
ANTONIO ROSSIN:Mon Aug 20, 2007.
Of course I read The name of the Rose
several
times, and the movie too, and of course
I
enjoyed it very much.
GARY C. MOORE:
One key to the understanding of the
novel
is, relatively, how bad and misleading
the
movie is - in comparison. Obviously
it is
superior to movies of a similar type
and
subject. But, once again compared to
the
novel, it shows itself as a vastly
inferior
media by which to communicate ideas.
This
is relevant to education theory.
Chapter *Nones* [142-154] is of great interest A movie is
an abstraction of the novel controlled
by
the nature of the conversion from one
medium
to another. This applies not only to
audio-visual
aides in the classroom but also the
very
presentation verbally and textbook-wise
to
the student by the teacher. They do
not -
usually - DO what they teach, or, as
the
common American saying goes, If you
cannot
do it, teach it, referring to people
who
teach business and science. Things
are vastly
compressed and abridged for immediate
though
often highly confusing digestion. This
is
supposed to be the presentation of
knowledge
in a compact form that is still validly
the
same as the knowledge that is compressed.
But just as I made the
point
about modern science not laboriously
being
worked through, in an *ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny* form, where one goes through
the
primitive laborious processes of doing
something,
for instance making fire from rubbing
sticks
or chipping flint to striking a phosphorus
match, so as to understand how we came
about
the modern machine that helps in scientific
research. This is not to denigrate
modern
science. In fact modern science is
impossible
without these machines. As the contemporary
villain Robert Doniger says in Michael
Crichtons
TIMELINE [pg. 141, Ballantine paperback],
*But today, no important scientific
discovery
could be made with such simple tools.
The
sciences are utterly dependent on advanced
technology* [Crichton also says a number
of very interesting things about Quantum
mechanics - it is a very interesting
book
to read alongside Ecos THE NAME OF
THE ROSE
as both books demonstrate mixed interpolation
of very modern science with moderate
teachers
modern science with medieval science].
But with the educational
compression
and abridgement, crucial historical
understanding
of ideas - both Eco and Crichton make
the
same point in different ways - is wholly
lost, and what knowledge the educator
is
trying to convey to the student is
almost
entirely lost or distorted in the process.
Unless the student supplements his
studies
with a vast amount of reading - and
therefore
labor, the basic structure of *value*
in
both Adam Smith and Karl Marx - what
he learns
simply in class is mediocre at best.
In some
ways, military education - or variations
of a similar theme such as hands-on-business
to learn the real working of economics
-is
a far better model for educating in
depth
than academic education. In the military,
the drill sergeant breaks the recruit
down
to nothing, no self confidence, no
reliance
on *previous knowledge* [mere assumptions].
Then the drill sergeant builds up the
recruit
again from nothing by learning every
single
material step needed for a knowledge
of working
military science. And it has always
been
a science, or appreciative of science,
as
Crichtons TIMELINE demonstrates. This
is
what they do at West Point. There you
learn
improvisation, technology and the limits
of technology, and the philosophy of
strategy
which stands next door to outright
politics.
In France, after graduating from St.
Cyr,
the student does not become an officer
automatically
but rather becomes a buck private and
for
two years is expected to work his way
up
the ranks to sergeant before he can
really
become an officer. I think this is
a methodology
directly held over from the French
Revolution,
not the royal military schools like
Napoleon
attended. So they know how to clean
and maintain
a rifle, how to repair a tank, how
to calculate
artillery fire in the field, etc, before
they get the privileged, but minimal,
rank.
So in contrast
to this
we might put modern education. How
so exactly?
Why specifically this contrast? What
contrast
am I referring to exactly? Military
education
actually reflects a much older form
of education
that has gone out of style since the
formation
of modern universities, specifically
universities
in the 20th century. First, what is
the overall
form of a modern university education?
It
is to teach you to qualify for a job,
a mere
blind process of life, according to
other
peoples demands. How so? The graduate
is
a person qualified to perform certain
functions,
not to determine ends or purposes -
that
is the employers right only. How is
this
different from a military education?
The
end purpose of an ordinary *job* is
not yours,
in fact, the end purpose has little
or nothing
to do with you. You may not even know
what
the end purpose really is, or it changes
from year to year according to the
newest
catch words or form of corporate image.
All
that belongs to your employer, not
you. This
is true even of a university professor.
Universities
completely ceased to be repositories
of tradition
and overall recognized purpose in the
middle
of the twentieth century, if not earlier,
and became mere job factories.
But the basic values
of the military man had to remain at
least
formally the same or the morale of
the military
declined drastically and publicly.
There
are numerous examples of this in newly
independent
countries as opposed to countries with
an
established military tradition. The
basic
values also were materially welded
to a military
education - essentially survival although
the aspect of survival had to be forcibly
changed from the individual - as in
a modern
university - to survival as a unit
whether
the smallest or the largest. This meant
the
identity of the members of a unit had
to
be maintained as a unit, and one way
of doing
this was maintaining the traditions
of the
unit either as a part or as a whole.
I had
a little bit of this when I was in
the army
- but I had unusual circumstances.
Jud probably
have much more of this in the British
Army.
What I am saying
is that
the military maintained aspects of
the medieval
guild system. That system was reflected
in
every aspect of learning a profession.
The
universities of the time also reflected
this,
and when you graduated from a university
you still went into a master-apprentice
relationship.
Some professions today still reflect
this
as when a new lawyer joins a law firm.
But
not many professions operate that way
any
more, and there is little tradition
in a
law firm. You were apprenticed to a
master
and worked your way up starting at
the most
menial tasks until you were a master
yourself.
You learned all the traditions and
meanings,
the religious? Philosophical? symbolism
of
your profession, all of its history,
a Why
for everything you do that could change
only
if you achieved master hood yourself.
The
guild of architects, the Masons, is
one of
the most outstanding large guilds.
Though
little is known about the medieval
guild
of masons - keeping it, with difficulty
since
they were connected, separate from
the Knights
Templar and the later political aspect
of
Masons in the American Revolution and
the
Illuminati in its attack on the sovereigns
of middle Europe during the approximate
time
of the French revolution - it is known,
since
it is carved in the hard to see corners
of
all the great cathedrals, they maintained
the explicit symbolism of the Celtic
gods
and made common decorations like gargoyles
still hard to explain being on purported
Christian places of worship and wholly
contradictory
to the spirit and letter of Christianity.
