T
HE CITY OF THE WORLD
Dear Citizens and entities of the City
of
the World,
Before I look at my mail before these
thoughts
slip my senile mind -[For those new
to Stoicism,
Marcus Aurelius often uses this complex
-
in use and context - and profound concept
which does seem to be related to his
political
theory - in the same status - that
seems
a reflection of his social theory -
in the
same status - all of which he seriously
seems
to relate to his respectful views of
Roman
republican ideas which he seemed to
have
practiced as well as preached - which
one
must keep in mind are Roman ideas and
not
Christian and NOT ours - a lot of *seems*
and *lack of precise definitions* -
which
someone, not me, needs to research.]
- I
thought I would bring forth these *untimely*
thoughts like a drunken midwife far
too soon
into the survivalist world of Mother
Nature.
The thought occurred
to me that Stoicism had been around
in the
Hellenistic and Roman world a long
time before
even Seneca, much less Epictetus and
even
more so Marcus Aurelius. It is hard
to gage
the value of the Greek Stoics since
one only
has the essentially dismissive views
of Epictetus
- I am ignorant of Seneca who himself
seems
to be regarded as a loose or lax Stoic
and
to some extent a flunky to Nero - but
Stoicism,
in my very limited knowledge seems
to have
been seriously taken up by the Romans
- hence
the mass of Posidonius’ writings discovered
at Herculaneum - popular in the Army
which,
from the beginning of Roman military
seems
to have already had basic Stoic tenants
-
and both Cicero and the elder Pliny
[taken
from the light of day, literally, at
the
same time and place as Posidonius’
writings]
seemed deeply imbued with Stoic philosophy.
Now considering
the distinctly
and radically pre-Christian point of
view
of these kinds of Stoics, A] simply
being
Roman at all, or at least a free born
Roman,
it is seen primarily as a military
virtue
- endurance, no shock because you have
seen
it all before, you do your duty no
matter
what, you live with the minimal all
the time
or nothing at all, you examine everything
strictly as it actually is in experienced
reality and repeatedly test it, in
times
of military necessity you do not give
mercy
or justice because you do not expect
mercy
or justice, etcetera - and B] Skepticism
- which means the gods are a matter
of strict
logical analysis that either resulted
in
1] they are essentially useless if
they exist
at all, and 2] one pays attention to
the
forms of religion because it is a MANDATORY
family duty and the LAW. Public observance
of religious duties and respect whose
violation
required the death penalty was plainly
evident
in Socrates, Plato speaking for himself,
and Aristotle who almost got prosecuted
like
Socrates - all of whom supported the
death
penalty for violating religious custom
-
AND religious innovations like Christianity.
Marcus Aurelius close friend, Rusticus,
executed
Justin Martyr and his associates -
though
very reluctantly - for not renouncing
their
innovations in religion. It seems Judaism
was not considered, because of its
age, an
innovation, just a big pain in the
ass. So
*innovation* is the key word. The Stoic
point
of view seems to be, We already have
more
than enough gods - even Marcus seems
to imply
this
- we do not need any more.
Even though Christianity found Stoicism
[especially
Epictetus and Seneca] which is probably
why
the greater volume of their *writings*
survived
- inclusive of Simplicius who used
it essentially
as an imitative counter-Christianity
propaganda
to the point one could hardly tell
the difference
between Neoplatonism and Christianity]
highly
attractive, their evaluation was based
on
a future reward whereas real Stoicism
had
its ONLY reward in the happiness in
the IMMEDIATE
present of ONE’S OWN SELF. Later, influence
by its constant conflict with Persia,
the
Roman Army took on Mithraism, with
its very
black and white version of the battle
between
good and evil, which at least in the
Army
was highly competitive with Christianity.
One also reads
much
about corruption in the pagan Roman
Empire
as if Christianity brought reform to
it in
this regard. But this is completely
a lie
when one examines the facts. Corruption
was
the exception, however popular, under
the
pagan Romans and was constantly punished.
However, historical eruptions far too
often
caused opportunities for violations
of legal
precepts. However, the introduction
of Christianity
seems to have given wholesale corruption
a totally free hand most of the time
- once
massive instance the cause of the Arian
Visigoths
to get pissed and smash the Roman Empire
at Adrianople and later go on under
Alaric
to take Rome and then settle in the
south
of France and Spain. And while this
was technically
against the law, the law itself became
absolutely
ruthless even violating the rights
of Roman
citizens especially when anonymous
accusations
of a threat to the throne was involved
where
you could buy you way out of being
tortured.
