,
that there is between particular articulate
Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there
would be but one Language amongst all Men;
but by a voluntary Imposition, whereby such
a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such
an Idea. The use of Words then, is to be
sensible marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they
stand for, are their proper and immediate
signification. (Locke: Essay, III. ii. 1,
p. 405) Locke writes that he realized too
late that language was a very important tool
in the mind's work with its ideas. Therefore
the role of language in our relation to our
own ideas is not elaborated in all the places
where it would have been pertinent. Instead
the topic of language is treated mainly in
book III, which obviously and belatedly is
inserted between books II and IV at a later
stage in the writing of the Essay. {8} And
even if Locke in many places says that we
for the most part relate to language first,
and to ideas only secondarily, through the
medium of language, he still is unequivocally
clear that all the operations of the mind
and all our ideas are something which ideally
and in the last instance will manage without
language: Though examining and judging of
Ideas by themselves, their Names being quite
laid aside, be the best and surest way to
clear and distinct Knowledge: yet through
the prevailing custom of using Sounds for
Ideas, I think it is very seldom practiced.
(Locke: Essay, IV. vi. 1, p. 579) {9} David
Hume (1711-1776), a contemporary of Condillac,
is commonly known for his theory of association
of ideas. The entire reality, or rather,
our mental picture of it, is built up through
association of ideas, an unconscious mechanism
in the dark depths of human nature, over
which the conscious I has no control. For
Locke, the association of ideas is simply
the same thing as insanity (Locke: Essay,
II. xxxiii, p. 394, esp. §4, p. 395: «A degree
of Madness»). When association takes place,
the mind is passively led hither and thither
in the web of ideas, without any control
or government. This lack of control and government
is inherent in the language given and delivered
from generation to generation through tradition
and history. No-one has thoroughly inspected
this traditionally delivered and given language
from one end and to the other in order to
examine if it in reality contains truth and
knowledge.
Locke, as a representative of the scientific
revolution, considered it his duty to remove
the ferment and rubbish which, without examination,
was taken to contain truth and knowledge
(Locke: Essay, ``Epistle to the Reader'',
p. 10). Truth can only be obtained on the
condition that all human mediation through
language, literature, tradition, and uncontrolled
association are removed and the mind is guaranteed
a total control over its own contents, the
pure ideas. The critique of language is an
expression of the attempt to found all knowledge
on (mainly visual) impressions. The (visual)
impression therefore must be unmediated,
i. e., immediate (see for instance Locke's
Essay, IV. ii.
1, p. 531). Scientific language on the other
hand is a language constructed by the mind
to immediately reflect, represent and picture
the unmediated impressions.
Condillac and the double origin
All this we find in what Derrida (Derrida
1980) calls Condillac's concept of frivolous
propositions. These are propositions which
are not founded in experience in the form
of primitive impressions. One reason for
the existence of unscientific speculation
is that we do not examine our language. We
do not examine the signification of each
single linguistic expression, to see whether
they are founded on a connection with clear
and distinct ideas. This situation has its
background in the way we, as children, acquire
language: We simply start to talk without
caring for the connection between the linguistic
elements and their respective determinate
ideas. On the other hand according to Condillac,
the only person who is able to speak with
meaning is the one who exactly knows which
simple ideas are connected to each and every
word he is pronouncing:
What accustoms us to this inaccuracy, is
the manner in which we form ourselves to
language. We do not arrive at the age of
reason, till long after we have contracted
the habit of speech. (I. ii. i, §5, p. 302)
} Since language is learned pre-reflexively,
we get stuck in our habits and thereby confuse
an unexamined language with innate and immediately
true ideas. The surest way of attaining truth
accordingly is to remove language from the
process of knowledge: ``Consequently, to
detect the whole artifice, it will be sufficient
to lay aside this empty language'' (I. ii.
i, §7, p. 304). Condillac's opinion, like
Locke's, is that we have to re-establish
language from scratch, that is by founding
it on unmediated ideas, and without being
in any way concerned about the existing common
use:
[... ] so I apprehend that if we have any
design of rendering a language exact, we
ought to reform it without regard to use
or custom.
[... ]
Hence I have been induced to believe, that
to render a language clear and precise, it
would be requisite to take the materials
of our knowledge once more in hand, and to
frame new combinations of them, without any
regard to those already made. (II. ii. ii,
§11, p. 305-6)
Since we do not possess a clear consciousness
prior to acquiring language, the traditionally
delivered language has only what Condillac
called {\it ``usage''\/}, corresponding to
Locke's ``common acceptance''. It does not
have signification. It is in our infancy
that we imbibe those prejudices which retard
the progress of knowledge, and lead us into
so many errors. If God were to create an
adult person, with organs so perfect, that
the very first moment of his existence he
enjoyed the full use of reason, this man
would not meet with the same difficulties
as we in the investigation of truth. He would
invent no signs but in proportion as he experienced
new sensations, and made new reflexions.
