On Nonlinearity I am going to try to make
a coherent reply to both Jud and Mariano
on non-linearity. Both of you have honed
in upon aspects that are very important,
showing precisely the need for such thinking.
I shall be doing editing to supposedly clarify
the points made so pay attention to both
your words and mine. There are a number of
both general and very specific reasons why
I am pursuing this course. Unfortunately,
they are time consuming for someone short
on time and intelligence.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
What I understand by a "point of view"
is neither the same as "opinion"
nor as "belief".
GARY.C. MOORE:
My approach is an imitation by my limited
understanding of Merleau-Ponty's PHENOMENOLGY
OF PERCEPTION, a science based study giving
physical and logical basis for philosophical
premises when they are justified. Merleau-Ponty
is an expert in physical human psychology
who also wrote THE STRUCTURE OF COMPORTMENT.
Disregard all his other works even though
many pieces are quite valuable to my thesis.
Phenomenology, HERE, means precisely and
ONLY the reception of sense impressions bound
within the context of the human body. This
is no derogation of an external 8world*.
If you have not read the book, do not judge
it. It is NOTHING like Heidegger or Sartre.
In fact, Heidegger did not like him.
*Point of view* here is a strict and logico-mathematically
bound concept. It can be broken down, at
one point, into simple line of sight. My
point is, though, that is an invariable.
*Line of sight* as a physical situation can
belong only to one unique person. Uniqueness,
I hesitate to say, is absolute perceptual
aloneness. However, each person is numbered
one unique person. In this regard, one can
generalize, for arguments sake, that all
unique people are exactly the same, even
though there are physiological variations
for some people. AND those varieties are
important because, not only do they help
define the *rule*, they show perception –
as COMMUNICATED from one person to another
such as blindness, blurred vision, having
only one eye – CAN BE fundamentally different
from one person to another, showing different
kinds of perception.
I will not try to show it here, but Impressionism
in painting, for instance Monet, shows both
A] perception is always perception in every
situation, not sufficient or deficient, and
B] brings in contextually an interpretation
of the *world* through mood, etc. Seeing
London in a fog impresses one differently
than seeing London in the bright day. The
impression cannot be separated from perception.
This will be important for Stoic doctrine
and determining what is open to *free will*
and is not. Not only is the Stoic concept
of *free will * highly restrictive BUT, in
it, ALL APPROACHES TO ETHICS IS THROUGH WHAT
THEY CALL PHYSICS which, seems to me, more
like epistemology. It is founded upon the
independence of the impressing object, as
Jud says, in itself from the impressed perceiver
whereby, most importantly, a judgment is
made on JUST the impression! The object *in
itself* is always indifferent and outside
any moral order which only exists inside
the perceiver. So, situating the perceiver
and determining what perception is and does
is important to ethical as well as logical
and mathematical judgment as they all operate
upon the same plain.
A QUOTE FROM EPICTETUS: [edited] *Instruction
consists precisely in learning to desire
each thing exactly as it happens. How do
they happen? As Nature that ordains them
has ordained. It has ordained that there
be summer and winter, and abundance and dearth,
and virtue and vice, and all such opposites,
for the harmony of the whole, and has given
us a body, and members of the body, and property
and companions. Mindful of this ordaining,
we receive instruction, not in order to change
things [non-technological but evaluative,
aesthetic], but that we may keep our wills
in harmony with what happens. For can we
escape from men? What method can we find
for living with them? While they will act
as seems best for them, we will be in a state
comfortable to nature. You ought, when staying
alone, to call that peace and freedom, and
look upon yourself as like the gods. What
is the punishment of those who do not accept?
To be just as they are. 'Throw him into prison.'
What sort of prison? Where he now is. [DO
YOU SEE THE IRONY?] For he is there against
his will, and where a man is against his
will, that for him is a prison. Just as Socrates
was NOT in a prison because he was there
willingly. Things proportionate to the faculty
which you possess [perception, logic, physics]
are brought before you, but you turn that
faculty away at the very moment you ought
to keep it wide open and discerning. The
gods allowed you to be superior to all the
things that they did not put under your control
[note the phrasing!], and rendered you accountable
only for what is under your control. As for
family, the gods have released you from accountability
[Remember - *They will act as seems best
for them*, i. e., if they want to listen
to you, they will – if not, not]. As for
the body, they have released you [*Is the
house filled with smoke? The door is wide
open!*]. For what have they made you accountable?
For the only thing that is under your control
– the proper use of impressions.* END EPICTETUS
QUOTE, DICOURSES, Bk. I, 12.
The editor of my Epictetus from the Harvard
Loeb Classical Library, W. A. Oldfather,
writing in 1925 is unexpectedly ruthless
and to the point in his examination of the
Stoic doctrine of *free will*. QUOTE
Every man bears the exclusive responsibility
himself for his own good and evil, since
it is impossible to imagine a moral order
in which one person does the wrong and another,
the innocent, suffers. Therefore, good and
evil can only be those things which depend
entirely upon our moral purpose, what we
generally call, but from the Stoic point
of view a little inaccurately, our free will;
they cannot consist in any of those things
which others can do neither to us or for
us. Man's highest good lies in the reason.
This reason shows itself in assent or dissent,
in desire or aversion, and in choice or refusal,
which in turn are based upon an external
impression, PHANTASIA, that is, a prime datum,
a constant, beyond our power to alter. But
we remain free in regard to our attitude
towards them. The use which we make of the
external impressions is our one chief concern,
and upon the right kind of use depends exclusively
our happiness. Page xxi. END QUOTE
The point is, THIS ALL IS AS MUCH PHYSICS
AND PHYSIOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY!
What I choose is the unexceptional and average
ability. *Opinion* and *belief* are secondary
in the sense of not being primary to the
physiology of sight. *Sight* is chosen as
the primary representative of *perception*.
However, the other senses always operate
in combination with sight, an inescapable
fact. Therefore, though their effects may
be evaluated as trivial, that is because
one's primary attention is almost always
focused on sight. There are things, then,
going on within you that you literally know
nothing about.
And *opinion* and *belief* also effect sight
just as the other senses do in a usually
unnoticed fashion. You like Masserattis.
You look at a street lined with parked cars.
Suddenly the only thing clear in your line
of sight is a Masseratti. This happened to
me is Pisa. The rest of perception became
mere background. My attention is focused
on a single object and someone could have
walked by me with a gun and shot me and I
would not have realized what happened till
the bullet hit me. I was also shot by a man
in Pisa that also focused my attention, but
it was a grown man with a cowboy cap pistol
and leather scabbard. One forgets everything
else in such situations, and they effect
you physically, materially. So, in effect,
initial judgment and evaluation literally
reaches into sight – but not the object of
sight - and determines a focal point with
vastly decreased peripheral vision.
Now, peripheral vision, itself, is fascinating,
and, guess what?, what happens in it can
save your life through reflexive action without
your knowing why you are acting. Another
fascinating fact one has to deal with is
that peripheral vision has no clear physiological
boundaries, however much common sense and
objective observation by others tells you
otherwise, whereas focused vision is always
situated in the context of peripheral vision
and, to a certain degree, situates it, maps
it UNLESS the object obsesses one too much!
So, though all these things constantly are
present and interplay, to establish phenomenologically
what literally happens with vantage point
and point of view I am deliberately emphasizing
line of sight, taking into context the point
from which the view is taken and all that
is present to view including literal obstructions,
angles, amount of light, and so forth. That
fact that, even though someone is standing
right next to me, at the same approximate
height, facing the same direction, physically
our points of view cannot be the same. This
is not a trivial point. It means, as close
as we can get an experience to be EXACTLY
shared, it cannot ever happen. It is the
difference between
*close enough* and *exactly perfect*. And
this is when all the elements of the situation
are as alike as are deliberately physically
possible. There is a world of conceptual
difference between *almost* and *perfectly*.
THIS IS UNDER STRINGENTLY CONTROLLED CIRCUMSTANCES!!!!!!
