The term "Stoicism" derives from the Greek word "stoa," referring to a colonnade, such as those built outside or inside temples, around dwelling-houses, gymnasia, and market-places. They were also set up separately as ornaments of the streets and open places. The simplest form is that of a roofed colonnade, with a wall on one side, which was often decorated with paintings. Thus in the market-place at Athens the stoa poikile (Painted Colonnade) was decorated with Polygnotus's representations of the destruction of Troy, the fight of the Athenians with the Amazons, and the battles of Marathon and Oenoe. Zeno of Citium taught in the stoa poikile in Athens, and his adherents accordingly obtained the name of Stoics. Zeno was followed by Cleanthes, and then by Chrysippus, as leaders of the school. The school attracted many adherents, and flourished for centuries, not only in Greece, but later in Rome, where the most thoughtful writers, such as Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and Epictetus, counted themselves among its followers.

GARY.C. MOORE:
So, gentlemen, let us take on the question again

MARK TRAVIS:
I don't think that Stoicism is possible in conjunction with atheism without mangling either or both beyond recognition.

GARY.C. MOORE:The main thing that attracts me to Stoicism is the utter simplicity of its ethics which, legitimately, can be contained in a nut shell:

1] You receive sense impressions.

2] You refuse to let them make you respond spontaneously but instead distance yourself from them in a judging process. At that time, no matter what kind of sense impressions they are - maybe one can differentiate different objective types of sense impressions without evaluation - they are *mere* or *pure* indifferents.

3] Then one gives an assent or non-assent as to whether and/or how they motivate you to action. That is, they either remain indifferent to you or not according to Epictetus rule number 1 in the ENCHEIRIDION whether or not they are in *pure* reality under your control. None of this involves any sort of *other* whatsoever.

   It is wholly a matter of what is in your control. Not only is *god* unnecessary but any other human being. Therefore, by logical necessity, it has to be *pure* self interest, not in the sense of excluding anyone else, but *purely* in the sense of no other self can rationally be involved at all.

    This is an archeology of knowledge. I use *pure* or *mere* in Kant’s absolute sense of *ground* or *ontological* fundamentality in the beginning of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON [Norman Kemp Smith] where his starting point of examining knowledge per se, that is, *pure* or *mere* without bringing in external context - ideally. In fact Kant’s breakdown of this beginning is exactly the same as Epictetus: 1] a posteriori experience, *the receptivity of the mind*, sensibility, [B 75, A 71], and 2] an a priori criterion, *spontaneity of knowledge*, understanding, a *universal rule* *borrowed by us from experience* [B 2, A 2]. Any a priori criterion is *analytic judgment*, but it is logically absurd to suppose analysis can precede experience. One must somehow *borrow* it from experience, *intuition*.


     But intuition is the whole of experience, of perception, the *inner perception of the manifold which is antecedently given in the subject*, that is, *the consciousness of self [apperception]*, *the I* or hegemonikon and, like a map, *sort of* inherently inherits *nothing but relations* [B67], that is, *the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity* [B 68, p. 87 Norman Kemp Smith], that is, a priori space - left, right, up, down, near, far - and a priori time - remembrance, perception now, prediction - *and so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense* [B 68]. *To neither of these powers [sensibility and understanding] may a preference be given over the other . . . These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions . . . Only through their union can knowledge arise * [B 75, A 51]. *There are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common root* [B 29, A 15]. [They] *must be connected with each other according to one concept or idea* [B 92, A 67]. Only intuition or sensation has an immediate relation to an object. *No concept is ever related to an object immediately* [B 93, A 68]. *Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it* [Ibid.]. *All judgments are functions of unity . . . a higher representation . . . The understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment [this is the *higher*]* [A 69]. *Synthesis of a manifold [relations per se] is what first gives rise to knowledge* [B 103, A 77]. And then the grand finale. *Synthesis, in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of the imagination [*a common root*, B 29, A 15], a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious . . . Pure synthesis, represented in its most general aspect, gives us the pure concept of the understanding . . a priori synthetic unity* [B 1-3-104, A 78]. *But *What first must be given - with a view to the a priori knowledge of all objects - is the manifold of pure intuition [sensation]; the second factor involved is the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination* [B 104, A 79].

    So the whole *possible* function of God has been replaced by the *blind but indispensable function of the soul* which is imagination. Imagination is the *borrowing* or abstraction of physical relations from sensation to ground the understanding. And this is precisely the function of assent in Epictetus, that is, How is this sense impression related to the self-interest [experiential, not exclusionary, the apperceptive *I* or *transcendental X* from Kant, a mere mathematical point] of the *guiding*, judgmental hegemonikon? So all knowing is necessarily moral as well as epistemological. There is no difference. Essentially we have gone down from the perfectly obvious to the far from obvious - sensation as a function of the imagination?