(II. ii. iii, §29, p. 365). Like Locke, Condillac
has as his project to found language on the
mind's clear and distinct ideas. But where
Condillac ``supplements'' Locke is in the
area concerning the role of language plays
as tool or means for acquiring clear and
distinct ideas. This role, however, makes
the possibility of such a foundational and
representational relation highly questionable.
If this is so, it is also necessary to doubt
Condillac's role as the most representative
thinker within the episteme of representation.
Thus Condillac's supplementation in relation
to Locke makes it more natural to regard
him as on the way from Locke's theory of
representation in the direction of Herder's
theory of language as action. The origin
and source of language is no longer in our
impressions or other mental content, but
in our actions. Thus in thinking like this,
we are no longer thinking like Foucault but
more like one of his ``despised'' historians
of ideas, in other word on a more superficial,
less archaeological level. But with this
said, we still accept that there takes place
a change of paradigms in the theory of language
from the
17th. and 18th. centuries to the 19th. This
is in opposition to Aarsleff. As is clear
from his ``Introduction'', Aarsleff's main
point is that thought precedes language,
and that this is what makes language other
than a mere piece of physical nature.{10}
In his introduction, Condillac proclaims
that he has found the solution to every philosophical
problem, and that solution lies in regarding
the connection between ideas (la liaison
des idées). Everything can be traced back
to this principle (Essai, Intro., p. 6).
Everything is composed through the connection
of ideas. But --- this is the supplement
and what he proclaims to be the new in relation
to Locke --- the connection between ideas
takes place through the idea's connection
with the linguistic sign. External language
is a condition for the existence of both
mental ideas itself and the connection between
them.
The ideas are connected with the signs, and
it is only by this means, as I shall prove,
they are connected with each other. (Essai,
Intro., p. 7) Contrary to the concluding
chapter on scientific method, where Condillac
has as his project to found language on the
mental ideas by regarding the latter as the
origin of knowledge, the Introduction proclaims
that everything in fact has two origins.
When he is to explain how everything is,
he has to begin in two places. On the one
hand the origin is in impressions and ideas,
on the other hand it is in what he denominates
the language of action. The language of action
is the origin and the foundation of everything
that can be called art. As the source of
art it is simultaneously the source of the
mind's artificial and artful sovereignty
over itself, and hence its freedom. Language
is the instrument the mind uses to gain autonomy
over its own operations and content. On the
one hand, I have ascended to perception,
because it is the first operation we observe
in the mind; and I have shewn how, and in
what order it produces every other operation
of which we can acquire act and habit. On
the other hand, I have begun with the language
of action: here the reader will see how it
has produced every art proper to express
our thoughts; such as gesture, dancing, speech,
declamation, arbitrary marks for words or
things, pantomimes, music, poetry, eloquence,
writing, and the different characters of
language. (Essai, Intro., p. 6)
Language of action and freedom The ``other
source'' of knowledge, the source that is
not in impressions and ideas, but in the
language of action, is the source of the
mind's sovereignty over itself, of freedom.
The mind becomes free by exercising technical
skills on itself using language as an instrument
and means. Approximately contemporaneously
with Condillac's formulation of his theories,
David Hume points out that the camera obscura
model of knowledge which Locke instituted,
implies that the mind is a purely passive
mechanism. The impressions push this mechanism
to action, and from then on everything just
continues its movements along habit's dull
tracks, without any ``I'' to govern and control
the process. Hume's ``I'' is rather a result
of the causal impingements of impressions
than a precondition or government of them.
Condillac's project can be read as an attempt
of escaping the passivity and unfreedom which
is implied by the representational model
of knowledge as unmediated offprints of external
reality. The formulated contrariety between
ideas as the foundation for language and
language as foundation for ideas can be seen
as an expression of the point that Condillac
is on the move away from the way of ideas
and towards a theory of culture and forms
of life as regards the fundamental. Through
Condillac (as with Hume) the philosophy of
enlightenment is in the process of overcoming
itself.
In the Introduction to the Essai Locke is
criticized for presupposing from the outset
a pre-established, fully functioning mind.