And then on top of that, the Church
had its
own government and law. It had a tremendous
problem getting qualified administrators
- for obvious reasons - to the point
of A]
forcibly recruiting anyone who could
read
and write like Synesius of Cyrene -
possibly
while still a pagan - and Augustine
of Hippo
and women bishops in Southern Italy
[I found
that out researching Saint Ceacilia,
the
music saint, for her meaning in SILENCE
OF
THE LAMBS] which also led to the abuse
of
totally unscrupulous characters buying
bishoprics
with their attached *livings*, i. e.,
unearned
incomes. God help their parishioners!
So saying Christianity
is like Stoicism is like saying black
is
white. There may be similar practices
but
completely opposite motives, ref.,
suicide.
SUPPLEMENTAL QUOTE: *Observe what your nature requires in so
far as you are governed by mere physical
nature [Haines, the Christian: *by
nature
alone*, Staniforth:
*wholly under great Nature’s governance*,
Hicks & Hicks: *since you are governed
by inanimate nature* - oos hupo phuseoos
monon dioikoumenou - I think Farquharson,
consistently for him, uses *mere* as
a philosophical
term meaning *pure* as Kant would,
that is,
*mere reason* synonymous with *pure
reason*];
then do that and accept that, if only
your
nature as part of the animal world
will not
be rendered worse. Next you are to
observe
what your nature as part of the animal
world
requires and to take it all, if only
your
nature as a reasonable being will not
be
rendered worse. But what is reasonable
is
consequently also social. Make use
then of
these rules and do not be troubled
about
anything besides.* END QUOTE X, 2.
Taking in this
strict
context reason with nature, and then
social
with reason, and then the dictum *Makes
use
of these rules and do not be troubled
about
anything besides* which, to me, plainly
seems
to say NOTHING ELSE WHATSOEVER IS RELEVANT
outside the contextual meanings and
subdivisions
of these terms - which means, of course,
one must strictly study what Aurelius
means
by *nature*, *reason* and *social*.
The first
two of which he is extremely detailed
in
his writings, the last fuzzy as hell,
like
the title of my letter - but still
thought
provoking!
F
irst of all, I am essentially a newcomer
to Stoicism. But one finds basic elements
of Stoicism as important elements of
almost
all other major schools of philosophy.
My
major emphasis is Marcus Aurelius,
but I
know to understand Marcus Aurelius,
one must
comprehend Epictetus, and I have read
a fair
amount of him. If you look at the group
Stoic_Marcus_Aurelius@yahoo.com
you will see I employ both Aurelius
and Epictetus
in a purely secular context.
I plan to take
on Seneca
eventually and have read hunks of him
in
explication of Aurelius and Stoicism
in general.
Though several people do not consider
him
a representative Stoic - as Robin Hard
does
not consider Aurelius likewise, but
detailing
these things gets into a very large
can of
worms - his political status may be
as important
to me as Aurelius’ is, and eventually
I need
to get into him. I have dipped into
Long
& Sedley as well as Diogenes Laertius
and know there is a vast range of otherwise
relatively untouched subjects covered
by
earlier Stoics - Zeno wrote a REPUBLIC
supposedly
- as well as vast range of differing
views.
And on top of that they had their pagan
critics
like Plutarch whose points of objection
I
barely comprehend on things very different
than those covered in Epictetus and
Aurelius.
One of my purposes is, to be upfront,
is
to put Aurelius in his specific context
as
Roman and as politician. He is a historical
figure, so his acts can be compared
to his
teaching to a far greater and deeper
degree
than what we know of Epictetus.
C
oming primarily from Marcus Aurelius,
and
considering that he - as well as Epictetus
- had a thorough training in rhetoric,
literature,
and all the schools of philosophy,
one sees
a generic view of *God* espoused by
all the
Greek philosophers and playwrights,
especially
Aeschylus. This means that though there
might
be some slight personal aspects here
and
there - maybe - to their concept of
God,
it much more fits our post-Spinozan
concept
of pantheism. Even Spinoza seemed to
give
personal aspect to his concept of God
here
and there in his ETHICS, but I do not
know
of any scholar that thinks this is
more than
window dressing. And, of course, many
of
his contemporaries considered him an
atheist.
I would say that is technically wrong,
and
on such a point a technicality has
importance
as I have brought up elsewhere with
David
Hume’s insistence he is a *philosophical
theist* and not an atheist in the face
of
his French friends like Diderot who
thought
he was merely hiding his real views.
