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THE ENCOMIUM OF HELEN
GORGIAS OF LEONTINI
(483 - 376 BC.)
The Encomium of Helen
Gorgias of Leontini
(483-376 BC)
Gorgias of Leontini (5th cent. BCE) was among
the earliest of Greek orators and was widely
influential for theorizing oratory and for
perfecting certain stylistic traits in his
efforts to adapt the artistry of poetry to
prose. His speeches, including the famous
Encomium of Helen, feature figures that share the common traits
of employing both repetition and contrast
in artful ways. Consequently, the following
figures are sometimes known as "Gorgianic"
figures:
"That the things thought which are non-existent
is plain ; for if the things thought are
existent, all things thought exist, and in
this way too in which one has thought them.
But this is contrary to sense. For if someone
thinks of a man flying over the sea, it does
not follow at once that a man is flying over
the sea. So that the things thought are not
existent [=the thought is not a thought of
being.]"
From The Origins of Socrates.translated from the Greek and published on
the Web by Brian R. Donovan, 1999
Gorgias’ writings are both rhetorical and
performative. He goes to great lengths to
exhibit his ability of making an absurd,
argumentative position appear stronger. Consequently,
each of his works defend positions that are
unpopular, paradoxical and even absurd. The
performative nature of Gorgias’ writings
is exemplified by the way that he playfully
approaches each argument with stylistic devices
such as parody, artificial figuration and
theatricality (Consigny 149). Gorgias’ style
of argumentation can be described as poetics-minus-the-meter
(poięsis-minus-meter). Gorgias argues that persuasive words have
power (dunamis) that is equivalent to that of the gods
and as strong as physical force. In theEncomium, Gorgias likens the effect of speech on
the soul to the effect of drugs on the body:
“Just as different drugs draw forth different
humors from the body – some putting a stop
to disease, others to life – so too with
words: some cause pain, others joy, some
strike fear, some stir the audience to boldness,
some benumb and bewitch the soul with evil
persuasion” (Gorgias 32). wikipedia.
The Encomium of Helen
Gorgias of Leontini
(1) The order proper to a city is being well-manned;
to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to
a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and
the opposites of these are disorder. And
the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse
and work and city-state and deed one must
honor with praise, while one must assign
blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error
and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and
to praise the blameworthy. (2) It being required
of the same man both to speak straight and
to refute [crooked speech, one should refute]
those blaming Helen, a woman concerning whom
the testimony of those who are called poets
has become univocal and unanimous--likewise
the repute of her name, which has become
a byword for calamities. And by bestowing
some rationality on the discourse, I myself
wish to absolve this ill-reputed woman from
responsibility, and to show that those who
blame her are lying--and, having shown the
truth, to put an end to ignorance. (3) It
is not unclear, not even to a few, that the
woman who is the subject of this discourse
was the foremost of the foremost men and
women, by nature and by birth. For it is
clear that her mother was Leda and her father
was in fact the god, but said to be mortal,
Tyndareus and Zeus--of whom the one, by being,
seemed, while the other, by speech, was disproved--and
the one was the mightiest of men while the
other was tyrant over all.
(4) Born of such parentage, she had godlike
beauty, which having received she not inconspicuously
retained. She produced the greatest erotic
desires in most men. For one body many bodies
of men came together, men greatly purposing
great things, of whom some possessed great
wealth, some the glory of ancient and noble
lineage, some the vigor of personal strength,
and others the power of acquired cleverness.
And they were all there together out of contentious
love and unconquerable ambition. (5) Who
it was, then, who fulfilled the love by gaining
Helen, and the means and manner of it, I
shall not say; for to tell knowing people
things they know supplies corroboration but
does not convey enjoyment. Having now finished
the first section, I shall advance to the
beginning of the next section, and I shall
set out the causes through which Helen's
journey to Troy was likely to come about.
II
(6) Either by the wishes of Fortune and plans
of the gods and decrees of Necessity she
did what she did, or abducted by force, or
persuaded by speeches, or conquered by Love.
Now in the first case, the responsible party
deserves the responsibility. For the will
of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought.
For it is not natural for the superior to
be hindered by the inferior, but for the
inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for
the superior to lead and the inferior to
follow. And a god is superior to a human
being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly,
if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune
and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.
(7) But if she was abducted by force, unlawfully
constrained and unjustly victimized, it is
clear on the one hand that the abductor,
as victimizer, committed injustice--and on
the other hand that the abductee, as victim,
met with mishap. Accordingly the barbarian
assailant deserves to meet with barbarous
assault, by speech and custom and deed--deserves
to be blamed in speech, dishonored by custom,
and penalized indeed. She who was forced
and bereft of fatherland and orphaned of
friends--how is she not to be pitied rather
than reviled? For he did terrible things;
she was the victim; it is accordingly fair
to pity her and hate him.
(8) And if persuasive discourse deceived
her soul, it is not on that account difficult
to defend her and absolve her of responsibility,
thus: discourse is a great potentate, which
by the smallest and most secret body accomplishes
the most divine works; for it can stop fear
and assuage pain and produce joy and make
mercy abound. And I shall show that these
things are so: (9) explanation to the audience,
by means of opinion, is required. Discourse
having meter I suppose and name (in the general
sense) to be poetry. Fearful shuddering and
tearful pity and sorrowful longing come upon
those who hear it, and the soul experiences
a peculiar feeling, on account of the words,
at the good and bad fortunes of other people's
affairs and bodies. But come, let me proceed
from one section to another.