Remember, and this is crucial not only for
this but for understanding Aristotle, A is
equal to A ONLY at the same place at the
same time. And, as Hegel pointed out – he
does have his moments – A can therefore NEVER
be PERFECTLY equal to A. And therefore what
happens when we get away from this extremely
exact method of thinking? We have to do this
to live in the everyday.
That is the intellectual point we must proceed
from, that is, if the intellectual perception
of *reality* cannot be *perfect*, instead
of *close* or *good enough*, then all our
other determinations are going to necessarily
have to suffer from some degree of approximation
EXCEPT THAT we CANNOT POSSESS any perfect
standard to judge by. And what does that
mean? Approximation must necessarily be measured
by another approximation, even if regarded
as a trivial fact in everyday action.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
An opinion may be a generalization of a
point of view, a belief may be an illogical
generalization of a point of view. A point
of view is a singular or a general statement,
-but it is not a generalization-, and has
a logical sense or is a part of a logical
theory.
If we wish to develop a logical theory of
points of view, we may start by remembering
one of the oldest theories, the logical theory
of the Jain religion, based upon the principles
of: anekanta vada (non-one-sided talk), syat
vada (may-be talk), and the seven sides paralogism
(may be is; may be is not; may be, undecidably,
is and is not; may be is or is not; may be,
undecidably, is; may be, undecidably, is
not; may be, undecidably, is or is not).
European thinkers might be said to have
started to think in a logical theory of points
of view with Gottlob Frege's notion of "mode
of presentation", in which "the
morning star" and "the evening
star" both referring to "Venus"
are taken to be different modes of presentation.
GARY.C. MOORE:I loved all of this. It reinforces
what I said above. The identification of
Venus1 as Venus2 is temporal and positional.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
I like the idea of talking of a non-linear
logic and relating it to a theory of chaos.
There are at least two other related names
which may be mentioned: "informal logic"
and paraconsistent logic". As well there
is the science called Pragmatics of Language
which might deal well with a theory of points
of view. I take a more philosophical than
mathematically formal approach.
GARY. C. MOORE: wrote:
I am trying to approach a problem of personal
human point of view from an aspect whose
focus is assumed outside of that point of
view which, as I have always said, factually
and materially means MY point of view, meaning
that *point of view* always and necessarily,
in materialist terms, must mean MY point
of view since that is the only perceptual
point of view I can physically possess.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
As there is not a physical subject who might
the possessor of the point of view, because
"subject" is a term within a logical
theory, -a subject is not a reality, it is
not an object-, I understand that the term
"possess", above, has a logical
sense too, equivalent to say: the physical
locus which 'determines' the logical point
of view. Then, I talk about a 'physical locus'
as being the determinant of a point of view,
and not a 'physical entity'; so that, say,
for example: what determines your point of
view is not your body, but the place of your
body.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Yes. Get rid of subject. As a Stoic, I do
not *possess* a point of view, it strikes
within me as phantasm. It is there without
my willing. It is neutral in evaluation till
I judge it. A Stoic denies ALL instant judgment,
even if there is an involuntary immediate
reaction of body or moral/emotional reflex,
but notes in his detached physics the object
exists, and, as existing, is neither good
or evil or necessarily connect to any other
opinion, i. e., *a pretty wench* Epictetus
uses unusually often. You are neither cold
nor hot but a neutral observer who may –
or may not – judge at all. You do not have
to judge, and if you do judge, must neither
forget physics or logic.
*Physical locus* is usable ONLY if one does
not forget its necessary source IS a *physical
entity*, your body and moral history, which
automatically provides reactions you must
not act on without detached judgment. * What
determines your point of view is not your
body, but the place of your body * is good,
EXCEPT the body ALWAYS has a place, though
sometimes, being slothful and negligent,
we abstract it out of this real world into
another of mere fantasy.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
This would be different for an 'opinion',
in my view, an opinion is determined by a
physical entity, say, for example: your body,
where emotions, perceptions and conceptions
are conditionings of opinions; opinions are
not determined just by physical loci.
*Opinions are not determined JUST by physical
loci* is true, but it is always and in every
case A determinant.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
Now, if what determines a point of view
is a physical locus, then several questions
arise:
As long as we can not fix a physical locus
for a body say: for our body the is an ever
changing location and an ever changing constituent
matter, therefore "my" point of
view is ever changing, then, a point of view
may not be fixed even for a single observer.
GARY.C. MOORE:
What I said about Aristotle and A=A applies
here and the necessity of always measuring
by an approximation, however *close*.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
I am ever losing a point of view to take
another, or, in other words: my self lacks
of a consistent physical locus; and it is
not that my self has another locus than a
physical one, it is that its physical locus
can not be determined because it is a plainly
conditioned locus, any condition you may
think of is a condition of the self's locus.
Also, as long as the size of a physical
locus is not determined, say, for example:
by our body, so that, it is undetermined.
We may have a physical locus embracing several
observers giving a common perception or a
shared point of view.
GARY.C. MOORE:
That the body cannot determine precisely
its physical locus comes under what I said
about peripheral vision. My body, as locus,
is always, therefore, a *more than . . .
* what can be logically accounted for at
many levels. Another approximation.
But that does not justify *embracing several
observers* because my physical locus necessarily
remains cognitively primary since it is ontologically
unique, that is, as physical locus physically
alone quite literally. And this *aloneness*
has several other connotations connected
to it necessarily that have to be worked
out, as the Stoics do, with physics and logic.
*Embracing several observers* can only be
allowed physically and logically through
communication through language. Thereupon
it becomes symbolic and abstract, no matter
how reliable it may turn out to be in one's
own calculations.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
For example: as we all are in Earth we have
a common earthly point of view; thus there
may be material general statements; notice,
that the point of view of a shared physical
locus is not a generalization, but a general
point of view, not a single person can perceive
it, but all sharing the locus perceive it.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Unfortunately time makes me call a stop
here. But this will be where I introduce
Jud Evans' comments and the non-linearity
of the points of view of *others* which is
in reality a euphemism for a *God's point
of view* and the introduction of the theological
aspects of abstractions we can only delimit
to a degree by Stoicism and Eliminativism.
Any abstraction habitually dealt with as
a reality is theological. That it is a *habit*
implies a number of things. Everything we
learn, we DELIBERATELY make habitual like
ridding a bicycle. We need to examine the
nature and historical archeology of *habit*
- the only way of parents teaching their
young in Aristotle which means, all education,
all knowledge starts out, with children,
spoken from a *God's point of view*.
JUD EVANS:
This is something I have been trying to
do for years. I have been attempting to view
the things that exist, our earth, the cosmos
as if I was an independent observer - meaning
someone else - not me. I have been attempting
to conceive of *things-in-themselves.* It
is far too difficult for me to try to describe
what I mean here, but part of it involves
looking at a tree and trying to imagine what
it is like for the tree not to be looked
at, or - how it exists as a thing in itself
free from sensorial human attribution - too
see it *in the mind's eye* as it really is
existing in the way that it exists. I do
NOT believe that it exists in different phenomenological
versions depending upon whether a human or
a cow or a bird or an insect is looking at
it and interpreting it sensorially.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Quickly, I can agree with all of that. But
account should be taken of the mathematics
and geometry of an insect's point of view
as well as the fact there are other variables
one knows little or nothing about, for instance,
segmented eyes. In fact, that may well be
extremely important for this discussion.
Have there not been scientific studies SUPPOSEDLY
showing how a fly sees things?
JUD EVANS:
I believe that it simply exists in the *raw*
way that it exists and that it is the human
causal object which exists and sees it differently.
The bottom line? All objects in the universe
exist in ever-changing modalities, but there
is only ONE VERSION OF THE CHANGING OBJECT
AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT IN TIME.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Appropriate to what I said about A=A.
JUD;
I do not believe for example that electrons
can exist a point-particles and waves at
the same time. A very convincing case for
the wave nature of the electron has been
posited and the electron certainly behaves
like a particle sometimes. An electron has
a definite mass and charge, it can move slowly,
it can travel through a piece of apparatus
from a gun to a screen. What, then, is the
relationship between the wave and particle
viewpoints? {point of view?] I believe it
is the human observer who is misinterpreting
the true nature of the electron in the same
way that the human observer of the tree and
the insect's are entirely different. I feel
it in my guts that the confusion over the
electron gun and the impact scattering is
NOT an indication of chaos but an indication
of the experimenters not being able to see
or detect or understand the nature of the
electron as *a-thing-in-itself* but persist
in slapping erroneous attributes on it which
misunderstand it true nature. The standard
modern interpretation is that the intensity
of the wave (measured by the square of its
amplitude) at any point gives the relative
probability of finding the particle at that
point. Hide and Seek.