Condillac, the contrary, point to the necessity
of describing how we come to acquire such
an autonomous mind. In childhood we had impressions
long before we acquired consciousness of
these impressions as ideas:
Thus the soul not having had immediately
and from the first instant the exercise of
all its operations, it was a point of the
utmost consequence, for the better unfolding
the origin of knowledge, to shew in what
manner she acquires this exercise, and what
progress she makes in it. (Essai, Intro.,
p. 10) What is new in Condillac compared
to Descartes and Locke is that the mind's
sovereignty over its ideas, ``l'exercise'',
is something acquired and formed through
the history of the individual. This exercise
is freedom from the passivity of the causal
impingement of the impressions. But like
his predecessors Condillac still operates
with the simple, atomic impression as (one)
point of departure. From this origin (one
of the two) Condillac describes how the autonomous
mind is formed parallell to this mental mechanism's
refinement of the mental content from crude
impressions to (general and abstract) ideas.
Nay, perhaps the design of explaining the
origin of the operations of the mind, by
deriving them from a simple perception, will
appear so new, that the reader will have
a difficulty to comprehend, in what manner
I shall execute it. (Essai, Intro., p. 11)
The linguistic sign and the operations of
the mind This history of the formation of
the mind is described in the Essai's chapter
I. i, which carries the title: ``Of the analysis
and [formation of] the operations of the
mind''. {11} The various operations of the
mind in ascending order from the more primitive
to the more advanced, are as follows:
--- perception
--- conscience
--- attention
--- réminiscence
It is through the principle of the liaison
des idées, which at this stage of the process
is pre-reflective or ``pre-exersive'', that
causes the next operation of the mind to
grow forth. Perception is pure receptivity
of impressions, conscience implies that we
become conscious of impressions, attention
that we select and focus on one part of the
conglomerate of impressions (it is rather
more adequate to express the latter more
passively: that we are led to be more aware
of one idea to the exclusion of others).
The variant of memory called réminiscence
conserves the order of impressions. It establishes
a chain of ideas based on their original
and natural order. This chain will subsequently
put us in the position where we can recall
a certain idea by activating one which is
earlier in the chain. Condillac stresses
this point: ``Hence I consider this connexion
as a first and fundamental experience, which
has a right to be considered as sufficient
to explain every other'' (I. ii. i, §15,
p. 37)
The next operations are:
--- imagination
--- contemplation
--- mémoire
Of these, imagination is the more important
one. On this stage of the exposition, it
is purely passive. Derrida of course makes
a big fuss around the fact that Condillac
at a later stage introduces a new operation
which on the contrary is active, exercise,
sovereign and autonomous, and which carries
the same name as passive imagination
(Derrida 1980, p. 71ff.). On the other hand
we more modestly state that there is a distinction
here between passive and active imagination,
and we are relating for the time being to
the passive one. This latter is parasitic
on reminiscence and consists, as we have
already seen, in the following: When one
link in the chain which is established by
the réminiscence is activated, imagination
is the causal activation through the chain
of a later link in it. Passive imagination
consists then in that the chains of ideas
which reminiscence has established becomes
activated by impressions (I. ii. ii, §17,
p. 38).
The passive imagination wakes up chains of
perceptions. In distinction to this mémoire
consists not in the waking up of one idea,
but in the waking up of the circumstances
of a previous idea or impression. Passive
imagination can then for instance be that
the name awakes the idea of the person carrying
this name. And mémoire is thus described:
Let us think, for example, on a flower whose
smell we are not accustomed to, we shall
recollect the name of it; we shall remember
the circumstances of our having seen it;
we shall represent to ourselves the fragrancy
of it, under the general idea of a perception
that affects the specific perception. Now
the operation which produces this effect
I call it memory. (I. ii. ii, §18, p. 38-9)
Between the imagination, the memory, and
reminiscence, there is a certain progress,
by which alone they are distinguished. The
first renews the perceptions themselves;
the second brings to our minds only their
signs or circumstances; the third makes us
discern them as perceptions which we have
had before. And here it may be proper to
observe, that the same operation which I
call memory, in regard to those perceptions
of which it revives only the signs or circumstances,
is imagination in respect to the signs or
circumstances revived; since these signs
and circumstances are perceptions. (I. ii.
ii, §25, p. 44.)
The distinction between passive imagination
and mémoire becomes important when we reach
the explanation of the different types of
signs. The circumstances surrounding something
which we perceive are by Condillac regarded
as an accidental signs of this perception.