So essentially they were a society
completely
unto themselves. And most certainly,
despite
minor outward trapping at times, the
military
maintained a world view far closer
to paganism
than to the literal teachings of the
Church.
And every co-operation between the
military,
or politics, and the Church had a material
reward usually for both but always
for the
military. So they also were a society
unto
themselves. The military and medieval
guilds
had members who shared a common purpose,
a common understanding of the world
from
their professional point of view, and
either
kept it secret or assumed no one else
would
really be interested because they did
not
share the same values. So, where do
we place
scientists in this scheme I have described
which is a public and established fact?
They
are products of the modern university.
One
might see a difference between academics
and scientists working for corporations.
But I find this ambiguous. What do
you think?
Adso is merely
comic
relief in the movie, whereas he is
as crucial
as William or Jorge in the novel. Those
three
represent three fundamentally different
approaches
to the same object of thinking. What
this
object is, is hard for me to identify.
For
one thing, a major - maybe THE major
theme,
in THE NAME OF THE ROSE is the identity
of
differences and difference within identities.
One difference that MAY retain its
form is
the difference between the *simple*
and the
*philosophical*. Another major difference/identity
is the love of God equal to the love
of the
flesh equal to the love of the mind
[there
are TWO, actually THREE, maybe four,
different
love scenes in synchronic and diachronic
contiguity staring with Adsos conversation
with Ubertino where the nature of sex
is
thoroughly confused, leading to Adsos
confusion
and rebelliousness against William
that leads
him alone in into the library where
he remembers
the religious ecstasy of a hertic burned
at the stake in Florence, then his
hasty
departure from the library to the kitchen
where he discovers a naked girl and
confuses
the mysticism of the Song of Songs
or Song
of Solomon or Canticle of Canticles
with
the discovery of real flesh - for Adso
a
mass of real and distinct differences
made
the same in actual experience - and
it is
explicitly stated as being such by
Eco].
Jorge most definitely belongs to the
later,
the philosophical, and not the former,
the
*simple*. That is made clear himself
as he
himself distinguishes himself from
the *simple*
whereas William sees a similarity to
them
within himself, or rather his moral
purposes,
whereas Adso is a definite combination
of
the
*simple* and the *philosophical* -
but then
he is the one who most often finds
identity
in difference and differences in identity
and therefore carries most of the burden
of the central theme of the novel.
In the
movie Jorge is merely a narrow minded
fanatic
whereas in the novel one can see the
rational
necessity of his line of thought from
his
premises also accepted by the majority
of
people in the modern world, especially
educators,
politicians, and military leaders.
William
and Adso are out of place or out of
date
or simply contradictory to this way
of thinking.
It is Jorge who is most *Modern*. But
you
have to read the novel to understand
why.
Jorge is the *Organizer*, the CEO of
the
mind.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Yet Umberto Eco disappointed me, twice,
both
on the same point.
The first time, I sent to him a 45
page writing
of mine, where I presented the rough
main
lines of my educational theory based
on Dialectics.
What I wanted to do, it was do deliver
my
pragmatic proposal about communication
(of
knowledge).
*** He answered me a 8 page thoughtful
letter
- at whose end, to my great disappointment,
this sentence (I translate it into
English
from memory): "But finally, at
a re-reading
of your work, in front of the width
of your
project, I feel shy to give you further
suggestions:
I don't own the necessary competence"
GARY C. MOORE:
Considering how he has changed the
major
format of his writing to, at first,
the novel
where he can put both his own, *new*
ideas
[Eco has no illusions how *original*
his
ideas are - he is explicit about this
in
the POSTSCRIPT and elsewhere] next
to old
ideas of many different sorts - reflecting
many different kinds of people, that
is,
a real world of people in contrast
if not
in outright conflict - with old ideas
that
have demonstrated longevity if not
necessarily
accuracy - although *accuracy* is shown
to
be, at least in part, merely a *point
of
view* of methodological application
where
many times an *old* idea that *failed*
is
now become a successful *new* idea,
applied
in a different manner - like Idealistic
abstract
thinking for instance. It does not
have to
be *True* in order to work and achieve
its
goal. This is a point William recognizes
about his detecting method in his conversation
with Jorge, that is, he arrived at
the right
conclusion from the wrong premises.
*** Eco has, secondly, changed the
format
of his *academic* writing to one with
a great
deal of humor and irony in it, both
laughing
at himself and laughing at the seriousness
of the human beings around him. In
a sense
this shows his *academic* writing is
taking
second place in importance to his novels
because the *academic* position now
presupposes
more fundamental propositions than
it puts
forward, propositions explicitly stated
in
the dramatic argument in the library
labyrinth
between William and Jorge where the
ultimates
of life and death are both literally
and
philosophically the issue and literally
at
hand, a debate that Adso in fact concludes
with William in the midst of the horror
and
devastation of the monastery, thus
insuring
his ultimate importance in the novel
completely
ignored in the movie.
*** It is Jorge who perfectly defines
the
importance of Book II of the POETICS:
***QUOTE***
*Here the function of laughter is reversed
[from being *base, a defense of the
simple,
a mystery desecrated for the plebians
. .
. Elect your king of fools, lose yourselves
in the liturgy of the ass and the pig,
play
at performing your saturnalia head
down*],
it is elevated to art, the doors of
the world
of the learned are opened to it, it
becomes
the object of philosophy, and of perfidious
theology . . . .* [and from the preceding
page] William: *Why does this one [POETICS
Bk II] fill you with such fear?* Jorge:
Because
it was by the philosopher. Every book
by
that man has destroyed a part of the
learning
that Christianity has accumulated over
the
centuries . . . Boethius had only to
gloss
the Philosopher and the divine mystery
of
the Word was transformed into a human
parody
of categories and syllogism . . . But
he
had not succeeded in overturning the
image
of God. If this book were to become
. . .
had become an object for open interpretation,
we would have crossed the last boundary
.
