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GARY.C. MOORE:
It is a key text in the fundamental
cultural
change throughout the world when it
started
giving primary authority to the written
word
over the oral word, that is, recording
words
on a physical medium rather than recording
words in memory.
*** The history of philosophy memorializes
this in Plato's banishing of the poets
as
liars from the REPUBLIC and the rote
[*the
use of the memory usually with little
intelligence*]
imitation of ethical norms from the
recitals
of Homer by rhetors [not rhetoricians
directly
but by implication as Sophists] as
in the
ION. In Plato - supposedly - this is
the
opposition between rational thinking
versus
mere imitation of traditional values.
Ayn
Rand loved the book precisely for this
reason,
but it does not reflect Ayn Rand's
values
at all in actuality.
*** It has been a long time since I
looked
at the book, but it is a seminal text
of
great importance, not only easy to
read but
I originally found it rather exciting
like
reading a novel because of the new
view it
presented on reading Homer and others
like
him. I think Ellis is very balanced
on that
point, and if I remember right he makes
a
point that Plato in the REPUBLIC is
really
overemphasizing his condemnation of
poets
for political/social reasons when in
fact
the rest of his dialogues show a high
appreciation
of poetry.
*** Actually, the attack on the poets
in
the REPUBLIC is part of his attack
on the
Sophists. His primary point in that
is the
Sophist claim they can make the good
argument
seem bad and the bad argument seem
good which,
of course, really riled Plato. However,
it
is, in reality, it is the foundation
of the
confrontational [better word?] legal
system
we have inherited from Classical civilization
where there are two diametrically opposed
viewpoints, the prosecution and the
defense,
where every effort is made by each
to make
each side of the argument seem to be
the
truth of the matter. Plato makes it
seem
like an attack on rhetoric as such,
but,
as Jud can probably tell you, that
is extremely
problematic, especially in the PHAEDRUS,
because Plato constantly uses rhetorical
comparative and analogical logic, which
can
never be anything more than approximate
or
merely suggestive, to attack Sophism.
*** Now, we all do this. And this is why
the justice of the judge and jury is suppose
to be blind to external blandishments as
mere neutral hearers of the oral words whereby
they judge reasonable doubt and belief. But
the point of Plato and Ayn Rand is that we
should always judge by hard rock logic, that
is, logic with mathematical certainty. This,
I am sure, is why Plato’s philosophy ultimately
as a system, if it can be called that, tries
to resolve the Ideas as mathematical formulae
as Jud and I have discussed about Findley.
However, the major problem with such an approach
is the open endedness or *infinite judgment*
from Kant - in hope that Jud will edit for
public consumption a letter I sent him since
legally and morally I tend to screw things
up in dealing with letters from other lists
- with concepts like *soul* or *the Good*
or *god* where no legitimate limits can be
applied to their definition - similar to
dealing with Cantor’s dilemma *all numbers
are infinite* but if *all numbers are infinite*
then *all even and odd numbers must each
be infinite* also even though a boundary
has been drawn dividing them into two subclasses
where the subclass is purportedly the same
size as the class, if I have phrased that
right.
I think there
have been objections raised to that way of
thinking, but, as I remember vaguely, they
were rather insubstantial if you admit the
infinity of all numbers in the first place
- which I personally would object to. Kant
puts it, for the *soul*, that its only possible
definition is *non-mortal* which is a positive
proposition as such, but is otherwise completely
empty. And all of Plato’s dealings with the
soul and with Ideas for which he wants mathematical
certainty, not simply because of the certainty,
but because they do not *exist* or *live*
in time but are timeless, static:
QUOTE - FROM:
THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: Demonstration,
Dialectic, Rhetoric, by P. Christopher Smith,
Northwestern University Press, 1998, page
113-114.
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For in fact, the possibility that demonstration
holds out for countering sophism’s corruption
of rhetoric continues to fascinate [Plato].
In turning to the PHAEDRUS, we will now explore
other dimensions of the tension generated
by this ambivalence, a tension, however,
that is found throughout Plato’s dialogues.
For on the one hand, insofar as they continue
to take mathematics as their model and would
instruct the learner in the way that mathematics
does, they presuppose that *what really is,*
to ontos on, is the kind of being characteristic
of mathematical entities such as numbers
or geometrical forms, namely being that *is*
as fully disclosed and ever present to consciousness,
with no *no longer but past* and no *not
yet but coming*attaching to it. And such
an understanding of what *is* presupposes,
in turn, that writing in visual word signs
[semeia] has begun to displace speaking in
audible word names [onomata] as the appropriate
mode of communication [11]. On the other
hand, the dialogues, even as they would call
rhetoric into question and replace it with
the real *art* of dialectic, the dialectike
techne, remain persuasive speeches [logoi]
to be enacted out loud and heard, and to
this extent, at least, the older being as
what *is* in coming to pass [gignesthai]
and told orally in the narrative historical
tale, still prevails in them [12].