I think
the distinction is subtle but important
and
I think connects with Kant’s exposition
of
imagination as THE fundamental faculty
in
the first edition of the CRITIQUE OF
PURE
REASON.
I have read that
Epictetus
believed in a personal God but have
not myself
found anything in him to justify such
a conclusion.
Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand,
pounds
it into you again and again the Goddess
Nature
is paramount, and his view of Nature
- though
he calls it benevolent and providential,
is so from his definition which is
precisely
the same as Hegel’s of the Universe,
If it
is real, it is rational - is no different
than Darwin‘s or especially Thomas
Huxley‘s.
But, as I think Darwin also believed,
any
idea of the survival of the fittest
is absurd.
Darwin thought in terms of *niches*,
that
is, what has survival value at this
time
at this place by pure accident, and
so Huxley’s
and especially Herbert Spencer’s progressive
evolution is alien to his mind although
he
could think in moderate terms of evolutionary
advancement. The point is, taking in
consideration
what Aurelius literally said and what
he
did as an Emperor, his Mother Nature
was
as savage as Huxley’s and Spencer’s
without,
however, any future beautiful outcome
to
the natural struggle as they saw. Though
his view is thoroughly materialistic,
it
is also somewhat pessimistic. And seemingly
slightly more so than what I have found
in
Epictetus.
What it all comes
down
to, What was pagan classical language
and
meaning when using such words as *God*
and
*providence* as well as *good* and
*social
duty*. We cannot automatically impose
our
modern popularity conceptions of these
things
upon what they thought because, however
distressing
it may be to some, it plainly does
not fit
in the slightest.
Just like all Stoics
are not alike and had great differences,
so there are extreme differences from
Christian
to Christian, and the context in which
they
thought has to be taken seriously and
fundamentally
into account also. The doctrine of
the trinity
as defined by Anasthasius is essentially
incomprehensible and nit-picking today
to
modern Christians who merely give lip
service
to it, not really having the vaguest
idea
what it was all about - this includes
most
if not all theologians. But when he
proposed
it, it was not only a life and death
situation
politically, he was saying something
original
and profound in the sense of, - If
religion
of any kind at all is going to make
sense
in a world which has philosophy and
have
any real and enduring practical importance,
what I say HAS to be true.
The subsequent
history
of Jewish theology in the Kabbalah
culminating
in Isaac Luria and Sabbatai Sevi as
demonstrated
by Gershom Scholem, though a Zionist
he was
an atheist, divinity necessarily receded
into an infinite distance from man
- needing
a new saviour to relate God to man
- demonstrates
Anasthasius’ point. Essentially he
was saying
logically Monophysitism and Arianism,
philosophically,
theologically, and eventually practically,
would not work. God literally had to
be a
real man. There are still many unexplored
implications to that, but first it
has to
be taken seriously as literal. This
certainly
does not mean by any means I accept
his point
of view, just that I think it is very
important
to truly understand it and that any
Christian
who does not understand the issue cannot
really be a Christian just as any pagan
that
does not believe God is personal cannot
be
a theist. Now, in this context, to
discuss
the difference between a *philosophical
theist*
like Hume and a pantheist like Spinoza,
whom
Hume thought absurd, would be interesting.
For
Aurelius, if it is natural, it is rational,
and his view of Nature’s relation to
man
he states explicitly at several points
-
see letter at noted site - that the
gods
relation to man is indifferent even
though
he says they help men. But he also
says they
help good and bad men exactly the same,
and
that bad people have an equal place
in the
cosmic view of things as good people,
ending
up the same way, and that any individual
human importance for whatever reason
is utter
nonsense. And also what no one seems
to apply
seriously, what he thinks is right
to do
to and think of himself applies, as
would
be philosophical consistency would
demand,
to everyone else too. Think of the
implications
of that. He says his life is worthless
and
life in general is worthless, and Epictetus
agrees completely. So what about the
lives
of other people? Why did he do absolutely
nothing about the shows in the arena?
I quote
a long passage from Epictetus about
Medea
from the DISCOURSES in the above mentioned
letter which sheds great light upon
such
thinking.
Just as Epictetus and Aurelius did, you thoroughly
learn physics, natural science, and
logic.
The earlier Stoics went into all of
them
in depth. Epictetus says get what you
need
out of it - more or less - and then
drop
them because they, in themselves, do
not
have primary importance and are just
tools.