The transition from natural to instituted
signs The transition from natural to instituted
signs is a transition from passive to active
imagination. In the section carrying the
title ``That the use of signs is the real
cause of the progress of the imaginations,
contemplation, and memory'' we find the famous
distinction between three types of signs:
I distinguish three sorts of signs: 1.~Accidental
signs, or the objects which particular circumstances
have connected with some of our ideas, so
as to render the one proper to revive the
other. 2.~Natural signs, or the cries which
nature has established to express the passions
of joy, of fear, or of grief, etc. 3.~Instituted
signs, or those which we have chosen ourselves,
and bear only an arbitrary relation to our
ideas. (I. ii. iv, §35, p. 51.) The operations
preceding the réminiscence do not presuppose
the use of instituted signs. They are automatic
operations which are executed as a result
of impressions causing one link in the chain
to be activated, and once one link is activated
the entire chain becomes activated. Though
without instituted signs one will have no
autonomous exercise of one's own mental operations:
When it is absent, he [the person used as
an example] has no possible means of reviving
it of himself, since he has no command over
those things with which the object is connected;
[... ] Hence his imagination is not as yet
in his power. (I. ii. iv, §37, p. 52) The
natural signs or natural cries are not yet
real signs, for they are produced causally
by the impressions. Derrida thinks that a
concept of the end or telos of the process
of formation of signs --- i. e., the instituted
signs and the freedom and autonomy of the
mind --- is a precondition for speaking of
natural and accidental signs as signs. These
are signs only through an analogy with the
only and proper signs, the instituted ones,
and by being stages on the way to the telos
of proper signs (Derrida 1980, p. 110). Natural
cries/signs are not capable of producing
any perception. They are causally-instinctive
effects of perceptions. But through habituation,
by enough repetition of the natural cries,
we will acquire familiarity with the connection
between these cries and the perceptions or
emotions that causes them and of which they
are the natural, quasi instinctive expressions.
Hence the cry, after a while, will be capable
of producing these perceptions or emotions
in ourselves. And when this happens, the
natural cry has become a sign for the perception
or emotion. But then the cry is no longer
natural, but instituted.
Under these circumstances mémoire, in its
fundamental and human meaning consists in
the following: The sign of an idea is something
which we are capable of producing ourselves
through our own will, arbitrarily and not
causally. By producing the sign we become
capable of exercising control and government
over our own ideas. In this way we also gain
self-control over our imagination. Imagination
has now become active.
When this is done, he begins of himself to
dispose of his imagination, and to give it
a new habit. For by means of the signs which
he is able to recall at pleasure, he revives,
or at least is often capable of reviving
the ideas which are connected with them.
Afterwards he obtains a greater command over
his imagination, in proportion as he invents
more signs, because he thereby procures more
means of employing it. (I. ii. iv, §46, p.
57-8)
Language of action and the freedom of the
agent's perspective Now one wants to ask
why the use of external, verbal or in other
ways physical signs should contribute more
to our freedom than the use of internal,
mental signs. Can it possibly be thought
that the transition from internal to external
will make us masters over our own mental
sign operations? Is not passivity and causality
something which are still more unavoidable
in the external world than they are in the
internal? Ought the soul's movements in thought
to be considered as less free than the body's
movement according to the causality of nature?
This way of posing the problem can be dismissed
as irrelevant. The transition from internal
to external implies that Condillac, obviously
more or less without conscious deliberation,
is taking the consequences of the {\it camera
obscura\/} model of the mind. We must therefore
seek human freedom, the sovereignty over
our own thought in an altogether different
dimension. Condillac is in transition from
the concept of the mind as a mental container
towards a concept of the body's movement
of body in space and time as the place for
the constitution of meaning. Like his contemporary
David Hume he starts working on the disassembling
of the passive representational mechanisms
found in the way of ideas. The theory of
the language of action is the beginning of
the introduction of the first persons agent's
perspective as a substitute for the objectifying
and hence passive perspective inherent in
the mind's perception of its own ideas as
internal objects.
As soon as the memory is formed, and the
habit of the imagination is in our power,
the signs recollected by the former, and
the ideas revived by the latter, begin to
free the soul from her dependence in regard
to the objects by which she was surrounded.
(I. ii. v §47, p. 58-9) But it is the instituted
signs which gives us this active power. And
is not the specific difference of an instituted
sign compared to a natural cry the fact that
the former is founded on reflection, the
clear and distinct thought, in other words
a pre-established consciousness? It seems
that we could never make use of instituted
signs, unless we were previously capable
of sufficient reflexion to chuse those signs,
and to affix ideas to them: what is the reason
then, some perhaps will object, that the
habit of reflexion is to be acquired only
by the use of these signs? My answer is,
that I shall solve this difficulty, when
I come to treat of the history of language.