Now I may appear to be going off the subject
a bit here - I mean the question you raise
about *point-of-view* and the reason for
that is that I do not believe that such a
thing exists. I believe of course that all
humans are *point-of-viewers* and that we
all have *attitudes* and *preconceptions*
based upon our antecedal experience of similar
objects or situations. My *attitude* or *point
of view* towards work if I am lying on Southport
beach in the sun with a beautiful blonde
[my wife is the ideal candidate for that]
with a *mint julip* [whatever that is - but
it sounds good?] in my hand, will be quite
different to that if I find myself in the
garden with a vibrating lawnmower in my control
and a passing neighbour congratulates me
upon my roses.
GARY.C. MOORE:
OUT OF TIME.
MARIANO dV. C-T:
To easy things, it can be used the term
"may be" as well as the term "point
of view" as technical terms intended
to mark a statement as an 'undecidable truth',
as something which can not be said openly.
Say, for example: "May be cows exist",
to include the cases in which by "cows"
we understand a word, a drawing, a concept,
a class,... which do not exists, nevertheless
cows exist, as long as we take the "cows"
to have a referent, in reality, different
than any of those mentioned (word, drawing,
concept, class,...). Again, as any statement,
being a representation, purports ambiguity,
any statement may be marked with a "may
be", else, we may take any statement
as having implicated a 'may be' mark. Notice,
that this is may be a way to avoid reifications,
-or false generalizations.
Again, you might say, that 'your' point
of view is the point of view 'located in
the place indicated by the word "you"'
which may be pertinently interpreted, in
this case, to be the same as the locus "Gary"
or, may be, of the DNA+finger prints-Gary.
Now, if this is so, think, then, that we
may be unable to say openly what is the referent
of Gary, because there is not a universal
-or general- manner to determine it. Again:
we may know Gary, but we may not be able
to acknowledge such knowledge openly, we
may not be able to demonstrate that we know
Gary, even in the event of being able to
say things about him or to point to him,
because we can not be in -or can not know-
the same particular point of view which Gary
possess; we may not share with him his particular
physical locus... Or, also, we may share
a particular physical locus different than
his locus or my locus... this depends on
which physical locus are we talking about.
There may be truths which can not be said
openly, -or as mathematicians say: "undecidable
truths"- about Gary, truths which even
think we may know them, we can not put them
within a theory -or a system- by means of
which we might decide what is true and what
is false.
Resuming. I think that there is more than
one point of view possible, physically speaking,
I can not have the same particular point
of view as you have, in a body bounded physical
sense, in another of those views I communicate
with you, and this communication act is in
fact -or physically- sharing a space and
time which determines a common physical locus,
a locus of you and me, which imply to have
an, undecidable, same point of view. This
common, to both -you and me-, point of view
is not a question of agreeing or disagreeing,
it is a question of being in the same physical
locus; which is not the locus of the body,
it is, for example, the locus of communication.
In my logical theory about points of view,
physical loci are not restricted to bodies,
and knowledge is not restricted to what happens
inside a brain, as there are senses by which
physical communication happens. Communication
means continuity between loci, therefore
there can not be communication between different
loci, we talk, metaphorically, about a communication
between loci when there is a common locus
of two or more loci; it my be said that each
personal loci, your, mine, other, is a part
of a common locus of us. When you express
your point of view, and I interpret your
_expression there is a point of view, different
of the expressed point of view and different
of the interpreted point of view which is
a point of view of both of us.
Another example of a non-person bounded
point of view, as long as we share to be
physically in an Earth bounded physical sense,
we may share a same general point of view;
this an ontological question not an epistemological
one.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Now automatically, as you well know, such
a pin pointed determination brings objections
that there must be other points of view.
However, materially, such so-called points
of view are physically impossible to an actual
human being and are mere abstractions, likenesses
made from my perceptual point of view made
on the assumption that, other human beings
seeming physically like me and more or less
communicating information that can be corroborated
factually or logically, they also have perceptual
points of view exactly like mine. However,
I can never ever EXPERIENCE this as a physical
fact. One makes deductions from language
but that is where it must remain.
JUD EVANS:
The way I see things the question: *What
is Gary's point of view* can be answered
that: *Points of view* are rather like qualia,
or the answer to yet a further question:
*What is it like to be a bat?* The answer
is Gary's point of view is one of the ways,
manners or modes in which Gary exists - Gary's
point of view ... is... Gary, and what it
is like to be a bat is to be a bat. As you
say above: I can never ever EXPERIENCE this
as a physical fact. One makes deductions
from language but that is where it must remain.*
GARY.C. MOORE:
So one fictionally, that is, abstractly
assumes there are perceptual points of view
other than one's own. They seem exactly alike
in quality and ability - generally in
*normal* people - but many differences arise
from different mathematically diagrammed
vantage points. There is also the problem
of what is
*important*, that is, what is worth paying
attention to. This sometimes notably *warps*
- not really meant derogatorily but rather
simply factually - transmitted information
from another's point of to be integrated
into my own.
JUD EVANS:
As we get older we become more attuned to
guessing how another person must be feeling
because we have met so many other people
of a different sex, different age, different
nationality and class that we get a good
idea of the average person responds to certain
stimuli and situations. There are ALWAYS
exceptions and we can encounter people who
react entirely differently to our expectations.
GARY.C. MOORE
:It is essentially the FUNDAMENTAL meaning
of the concept *importance* I am trying to
delineate, attempting a historical portrayal
of how it came about as something different
from the strictly, physically personal and
uniquely individual. After all, even many
animals regard their mates and offspring,
as it seems, *naturally* as IMPORTANT. But
it is not the lion as a SPECIES that values
its progeny but the lion as a UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL
supposedly just like me.
JUD EVANS:
Yes, I agree that though the lion is imprinted
with the necessary deterministic coding in
accordance with *nature* or the existential
imperative [or whatever] at conception to
manifest protective behaviour in relation
to its young to ensure the eventual reduplication
of its genes, etc., you are right that it
is the individual daddy-lion that is at the
cutting-edge carrying out the protection.
GARY.C. MOORE:
THIS lion values ONLY its own progeny and
eats another's. THEREFORE is there the possibility
of plotting a non-linear vector outside my
personal point of perceptual view? I think
it is all too easy to say *Of course!* since
such a conclusion is emotionally comforting,
but you know very well that is NOT what I
want. I want facts. I want MATERIALLY or
LOGICALLY ascertainable FACTS.
*Matter* may possibly be out of the question
here, though, and the logic seems to be getting
away from the digital and wandering into
the analogical. Analogically, I can put myself
in the lion's point of view - but not factually.
JUD EVANS:
Yes, a man like you can make intelligent
guesses/judgements based upon your own experience
which no doubt includes stuff you have studied,
read, seen on TV about the behaviour of lions
and other mammals and reached certain conclusions
about the nature of the deterministic concatenational
patterns that motivate them.
GARY.C. MOORE:
And here determinism comes in, but not quite
as obviously as it might seem to be at first
glance. With a lion, is there really any
such thing as instinct
- which it would seem to immediately put
it beyond my purview - or is the lion's brain
essentially like mine in all aspects? It
is the point of instinct, that is, automatic
appropriate action, that is the sticking
point. However, I have never, using Occam's
razor, ever seen to need to make that assumption.
Instinct assumes qualities above and beyond
mere nerve reflex so I see no comparison
between to two whatsoever. Instinct has to
be selective for whatever reason, by whatever
cause, whereas reflex ALWAYS occurs with
the proper stimulus. So there is a physical
chain of causation in a lion's actions, but,
going by the simplest explanation of the
matter, it operates just like mine. You can
corroborate point of view even with a lion
to a certain degree.