[474 resumed] Then what in the villein
is
still and operation of the belly would
be
transformed into an operation of the
brain
. . . But from this book many corrupt
minds
like yours would draw the extreme syllogism,
whereby laughter is mans end! Laughter,
for
a few moments, distracts the villein
from
fear. But [475] law is imposed by fear,
whose
true name is fear of God. This book
could
strike the Luciferine spark that would
set
a new fire to the whole world, and
laughter
would be defined as the new art, unknown
even to Prometheus, for cancelling
fear.
. For the villein who laughs, at that
moment,
dying does not matter: but then, when
the
license is past, the liturgy again
imposes
on him, according to the divine plan,
the
fear of death. And from this book there
could
be born the new destructive aim to
destroy
death through redemption from fear.
And what
would we be, we sinful creatures, without
fear, perhaps the most foresighted,
the most
loving of the divine gifts? . . . But
on
the day when the Philosophers word
would
justify the marginal jests of the debauched
imagination, or when what has been
marginal
leap to the center, every trace of
the center
would be lost . . . A Greek philosopher
[whom
your Aristotle quotes here, an accomplice
and foul auctoritas] said that the
seriousness
of opponents must be dispelled with
laughter,
and laughter opposed with seriousness.*
***END
QUOTE***
GARY RETURNED:
The problem, for Jorge, is not only
laughing
at God but laughing at death as Bakhtin
show
Rabelais doing with his characters.
I do
not think Jorge directly says it but
I think
Jorge, like Martin Luther, hinged the
whole
question of real human immortality
not on
anything God has done or will do or
given
us, etc, but hinged it purely on the
fear
of death. Not on Hell fire, though
Jorge
like Luther speaks a lot about damnation,
but on the *blackness of darkness*
[Jude],
life simply ending and the erasure
of the
personality. He certainly accuses laughter
of destroying the disciplining fear
of death
much as Hamlet did from the opposing
point
of view: *Who would put up with all
this
crap if one could end it with a bare
bodkin.*

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
The suggestions he gave be, were about
reading
a lot of books and treatises which
he surely
had read: something like the Alexandria
library!
Indeed, KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE.
My answer was still
unanswered:
what to do, with all of that knowledge?
How
to teach it? By making children read
the
same Alexandria Library?
GARY C. MOORE:
It would be much knowledge without
form as
I said above about modern universities
versus
medieval guilds. It is far too glib
and easy
dismissal of guilds as *outdated ideas*
especially
when those ideas keep being repeated
piecemeal
in contemporary history - and, being
piecemeal,
fail since their ultimate purpose is
*out
in the world* that does not care about
context
and meaning and not *in themselves*
- for
instance, labor unions. Guilds may
have had
less numbers in members but they had
much
more political influence in their time.
Purpose
asks what is the form of my life, its
meaning,
not in a supernatural way - other way
to
put your life in the hands of outsiders
-
but in the form of material accomplishment
and practical actions - like avoiding
death,
surviving.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Now, coming to Eco's "the Name
of the
Rose". The book is a monument
to KNOWLEDGE.
For the abbey Library was "the
greatest
of Christianity". For the love
of scholars
for books.
GARY C. MOORE:
No, not scholars, monks, men religiously
devoted to books as such, books of
any sort
whatsoever. Petronius SATYRICON was
preserved
in a Yugoslavian monastery, possibly
an inspiration
or source for Eco. They were devoted,
firstly,
PHYSICALLY to books. Secondly their
reproduction
- AND DECORATION which was related
to interpretation-
and then thirdly actually reading them.
Never
was scholarly work, in the modern sense
of
the term, ever performed by the monks
other
than casual checks for literal accuracy
inefficiently
carried out. And only around the Renaissance
did they think to write their own books
about
these books unless they were being
trained
for an academic career like Thomas
Aquinas
- and then, much of the time, he did
not
himself write his books but dictated
them
to others.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:Mon Aug 20, 2007.
For William's method to match empirical
reasoning
with love for books.
GARY C. MOORE:
I do not think he is a book lover for
the
sake of the individual books like the
other
monks are. To them, the books are as
much
works of art in the very fullest sense
of
the term. In fact, the approach of
the actual
copyists does not simply reproduce
the text
- nor even simply decorate the text
with
pleasing art - but in the marginalia
provides
a space either for verbal commentary
or pictorial
ridicule of the seriousness of the
text.
Whereas William is an information collector.
In this regard, he is different from
both
Jorge - who had been a former librarian
and
collected books, especially copies
of REVELATIONS
from his native Spain - and Adso who
takes
all images both in the books and in
the church,
including the inner library, with the
greatest
seriousness whereas William pays little
or
no attention to either.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
For the damages knowledge could harm
to the
unprepared reader - up to the "hic
sunt
leones" dungeon where the worst
book
was carefully hidden, with the pages
poisoned
not to allow the whole knowledge to
be spread.
*** All of Eco's novel is built around
that
secret book, and knowledge (of it.)
GARY C. MOORE:
Actually I would disagree. The book
is an
excuse to have a mystery. When Jorge
and
William have their final debate William
admits
he came to the right conclusions for
the
wrong reasons. And, even more, it is
difficult
- I think very deliberately so - to
discover
the actual culpability of Jorge in
the murders
which at point poin the seems to admit
yet
at other points he seems to deny either
wholly
or in part. And this is when he fully
understands
that William has *caught* him so, as
he says
himself, there is no reason any longer
to
deny his part in the events. The question
that remains despite all is, What were
the
events actually?
***
QUOTE
(page 492) ***
ADSO:
[in the face of Williams despair at
solving
the crimes]
*I could go on listing all the true
things
you discovered with the help of your
learning
. . .* WILLIAM: *I have never doubted
the
truth of the signs, Adso; they are
the only
things man has with which to orient
himself
in the world. What I did not understand
was
the relation among signs. I arrived
at Jorge
through an apocalyptic pattern that
seemed
to underlie all the crimes, and yet
it was
accidental. I arrived at Jorge seeking
one
criminal for all the crimes and we
discovered
that each crime was committed by a
different
person, or by no one . . . Where is
all my
wisdom then? I behaved stubbornly,
pursuing
a semblance of order, when I should
have
known well there is no order in the
universe.*
***
END
QUOTE ***
GARY AGAIN:
There is much more of importance in
that
scene - William quotes Wittgenstein
- but
the point is the break down of communication
- wholly - because there is no order
in the
universe [this is a simple way to put
it
- read the chapter to get the full
meaning].