III
(10) By means of words, inspired incantations
serve as bringers-on of pleasure and takers-off
of pain. For the incantation's power, communicating
with the soul's opinion, enchants and persuades
and changes it, by trickery. Two distinct
methods of trickery and magic are to be found:
errors of soul, and deceptions of opinion.
(11) Those who have persuaded and do persuade
anyone about anything are shapers of lying
discourse. For if all people possessed memory
concerning all things past, and awareness
of all things present, and foreknowledge
of all things to come, discourse would not
be similarly similar; hence it is not now
easy to remember the past or consider the
present or foretell the future; so that most
people on most subjects furnish themselves
with opinion as advisor to the soul. But
opinion, being slippery and unsteady, surrounds
those who rely on it with slippery and unsteady
successes. (12) Accordingly what cause hinders
Helen . . . praise-hymn came . . . similarly
would . . . not being young . . . just as
if . . . means of forcing . . . force was
abducted. For the mind of Persuasion was
able . . . and even if necessity . . . the
form will have . . . it has the same power.
For discourse was the persuader of the soul,
which it persuaded and compelled to believe
the things that were said and to agree to
the things that were done. He who persuaded
(as constrainer) did wrong; while she who
was persuaded (as one constrained by means
of the discourse) is wrongly blamed. (13)
Persuasion belonging to discourse shapes
the soul at will: witness, first, the discourses
of the astronomers, who by setting aside
one opinion and building up another in its
stead make incredible and obscure things
apparent to the eyes of opinion; second,
the necessary debates in which one discourse,
artfully written but not truthfully meant,
delights and persuades a numerous crowd;
and third, the competing arguments of the
philosophers, in which speed of thought is
shown off, as it renders changeable the credibility
of an opinion.
(14) The power of discourse stands in the
same relation to the soul's organization
as the pharmacopoeia does to the physiology
of bodies. For just as different drugs draw
off different humors from the body, and some
put an end to disease and others to life,
so too of discourses: some give pain, others
delight, others terrify, others rouse the
hearers to courage, and yet others by a certain
vile persuasion drug and trick the soul.
IV
(15) It has been said that if she was persuaded
by discourse, she did no wrong but rather
was unfortunate; I proceed to the fourth
cause in a fourth section. If it was love
that brought all these things to pass, she
escapes without difficulty from the blame
for the sin alleged to have taken place.
For the things we see do not have whatever
nature we will, but rather that which befalls
each. The soul receives an impression in
its own ways through the sight. (16) For
example, whenever hostile bodies put on their
bronze and iron war-gear of ward and defense
against enemies, if the visual sense beholds
this, it is troubled and it troubles the
soul, so that often panic-stricken men flee
future danger as if it were present. For
the strong habitual force of law is banished
because of the fear prompted by the sight,
which makes one heedless both of what is
judged by custom to be admirable, and of
the good that comes about by victory. (17)
Some who have seen dreadful things have lost
their presence of mind in the present time;
thus fear extinguishes and drives out understanding.
And many fall into useless troubles and terrible
diseases and incurable dementias; thus sight
engraves in the mind images of things seen.
And the frightening ones, many of them, remain;
and those that remain are just like things
said. (18) But truly whenever the painters
perfectly complete one body and figure from
many colors and bodies, they delight the
sight; and the making of statues and production
of figurines furnishes a pleasant sight to
the eyes. Thus it is in the nature of the
visual sense to long for some things and
for other things to give it pain. And in
many there is produced much love and desire
for many things and bodies.
(19) Accordingly, if Helen's eye, taking
pleasure in Alexander's body, transmitted
to her soul the eagerness and struggle of
Love, is it any wonder? If Love, being a
god, has the divine power of gods, how could
the weaker being have the power to reject
this and to ward it off? But if it is a human
disease and an error of the soul, it ought
not to be blamed as a sin but ought rather
to be accounted a misfortune. For she went,
as she started out, in the clutches of fortune,
not by plans of the mind; and by the constraints
of love, not the preparations of art.
V
(20) How then is it necessary to regard as
just the blame of Helen, who either passionately
in love or persuaded by discourse or abducted
by force or constrained by divine constraints
did the things she did, escaping responsibility
every way?
(21) By this discourse I have removed infamy
from a woman; I have continued in the mode
I established at the beginning. I tried to
put an end to the injustice of blame and
ignorance of opinion; I wanted to write the
discourse, Helen's encomium and my plaything.
I have made no attempt here to reproduce
or imitate the obtrusively artful and paronomastic
style of the original, as Kennedy did; rather,
my focus has been on reproducing literal
meaning. Where the literal meaning of this
translation differs from Kennedy's translation
and/or Freeman's, I would suggest that all
three versions represent valid optional interpretations.
Notable among my departures from the lead
of Kennedy and Freeman are my division of
the discourse into five Roman-numbered sections,
and my fragmented rendition (in italics)
of the first half of Arabic-numbered section
12. All but the last of the Roman-numbered
sections are explicitly identified as distinct
sections, in my view, by the original's use
of the term logos, which in these instances
I have translated "section"; and
the last seems obviously enough a distinct
peroration or coda. As to the first half
of Arabic-numbered section 12, which Diels/Kranz
aptly describes as "heillos verderbt,"
I have opted for the admittedly peculiar
procedure of "translating" the
unemended original mess, partly because Freeman
and Kennedy had already gone the other way,
translating from the emended Greek version
suggested in the Diels/Kranz apparatus. This
was thus the road less traveled.