In the mean time it will be sufficient here
to observe that it has not escaped me.
(I. ii. v, §49, p. 60)
But we do not really have to wait until the
chapter on the origin of language, since
Condillac has given us the answer on the
previous page. Here he says that once we
acquire a sufficient degree of passive mémoire,
then the minimum of reflection and self-control
needed for instituting the first arbitrary
sign will already be present. And when we
in this way have established the first point
of departure, we have embarked on a progress
ending with the most advanced languages and
the level of conscious reflection known to
us today. The first, tiny reflection is established
by a mémoire which through conditioning has
grown to a sufficient size and with sufficiently
strong chains of association. Thus it is
possible to institute the first sign, so
that the tiny reflection can grow to a size
sufficient for instituting more signs etc.
etc. Thus by the mutual assistance which
these operations shall lend each other, they
will reciprocally contribute to each other's
progress.(ibid.) And then we gain freedom
by being delivered from our passive dependencies
on the world surrounding us. So long as we
do not direct our attention ourselves, we
have seen that the soul is subject to whatever
environs it, and possesses nothing but by
an extrinsic virtue. {12} [... ]
The effect of this operation [reflection]
is so much the greater, as thereby we dispose
of our perceptions, in the same manner almost
as if we had a power of producing and annihilating
them. (I. ii. v, §51, p. 61)
Through the power of putting before us the
sort of objects called signs, we become capable,
by free will, to activate those perceptions
which are effects of those objects in the
causal chain of ideas. In this way imagination
has become an active, no longer passive,
power (I. ii. ix, §76-77, p. 79). Later Condillac
becomes known for his thesis that nature
teaches us to analyze and thereby to become
masters over our own ideas. This is found
in his Logique, which can be regarded as
a shorter version of his Essai, published
34 years later, in 1780. But this theory
is also present in the Essai, in the form
of the theory that the language of action
(which corresponds to what he in Part I of
the Essai calls the natural cries) is the
foundation of instituted signs.
In Part II of the Essai, Condillac describes
the thought experiment which is criticized
by Herder: two children are placed in the
desert to see how they develop language.
Herder's point is simply that the children
will die from starvation and thirst long
before they get the chance to say something
meaningful. According to Herder language
never starts from scratch in this way. We
humans are social beings, and live in society,
where we through a long period are cared
for by our parents. This is essential for
our being language-creatures.
But Condillac's point with the experiment
is to show that reminiscence and imagination
are purely passive, instinctive mechanisms
in the children. The language of action as
well as the natural cries are functioning
socially (presupposing that the children
do not die, of course). Like in Herder's
theory, needs, lacks, and dangerous situations
make the children act in certain ways and
utter various sounds. These actions and sounds
are something the children have in common.
They understand each other's expressions
without them being explicit agreed upon.
One of them did not say to himself, I must
make such particular motions to render him
sensible of my want, and to induce him to
relieve me: nor the other, I see by his motions
that he wants such a thing, and I will let
him have it: but they both acted in consequence
of the want which pressed them most. (II.
i. i, §2, p. 172-3.) This is a pre-reflective
community of meaning, whose participants
have in common the instinctive expressions
of natural signs in the language of action.
By time we accustom ourselves more and more
to this language of action. The result of
this is that it becomes more and more natural
to apprehend the actions as signs. This,
in its turn, will make it possible to see
the possibility of instituting new signs.
There will be an imperceptible transition
from passive expressions or instinctive responses
to a reflected and intended use of the same
expressions. The status of the language of
action will be transformed from natural to
instituted even though the actions themselves
remain unchanged. During this transition
the repertoire of actions is not enlarged.
[... ] and insensibly they learned to do
by reflexion what they had hitherto done
merely by instinct. [... ] For example, he
who saw a place in which he had been frightened,
mimicked those cries and movements which
were the signs of fear, in order to warn
the other not to expose himself to the same
danger. (II. i. i, §3, p. 173) Hence the
natural cries are a model for the establishment
of a real instituted language. So one will
``understand'' that it is possible to enlarge
the limited repertoire of actions existing
within the original language of action. And
one finds that the adequate bodily organ
to use for this is one that it is possible
to develop to a much larger degree of flexibility
than any of our limbs, namely the voice.