If there is no order in the universe,
there
can be no difference. No difference
between
heretic and orthodox. And especially
no difference
between the love of God as *spiritual*
and
the love of God as passion and sex.
Ubertino
really confuses Adso on this point.
The passion
of the Florentine heretic to be burnt
astonished
him. And then he meets a real woman
and describes
his feeling through the imagery of
the SONG
OF SONGS - which was a favorite text
of monks
and mystics - if there is any difference.
I have known about the popularity of
the
SONG OF SONGS in the Cloister for a
long
time - but *scholar* wise it is always
explained
*spiritually* whereas poor Adso is
confronted
with real people who put real life
into that
text in the real world in one immediate
event
after another - the discussion of the
Virgin
Mary with Ubertino in the church, the
rebellious
trip to the library immediately afterward
thinking of the passion of the Florentine
heretic, then, frightened, stumbling
into
the kitchen upon a naked girl straight
out
of the BIBLE - a text proper people
no longer
read. But in his monkish tradition
it was
the most important book in the whole
BIBLE
- something the Catholics know very
well
today, but would like to forget. I
find Christians
absolutely amazing in their selective
blindness.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Ok., Ok., also some thrilling, some
sex too,
to make the reading more delightful:
but
what remained, after the fire, it was
the
highest value of KNOWLEDGE ( witnessed
by
William, who risked his life to save
two
books from the fire, and the great
mystery.
What was the contents of the poisoned
book?
GARY C. MOORE:
Theresa Coletti says the sex scene
is the
central scene of the whole book, and
I agree.
Unless you understand its importance,
you
do not understand the novel. And right
in
the middle of the debate Adso witnesses
between
Jorge and William, Adso thinks to himself:
*** QUOTE ***
***pages 472-473 ***
*I realized, with a shudder, that at this
moment these two men, arrayed in a
mortal
conflict, were admiring each other,
as if
each had acted only to win the others
applause.
The thought crossed my mind that the
artifices
Berengar used to seduce Adelmo, and
the simple
and natural acts with which the girl
had
aroused my passion and my desire, were
nothing
compared with the cleverness and mad
skill
each used to conquer the other, , nothing
compared with the act of seduction
going
on before my eyes at that moment .
. . Each
fearing and hating the other.
*** END QUOTE ***
GARY AGAIN:
What more proof could you need showing
the
centrality of passion in the novel
over intellect,
passion using intellect for its own
purposes,
than this? And where would a teacher,
an
academic go after realizing this in
his own
text other than to writing novels or
papers
couched in self-mocking humor?

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Eco gives us some clues, to know what
the
poisoned book was. "the donkeys that flew, and the world
topsy turvy", were the illuminations made by a (poisoned)
monk who read last that book. Enough
for
us to understand that the book was
Arisrtotle's
"Comedy". A book that could
have
upset the fundamentals of knowledge.
Yet
Eco did not deepen this point, and
it is
the same point that I wanted him to
collect,
out from my rough 1973 typescript.
This is why I despise
the man
Umberto Eco. He is a mastermind, true,
he
is a man with success, true, he is
a top
academic scientist, true, but he is
shy,
a coward as for how to question knowledge
- what to do with it - and he has all
the
tools to do it.
To Umberto Eco,
like
most academicians, knowledge is something
to possess, to sip drop by drop, to
enjoy
from the power and fame and money it
can
procure.
To get everything,
except
the criticism of the fundamentals of
knowledge
itself, and its owners. Except that
which
Aristotle's "Comedy" stood
very
likely for and which, far more humbly
roughly
and naively, my "Negative Language"
stands for. See on this topic my "Dialectic
Synthesis speaks Negative Language"
attached, where I advocate systemic
criticism
(antithesis) of any truth funtamental
(thesis);
and a what to do with knowledge, to
wit,
my article "Democracy or Fundamentalism:
which Education Model" at http://evans-
experientialism. freewebspace. com/rossin08.
htm
When I sent my typescript to Eco on
1975,
I enclosed a check to pay for his answer,
much like 1,500 US# of today -- otherwise
he wouldn't have answered, he wrote
in his
courteous reply. What a shame.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
I owe you some more explanations.
In my previous post with same subject
I used
the term "parasites" which
use
could appear inappropriate. Not so.
They are parasites not because they
do harm,
but because they do not the work that
they
are paid to do.
The fact is, here in our country (mine
and
U. E.'s) the academe and the universities
are no private business. This means
that
the academicians, university teachers
and
institutional educators are paid with
the
money of taxpayers, so they are in
duty to
do what the taxpayers (PITS) ask them
to
do, and what the taxpayers are in need
for
them to do. BTW, in the Italy the average
tax rate is 45% over, whilst in the
U. S.
it is about 20%, my daughter tells
me from
Missouri.
Well now, in my exposed case, I asked
him
for giving parents the information
about
a possible link between earliest language
learning and mind-frame self-fixing
in children,
under parenting feed-back. As everybody
knows
as, today's parents are in need of
such informations
for a number of relevant reasons, and
my
question was clearest, and he understood
it very well -- and I 've also paid
him with
my private cash to perform that institutional
task of his own, which task he, unlike
me,
had at his disposal all the needed
institutional
tools to perform it.
But he did not do. So he results to
have
been paid twice (one with the university
academic salary, the other with my
money)
for doing a work he should have performed
because it was his job, but which he
did
not do just once.