  This is why I have said Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius references to god are rhetorical. One must, however, totally delete from ones thinking the purely modern prejudice against rhetoric as hypocritical and consider it as Classical civilization did, as education in general wherein logic and philosophy are merely a subcategories of rhetoric. This is certainly the way Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius considered it while Seneca overemphasized its worse aspects lugubriously. And before one jumps on Kant’s mention of *soul*, one must study what he says about soul very carefully [B 97-98, A 72-73]. It is a *negative* and *infinite judgment* [imagined in Kant‘s sense] merely defined as *non-mortal* Though this is an *affirmation*, it merely places it in *the unlimited sphere of non-mortal beings*. *Nothing more is said by my proposition than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain over when I take away all that is mortal*. This is merely a *logical extension* in  *the infinite sphere of all that is possible* minus all that is mortal. But like infinite even and odd numbers a la Cantor, *such exclusion* [definition] *still remains infinite . . . without the concept of the soul being thereby increased, or determined in an affirmative manner . . . These judgments are thus limitative only . . .*

MARK TRAVIS:
It's not realistic to remove Stoic ethics entirely from Stoic physics. In particular, the belief that this is a rationally-ordered universe ordered by a rational agent. That's theism. And it's the thing upon which Stoics hang their hats.

GARY.C. MOORE:
That there is order in the universe that is rationally comprehensible and all physical reality is undeniable. But you bring in the expression *ordered*. You are right to say the Stoics *say* this. I dispute with you that the Stoics mean the same modern Christian theistic definition as you do, that is, that there is a *person* in definition just like a human *person* who *ordered* the universe.

   For one thing, that concept necessarily brings in a creation of the universe at a specific point in time, a *personal* decision, which all the non-Christian ancients rejected. The pure arbitrariness of this decision stuck in both Origin’s and Pierre de Teilard Chardin’s throats. There is no need for such a decision just as there is no need for a divine *person*. And God without a personality is merely rhetorical once again, however one may phrase it.

MARK TRAVIS:
I understand that Stoic ethics are an attractive point to which to strive--but I'm curious as to how one can arrive at that position intellectually while rejecting the most critical physical foundation.

GARY.C. MOORE:
Reading the *physics* and *theology* of Long & Sedly, I found their arguments either superlatively silly or incredibly naïve. This leads me to think they were merely directive toward the popular crowd, a rhetorical device, to get the less educated to listen to them. After all, there was a death penalty associated with denying the existence of the gods, and despite Socrates denials that he was not introducing a new god - so that even a philosophical god was not acceptable - and that he did believe in the traditional gods, he was condemned to death. It was a point well taken by Aristotle who, in his esoteric lectures defined an extremely abstract god, still said - somewhere - atheists should be put to death, just like Plato said homosexuals should be burned at the stake in the LAWS.

    Lip-service saves lives from bigots, and it makes what you say more or less acceptable to everyone, that is, persuasive, that is, rhetorical. Even Thomas Aquinas is infinitely superior to this Stoic junk. And the usage found in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius is blatantly rhetorical, especially if compared to Thomas Aquinas. The order/disorder expositions in Marcus Aurelius are especially intriguing, even more so because he says that it makes no difference in the end anyway - it is still preferable to be a Stoic. If you want a *personal* god, go read Aquinas. However . . .


Steve wrote:

The atheistic claim is 'There is no God' period.


DANIEL STRAIN:
That is false.

GARY.C. MOORE:
This is absolutely true. A negative cannot be proven. One must first, as in Plato’s Socrates, have someone make a positive assertion and then make him provide a definition of it. If contradictions in the definition arise, they must either be further explained by the asserter of the positive or they must admit their concept is irrational. Just like Kant’s dealing with the term *soul* above, the term *god* does have a meaning in the logical extension of things and therefore can and should be dealt with But it is in finding a logically consistent definition where lies the problem. Now, this is possible, and Jewish thinkers like Issac Luria have done this. But their definition of God excludes Him from all possible human experience forever and always. He is like the Deistic or Pantheistic god, utterly irrelevant to human experience. This is why Nathan of Gaza  *invented* or discovered Sabbatai Sevi as the Messiah. Or why Anasthasius went to such great effort to establish Jesus was wholly divine as well as wholly human and stuck to his guns though death stared him in the face. It was, they thought, the only way to make God relevant to man. This is totally disregarding all other propositions, merely, Is God relevant to human existence at all, in any possible way? The answer is yes. Imaginatively. Rhetorically. What Anasthasius and Nathan of Gaza have done is rhetorical logic, not demonstrative or mathematical logic. It is comparative, analogical, that is, if this which you want, then here is that which makes it seem plausible.