JUD EVANS:
Predictably I do not believe that some *thing*
called instinct exists. For me what exists
is a causal object we call a lion. The animal
is programmed genetically to act in certain
ways [just like plants are programmed to
turn their leaves towards the sun etc] which
explains what we humans perceive and describe
as *a physical chain of causation in a lion's
actions* when what ACTUALLY exists is a physically
concatenationally programmed and acting causal
object called a lion. I hate these mouthful
of words, but in order to be ontologically
correct there is no way to avoid them.
GARY.C. MOORE:
But you can see many of these arguments
are merely approximations as compared to
an absolute fact such as a normal mathematical
equation. Therefore I was wondering about
non-linear thinking, something I got from
Malcolm and his chaos theory in reviewing
JURASSIC PARK, and its appropriateness in
dealing with problems like
- I *believe* other human beings are very
much like me but I do not KNOW this.
Below is an article from Wikepedia --- Non-linearity
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Non-linear) This article
describes the use of the term non-linearity
in mathematics. For other meanings, see non-linearity
(disambiguation).
JUD EVANS
:I think that linear thinking is an impossibility.
There is a danger that it is confused with
opinion. I am looking forward to responding
to you longer piece received today on SCHOPENHAURIAN
SHENNAGINS. which I find very interesting
because it addresses certain personal traits
I recognise in myself, which might be perceived
as cognitive linearity. As Richard points
out human thought processes are so diversely
antecedally determined that though the RESULTS
of my deterministically arrived at attitudes
to [say] ontology look like a
*one-track-mind* in action, the origins
of why I am like that in my attitudes go
back a long, long way. In that sense it is
difficult to draw a line in the deterministic
sand and say: The Israeli attack on Lebanon
happened because the Palestinians kidnapped
two soldiers [or was it one soldier?] when
plainly the deterministic origins of the
invasion can be traced back concatenationally
nearly 70-years during the long period of
the gradual take-over of the Arab homeland
by the Israelis.
I suppose, if I am honest with myself, although
the origins of what led to my linear thinking
are interesting, the more interesting point
is identifying at what precise stage any
competing [ontological] ideas ceased to be
deterministically successful? In other words
when was it that any residual transcendentalist
ideas or influences became concatenationally
ineffective in altering my *fixiation, strong
beliefs, obsession, considered opinion, sincere
belief, philosophical analysis, loony ideas?
I realise that the above developmental paradigm
could be applied to Hitler, Stalin, the Archbishop
of Canterbury, a dedicated golfer, or just
about anybody who has decided to concentrate
on a certain subject to the exclusion of
most others, and I am reminded rather guiltily,
of my attitude some years ago to a certain
guy [who was a nice chap actually] who was
on a list that Richard and I were both members
of [I cannot remember its name or his right
now?] who had a similar preoccupation with
Wittgenstein. All you got was: *Wittgenstein,
Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein,*
all of the time. I left in the end. Richard
will remember.
Well, now I am conscious that all you seem
to get from me is: *X doesn't exist, X doesn't
exist, X doesn't exist, X doesn't exist,*
and I thank you all for being so forbearing
and patient with me. It is indeed a pleasure
to read all your mails and to enjoy the changes
of subjects that you all bring to this list.
Thank you all once more.
The amusing/comforting part is, that when
my critics or my sympathisers select which
of the above terms best describe my *Point
of View,* they are themselves as much
*casualties* of their own experiential catenulate
culmination as the person they criticise
or congratulate. ;-)
Regards,
Jud Evans. Science and the Insanity Defense
Posted by: "gevans613@aol.com"
gevans613@aol.com tenbury220002003 Thu Aug
3, 2006
Sunday, July 30, 2006 Science and
the insanity defense
Writing in the Times on July 30, 2006, judge
Morris Hoffman and law professor Stephen
Morse defend the insanity defense. They rightly
point out that the very notion of moral responsibility
requires us to excuse those who don’t have
sufficient capacity for what they call moral
cognition. But in reaching what should be
an uncontroversial conclusion, they argue
that science and the law are at odds, when
in fact they collaborate. First, they say
The rise of various materialistic and deterministic
explanations of human behavior, including
psychiatry, psychology, sociology and, more
recently, neuroscience, has posed a particular
challenge to the criminal law’s relatively
simple central assumption that with few exceptions
we act intentionally and can be held responsible.
These schools of thought attribute people’s
actions not to their own intentions, but
rather to powerful and predictable forces
over which they have no control. People aren’t
responsible for their crimes: it’s their
poverty, their addictions or, ultimately,
their neurons. This levels a false charge
against science and is misleading about control.
Although materialistic and deterministic
psychiatry, psychology, sociology and neuroscience
deny contra-causal free will, they don’t
deny human intentions or responsible agency.
Rather, science shows their causes in biology
and culture, and eventually might describe
their neural correlates in some detail. And,
in point of fact, we aren’t in control
of the powerful and predictable forces that,
early in life, shape our brains, and therefore
our personalities and proclivities – we
aren’t self-made. Nevertheless, we form
intentions, and can be held responsible for
acting on those intentions, if we have normal
capacities for rationality and self-control,
all of which are entirely material and determined
(as Morse freely admits elsewhere).
So why this straw man of scientific eliminativism,
one wonders? Perhaps to carve out a special
domain for the law by casting science as
an inept interloper, a misguided threat to
commonsense moral responsibility. Furthermore,
scientific materialism and determinism do,
of course, undermine widely held supernaturalist
notions of moral agency, those that ground
ultimate metaphysical responsibility in contra-causal
free will. So maybe Hoffman and Morse, both
materialists as far as I know, distance themselves
from science in order not to offend certain
sensibilities.
Second, they claim that “we should recognize
that the criteria for responsibility —
intentionality and moral capacity — are
social and legal concepts, not scientific,
medical or psychiatric ones.” But they
immediately point out that in ascribing responsibility
we recognize that “some people suffer from
a mental disorder, and some do not” and
of course we don’t hold responsible those
with serious mental disorders. So, if psychiatric
illness is real (and few would dispute this,
except notoriously Thomas Szasz or, curiously,
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga), then at
least some of the criteria for responsibility
are indeed medical, psychiatric and scientific.
Third, Hoffman and Morse say that “Convicting
and punishing a defendant who genuinely believed
that God commanded him to kill is not unscientific,
it is immoral and unjust.” But the immorality
and injustice of such punishment stems directly
from the fact that the defendant (Andrea
Yates, for instance) suffered from a morally
impairing psychosis, the diagnosis of which
is a matter of science, not law. The point
again is that, contrary to their op-ed thesis,
the law’s definition of responsibility
isn’t conceptually independent of science.
Rather, neural and functional deficits in
rationality and impulse control, undermining
the capacity for responsibility, are precisely
what medicine, psychiatry and neuroscience
can help us discern. The legal test for insanity
can’t be divorced from these.
Much of the injustice in the recent rollbacks
of the insanity defense is due to the failure
to take the science of human behavior seriously,
and substitute instead the narrow, stern
and retributive judgment that wrongful behavior
must be punished, what ever the mental state
of the accused. If they were less concerned
with defending the law from science, Hoffman
and Morse would discover in a materialist
understanding of the mind an ally in clarifying
our judgments of when a person has, or has
not, the neurally instantiated cognitive
capacities to be justly held responsible.
We need not keep science at a distance to
retain moral agency, even if we are fully
material, and fully determined. posted by
Tom Clark at 9:30 PM 0 comments
regards,
Jud Evans.
GARY. C. MOORE:
NON-LINEARITY AND THE TREE
Fri Aug 4, 2006
So why this straw man of scientific eliminativism,
one wonders? Perhaps to carve out a special
domain for the law by casting science as
an inept interloper, a misguided threat to
commonsense moral responsibility. Furthermore,
scientific materialism and determinism do,
of course, undermine widely held supernaturalist
notions of moral agency, those that ground
ultimate metaphysical responsibility in contra-causal
free will. So maybe Hoffman and Morse, both
materialists as far as I know, distance themselves
from science in order not to offend certain
sensibilities.