Aurelius says the same. In fact, he
says
stop reading altogether and just concentrate
on repeating his basic premises, driving
them into his memory and soul. But
we both
know they both studied a general range
of
literature and philosophy in great
depth
- but to a purpose, not frivolously.
What are their basic principles? They
are
fundamentally perceptual and common
human
nature then as now. In that regard,
there
is not the slightest difference in
actual
human situation then or now. There
is absolutely
nothing in the principles that even
can ever
be outdated. They apply equally to
an alien
from Alpha Centauri visiting the earth
ten
million years from now after all life
is
extinct. Thought, action, assent. Eliminate
EVERYTHING that can be eliminated eventually
even yourself.
QUOTE:
*Continually and, if possible, on the
occasion
of every imagination [impressions,
phantasias],
test it by natural science, by psychology,
by logic.* VIII, 13.
*Where then is it [*the good life*,
oudamou
eures to eu zeen] to be found? In doing
what
man’s nature requires. How then will
he do
this? If he hold fast doctrines upon
which
impulses and actions depend.* VIII,
1.
Off the wall, ethics
has to
be a secondary and derivative inquiry
from
some other discipline OR ability. My
thinking
automatically starts from Kant since
he was
always the major philosopher to me
either
when I was for him or against him since
I
was 14 when of course, I hardly could
understand
him. But his 3 Critiques provide, summarily
even, a *beginning from the nearly
absolute
beginning*, a near pre-suppositionless
philosophy
Hegel desired, that almost all other
modern
philosophers reflect in one fashion
or another
[as Kant in turn reflects an original
understanding
of Descartes, Hume, and Liebnitz].
In the
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, he postulates
a
fundamental intellectual faculty, imagination,
from which *intuition* [or for me *perception*]
and *understanding* [reason, and Heidegger
would add the history of experience].
Which
means, first in intellectual priority
one
has intuition and PURE reason, and
then one
has to deal with the subject matter
of Kant’s
second CRITIQUE, the CRITQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON which actually reflects many
Stoic
tenants and deals mainly with *practical
ethics*. But the second Critique is
deliberately
derived from the first. He revised
the first
edition of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
to
reflect a more hard science approach
and
toned down the fundamental faculty
of the
imagination - and because of this revision
there are fundamentally two different
kinds
of Kantisnism – but he went on to deal,
in
the CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, extensively
but
obscurely with imagination as an aesthetic
[both as art AND as aesthesis, sensation]
and as the imaginative formulary of
intellectual
concepts that makes a human being tend
to
forms overall theories of knowledge
as in
metaphysics – which he dealt with extensively
in the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON - and
theology
where in the CRITQUE OF JUDGMENT he
deals
with the near overpowering tendency
of teleological
thinking as in *Nature looks as if
it were
designed therefore there must have
been a
designer.*
The temporal order
of
Kant’s actual publishing reflects the
order
of initial intellectual importance,
that
is what comes first, second, and third,
although
after the full scheme is dealt with
they
all seem to have an importance that
no longer
reflects the temporal, causal order
of their
coming into being. So, in this context
I
can see the importance in your mind
of ethics,
but, in logical development, ethics
still
has to be derived from more fundamental
intellectual
disciplines. I will deal with this
more below,
and more relating to Stoicism. But
you must
keep in mind that Stoicism was a major
formulary
in the thought of almost every major
‘modern’
thinker, especially starting with Thomas
Hobbes. Also, remember the three fundamental
disciplines, in order the discipline
of thought
first, the discipline of action, and
the
discipline of assent – or as in Epictetus
below – there are several variations
of this
– desire, choice, assent. What is it
you
perceive, as part of thought, and then
what
is it you want, as desire, comes first,
then
choice/action, then, the final decisive
arbiter,
assent. Also, VIII, 27. methodologies,
their
subject, their object, through logic.
Both
Epictetus and Aurelius say a person
can ETHICALLY
operate from extremely different premises
with extremely different results. And
they
also say it is wrong to expect them
to act
any other way.
As
I think
I have brought up several times before,
this
does not have to deal with premises
Epictetus
or Aurelius *approve of* - they definitely
do not - but the point is people operate
upon different premises of what their
true
good is. The most outstanding example,
out
of numerous ones in both Aurelius and
Epictetus,
is Epictetus’ examination of Euripides’
*** MEDEA. LONG QUOTE: [pg. 333, v.
II]
*’And yet what need is there for me
to bring
forward now our strife with one another
and
make mention of that? Take your own
case:
if you apply properly your preconceived
ideas,
why are you troubled, why are you hampered?