DANIEL STRAIN:
It is also one of the more aggravating and continuous misconceptions that atheists must regularly and repeatedly deal with. Although they are continuously told otherwise by others, atheists know what they believe - just ask us :)

Agnosticism is not a separate category from atheism. All agnostics are atheists - agnostics are a type of atheist. As I said before, trees, dogs, and infants are all atheists.

GARY.C. MOORE:
Excellent.

DANIEL STRAIN:
It is not about withholding judgment. That is precisely what a-theism (the lack of theism) is.  "Agnostic" was just a somewhat redundant word that was invented to distinguish:

(a) those who lack theism (atheists) AND lack belief in the non-existence of God

from

(b) those who lack theism (atheists) and HOLD a belief in the non-existence of God.


GARY.C. MOORE:
The Skeptics hold this *with-holding of judgment* to absolutely everything. Therefore, in public, they act and say exactly the same way as everyone else does. And you must admit they have a good point. It is the Skeptical objections in Long & Sedly that are by far the sharpest and most cogent. And to mention a modern Skeptic - for what else can he be [he was not very sympathetic to the Stoics]? - David Hume, one of the most cogent objections to religious belief ever made - one of the others is his analysis of *miracles* - is when he said everyone says they believe in God but no one acts like it. And before objections are raised, first one must provide a rationally consistent definition of god relevant to human behavior because obviously the utter failure of such a convincing definition in itself would explain part of this existential inconsistency.

DANIEL STRAIN:
Whatever other beliefs you hold or don't hold, the mere lack of theism makes one an atheist, regardless. If you use something like 'anti-theists' or 'hard atheists' you would be more clear. But I should warn you that after being involved with
 atheists and atheist organizations over 13 years, I have only ever met one person who would really be an 'antitheist' - maybe that's why there's no word for what you're talking about.

GARY.C. MOORE:
David Hume called himself a *philosophical theist* and maintained that definition even in the faces of the Baron de Holbach and Diderot. But if one reads the NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION, which is mainly about the absurdities and horrors of religion, he concludes with this positive thought in an ambiguous way, not as an evasion - he never evaded anything though he may have tuned down his tone at times - he certainly had his plain say in his HISTORY OF ENGLAND for sure - with something that sounds very much like the establishment of the human mind through the power of the imagination - and Kant was a superb student of Hume. If the *self* is a mere imaginative mathematical point, and Hume definitely believed this also, then there are going to be all sorts of things grander, greater, and bigger than the persons Hume and Kant, some of them beautiful, most of them ambiguous or downright horrible. So any sane, rational person can say they believe in a being *greater* than himself, woman for instance. And to say the imagination does seem to have divine qualities, especially when combined with Augustine’s archeology of the nature of his own memory, can inspire one with some rationally legitimate awe of an ambiguous *something* that is much greater than oneself. But the difference between this and atheism is not worth debating. It is merely . . . . rhetorical.


MARK TRAVIS:
OK, forget God for a moment. Could somebody sanely have Stoic ethics if they believed that the universe was fundamentally arbitrary, chaotic, gratuitously cruel, and absurd?

DANIEL STRAIN:
Probably not 100% of them, untouched and with all the frills. However, I'd still think that simply being in a universe where we don't control externals, and understanding that, should lead to a very similar system of ethics. One big difference might come in when it gets to particulars of what is and is not virtuous (but I'm not even sure about that without looking at specific examples).

GARY.C. MOORE:
Marcus Aurelius certainly thought, ultimately, the point was irrelevant, though he obviously thought an orderly universe preferable. And, by the way, do yall know what Epicurus’*hedonism* really consisted of? Satisfying one’s needs. *So, what is your point?* He said that all you need to do is satisfy your need. If you do more than satisfy a necessary need you throw everything out of balance with the unnecessary superfluity. If all you need to satisfy your thirst is drink half a glass of wine, that is all you should drink. And sex was certainly not a necessity - something highly disturbing to politicians needing population growth. Epicurus hated the political life, *one‘s duty to one‘s country*. And Marcus Aurelius - who quotes Epicurus sympathetically at times [and Seneca often] - certainly details the natural corruption of the soul through the political life [and Seneca‘s life exemplifies it], showing, no matter how pure you try to maintain yourself, the people you must associate with push you down with them over time. How else would you explain his letting his son Commodus become emperor? The argument that *he did not know* is incredibly lame since they lived constantly together in the last years of his life. So the more I learn about Epicureanism - and Skepticism - the less real difference I see - despite Epictetus diatribes against it - which actually are logically kind of formless, and more rhetorical, competitive, political.