RICHARD SANSOM:
Antonio, here is a general response to your
post:
First you state that my remarks [and my questions
regarding the criteria for *perfection*]
are academic and theoretical. I challenge you to show this is the case
in light of what I said regarding the
rearing
of children. In dealing with children only a fool applies
some academic orthodoxy, and having
raised
six children I can attest to this fact. Second, I respectfully suggest that it is
you who are academic and theoretical
in your
structures of the four components you
discuss. Next, I asked the very straightforward question
as to how one might go about establishing
a criteria for *perfection,* [i.e.
vis a
vis child rearing and perfect people]
and what those criteria might be. You did not answer except to get into how
such a criteria could be communicated. It seems simple enough to me: state them
outright [e.g. one such criteria for
the
perfect boat would surely be that it
must
float!] IMO, if one uses an abstraction such as *perfection*
they must be able and willing to explain/defend
its use – if not its utility.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
True. Since I was a simple
parent
in the street, about forty years ago,
I had
no special suggestion by the education
officials
about how to raise up independent,
self-conscious,
flexible children. Indeed, I had somehow
come to considered that kind of mind
frame
to be the best one in order to prevent
discomfort,
psychical pathologies and drugs addiction
in the youth – just the opposite of
the fundamentalist
mind frame. No education authority
whom I’ve
asked and urged for, gave me any reply.
So
I tried to do it myself. I drafted
a theory.
Yet I am neither an academician nor
an institutional
educator, since I'm not paid by the
collectivity
for that task. I am a simply amateur
who
substituted himself to the institutional
authority -- because I realized that
there
was a lack of any suggestion to parents
by
the qualified institution about raising
up
flexible children.
I but agree, children are raised up
all the
same, parents don’t need of any suggestion
to do it but good sense only. But a
number
of mistakes are made by the unaware
parents,
and some hints to avoid those mistakes
could
be the case.
I've presented my findings in some
writings
of mine. Forty years ago, and thence
on,
I tried to engage the education officials
(U. E. included) for filling-in to
that empty
parenting domain with the missing informations
, how to deal awarely and responsibly
with
the zero-to-three aged children. I’m
still
waiting…

RICHARD SANSOM:
Regarding your response to my comments on
the Nazi endeavors to create the perfect
Aryan human, instead of simply refuting
the
endeavor as not only impossible, but
horribly
immoral, you said: *that is, they [Nazis]
did perform no fair communication.*
. No,
that is not what they did not do. What they did not do was to value human life.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
They valued their own (human) life
even too much, and managed to preserve
it
from any corruption coming from other
people
whom they were in communication with...
Let's
suppose, there is a number of ways
in which
we can understand and/or expose the
Nazi
craziness. Please notice, my above
sentence,
however insufficient to describe so
monstrous
a crime, was in order to explain communication
and not to explain the massacre of
so many
innocent peoples.
Though here you make me remember of Cardinal
Richelieu, whom is said he once stated:
“Give
me six lines written by the most honorable
of men, and I will find an excuse in
them
to hang him..."

RICHARD SANSOM:
I recall in the excellent movie The Dead
Poets Society, the text on understanding
poetry had a diagram showing an X and
Y axes
on which some parameters of poetic
value
and meaning were assigned.
Robin Williams, the iconoclastic teacher,
who was later fired, tore up the text
as
being entirely unrelated to understanding
poetry. We cannot, except at our peril,
cast
human behavior, characteristics, values,
etc. in some functional form using
lines
and numbers. Humans, IMO, are far too complex and varied
– beautifully and interestingly so.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Humans are six billions over of different
persons. But I was speaking of the
barebone
structure of communication. Let me
recall:
When you communicate with another person,
you can either give or receive a given
information,
or a given object. When you discuss
a given
information, you can either agree (i.
e.,
by speaking of it into positive language)
or disagree (i. e., by speaking of
it into
negative language.) Plainly, to agree
with
a given information, you can write
an entire
treatise – or say a simple YES. Countless
variations in between.
GARY C. MOORE:
Dear Richard, In the *First Thought* I wanted
to delineate the stages of human efforts
to understand the world VERY SIMPLISTICALLY.
*** I can see, now, what is happening here
is an ongoing change in the paradigm of *reality*.
I want to relate it to the psychology of
how human beings actually think in the world
of everyday life, *everyday life* being that
for every individual in which they necessarily
are forced to fit all their actions including
all their thoughts however purportedly specialized
in a theoretical fashion and deliberately
intended to be separated from everyday concerns
and motivations.
I think Jud would agree this can never be
done realistically at any level or situation,
that the purportedly most abstract scientific
theory or experiment can never be divorced
from the everyday reality around it but merely
segregated to an extent by acknowledging
and trying to define approximate boundaries
where one starts and the other stops but
that there never is an absolute divorce and
that at some point in time, no matter how
theoretical the endeavor, its place within
the everyday world of concerns, motives,
and average abstract thinking has to be taken
account of. If nothing else, when the bills
have to be paid.

RICHARD SANSOM:
Gary, as I mentioned in a post to Antonio
[I think] the conceptual or what he called
the *academic* has its roots in the practical
and the *every day.* How could it be otherwise?
As I mentioned, even the most complicated
and arcane problems of physics and mathematics
can be traced to simple [and practical] situations
that, over time, have grown into what I call
*knowledge problems,* that deal with abstractions.
As for everyday concerns and motivations
being involved, I agree; our motivations
related to achieving success in any endeavor
have fundamental and common ingredients –
finding out why something is the way it is;
discovering how to use or change it; absorbing
the lessons learned, eventually into a canon
of experience-based rules and theories.
GARY C. MOORE:
Then, with the invention of observational
machines like electron microscopes, crystallography,
and spectrometers and so forth we have information
that is either not obtainable at all by any
other means or which saves tremendous amounts
of time, labor, and money. This is undoubtedly
a good thing except that, for the common
scientist, they forget the real limitations
of the medium they are using or never even
really learned what they are or never experienced
the labor of working through the old timey
way of analyzing amino acids like an Alexandrian
student of Euclid would have to work through
THE ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRY page by page. In
other words, unless he is the exception,
he does not know how the machine gets its
results, he just trusts them as long as they
remain within expected parameters - and if
not runs them again, tests the machine, and
maybe calls in a repairman. In material fact,
then, he really does not know how he gets
his results - just that they do or do not
fit his expectations in which he has a religious
faith reflects reality. Now someone like
Thomas Kuhn or Albert Einstein have devoted
their lives to pointing out the utter inanity
of approaching science in this fashion, but
it is the average way the average scientist
approaches science.