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Footnote [11] Quote:
The exposition here will rely extensively
on E. Havelock’s PREFACE TO PLATO [Cambridge,
Mass., 1963], in particular chapter 7, *The
Oral Sources of Hellenic Intelligence,* pp.
115-33; chapter 8, *The Homeric State of
Mind,* pp. 134-144; chapter 11, *Psyche or
the Separation of the Knower from the Known,*
pp. 197-214; and chapter 12, *The Recognition
of the Known as Object,* pp. 215-33. However,
I read Havelock with Heideggerian eyes, as
it were; for what Havelock has to say about
orality and literacy takes on new significance
if it is correlated with Heidegger’s account
of the shift in the understanding of being
[das Sein] that occurs with Plato, a shift
from being as coming to pass, to being as
static presence. See in particular, Heidegger,
PLATONS LEHRE VON DER WARHEIT [Bern, 1947].*
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Footnote [12] Quote:
As noted previously, I use the admittedly
cumbersome *narrative historical*
to render
Heidegger’s rather more ordinary
word GESCHICHTLICH.
The point is that DIE GESCHICHTE
in German
means both history and story.
In this regard,
then, one can read Heidegger
with Havelockian
eyes, and see that the temporality
of particular
existent beings, their GESCHICHTLICHKEIT
or *historicity*, correlates
with the way
we *talk* about them, correlates,
that is,
with their *narrativity* when
we, like Homer,
come to tell the oral tale to
them
Both footnote quotes can be found on page
331. |
GARY. C. MOORE:
So Smith’s main thesis is that rhetorical
logic is necessary, but not infallible
-
only probable, for dialogue with other
people,
which Plato found necessary to use
even when
arguing against it to establish his
demonstrative
mathematical proofs, and which he sees
Heidegger
as betraying - the public oral discussion
and debate of ideas - for a much more
singularly
authoritative way of statement. So
there
are two sides to this story of graphism
versus
orality - prosecution and defense.
Remember,
at the end of the Rector Speech, Heidegger
invokes Plato.
In Plato, there is a relevant, though sometimes
confusing, political element with his argument
with the scandal mongering poets [the behavior
of the gods], the rhetors presenting rote
models of behavior, and the rhetoricians,
usually labeled Sophists - though some like
Protagoras prove to be very wise and more
or less get the best of Socrates [whereas
Gorgias is smart enough to withdraw from
debating Socrates, when he knows he will
loose, and lets his rash students make fools
of themselves]. The Sophist is usually associated
with defending democracy - but this is the
democracy Thucydides portrayed and the American
Founding Fathers abhorred. Plato wants a
strong and straight forward constitution
to the state, much like, in spirit, to Napoleons
and Charles de Gaulles where the executive
branch can act decisively without waiting
too much on the legislative. Both French
constitutions were decided improvements over
previous chaotic political situations. The
same thing happened in Greece where, even
with the military junta removed, they have
retained the same constitution they put in
place and their continuous political turmoil
has stopped also. But one mans discipline
can easily be another mans tyranny. I would
really need to know much more to make a truly
knowledgeable judgment.
However, in Athens, they did opt for conservative
type constitutions after losing the Peloponnesian
War. However, Platos is rather extreme -
if serious - and that is highly debated by
scholars. That is one of the *tensions* P.
Christopher Smith describes throughout Platos
dialogues - that, though, more or less positively
put forward, at least at first, through the
analysis of the specific terms he usually
discovers foundations of quicksand sooner
or later, for instance, Is health an absolute
value to all? Plato continually criticizes
the Sophists because they do not seek a definitive
Good as opposed to a definitive Bad - rather
they deliberately switch the terms back and
forth, arguing purposely for one side and
then the other showing words have no inherently
fixed meaning - that they are just words.
Unfortunately for Plato, searching for an
absolute Good, he discovers exactly the same
thing. His *deconstruction* of Lysias speech
in the PHAEDRUS shows the analytical and
logical poverty of the rhetoricians philosophical
thinking, but also shows the speech does
stringently follow the rules of rhetorical
speech which are analogical and repetitive
to better imprint the minds of listeners
rather than readers - and that is what Socrates
is doing - reading Lysias speech that was
written for the purpose of being heard, not
read. So, in a way, Socrates is cheating.
His points are good, but he is not playing
properly by the rules of context.