Let us pass by for the moment the second
field of study – [the 3 fields are
1. orexis
– desire; 2. hormee – choice; and 3.
sugkatathesis
– assent – see DISCOURSES, Book III,
chapter
2]
That which has to do with our choices
and
the discussion of what is our duty
in regard
to them. Let us pass by also the third
–
that which has to do with our assents.
I
make you a present of all of this.
Let us
continue our attention to the first
field,
one which allows an almost palpable
proof
that you do not properly apply your
preconceived
ideas. Do you at any moment desire
what is
possible in general and what is possible
for you in particular? If so, why are
you
hampered? Why are you troubled? Are
you not
at this moment trying to escape what
is inevitable?
If so, why do you fall into any trouble,
why are you unfortunate? Why is it
when you
want something it does not happen,
and when
you do not want it, it does happen?
For this
is the strongest proof of trouble and
misfortune.
I want something , and it does not
happen;
and what creature is more wretched
than I?
I do not want something, and it does
happen;
and what creature is more wretched
than I?
‘Medea, for example, because she could
not
endure this, came to the point of killing
her children. In this respect at least
hers
was the act of a great spirit. For
she had
the proper conception of what it means
for
anyone’s wishes not to come true. ‘Very
well,
then,’ says she,
This is the out-bursting of a soul
of great
force. For she did not know where the
power
lies to do what we wish – that we cannot
get this from outside ourselves, nor
by disturbing
and deranging things. Give up wanting
to
keep your husband, and nothing of what
you
want fails to happen. Give up wanting
him
to live with you at any cost. Give
up wanting
to remain in Corinth, and in a word,
give
up wanting anything but what God wants.
And
who will prevent you, who will compel
you?
No one, any more than anyone prevents
or
compels Zeus.’* END LONG QUOTE,
from DICOURSES, Book II, chapter 17,
lines
14-22, W. A. Oldfather trans., Harvard,
Loeb
Classical Library, 1925, reprinted
1998,
pp. 332-335
*** I
This part of a complex of what I, for
now,
call the *bad man* arguments, that
is, the
bad man has a rational mind just like
the
good man but operates on the wrong
premises
-QUOTE: *Every man who does wrong is going wrong
from the goal set before him and has
gone
astray.* [IX, 42], or we also have had the same desires
as the bad man therefore we should
leave
him alone - QUOTE: *Of your neighbor [to this man‘s], that
you may observe whether it is ignorance
or
design [that makes him act wrongly
in the
way he does], and may reflect at the
same
time that his self is of one kind with
your
own.* [IX, 22] , or the bad man also has his proper
place in nature and therefore the gods
aid
them also- QUOTE: *In the natural order they are friends,
and moreover the gods help them in
a variety
of ways, by dreams, by prophecy; to
get,
however, the objects about which they
are
concerned.* [IX, 27]. [Therefore to the Goddess Nature
no one is special because everyone
is in
some sense *good*, or at least *proper*.
QUOTE:
*But for those who wish to follow nature,
being like minded with her, must be
indifferent
towards the things to which SHE is
indifferent,
for she would not create both were
she not
indifferent to both. Whosoever, therefore,
is not himself indifferent to pain
and pleasure,
death and life, honor and dishonor,
which
Universal Nature employs indifferently,
plainly
commits sin [or - impiety].* [IX, 1]
In fact, no one
is special
at all in the cosmic scheme of things
which
Christopher Gill below seems to think
is
special to Marcus Aurelius and I agree
with
him.] References: IX, 11 [the gods are good to the bad]; VIII, 46 [*Nothing can happen to any human being which
is not an incident appropriate to man
. .
.*],35 [Nature converts everything to her purpose
and man should do so likewise.]; VIII, 17,14[knowing a person‘s premises, there is no
surprise at his acts], 6 judges by the results of one’s and others’
acts initially in experience. The initial
standard must be that of the natural
animal,
that is, natural or inherent desire
all animals,
including humans, share. As humans,
it is
also natural they do not DESIRE to
act against
reason since they know acting against
reason
is against their self-interest. THE
STOICS
NEVER DENIGRATE OR RENOUNCE SELF-INTEREST
AS A NATURAL DESIRE!!!!