RICHARD SANSOM:
Gary, I think we must separate the
user of
surrogate technologies, whose interest
lies
in solving one kind of problem [are
the red
blood cells shaped like sickles?] from
the
researcher who inspires and even designs
such technology. What is important
is establishing
the purpose of the use and the sought
objectives.
There is little need for the orthopedic
surgeon
to know the intricacies of the MRI
machine
design – only its use and its limitations.
However, I believe that most highly
complex
medical technologies are designed by
those
who know what is needed – i. e. those
who
use or wish to use them, and also possess
the necessary skills to design the
equipment..
GARY C. MOORE:
Now, the reason John Duns Scotus is important
to me is that he stands midway, both temporally
and intellectually between Aquinas and Ockham,
between *modified realism* and *nominalism*.
Learning from Eco not to read Aquinas as
if he were anticipating objections to his
thought from the Enlightenment and the Age
of Science but rather, in common sense, confronting
at-hand problems wholly of his own age and
place without any anticipation of readers
in the distant future, you can see him as
trying to bring philosophy out of the mysticism
of Neoplatonism into the real world of real
people dealing with the only thing they really
know and all they can know - material objects.
Eco is the first scholar that has ever made
this clear to me. This should automatically
raise a red flag that what Aquinas regards
as *supernatural* and what we regard as
*supernatural, though still the same thing,
are being approached from an extremely different
point of view from our own. Eco points out,
unfortunately rather subtly, a number of
real problems to such an approach to philosophy
- but if you read THE NAME OF THE ROSE you
can understand the political and economic
pressures already evident in Aquinas time
of having to put theology on some sort of
realistic - in our sense of the term - basis.

RICHARD SANSOM:
I liked what Eco said in the postscript regarding
the intended style of the novel; to have
the voices be those likely to have been spoken
in the milieu of the period. I think he took
some liberties in this regard, but I assume
that he knows far more than I do about that
subject. I have an excellent book --*The
Shorter Cambridge Medieval History* by C.
W. Previte-Orton, as well as the Heer, that
I have mentioned recently. If one reads the
history of that age it becomes quite clear
that folks then did not see the world anywhere
close to how we see it today – in all areas
of life. I think Eco tried hard to infuse
this sense into the book while at the same
time making it readable, and exciting as
a mystery, to modern audiences. Even as detailed
and explicit as Previte-Orton is, it is still
difficult for me to visualize [and feel deeply]
the daily life of a peasant, clergyman, royalty,
scholar, artisan or merchantman of those
times.. Life then seems to have been shrouded
in a continual confrontation with death,
sickness, ignorance, superstition and the
many warring factions that abounded. Since
the life spans were usually very short compared
to ours today, this alone must have had a
serious effect on the psychology of the individual.
Hope was probably a rare commodity and concern
for anything [e. g. the future – as in global
warming!] but one’s own life and that of
their family was no doubt absent except for
the very few.
Incidentally, I read that the 12th
and early
13th centuries were far more accepting
[or
forgiving] of *progressive* ideas,
than the
following two or three centuries, in
terms
of the Church. I am curious to know
what
happened to begin the great focus on
heresy.
Any thoughts on this matter?

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
You make me think of the thinking brain function
in order to acknowledge, and relate with,
the components of the reality existing in
the outside.
GARY C. MOORE:
I am glad you brought this up. There
cannot
be an outside or inside – actually
of anything!
All knowledge is necessarily knowledge
viewed.
Reading is viewed. Thought is viewed
objectively.
Dreams are viewed – sometimes from
a strange
slant but still literally viewed. One
presupposes
there is an *inside* to something till
you
open it up, and then – guess what!
– it is
now outside and viewed.
ANTONIO ROSSIN:
As regards to this function, let's
imagine
that the thinking brain barebone structure,
at birth, is "tabula rasa".
But
not completely. Understandably indeed,
it
presents like a cross with four main
components:
To Give (top), To Have (below), Positive-equal
and Negative-contrary in the sides.
These
four components, at one's birth are
still
empty slots, which everyone of us goes
to
fulfill with the knowledge we need
of to
live.
GARY C MOORE:
Actually they are necessary components of
sight and therefore have nothing to do with
built-in, innate knowledge. It is simply
the directions of sight from an upright position.
Now, as to someone staying upside down from
birth, I would expect severe problems in
adjusting to a right sided world - *right-sided*
being standing upright as the standard of
proper visual judgment. And I have heard
of this and you probably know much, much
more.
Now, your categories,
however,
as categories are VERY interesting
and I
will have to think about them some
more.

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Accordingly, we have at the top of our thinking
brain barebone structure the "To Give"
slot which we look at from a "to Have"
position, of course. From birth on, we have
fulfilled it with a number of analogous ideas,
all of which are necessary to our understanding-
acknowledgment of the reality we live in.
The idea of God (however
you
or Aquinas may define it) is one among
the
more common ideas inside the "To
Give"
slot, together with a few other analogues:
money, powerfulness, knowledge, etc.
Not
so many items, indeed, but one at least
of
these analogue items inside our "To
Give" slot is necessary as the
reference
point for us to look upwards at.
GARY C. MOORE:
I see your point and it has its validity
that I need to think of more. The *to
give*
aspect of *necessary* as opposed to
contingent
is interesting. There is in fact a
*giving*
of sorts. We like to place all our
concepts
in pairs of opposition except the opposition
of necessary and contingent is highly
problematic
and directly related to the analogical
language
that Aquinas, through Coplestons highly
competent
eyes, is trying to justify. For instance,
IF we have sight, there is an up and
down
and left and right and a necessary
oppositeness
between all four. True, this is *necessary*
knowledge – sight cannot be viewed,
or conceived,
in any other fashion. But it is based
on
the contingency of actually possessing
sight.
So, here, contingency is more *necessary*
than *necessity* is. One things necessity
is another things contingency.