The dialogue form, then, in practice, is
a *rhetorical*, though *dialectical*, mrthod
of *persuading emotionally people to emotionally
prefer demonstrative and mathematical logic
to the persuasive techniques rhetoricians
employ to get people to understand their
main points and remember them in legal or
political consultation. No one is going to
read a Platonic dialogue in such a public
situation.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Gary, I am up to page 50 and find the book
excellent and provocative. I had never before
considered what happened with the invention
of the alphabet and the written word vis
a vis intellectual progress. I can certainly
see Platos point, but have issues with the
harshness of his criticism of the spoken
arts.
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On page 47 Havelock comments:
He [Plato] asks of men that instead
they
should examine this experience
and rearrange
it, that they should think about
what they
say, instead of just saying it.
And they
should separate themselves from
it instead
of identifying with it; they
themselves should
become the *subject* who stands
apart from
the *object*and reconsiders it
and analyses
it and evaluates it instead of
just *imitating*
it.
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GARY. C. MOORE:
This is Stoic technique, appropriately so
since their main philosophical hero is Socrates.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Of course we can see the direction Plato
takes as it relates to his own writings and
philosophical beliefs. However no amount
of objective intent can remove the speaker
or writer from his own personal persuasions.
While I can see that Plato has a good point
in denigrating the bogus history contained
in Homer, if he himself had been able to
see the Homeric mythology for what it was
[just that] and extracted from Homer the
enjoyment of the tale, he might have relaxed
a bit on the matter. Of course he saw Homer
and similar oral histories and stories differently
from the way we see them and took them far
more seriously as *educational* tools.
***
GARY. C. MOORE:
He does show literary appreciation of Homer
and others in other, non-political, dialogues,
sometimes with great effect.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Another aspect is this: oral tradition carries
with it the continual reinterpretation of
*facts,* meanings and utility. Just think
about what Freud did with the Orestian tale.
Perhaps had Plato been a bit wiser he might
have seen the psychological substrate of
human truths and values contained in the
plays of Sophocles, Euripides and Aeschylus.
GARY. C. MOORE:
He may have, but I know too little to argue
such a difficult point.
Actually, the attack on the poets in the
REPUBLIC is part of his attack on the Sophists.
His primary point in that is the Sophist
claim they can make the good argument seem
bad and the bad argument seem good which,
of course, really riled Plato. However, it
is, in reality, it is the foundation of the
confrontational [better word?] legal system
we have inherited from Classical civilization
where there are two diametrically opposed
viewpoints, the prosecution and the defense,
where every effort is made by each to make
each side of the argument seem to be the
truth of the matter.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Instead of *confrontational* I would use
adversarial.
GARY. C. MOORE:
That is what I wanted to say but could not
think of the word. I think Plato would have
hated, maybe even loathed, our legal system.
It SEEMS he would want a straightforward
declaration/definition, Did the defendant
- to hell with due legal process - do Good
or do Bad? And the *trial* would be over
in five minutes. The defendant, then, would
not even have had the public hearing that
even Socrates received. But I am fantasizing
here.
RICHARD:
I consider our judicial system, which came
out of English Law, to be flawed in that
the *truth* is never the issue – through
the prosecution claims that it is after the
truth. Both the defense and the prosecution
are after a win – the truth is not sought,
nor is it even relevant. We could use a third
*tie breaker* or entirely unbiased *ombudsman*
who really does seek the truth. But we humans
seem to be stuck with a binary way of seeing
things, and frequently use a zero sum approach
to conflict resolution and certainly in politics
and governance.
GARY. C. MOORE:
I think your analysis is accurate and recognizes
a real problem. But remember, this is a historical/practical,
not Idealistic, evolution. Would you like
Platos solution better if my image of it
is even remotely correct?
So Smith’s main thesis is that rhetorical
logic is necessary, but not infallible -
only probable, for dialogue with other people,
which Plato found necessary to use even when
arguing against it to establish his demonstrative
mathematical proofs, and which he sees Heidegger
as betraying - the public oral discussion
and debate of ideas - for a much more singularly
authoritative way of statement. So there
are two sides to this story of graphism versus
orality - prosecution and defense. Remember,
at the end of the Rector Speech, Heidegger
invokes Plato.
RICHARD SANSOM:
*Mathematical proofs* of anything dealing
with human utterances, no matter what
they
are, is folly. I can see why Plato
was so
rigid in this regard since, if axioms
are
treated as ideal forms, what follows
from
them is inarguable.
GARY. C. MOORE:
Exactly. And how does he, in actual practice,
resolve the problem? In esoteric, unrecorded
lectures to the elect few. Is this an admission
of the complete failure of his dialectical/dialogue
philosophy?
EDITOR'S NOTE:
For numerous startlingly percipient
letters by Gary.C. Moore about
oral tradition in literature.
click below.
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