The only difference
Aurelius makes between a *brute* and
man
is not that one is and animal and the
other,
for whatever reason, is not, but that
the
animal man reasons, and therefore only
as
he is a reasoning animal is he different
from the brutes. Even more specifically,
in studying Aristotle, it becomes evident
after struggling with many different
and
sometimes contradictory texts that
*brutes*
can have the reasoning abilities of
imagination,
experience, and memory whereas what
really
distinguishes human being is the addition
of only language per se. And going
back to
what I said earlier, primary would
be self-preservation
for all animals including man UNTIL
reasoning
at a specific point in time caused
a difference
to challenge that. And that would be
per
individual, not species-type. Also,
Aurelius
says:
QUOTE *To my will the will of a neighbor
is as indifferent as his vital spirit
and
his flesh. For even though we were
brought
into the world more than anything else
for
the sake of one another, still each
of our
governing selves has its own sovereign
right;
for otherwise the evil of my neighbor
would
surely be evil of mine, and that was
not
God’s good pleasure, in order that
my unhappiness
might not depend on someone other than
myself.*
[VIII, 56].
This also brings
up the
fundamental motivation of man is *happiness*
which therefore to bring this about
THEN
one develops ethics which is the same
message
Aristotle has, and self-preservation
actually
would be subordinate to an ethics promoting
the primary value of *happiness*. And
any
ethic not promoting happiness as a
primary
virtue would either not also include
self-preservation
or would be based primarily on a fear
of
death. Also, VIII, 16, 7. your self-interest.
Being dependent upon any object as
something
one *should* desire should be utterly
abhorrent
to a Stoic, even food, even vegetables,
even
air, even water, even life. Utter self-sufficiency
and independence even from God or gods
-
even though you can view them with
kindness
and condescension - is the central
Stoic
ideal. Saying one *should* desire anything
whatsoever except or, in a specific
sense,
including that state of independence,
destroys
the whole point of Stoicism.
Epictetus does
not issue
a command or advice to "go pick
whatever
premises you want". But he does
say,
as well as Aurelius, that everyone
has already
picked their premises and that it illogical
to expect them to act according to
yours.
Once you know what those premises are,
you
may be able to educate them in the
manner
of showing that they may be logically
incompatible
with each other. In fact, you have
already
agreed with this in - *GRANT # 7: This
is
true of everything. Ultimately, I decide
what to believe about everything. But
the
Stoics have no shortage of assertions
about
what we should believe ethically.*
And you
are correct about the Stoics. A short
and
quick fashion to make my point is to
appeal
to the argument of authority, which
Aquinas
said was the weakest of all arguments,
and
refer to Cristopher Gill’s introduction
to
Robin Hard’s translation of the MEDITATIONS,
which I just received, where he notes
a number
of variations of Aurelius’ approach
to Stoicism
from Epictetus’ approach.
QUOTE: *13. In orthodox Stoic ethics, a further
goal of human development is that of
combining
practical ethical understanding with
an understanding
of nature as a whole through the study
of
‘physics’ or natural science. In this
way,
you could live a ‘natural’ (rational)
life
and understand how rationality was
fundamental
to human life and the cosmos . . .
The ‘cosmic’
perspective is very prominent in the
MEDITATIONS,
expressed in the ideas that we are
‘only
a part’ of the cosmos and that we should
aim for ‘the view above’ our normal
standpoint.
As in Epictetus, we sometimes find
in Marcus
the idea that achieving the cosmic
perspective
depends partly on expressing in virtuous
action and character the rationality
we recognize
in the cosmos, and in this way helping
ourselves
to see disasters as merely ‘externals’
or
‘matters of indifference’.* END QUOTE, page xv
*Combining practical ethical understanding
with an understanding of nature* necessarily implies a *natural* view point,
that is, *practical* and *natural*.
I take
*practical*, especially because of
Gill’s
context, to mean *necessary actions*,
that
is, actions *nature* demands immediately
from us in the situation we are in.
Sartre
has as a primal starting point for
human
action and practical choice - perfectly
in
accord with animal nature as such -
*hunger*,
that A] you feel the need, B] you will
learn
what will satisfy it by trial and error,
and C] you will choose to act to satisfy
that need. There you have elementary
*practical
ethical understanding* - it is, in
the most
basic way, something you *should*
do
- *combined* with *an understanding
of nature*.
A new born has
the sensory
need, but it does not know what will
fill
that need until it finds it or is given
it.
Either immediately or eventually it
will
connect its behavior causally with
the satisfaction
of that need. This is not the use of
abstract
logic or learned language but is inherent
in the nature of perception itself.