Second, they claim that we should recognize
that the criteria for responsibility ” intentionality
and moral capacity” are social and legal
concepts, not scientific, medical or psychiatric
ones. But they immediately point out that
in ascribing responsibility we recognize
that some people suffer from a mental disorder,
and some do not and of course we dont hold
responsible those with serious mental disorders.
So, if psychiatric illness is real (and few
would dispute this, except notoriously Thomas
Szasz or, curiously, neuroscientist Michael
Gazzaniga), then at least some of the criteria
for responsibility are indeed medical, psychiatric
and scientific.
Third, Hoffman and Morse say that Convicting
and punishing a defendant who genuinely believed
that God commanded him to kill is not unscientific,
it is immoral and unjust. But the immorality
and injustice of such punishment stems directly
from the fact that the defendant (Andrea
Yates, for instance) suffered from a morally
impairing psychosis, the diagnosis of which
is a matter of science, not law. The point
again is that, contrary to their op-ed thesis,
the laws definition of responsibility isnt
conceptually independent of science. Rather,
neural and functional deficits in rationality
and impulse control, undermining the capacity
for responsibility, are precisely what medicine,
psychiatry and neuroscience can help us discern.
The legal test for insanity cant be divorced
from these.
Much of the injustice in the recent rollbacks
of the insanity defense is due to the failure
to take the science of human behavior seriously,
and substitute instead the narrow, stern
and retributive judgment that wrongful behavior
must be punished, what ever the mental state
of the accused. If they were less concerned
with defending the law from science, Hoffman
and Morse would discover in a materialist
understanding of the mind an ally in clarifying
our judgments of when a person has, or has
not, the neurally instantiated cognitive
capacities to be justly held responsible.
We need not keep science at a distance to
retain moral agency, even if we are fully
material, and fully determined. posted by
Tom Clark at 9:30 PM 0 commenNON-LINEARITY.
Dear Jud
- or any one knowledgeable - I am trying
to approach a problem of personal human point
of view from an aspect whose focus is assumed
outside of that point of view which, as I
have always said, factually and materially
means MY point of view, meaning *point of
view* always and necessarily, in materialist
terms, must mean MY point of view since that
is the only perceptual point of view I can
physically possess.
JUD EVANS:
Hi Gary, This is something I have been trying
to do for years. I have been attempting to
view the things that exist, our earth, the
cosmos as if I was an independent observer
- meaning someone else - not me. In other
words I have been attempting to conceive
of *things-in-themselves.* It is far too
difficult for me to try to describe what
I mean here, but part of it involves [say]
looking at a tree and trying to imagine what
it is like for the tree not to be looked
at, how it exist as a thing in itself free
from the sensorial contamination of human
attribution - too see it *in the mind's eye*
as it really is existing in the way that
it exists. I do NOT believe for example that
it exists in different phenomenological versions
depending upon whether a human or a cow or
a bird or an insect is looking at it and
interpreting it sensorially.
GARY.C. MOORE:
To clear up a misunderstanding – possibly
– what I propose deals with pure factual
perception. I do not believe in a Ding-an-sich
other than either A] materially and sensorally,
it persists in time and place, or as Aristotle
ALWAYS insisted for material identity *at
the same place and the same time* THEN A=A
AND ONLY THEN, with certain qualities in
literal UNINTERPRETIVE perception, that is,
the qualities are there in one place BUT
THAT FACT NEITHER CREATES AN OBJECT OR IDENTIFIES
ONE. HOWEVER, I can hand hand this glass
to you, and say *Describe this* and you say
*This is a glass*. And I reply, *No, that
is an interpretative concept. What I want
is a description of your sensorium of it
in the present moment and place.* Though
we would probably agree it is a glass, a
description of its sensorium, if I am using
that word correctly, would closely agree.
We could disagree about its qualities AS
A GLASS but that does not effect the sensorium
we agree upon.
AS A SENSORIUM, I do not see how *a human,
a cow, or a bird or an insect* would or even
could disagree on any part of the sensorium
they can adequately perceive according to
there physiology. I say *physiology* very
deliberately to make a point. Not only do
the dumb animals not possess language to
tell us what it is they perceive, but, if
we are literally and persistently honest,
we say absolutely nothing about their cognitive
abilities.
Well, you think, Gary is always saying animal
minds are basically no different from human
minds, and since, though common sense says
otherwise, I cannot scientifically get inside
an animal's mind [that is, *mind* as operative
and sensing brain] I have to humor him. But
I invoke Occam's Razor again. Is not the
simplest explanation of comparison of operative
brains, including GARY. C. MOORE:e's of Jud
Evan's, is that basically they are alike
but objectively, for historical and physiological
reasons, are seen to operate differently?
This means that nothing sees a tree as a
different kind of tree simply because of
what or who they are, but necessarily see
the same tree from a different vantage point
as an insect, or special human being, and
each and all of them from a different point
of view positionally. Now you say, as a straw
man, this distinction is trivial, but I say
it is not. I say it is a fundamental point
of what you literally KNOW versus merely
verbal erasure of what are real distinctions
in perception. The inconvenience of this
way of thinking encourages abstraction to
make the real tree into a mere abstraction
WHEREAS Dr. Hannibal Lecter, if in fact his
cell had a view which it does not, would
be able to view a tree from only one vantage
point, from his cell and all the connotations
and implications of that, and ONLY ONE SIDE
of the tree facing him. Is this important?
Extremely. The tree is outside in freedom
whereas he is inside caged. That jumps over
a lot of logically steps of literal interpretation,
but certainly the passion it aroses should
be obvious. The vantage point, the situation
of the perceiver, and the point of view,
what the perceiver CAN perceive, are physically
limited whereas we slovenly disregard our
literal freedom to view the tree any way
we want to and merely say, *It is a tree
– so what?* Great differences in physiological
abilities make great differencies in thought.
An insect or prisoner can only do so much
whereas we take our freedom to perceive for
granted and consider any other limited perceptual
view as morally and species-wise *inferior*,
a useless, meaningless moral judgment added
on arbitrarily to a fact that remains materially
the same.
This is one of the things reading the Stoics
and about the Stoics has taught me. *So-and-so
is talking behind your back.* It is a fact
these words physically are heard by your
ears. Your over-imaginative mind thinks *I
have been hurt!* This is a figment and does
not exist. My saying the tree is ugly and
your saying the tree is beautiful changes
nothing of the sensorium of the tree. *He
kills people*. That is factually said. *That
is horrible!* That is invented. There can
be an objective template of political action
that determines the action of law enforcers.
They say, *The man is a soldier. That is
his purpose to kill people that threaten
him.* *But the people killed are harmless
BECAUSE they are civilians!* *Wrong*, the
British Military Police say, as they apologize
for bothering Air Marshall Harris, *By their
actions, whether voluntary or not, whether
directly contributive or not, help support
and morally give approval, either actively
or passively since if they disapprove they
do nothing to contract it, to a murderous
activity directed at the citizens of our
country, not only killing people, destroying
our culture and history, but also trying
to destroy our government and political system.
A rational world community has the same aim
and motivation for their laws. Those people
work against that rational purpose to destroy
us whether they are forced to or not. Therefore
they also are killers exactly as an enemy
soldier is and it is this man's moral and
legal duty to destroy them until they stop
trying to destroy us by any means whatsoever.*
*But the means he does it by are too much!*
What is the rational standard for that? Marcus
Aurelius had no compunction against killing
Germans until Germans stopped killing Romans.
The same for Air Marshall Harris. The same
for Winston Churchill. The same for President
Truman. It is a logical, and in its context
*moral*, statement – kill them till they
stop. However, the *moral* is not necessary
or needed. To achieve a specific physical
fact you must do a specific physical action.
Did your parents want to die under German
bombs, Jud? Or did they prefer that German
parents died until German sons stopped killing
Englishmen?
It is never just killing is killing as a
physical fact, but the PHYSICAL vantage point
- which includes the physical situation
of the initiation of hostilities – and the
PHYSICAL point of view - *I am here at the
end of the trajectory of a German bomb* while
*he is there at the end of the trajectory
of an English bomb*. The physical continuity
in time will eventually come to a stop with
different results for the one or for the
other. What is your vantage point and point
of view of the tree between you and the German?