Since the language of action remains the
model for verbal language, the first verbal
languages will naturally be some sort of
verbal languages of action. In the same way
that the first vocal expressions are melodic,
the first verbal languages will have their
prosodies. This term usually designates the
rhyme and rhythm of verse, but for Condillac
it also includes melody in the term's literal
meaning. The prosody or melody of modern
languages has only a rudimentary existence
in the form of accentuation. Condillac puts
forth evidence for the probability of greek
and latin being melodic languages, so that
there was no difference between reciting
a poem and singing it. Condillac also reads
the Old Testament and argues that in the
cultures described there one had a mixture
of language of action and verbal language.
Of the evidence for this one can cite the
fact that prophets and priests are said to
dance, which is to use the language of action
in communicating their messages (II. ii-iv).
Language of action and meaning: communicative
or representative?
From the point of view of Condillac's theory
of the language of action, it seems plausible
to say that there is nothing original in
Herder's theory of language. But if we do
that, we fail to notice a very important
``detail'': Condillac really belongs within
the representational épisteme, while Herder
does not. Natural expressions, according
to Condillac, are always expressions of ideas.
Passive imagination, which is in a way the
internal kernel of the language of action
in its passive, reactive stage, is based
on the association of ideas. The purpose
of language is to gain control and self-government
over ideas. It is also a presupposition for
proper ideas. So even if the consequence
of the theory is that ideas in the last instance
become secondary in relation to action and
other external signs, according to Condillac
the function of language is to give us control
over and to express something internal, which
is presupposed there in advance. In Condillac's
theory of the different word classes the
noun is the most fundamental one, and not
the verb as it is in Herder. The first articulated
sounds get their signification by being expressed
in circumstances where other people present
necessarily must receive the same impressions.
In order to comprehend in what manner mankind
agreed among themselves, about the first
signification of words, it is sufficient
to observe, that they pronounced them under
such particular circumstances, that every
one was obliged to refer them to the same
perceptions. (II. i. ix, § 80, p. 237) The
first verbs according to Condillac are names
of the modes or diposition of the mind when
perceiving the object. These dispositions
are strictly private and can only be communicated
through a shared and common attention of
the object. One of the examples he gives
is a of a dangerous lion which it is impossible
not to fear. The verb ``to fear'' is given
a signification in that we point to the lion
in our active language of action, thus the
fearing also will express itself as a response
in the passive language of action (II. i.
ix, § 83, p. 239). Later on the other word
classes will develop, for instance the ``pure''
verb to be, which indicates the tense, person
and mode of any action, and thereby also
time, person and mode of the perception of
objects. Everything is built on the mind's
power to receive and produce copies of the
objects of the external world. Later, in
the Logique, it is possible to interpret
some passages in such a way that the idea,
the mental picture of the object, becomes
reduced to action; the idea can be ``bypassed''
like Wittgenstein's beetle in the box. The
same theory of natural cries as in the Essai
is found here, and it is undeniable that
ideas are mental images of the external objects.
But when treating the ontology of the idea
he describes it as a modification or movement
of the body.
The memory of a song played on a musical
instrument has its seat in the fingers, in
the ear, and in the brain. In the fingers,
which have developed the habit of a series
of movements; in the ear, which monitors
the fingers and, in case of need, directs
them only because it has developed for its
part, the habit of another series of movements;
and in the brain, which has developed the
habit of passing through the forms that correspond
exactly to the habits of the fingers and
the ears. (Logic, I. xi, p. 379) To have
ideas is, according to the Logique's chapter
I. ix, identical to the movements the body
runs through in certain situations. The cited
instance implies that the idea of a piece
of music is identical to the movements the
body runs through when it is playing the
piece on the piano, whistling or singing
it. When the fingers (and ears and brain)
of the piano-player are no longer exercising
these movements, the idea of the musical
piece is simply not there. The final consequence
of this --- far beyond any expressed intention
of Condillac's --- is that meaning is no
longer the representational copy of an object
but the function of action. This consequence
is drawn by Herder: action is its own meaning
in so far as it is performed. Meaning for
Herder is what Locke called common use or
common acceptation, and what Condillac simply
called usage. Signification is inessential
to Herder. When Condillac pushes the origin
of language back in a point where it is hardly
possible to distinguish thought and speech,
and where one instead finds the original,
passive language of action, and when one
further makes the speech act an instrument
for human thought, he has already formulated
the insights which later make it possible
for the hermeneuticians to say that it is
not man who speaks through language but language
which speaks through man. For the individual,
then, the origin of language lies in the
``language-games'' which are already there
from the time it is born, and which it must
accomodate to and acquire competence in in
order to be able to express itself so that
it can be able to formulate its own thoughts.