Pierre
Hadot in THE INNER CITADEL says:
QUOTE *All these ‘dogmas’ [the kephalaia
or fundamental points of the MEDITATIONS]
can, then, be deduced from more fundamental
dogmas. Yet they all become crystallized
around the three rules or disciplines
of
life, which we have distinguished.
The discipline
of thought, for example, obviously
presupposes
the dogmas which concern freedom of
judgment;
the discipline of action presupposes
those
which affirm the existence of a community
of reasonable beings; and the discipline
of consent to events presupposes the
dogma
of the providence and rationality of
the
universe.* page 40 END QUOTE
Since Hadot seems to
be saying
this shows the bedrock or *fundamental
dogmas*
of Aurelius, there is a primary decision
or disciplining to use reason, *the
discipline
of thought*, since reason gives you
truth
and no one pursues that which they
know is
not true. And the second most primary
decision/disciplining
is to operate within a community of
rational
beings that also desire what is true.
And
the tertiary decision/discipline is
to examine
sense impressions within the discipline
of
rational understanding of nature.
According to what
I said
above ethics MUST BE initially eliminated.
Natural desire originally supplies
its place.
Reason then creates ethics according
to experience.
Ethics is NOT primal but tertiary or
even
farther down the ladder of inherent,
necessary
values.
Even Aurelius says
things
change, that sometimes what you thought
was
the right thing to do had results that
repulsed
one. Re-examine one’s premises. Maybe
even
the premise is incorrect. NOTHING IS
WRITTEN
IN BEDROCK STONE! YOU SHOULD BE LISTENING
TO NO ONE BUT YOURSELF AS TO WHAT IS
RIGHT
OR WRONG! This is fundamental to the
basic
premise of Stoicism. One listens to
others’
opinions and then YOU decide. Otherwise
it
is emotion or even intimidation by
others
that makes your decisions
If happiness ceases
to
be possible, it ceases to be your fundamental
premise.
That is exactly what Marcus Aurelius
says
supported by VIII, 56 among many others,
several noted above. What exactly would
a
*inherent reason* be? How could it
possibly
be rational? If you are not moral because
of your *preference* for happiness,
why are
you moral? Or, if it is *inherent*,
is there
even a *Why?* If it is
*inherent*, then everyone is necessarily
moral - which, in another sense, is
exactly
what I said Aurelius says above INSOFAR
AS
everyone has self-interest and their
self-interest
is happiness - except in that case,
again,
happiness takes precedence over morality.
If morality does not *satisfy* you,
why do
you do it? If you really do not like
morality,
why do you choose it?
BERNARD BOVASSO:
T
hat was a very good synopsis of Roman
Stocism.
But I notice thereby that it is very
much
in force in the modern West but without
its
philosphical demonstrations but simply
a
condition of the collective Western
ego fixation
of "me, me" (is all), i.e.,
"f - - - -
you Jack, I'm all right."
GARY. C. MOORE:
Since materialistically I cannot think
any
thoughts but my own and cannot know
anything
except what I know, I do not understand
what
you mean by *in force*, and therefore
have
no idea whatsoever what *philosophical
demonstrations*
you expect. A *collective Western ego*
sounds
like a supernatural effusion of Carl
Jung.
And as to a *fixation of ‘me’*, what
other
epistemological, ontological, logical,
psychological
fixation can I have unless by mental
telepathy
I can intrude into, and live, the lives,
thoughts, and consciousnesses of other
people?
And since *lives, thoughts, and consciousnesses
of other people* are really just short
hand
sloppy conceptions in actuality of
the nature
and usage of language, and even I myself
as an *ego fixation* am just a linguistic
proposition according to G. E. Moore
and
Betrand Russell [and therefore, on
another
level, a similar problem arises], how
can
I possibly know what meanings other
people,
like you, are attaching to the words
they
use since I can only know language
as I use
it myself and understand it when reading
other people? Accordingly [?], it would
appear,
that Rome was destined to "fall"
notwithstanding the Mithraic cult of
the
Legion.
BERNARD BOVASSO:
Accordingly, it would appear, that
Rome was
destined to "fall" notwithstanding
the Mithraic cult of the Legion
GARY. C. MOORE:
How long the Mithraic cult persisted
in the
legions in a pure state I do not know.
Of
course, once the Roman state became
*Christianized*
in its kaleidoscopic and infinitely
revolving
variations of form, the battle between
infinitely
powerful good and light versus infinitely
powerful evil and darkness would seem
to
be easily absorbed into Christianity.