Ciao, Gary
GARY. C. MOORE:
Wed, 2 Aug 2006.
NON-LINEARITY
I am trying to approach a problem of personal
human point of view from an aspect whose
focus is assumed outside of that point of
view which, as I have always said, factually
and materially means MY point of view, meaning
*point of view* always and necessarily, in
materialist terms, must mean MY point of
view since that is the only perceptual point
of view I can physically possess. Now automatically,
as you well know, such a pin pointed determination
brings objections that there must be other
points of view. However, materially, such
so-called points of view are physically impossible
to an actual human being and are mere abstractions,
likenesses made from my perceptual point
of view made on the assumption that, other
human beings seeming physically like me and
more or less communicating information that
can be corroborated factually or logically,
they also have perceptual points of view
exactly like mine. However, I can never ever
EXPERIENCE this as a physical fact. One makes
deductions from language but that is where
it must remain. So one fictionally, that
is, abstractly assumes there are perceptual
points of view other than one's own. They
seem exactly alike in quality and ability
- generally in *normal* people - but many
differences arise from different mathematically
diagrammed vantage points. There is also
the problem of what is *important*, that
is, what is worth paying attention to. This
sometimes notably *warps* - not really meant
derogatorially but rather simply factually
- transmitted information from another's
point of to to be integrated into my own.
It is essentially the FUNDAMENTAL meaning
of the concept *importance* I am trying to
delineate, attempting a historical portrayal
of how it came about as something different
from the strictly, physically personal and
uniquely individual. After all, even many
animals regard their mates and offspring,
as it seems, *naturally* as IMPORTANT. But
it is not the lion as a SPECIES that values
its progeny but the lion as a UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL
supposedly just like me. THIS lion values
ONLY its own progeny and eats anothers. THEREFORE
is there the possibility of ploting a non-linear
vector outside my personal point of perceptual
view? I think it is all too easy to say *Of
course!* since such a conclusion is emotionally
comforting, but you know very well that is
NOT what I want. I want facts. I want MATERIALLY
or LOGICALLY ascertainable FACTS.
*Matter* may possibly be out
of the question here, though, and the logic
seems to be getting away from the digital
and wandering into the analogical. Analogically,
I can put myself in the lion's point of view
- but not factually. And here determinism
comes in, but not quite as obviously as it
might seem to be at first glance. With a
lion, is there really any such thing as instinct
- which it would seem to immediately put
it beyond my purview - or is the lion's brain
essentially like mine in all aspects? It
is the point of instinct, that is, automatic
appropriate action, that is the sticking
point. However, I have never, using Occam's
razor, ever seen to need to make that assumption.
Instinct assumes qualities above and beyond
mere nerve reflex so I see no comparison
between to two whatsoever. Instinct has to
be selective for whatever reason, by whatever
cause, whereas reflex ALWAYS occurs with
the proper stimulus. So there is a physical
chain of causation in a lion's actions, but,
going by the simplest explanation of the
matter, it operates just like mine. You can
corroberate point of view even with a lion
to a certain degree. But you can see many
of these arguments are merely approximations
as compared to an absolute fact such as a
normal mathematical equation. Therefore I
was wondering about non-linear thinking,
something I got from Malcom and his chaos
theory in reviewing JURASSIC PARK, and its
appropriatness in dealing with problems like
- I *believe* other human beings are very
much like me but I do not KNOW this.
JUD EVANS:
This is something I have been trying to
do for years. I have been attempting to view
the things that exist, our earth, the cosmos
as if I was an independent observer - meaning
someone else - not me. I have been attempting
to conceive of *things-in-themselves.* It
is far too difficult for me to try to describe
what I mean here, but part of it involves
looking at a tree and trying to imagine what
it is like for the tree not to be looked
at, or - how it exists as a thing in itself
free from sensorial human attribution - too
see it *in the mind's eye* as it really is
existing in the way that it exists. I do
NOT believe that it exists in different phenomenological
versions depending upon whether a human or
a cow or a bird or an insect is looking at
it and interpreting it sensorially.
GARY.C. MOORE:
Quickly, I can agree with all of that. But
account should be taken of the mathematics
and geometry of an insect's point of view
as well as the fact there are other variables
one knows little or nothing about, for instance,
segmented eyes. In fact, that may well be
extremely important for this discussion.
Have there not been scientific studies SUPPOSEDLY
showing how a fly sees things?
JUD EVANS:
I believe that it simply exists in the *raw*
way that it exists and that it is the human
causal object which exists and sees it differently.
The bottom line? All objects in the universe
exist in ever-changing modalities, but there
is only ONE VERSION OF THE CHANGING OBJECT
AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT IN TIME. GARY.C. MOORE:Appropriate
to what I said about A=A. JUD EVANS:I do
not believe that electrons can exist a point-particles
and waves at the same time. A very convincing
case for the wave nature of the electron
has been posited and the electron certainly
behaves like a particle sometimes. An electron
has a definite mass and charge, it can move
slowly, it can travel through a piece of
apparatus from a gun to a screen. What, then,
is the relationship between the wave and
particle viewpoints? [point of view?] I believe
it is the human observer who is misinterpreting
the true nature of the electron in the same
way that the human observer of the tree and
the insect's are entirely different. The
confusion over the electron gun and the impact
scattering is NOT an indication of chaos
but an indication of the experimenters not
being able to see or detect or understand
the nature of the electron as *a-thing-in-itself*
but persist in slapping erroneous attributes
on it which misunderstand it true nature.
The standard modern interpretation is that
the intensity of the wave (measured by the
square of its amplitude) at any point gives
the relative probability of finding the particle
at that point. Hide and Seek. GARY.C. MOORE:That
is much like Mariano's Jain blind men studying
the elephant. One interprets the unknown
by what one knows.
An Eliminativist approach
would be to state the facts as they are without
a comprehensive interpretation. That is something
not only that we need to get use to but actually
develop a methodology, something you are
very good at, of anticipating results that
are necessarily always going to be incomplete,
therefore not encouraging a comprehensive
God's eye point of view. How does one go
about describing something when it is not
a *something* is the problem. The God's eye
point of view wants a *thing-in-itself*.
And the real kicker is BOTH approaches have
their correct vantage points and points of
view if used correctly. What I am trying
to bring to the foreground is that NONE of
this is simple and obvious. The God's eye
point of view is absolutely essentially to
both an astronomer and an atomic physicist
because they deal with realms necessarily,
that is, when being *comprehensive*
which translates in practical terms *What
does it mean to us in the world we live in?*
Nobody, including the most detailed and fanatical
scientists, just want bits and particles
of information and mathematical formulas
for highly delimited aspects, they want something
to show their real bits and pieces – which
they can actually demonstrate in one fashion
or another – have important meanings for
the *whole scheme of things*, that is, and
only can be, the God's eye point of view.
So, we know the process in the laboratory
only gives us certain particles of information
that do not *interpret themselves for us*.
And if we leave it at that, that is, simply
show the real facts of the matter, we want
to say *And so . . . ? What does this MEAN?
Why is it IMPORTANT? What are we to DO with
this?*
What have we done? A number
of *human* issues have suddenly been connected
to material facts where there is no physical,
material connection, and, considering that
scientific experiments – ideally – are performed
not to achieve BENEFICIAL results but are
LEGITIMATE only if there is detached neutrality
as to the outcome which simply wants to find
a fact of reality no matter what it is. BUT,
once done, THEN the God's eye point of view
immediately – and, in its own way, legitimately
- intervenes giving the experiment a moral
framework of purpose and comprehensive understanding.
Now, this is in the very nature of language
AS WE HAVE LEARNED IT FROM OUR PARENTS. As
such, it is an inescapable fact not to be
avoided but should be dealt with straight
forward in an honest manner. *What should
be* always overwhelms in one fashion or its
opposite another *what is*, that is, the
bare facts of the matter. Therefore abstractions
always have a theological implication to
give them a sense of reality that they cannot
logically and scientifically truly possess.