Locke and Descartes experience the separation
of human though and subjectivity from nature
and concludes from this that subjective thought
is absolutely autonomous --- also for the
individual. Condillac can be seen, like Rousseau
I believe, as an transitory figure on the
way to the theory where what has acquired
autonomy is not the individual, but language
and culture, something living a life of its
own, ``like an organism'' {13} not controlled
by the individual in the way that Locke envisaged.
Not the individual but human society has
acquired autonomy, and sociality from now
on appears to man as ``second nature''.
Condillac's transitory status can be appreciated
in the chapter on the Génie des langues.
Here he opens by stating that each individual
has its own language ``according to his passions''
(II. i. v, § 143, p. 284). The great writers
and poets form and develop the language of
the nation (ibid., § 145, p. 286). But later
on, when he treats the individual genius,
using Newton as an example, the theory is
that the realization of Newton's geniality
requires that language, in this case the
mathematical language of calculus, is developed
to an appropriate level. Only then can language
be the tool Newton needed to perform his
genial thoughts by formulating them in this
language (ibid., § 147, p.
287f., see also Derrida 1980. pp. 65-6).
What makes language contain illusions for
Condillac is the fact that we in early childhood
learn language as a praxis without connecting
each word to a clear and distinct idea. In
Locke's terms we acquire language as common
use and common acceptance, but without signification.
This has the negative effect according to
Condillac that we mistake this form of linguistic
meaning with innate ideas. But it is exactly
the same fact about language-acquisition
which makes Herder point at the use of language,
since this fact makes it in principle non-transparent,
as the in itself unfounded fulcrum of our
thought. When historical-critical philology
later is established as a science, it is
through the establishment of the objectivity
of its subject matter by the means of considering
language as an objective entity, an organism,
living its own life and developing through
history without being subject to the control
of a cartesian/lockean ego. {14}
Notes
1. ``From the theory of the proposition to
that of derivation, all Classical reflection
upon language --- all that was called `general
grammar' --- is merely a detailed commentary
upon the simple phrase: `language analyses'.''
(Foucault 1970, p. 115) [back to text]
2. Aarsleff is citing this place from another
french edition than the one I have had access
to, and in that edition ``voilà le principe''
is obviously changed, since Aarsleff's translation
is: ``So far as I know, I am the first person
to have recognized it.'' (Aarsleff, p. 150).
[back to text]
3. ``The Abbé Condillac belongs in this group.
Either he supposes the whole thing called
language to have been invented prior to the
first page of his book, or I find things
on every page that could not possibly have
occurred in the orderly continuity of a language
in formation.'' (Herder 1770E, p. 99). [back
to text]
4. This in opposition to Locke. Locke's {\it
Essay\/}, Book III «Of Words», contains many
chapters on names, only one page «Of Particles»,
and none on verbs. [back to text]
5. ``Thus language appears as a natural organ
of reason, a sense of the human soul ...
'' (Herder 1770E, p. 128) [back to text]
6. ``The entire language of their children
was a dialect of their thoughts ... ''(Herder
1970G, p. 71). ``Children learn language
and children have learned language from the
beginning, they could simply not reflect,
simply not control anything, they accepted
every inventor's truths and prejudices on
the authority of their masters, and sweared
them eternal loyalty.'' (Herder 1770G, ``pp.
71-2.'' (Translation my own. There seems
to be a contradiction bewteen content and
grammatical form in the actual passage. The
German runs: ``Kinder lernen die Sprache
und Kinder haben sie von Anfange an gelernt,
die also nichts weniger als überdenken, als
prüfen konnten, die alle Wahrheiten und Vorurteile
der Erfinder auf das Ansehen ihrer Lehrmeister
annahmen und ihnen ewige Treue Schwuren.''
The ``nichts weniger als überdenken'' would
ordinarily mean that ``they could not do
anything but reflect''. But the context,
for instance the first sentence cited in
this note, makes the rendering ``they could
not even do as much as reflect'' the only
plausible one. This have been confirmed to
me by native speaking Germans. Herder 1970E
contains only the first of the two parts
of Herder's essay, and so could give no help
in this case.) [back to text]
7. Locke: Essay II. xxxiii. 19, p. 401: ``This
was that, which, in the first general view
I had of this Subject, was all that I though
I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach,
I find, that there is so close a connexion
between Ideas and Words; and our abstract
Ideas and general Words, have so constant
a relation one to another, that it is impossible
to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge,
which all consists of Propositions, without
considering, first, the Nature, Use, and
Signification of language; which therefore
must be the business of the next Book.''