But Aquinas defines *God* as *He who is*,
that strange and anomalous statement out
of one of the most ancient of all documents
EXODUS, out of the burning bush. This Aquinas
relates to his definition of God as that
whose existence is his essence. There are
lots of problems with this, but the initial
blunder of creation of the universe at a
specific point in time [and space?] is not
something one can blame Aquinas for. Aquinas/Copleston
locate the problem squarely where is belongs,
that is, Is there an ultimate opposition
between contingency and necessity and which
one comes out on top? Thereby bringing in
*common ideas* like money, power, knowledge
– though very important – and I am glad you
brought in money – that is a fascinating
subject in the abstract which, like God,
postulated as Pure Act, that is, *Money talks, bullshit walks* - maybe a law of physics all of its
own if given due recognition – are
irrelevant
because we are talking in Aquinas about
the
ultimate ultimates - *Why is there
anything,
anything at all, rather than nothing?*
-
a question asked by Liebnitz long before
Heidegger and maybe before Liebnitz
because
I seem to remember a Latin source.
So, what we need here
is the
proper question before we state an
answer.
What I have tried to say in the past
is that
if one believes in fundamentally necessary
things, one is thinking theologically.
Also,
in actual experience, one cannot experience
anything as fundamentally *necessary*
except
as *necessary* by definition as in
sight.
But I have shown how this *necessity*
is
actually dependant upon a contingency.
If one thinks the universe
is experienced in such a way that a greater
necessity is implied in its contingency –
as in the *question* - may be – then the
answer lies in the belief, and that is what
it is, in *natural law* and *determinacy*.
The necessity of such things is beyond our
finite experience. More than that, since
we cannot experience them, they cannot in
fact be presupposed. The rule of repeatability
of scientific experiment takes their place.
Incomplete, yes – conducive to extreme insecurity,
yes – true, yes. But the existence of the
universe? All we know are accidents, once
again, and worse – Is there order in the
universe?
No. This came to me as
something of a surprise because, once again,
it is a visual fact we manipulate to fall
into our presuppositions about *natural laws*.
The *big bang*, though a fruitful idea, is
extremely misleading since [A] the universe
as seen is extremely chaotic which is *heresy*
to an astrophysicist but obvious to line
of sight, photographs, micro-theories opposed
to macro-theories. Most of the purported
conclusions about the *big bang* are obviously
fallacious. For instance, in a regular explosion
in human physical experience there is a fundamental
difference between what is contained in the
shockwave and what happens at the site of
explosion. Things are thrown out at a more
or less regular distance and debris or a
crater are left at the center. None of this
shape in explosion is viewed in the universe.
The edge of the universe cannot be older
than the center of the universe because both
edge and center happened at the same time
no matter what form they took on. There is
absolutely no regularity whatsoever in the
shapes of the universe that we see though
theories are abundant to account micro-theoretically
for their unique shapes. One wonder in fact
how much mythology has accumulated in astronomy.
Everything we know, because that is
all we
can know, is accidental. There is no
physical
evidence of a *greater* necessity.
However,
I love the fact that a *necessary*
doubt
about the matter *necessarily* remains
behind.
So, is this also merely a necessity
contained
within a contingent situation or is
this
contingency actually contained within
a greater
necessity? And what would one call
it?

RICHARD SANSOM:
You asked about Copleston – I have only his
Vol. One, *Greece and Rome,* that deals with the pre-Socratics, Plato
and Aristotle In his lengthy comments on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he uses the word
God as if Aristotle used it in conjunction
with his ideas regarding the unmoved mover,
etc. Does anyone know if Aristotle actually
ever used the word *God,* in its original
Greek form – which I suppose would have been
Qeos or Theos, while gods would have been
qeos, or theos? [I do not know Greek, and
I am assuming that the capitalization of
the theta is significant?] This matters,
IMO, since it is an interpretation of Aristotle’s
intent regarding what the unmoved mover,
or first cause mean. For example, Copleston
says, regarding Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
*As we have seen, God moves the universe
as Final Cause, as being the object of desire.*
The following is a telling quotation from
Copleston’s chapter The Metaphysics of Aristotle:
*Is the God of Aristotle a Personal God?
Aristotle sometimes speaks of God as the
First Unmoved Mover…….Like most Greeks, Aristotle
does not seem to have worried much about
the number of the gods, but if we are to
say that he was definitely and exclusively
monotheist, then we would have to say that
his God is personal. Aristotle may not have
spoken of the First Mover as being personal,
and certainly the ascription of anthropomorphic
personality would be very far indeed from
his thoughts, but since the First Mover is
Intelligence or Thought, it follows that
He is personal in the philosophic sense.
The Aristotelian God may not be personal
secundum nomen, but He is personal secundum
rem. We should add, however, that there is
no indication that Aristotle ever thought
of the First Mover as an object of worship,
still less as a Being to Whom prayers might
profitably be addressed. And indeed, if Aristotle's
God is entirely self-centred, as I believe
Him to have been, then it would be out of
the question for men to attempt personal
intercourse with Him. In the Magna M oralia
Aristotle says expressly that those are wrong
who think that there can be a friendship
towards God. For
(a) God could not return our love, and (b)
we could not in any case be said to love
God.*
It is obvious, and no doubt unavoidable,
coming from a Jesuit, that the belief in
the existence of *God* is a taken-for-granted
substrate of all comments on both Plato and
Aristotle. This is of course true in the
case of Aquinas. For Copleston, there can
be no truly unvarnished explication of Aristotle
since God is an unquestioned aspect of all
discussion and thought – no matter the subject.
This is not to say he is not a good historian
and his discussion on Aristotle’s causes
is clear and far easier to comprehend than
when Aristotle discusses them!
At the end of the chapter on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, Copleston sums up and gives
away a bit of his Platonic sensibility:
*The Aristotelian God is efficient Cause
only by being the final Cause. He does not
know this world and no Divine plan is fulfilled
in this world: the teleology of nature can
be nothing more than unconscious teleology
[at least this is the only conclusion that
will really fit in with the picture of God
given in the Metaphysics.] In this respect,
therefore, the Aristotelian metaphysic is
inferior to that of Plato.*
If anyone doubts the influences of Copleston’s
faith on his writings and interpretations
of the ancient Greeks, one need only read
his remarks in the concluding chapter, one
of which is:
*Christianity, with its doctrine of salvation,
its sacramental system, its dogmas, its doctrine
of incorporation with Christ through membership
of the Church and of the final version of
God, its offer of supernatural life, was
the *mystery religion*; but it had the inestimable
advantage over all pagan mystery-religions
that it was an historical religion, based
on the Life, Death and Resurrection of the
God-Man, Jesus Christ, Who lived and suffered
in Palstine in a certain historical period;
it was based on historical fact, not on myth.*
[!!!!]