Does this invalidate their use? Then you
must cease to speak – and write. OR – you
can think of it this way. The *God's eye*
point of view gives one an IMAGINATIVE grasp
of things one cannot possibly grasp through
mere bits and pieces. It gives a MORAL imperative
to see logical connections that only the
imagination can bring together, which then
– maybe – can be scientifically verified.
We not only have a comprehensive grasp but
also a purpose and aim to our thinking –
where, in material fact, none exist. Now,
in this regard, the Stoics can be greatly
helpful because essentially what they are
trying to do is move in the opposite direction.
They want to LEAVE a world of overly emotional,
traditional belief smothering aspects. They
want to cut the theological in language down
to the bare bone. Though there is a necessary
and even useful theological remnant between
their vantage point and point of view and
our vantage point and point of view, none
the less, the purposes and directions, though
opposite, are true opposites, and are as
compatible, and mutually necessary, as the
north and south geographical and magnetic
poles. Opposites are absolutely necessary
to understand reality beyond bits and pieces
in the hand to the overall comprehension
in the bush.
Both Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius constantly hammer at the point *What
do you TRULY possess?* which translates *What
do you really control?* which translates
into OUR bugbear *How are you Free?* - NOT
does free will exist, but, coming from the
opposite direction where everything and anything
is considered in the power of human free
will including the powers and purpose of
nature and the wills of the various gods,
those two savagely cut your existence down
to a bear sliver of self-responsibility,
that is, *Do you assent to your sense impressions?*
Mere assent. Absolutely nothing else. No
changing of any external reality TO THAT
ASSENT. And that *assent* means ONLY do you
give that sense impression *importance*?
All moral – and theological – importance
– ALL OF IT, TOTALLY – hangs on that one
threadbare point – and it CANNOT be expanded
into anything more that that because both
Stoics rub your face repeatedly in the fact
the real object that caused that sense impression
is COMPLETELY OUTSIDE YOUR CONTROL, YOUR
*FREE WILL*, as a material fact even if it
may be your wife and children. You cannot
make a material exception for them. They
fall into the same material status as physical
objects as any other physical objects. If
they are important to you, and they compel
you to do certain things, then you are enslaved
by them. You have given them your assent
to be your masters. A harsh realization,
but an undeniable one. Guess where God has
a place in this? God is Nature, and what
happens is natural, and as natural is good
because it is rational and it has to be that
way and no other. And now you have been introduced
to the heart of Stoic physics and logic.
They are disciplined to approach their wife
knowingly in the same way they would approach
a scientific experiment. I said *APPROACH*,
no more. The Stoic acknowledges you will
have feelings, but that is exactly and only
how THEY should be approached, as
*sense impressions*, *Do you give assent
and to what degree?* As Epictetus says, It
is foolish to say you will not love your
children, but even more foolish to IGNORE
the ever-present fact they will die. Kiss
them, he says, with the thought in your mind,
*Tomorrow morning you could be dead.* In
other words, THE ONLY THING YOU OWN is what
you assent to. Period. Sum total of your
life. In fact, even your life, your body,
is totally at the use and abuse of anyone
who chooses to do something with it. That
too is part of reality as Nature. What happens,
really happens, and since it does happen,
grieving over it in a magical incantation
of emotion as if that would change reality
makes things much, much worse, not better,
despite the fact that is what the bystanders
around you expect from you. That is all that
they can be in such a situation, bystanders.
They are people of absolutely no importance.
So, your assignment, Jud, should you assent
to pursue it, is to approach imaginative
comprehension and scientific particulars
in a Stoic fashion, always knowing the facts
of the matter are absolutely beyond your
control – or *free will*, that what happens
happens, that you and I are specks of absolutely
no importance from the *God's eye* view of
the Goddess Nature – maybe from here we can
find out the insect's view of things, that
is, if we are not stepped on first – and
things go on without us as if we had never
lived. Now, a normal person would cry out
*That is an absolutely horrible thing to
say!* But a Stoic would say, *It makes you
free.*
3] JUD EVANS: Now I may be going off the subject here - the question you raise about *point-of-view* and the reason for that is that I do not believe that such a thing exists. I believe of course that all humans are *point-of-viewers* and that we all have *attitudes* and *preconceptions* based upon our antecedal experience of similar objects or situations. GARY. C. MOORE: That is actually what I am trying to get away from. But a better way to put it is *distancing ourselves from . . . * since several kinds, and very different types, of just such a general methodology have arisen here. A] I am trying to eliminate all *subjective* aspects from vantage point and point of view to the bare bones so anyone can say, no matter what their particular vantage point or point of view physically is, that what I say fits your facts of the matter. B] *Opinions*, *attitudes* and, more technically correct, *preconceptions* are, as concepts and modes of behavior toward thought, essential and ever-present in each unique individual. But they are only as empty concepts generally applicable as necessary forms one must apply to one's living thought. In each person's case, according to their individual experience, they are filled with different items, as if going to a grocery store and shopping, since we each think we need different things to solve different individual needs. C] Preconception determines without prior thought what one does with philosophy. The urge to change fundamentally one's present situation takes on forms DETERMINED by one's unique circumstances, therefore the aims and purposes of two different individual's pursuit of philosophy will necessarily be different even though they have many points of agreement. D] These points of agreement, though logically coherent, are still different in their aims. This is why I am trying to stay with a coherent and consistent and universally acceptable concept of physical line of sight. Each person's line of sight must necessarily be different. But, graphically, optically, geometrically, they accords with the same definitions and follow the same rules. Why? It is because we can draw a picture and, instead of locating each point with a physical particularity present only to oneself, we can put in algebraic symbols, as in classroom algebraic geometry, to show the SHAPE of our thought and see an easy and coherent method of comparison and general situational likeness. E] These forms are still abstract, and, as such, still liable to theological overtones giving them a reality in themselves as, for instance, *a word that everyone understands the same way*. But, since one can change one's thinking from solely using words to drawing lines on paper or figuratively in one's head, one has at least one item at hand one can simply perceive, though its interpretation and context will still be verbal and, hence, theological. F] If one cannot completely rid oneself of the theological point iof view, especially such a tremendously useful one as the *God's eye point of view* that places in a form or order all the particular facts you know, then make it mathematical. Now, mathematics was born directly out of theology through the agricultural and herd dependent astronomy as well as the priest developed geometry of Egypt for re-ploting the boundaries of farmer's fields after the Nile Flood, and even abstractly out of Pythagoras. But these theological origins were bound immediately and directly with correct versus incorrect physical results, or rational solutions to logical and mathematical problems, and any further mystical interpretation thereof extraneous and discardable if unwanted. And the history of the discarding of the mystical connections of mathematics has had varying ups and downs throughout history, but almost always with educated intellectuals with overall and even ulterior purposes in mind. It did not operate as an opiate of the mind as common religion does with the mass of people, but rather just the opposite. GARY.C. MOORE [previously] Automatically such a pin pointed determination brings objections that there must be other points of view. However, materially, such so-called points of view are physically impossible to an individual human being and are mere abstractions, likenesses made from my perceptual point of view made on the assumption that, other human beings seeming physically like me and more or less communicating information that can be corroborated factually or logically, they also have perceptual points of view exactly like mine. However, I can never ever EXPERIENCE this as a physical fact. One makes deductions from language but that is where it must remain. Jud: The way I see things the question: *What is Gary's point of view* can be answered that: *Points of view* are rather like qualia, or the answer to yet a further question: *What is it like to be a bat?* The answer is Gary's point of view is one of the ways, manners or modes in which Gary exists - Gary's point of view ... is... Gary, and what it is like to be a bat is to be a bat. As you say above: I can never ever EXPERIENCE this as a physical fact. One makes deductions from language but that is where it must remain.