[back to text]
8. For additional evidence and places in
Locke's Essay with relevance for this point:
See Parret (1975). [back to text]
9. References to Condillac's Essai are normally
indicated with parentheses within the text,
containing the number of part, section, chapter
in roman numerals separated by point, then
comes the paragraph number indicated by the
paragraph sign, and then the page numbers
of the english translation (Condillac 1756)
is added, after a comma. So
(I. iii. iv, § 1, p. 104) means Condillac's
Essai, Part I, section iii, chapter iv, paragraph
1, which is on page 104 in the english translation.
References to the Introduction to the Essai
are made with page number of the english
translation. I have used the french edition
indicated under references in my work, and
only inserted the appropriate parts from
the english translation as the last step
in finishing the paper. I use the french
spelling Essai to indicate Condillac's work,
and the english Essay to indicate that of
Locke's.[back to text]
10. For instance: ``With the essay on Breal
and Saussure I arrived at the completion
of my argument for the coherent tradition
that reaches from the seventeenth century
to the great figure who early in the present
century agin made the study of language relevant
to all other forms of intellectual life''
(Aarsleff 1982, p. 17). For a more thorough
criticism of Aarsleff, see Hacking 1988.
[back to text]
11. The contents of the square brackets are
taken from the French, lacking in the English
1756 translation. [back to text]
12. I hold ``possesses nothing but by an
extrinsic virtue'' to mean that the soul
is not capable of operating save by being
influenced by physical causes from the external
world. [back to text]
13. See Foucault 1970, ch. 8. iv, esp. pp.
180-1, and Aarsleff's citation from Schleicher
(Aarsleff 1982, p. 16). In his writings from
the 1820s, Wilhelm von Humboldt makes extensive
use of the expression ``organic'' and ``organism''
in relation to language, for instance in
Humboldt 1963, pp. 6-7, p. 27. [back to text]
14. This Foucault describes by saying that
the transcendentals becomes situated with
the object, which in this case is language
(Foucault 1970, p. 244) [back to text]
References Aarsleff, Hans. 1982. From Locke
to Saussure. Essays on the study of language
and intellectual history. Minneapolis: Univ.
of Minnesota Press. Condillac, E. B. de.
1982. ``Logic'', i Condillac: Philosophical
Writings, trans. by Franklin Philip, Erlbaum,
Hillsdale N. J. Condillac, E. B. de. Oeuvres
Complètes, édition de Gaston de Paris, 1821-1822,
Slatkine Reprints, Genève, 1970 (Essai is
in vol. I, and Logique in vol. XV). Condillac,
E. B. de. 1756. An Essay on the Origin of
Human Knowledge, Being a Supplement to Mr.
Lockes's Essay on the Human Understanding,
Translated from the French of the Abbé de
Condillac, Member of the Royal Academy of
Berlin, by Mr. Nugent, J. Nourse, London,
MDCCLVI. Derrida, Jacques. 1980. The Archeology
of the Frivolous. Reading Condillac. London:
Univ. of Nebraska Press. Foucault, Michel.
1970. The Order of Things, London: Tavistock.
[Reprinted by Routledge 1991] Hacking, Ian.
1988. ``Locke, Leibniz, Language and Hans
Aarsleff. pp. 135--153 in Synthese, vol.
75, no. 2, May 1988. Herder, Johann Gottfried.
1770E. ``Essay on the origin of language'',
in On the Origin of Language: Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: `Essay on the Origin of Languages'
and J. G. Herder:`Essay on the Origin of
Language, Moran and Gode (trans. and ed.).
London: University of Chicago Press. 1986.
Herder, Johann Gottfried.
1770G. ``Abhandlung über den Ursprung der
Sprache'', in Johann Gottfried Herder's Sprachphilosophie.
Ausgewahlte Schriften. Erich Heintel
(ed.). Hamburg: Felix Meiner. 1975. Humboldt,
Wilhelm von. 1963. Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellchaft.
Locke, John. 1690. An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford U.
P., 1975. Parret, Herman. 1975. Idéologie
et sémiologie chez Locke et Condillac. La
Question de l'Autonomie du language devant
la pensée, Peter de Ridder Press, Lisse,
Holland. Schmidt, Sigfried J. 1968. Sprache
und Denken als sprachphilosophisches Problem
von Locke bis Wittgenstein, Haag: Nijhoff.
Taylor, Charles. 1985. Human Agency and Language:
Philosophical Papers vol. I\/, Cambr. UP.
Yolton, John W. (ed). 1995. The Blackwell
Companion to the Enlightenment, Oxford: Blackwell.
|
Evans Experientialism 