And
what I actually said was, Later, influence
by its constant conflict with Persia,
the
Roman Army took on Mithraism, with
its very
black and white version of the battle
between
good and evil, which at least in the
Army
was highly competitive with Christianity.
There is no mention here of the fall
of Rome
in the first place, much less Mithraism
combating
that. Christianity assumed the position
of
the politically dominate form of religion
with Constantine the Great’s accession
to
the throne in 325.
In 395, at the
death
of Theodosius the Great, it was still
very
strong. The empire was divided, once
again,
for administrative purposes and fools
put
on both thrones. The Visigoths smashed
the
army of the Eastern Emperor at Adrianople
but nothing *fell*. They went on to
become
Federati, essentially a nation stating
it
was related to the Roman state, and
allies
of one or another of the parts of the
Roman
Empire. Pissed off again, this time
by the
Western Empire, they took on one of
the best
Roman Generals of all time, Stilicho
[I think
an Ostragoth or maybe even a Visigoth]
who
always defeated them in battle until
the
idiot emperor of the West, Honorius,
poisoned
him out of jealousy. Whereupon Alaric
took
and sacked Rome in 410 and caused Augustine
of Hippo to write the CITY OF GOD explaining
why God punished the evil neopagans
of the
Roman Empire. But even in the West
the Empire
persisted, at least in form, until
an Ostrogothic
*protector* got tired of protecting
the last
Roman emperor, Romulus Augustus, and
killed
him around 495. Even then the
Ostrogothic
state in Italy called itself a Federati
and
related politically to the still existent
Roman state in the east. In fact the
Visigoths
again named themselves Federati alone
with
the Franks taking over Northern Gaul
and
all three groups received recognition
as
such from the emperor in Constantinople.
All three peoples, including eventually
also
the Burgundians, considered themselves
*Roman*
and preserved Roman state institutions
and
laws. When Clovis conquered the Visogoths
in the south of France with the Papal
blessing
since he converted from Gothic Arianism
to
orthodox Catholicism, he in form became
the
*Holy Roman Emperor*. When Charlemagne
took
the throne after his father Pepin,
the mayor
of the royal palace, murdered the last
of
the Merovingian line some people assume
was
related by blood to Jesus, he conquered
all
of Italy to the north of Naples as
well as
a good part of the rest of Europe.
The Pope
awarded him the official title of Holy
Roman
Emperor and tricked him into coming
to Rome
to be crowned by him as if he somehow
was
responsible for Charlemagne being what
he
already was. This also occasioned the
creation
of the forgery of the *Constantinian
Donation*
where supposedly Constantine the Great
deeded
the Western part of the Empire to the
Pope
which the Renaissance scholar Valla
demonstrated
linguistically to be an impossibility.
The
Holy Roman Empire persisted as a political
entity until Napoleon in 1806 made
the Hapsburgs
give up that title. In the east, the
Roman
Empire persisted as such, although
they essentially
had given up Latin as the legal tongue
around
1000 CE, until the fall of Constantinople
in 1453 whereupon the despotate of
Mistra,
a province persisted for a few years
more,
and the breakaway Empire of Trebizond
- independent
when the Fourth Crusade took Constantinople
in 1204 - fell to the Turks in 1466.
So,
what are you referring to when you
refer
to the destined fall of the Roman Empire?
BERNARD BOVASSO:
The Stoicism you describe sounds very
much
like the contemporary "Post-Modern"
approach to world and self and, like
Rome,
is about to Fall and in turn be replaced
by an archaic form of an uncompromising
and
totalitarian state religion of the
sort practiced
by the Taliban.
GARY. C. MOORE:
I do not understand any of this at
all and
resent being called a *post modernist*,
a
movement I utterly despise, although
Derrida’s
*decontructionism*, as I have said
before
Richard will acknowledge has a number
of
merits and is related to Marcus Aurelius’
own cognitive methodology and logic
I have
explained in other letters. And what
even
*post modernism* has to do with totalitarianism
and the Taliban seems . . . Totalitarians
and the Taliban at least know what
they are
doing and why they are doing it.
BERNARD BOVASSO:
In the case of both Rome and the modern
West
the demise of a religious, or otherwise
a
transcendental outlook, left a vacum
that
was soon filled. Thank you for your
very
comprehensive resume of Stocism.
GARY. C. MOORE:
People will always love vacuums because
they
can put anything into it they want
to. |
Evans Experientialism 