* GARY. C. MOORE: I am concentrating on two individuals with the most similar and nearly identical point od view – as in a geometrical drawing, in the abstract. I am making *opinion* and different species secondary for now, ALTHOUGH one should carry over a geometrical model of perception to *opinion* and bats since even these have to be geometrically positioned and related in the world. Remember, I am concentrating on things that can have a literal geometrical figure drawn about them. MARIANO dV. C-T: To easy things, it can be used the term "may be" as well as the term "point of view" as technical terms intended to mark a statement as an 'undecidable truth', as something which can not be said openly. Say, for example: "Maybe cows exist", to include the cases in which by "cows" we understand a word, a drawing, a concept, a class,... which does not exist. Nevertheless cows exist as long as we take the "cows" to have a referent in physical reality different than any of those mentioned (word, drawing, concept, class,...). Again, as any statement, being a representation, purports ambiguity, any statement may be marked with a "may be", else, we may take any statement as having implicated a 'may be' mark. Notice that this is may be a way to avoid reifications, -or false generalizations. GARY. C. MOORE: Yes, ambiguity is inherent as no one can occupy the same place at the same time as anyone else whereby, even just geometrically, no one can have the same experience as physically equal or identically the same. But words, drawings, concepts, and classes are also physical with exactly plotable physical positions in their material realities as breathes of air, as printed words on a page, as grammatical positions in a physically delineated linguistic context. One can use as a model, Can a computer do it? It can provide the word, the drawing, the concept, the class in a physical object, a material space geometrically positioned and mathematically measurable so being *may be* or *undecidible* is not ontological in language or logic but merely incidental and accidental. And, as my computer just demonstrated, it can edit my words without my permission. MARIANO: 'Your' point of view is the point of view 'located in the place indicated by the word "you"' which may be pertinently interpreted, in this case, to be the same as the locus "Gary" or, may be, of the DNA + finger prints-Gary. Now, if this is so, think, then, that we may be unable to say openly what is the referent of Gary, because there is not a universal -or general- manner to determine it. We may know Gary, but we may not be able to acknowledge such knowledge openly, we may not be able to demonstrate that we know Gary, even in the event of being able to say things about him or to point to him, because we can not be in -or can not know- the same particular point of view which Gary possess; we may not share with him his particular physical locus... Or we may share a particular physical locus different than his locus or my locus... this depends on which physical locus are we talking about. There may be truths which can not be said openly, -or as mathematicians say: "undecidable truths"- about Gary, truths which even think we may know them, we can not put them within a theory -or a system- by means of which we might decide what is true and what is false. GARY.C. MOORE: Simplicity, simplicity, simplicity. I am NECESSARILY a mere abstract locus to you no matter what initially. In time, a history of locus points accumulates around my locus point as mere meaningless word, maybe taking the form *He is really a bastard is he not?* The vantage points on the map of my/your/X's experience accumulate detail through time and more incidental experience. If a single theme predominates, then X achieves a *character*, a *personhood*. It may well be completely bogus and most certainly will be partially so. You cannot know me like the rock you hold in your hand. I cannot know you like the brick I cement into a wall. WE WILL ALWAYS BE A CONTINUAL SURPRIZE TO EACH OTHER unless we are extraordinarily dull in which case, in that fashion, we will be extraordinary and objects of pseudo-scientific experimentation. However, I am always a place, a point. I am this word *Gary* and not *John*. The difference is minute and trivial in the extreme. But it is still the point where I exist to you – AND for myself. I am my writing – now – and, to tell the truth – pathetic as it is - most alive now. I am literally the words you read, no more. In time, maybe, as on a crime scene map, pins may accumulate at a spot, a town, say York, and the chief of detectives says, This is the center point of the serial killings. Though we must intensify the search for the killer here, we must also keep our minds open to the possibility this may be complete misdirection on his part. But, for some reason, he commits his murders here and either lives in York or has easy access for some reason to the city. You must study the clues. Hopefully they will tell you if he is a home town boy or an outsider. Knowing this will give us a great advantage in either locating him or at least discouraging him from further murders. In other words, determining the vantage point AND the point of view is a detective story where only FACTS are desired, COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM WILD ABSTRACTIONS not closely derived from the literal facts only. No one is able to share the locus with the murder except in the most logical and mathematical method possible. GARY.C. MOORE [previously] So one fictionally, that is, abstractly assumes there are perceptual points of view other than one's own. They seem exactly alike in quality and ability - generally in *normal* people - but many differences arise from different mathematically diagrammed vantage points. There is also the problem of what is *important*, that is, what is worth paying attention to. This sometimes notably *warps* - not meant derogatorily, but simply factually - transmitted information from another's point of to be integrated into my own. JUD EVANS: As we get older we become more attuned to guessing how another person must be feeling because we have met so many other people of a different sex, different age, different nationality and class that we get a good idea of the average person responds to certain stimuli and situations. There are ALWAYS exceptions and we can encounter people who react entirely differently to our expectations. GARY.C. MOORE: I would ask, How much of this is really getting attuned to others, others whose hearts we cannot know, or is it much more getting attuned to ourselves and saying, Differences really do not matter that much unless real harm is caused? GARY.C. MOORE [previously] It is essentially the FUNDAMENTAL meaning of the concept *importance* I am trying to delineate, attempting a historical portrayal of how it came about as something different from the strictly, physically personal and uniquely individual. After all, even many animals regard their mates and offspring, as it seems, *naturally* as IMPORTANT. But it is not the lion as a SPECIES that values its progeny but the lion as a UNIQUE INDIVIDUAL supposedly just like me. Jud: The lion is imprinted with the necessary deterministic coding in accordance with *nature* or the existential imperative to manifest protective behaviour in relation to its young to ensure the eventual reduplication of its genes. You are right that it is the individual daddy-lion that is at the cutting-edge carrying out the protection. GARY.C. MOORE :I disagree on some points. A lion, and there is even a difference between the female and male lion on this, does not only not care about its progeny after a certain period of development, stops treating them as children, but often casts them out of the pride. Now a lion knows nothing about genes or even the survival of the species. It can only do things from its point of view. What we do is impose our point of view on them. Actually that is totally incorrect. How? We impose a point of view of how we SHOULD regard our families idealistically, completely disregarding A] how we actually treat our families in fact, and, even MORE so B] how we have seen others treat their families. So, how is the idealistic point of view? Through and through thoroughly theological, un realistic wishful thinking of the worst possible sort. Not only is it *One size fits all* but we do not even care to actually observe if the size fits. And as to realistic observation of how we or others treat our and their families, we still strive laboriously to put an idealist show for others upon those actions while never paying attention to the actual facts of the matter. Tolstoy put it succinctly at the beginning of ANNA KARENINA, *All happy families are alike. Each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.* Though even that is inaccurate, it does nail down a number of points. The first point that is not at all obvious is that the happiness of the children determines the happiness of the family. For the adults, in a happy family, success in having a happy family depends A] on obviously necessary factors, but most importantly B] no abstract artificially imposed rules. The adults must establish rules, but sensible adults impose rules that are common sense and have immediate results that are observed carefully to maintain good results. IN OTHER WORDS, CAREFUL trial and error. And, of course, external events can completely destroy that. What makes a family unhappy should partially be evident, but the introduction even of traditionally bad rules will have different results with different members. I hope I am not talking complete nonsense – and someone bring this to Antonio's attention. One main point, in happy families, there is no primary imperative to carry on perpetuation of genes. That also gives an aspect as to unhappy families. There will be similar differences in a lion's pride [the name is interesting]. The female lion is most caring to a temporal point. The male lion is merely tolerant up to a temporal point. If male children are cast out of the pride, it is certainly not because of any imperative against inbreeding. A more common sense view would be the male children are more competitive, and therefore thoroughly obnoxious, than the females. If a female is competitive like a male – I am guessing but I bet I am right – mother swats the heck out of her. Daddy might kill her. If she persists, her survival potential may decrease drastically. Point of view? It is easy to see the simplicity of the lion's point of view and vantage point – IF ONE DOES NOT IMPOSE IDEALISTIC COMPLICATIONS THAT ARE NOT AT ALL SELF EVIDENT. And maybe it is just as easy to see the simplicity of human families – after all, they are animals too – except that WHAT SHOULD BE scoops our eyes out with a brutal spoon. The lion pride does give us an example of family life where there is the LEAST amount of interference in the education and raising of children. But if correction is needed, it is immediate, direct, and very severe. As if, let us pretend for a moment, that it were a life or death matter. The child gets the point or dies. |