In reading how the 12th century scholars
first discovered the Stagyrite, we see that
they read translations of the Greek by Muslim
scholars that were no doubt colored by elements
of the Muslim faith. Only later were direct
translations from the Greek to Latin made
that apparently washed the original clean
of these elements; but who knows that other
elements were inserted – i. e. flavorings
from the Catholic faith, influences from
Augustine, etc?.
JUD EVANS:
I get a bit peeved about Christianly's usurpation
of the Greek pantheon and the rendering down
of the individual prunus domestica insititiaian
godlets into one monotheistic sourish damson
wine. From what I can see the Greek conception
of the gods was utterly different from Yahweh's
petulant moodiness. Where at one moment the
temperamental lurker in the burning bush
favours the liberation of the Jews [as the
*chosen people*] from Egyptian bondage and
drowns thousands of the unchosen conscripts
of the army of the pharaoh, a little time
later by the Godly time-scale, he changes
in his mind and arranges that other elements
of the *unchosen* dispatch the chosen ones
from this world in the most hideous way possible
in the Europe of the twentieth century.
The Greek gods were
all different, much like the current Hindu
ones. Some were incredibly vicious, others
kindly and forgetful. At least you knew were
you where with a Greek god - you were aware
of his or her track record and his or her
*form,* not in the spurious Platonic meaning
of the word
*form,* but the meaning of the term as used
by the police department. With the god of
the desert wanderers however, you couldn't
be sure from one moment to the next whether
it was going to be *milk and honey* time,
having your eyes removed time, being turned
to a pillar of salt time or be nailed to
a cross with mindless cruelty of a little
boy pulling the appendages off a daddy-longlegs
time.
Richard: I understand, from the back jacket
remarks, that Copleston and A. J. Ayer had
a debate about the existence of God and the
possibility of metaphysics. I wonder if this
was recorded and is available? Anybody know?
Jud: It has been posted in the Athenaeum
library for years. You can read it
here:
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/copleston.htm

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
You make me think of the thinking brain
function
in order to acknowledge, and relate
with,
the components of the reality existing
in
the outside.
GARY C. MOORE:
I am glad you brought this up. There cannot
be an outside or inside – actually of anything!
All knowledge is necessarily knowledge viewed.
Reading is viewed. Thought is viewed objectively.
Dreams are viewed – sometimes from a strange
slant but still literally viewed. One presupposes
there is an *inside* to something till you
open it up, and then – guess what! – it is
now outside and viewed.
ANTONIO [ in a previous post]
I agree that all of what I acknowledge is
inside my brain. But I also know about self-consciousness
-- which runs inside my brain as well --
but which distinguish myself from what is
therefore not-myself, thus outside. Btw,
I suspect that that of self-consciousness
is not so practiced an activity :-)
ANTONIO ROSSIN:
As regards to this function, let's
imagine
that the thinking brain barebone structure,
at birth, is "tabula rasa".
But
not completely. Understandably indeed,
it
presents like a cross with four main
components:
To Give (top), To Have (below), Positive-equal
and Negative-contrary in the sides.
These
four components, at one's birth are
still
empty slots, which everyone of us goes
to
fulfill with the knowledge we need
of to
live.
GARY C MOORE:
Actually they are necessary components of
sight and therefore have nothing to do with
built-in, innate knowledge. It is simply
the directions of sight from an upright position.
Now, as to someone staying upside down from
birth, I would expect severe problems in
adjusting to a right sided world - *right-sided*
being standing upright as the standard of
proper visual judgment. And I have heard
of this and you probably know much, much
more.
Now, your categories,
however, as categories are VERY interesting
and I will have to think about them some
more.
ANTONIO [ in a previous post]
True. But one must have built-in, innate
knowledge of what one's upright position
stands for, and relates with other posited
objects in the outside. I mean, one must
have in one's inside the barebone scheme
of what the directions of one's sight can
be. I see this as if one were in the middle
point of the four direction (upwards, downwards,
leftwards and rightwards) cross. At each
direction end of this cross there is... what?
maybe, at one's "tabula rasa" age,
an empty domain, a slot into which one fulfills,
with the time passing, some basic ideas.
The very idea of God does usually fit the
upwards slot. Hence *a God in the outside*
becomes a necessity for one's self-consciousness.
Or some analogous of God...
ANTONIO ROSSIN:
Accordingly, we have at the top of our thinking
brain barebone structure the "To Give"
slot which we look at from a "to Have"
position, of course. From birth on, we have
fulfilled it with a number of analogous ideas,
all of which are necessary to our understanding-
acknowledgment of the reality we live in.
The idea of God
(however
you or Aquinas may define it) is one
among
the more common ideas inside the "To
Give" slot, together with a few
other
analogues: money, powerfulness, knowledge,
etc. Not so many items, indeed, but
one at
least of these analogue items inside
our
"To Give" slot is necessary
as
the reference point for us to look
upwards
at.
GARY C MOORE:
I see your point and it has its validity
that I need to think of more. The *to
give*
aspect of *necessary* as opposed to
contingent
is interesting. There is in fact a
*giving*
of sorts. We like to place all our
concepts
in pairs of opposition except the opposition
of necessary and contingent is highly
problematic
and directly related to the analogical
language
that Aquinas, through Coplestons highly
competent
eyes, is trying to justify. For instance,
IF we have sight, there is an up and
down
and left and right and a necessary
oppositeness
between all four. True, this is *necessary*
knowledge – sight cannot be viewed,
or conceived,
in any other fashion. But it is based
on
the contingency of actually possessing
sight.
So, here, contingency is more *necessary*
than *necessity* is. One things necessity
is another things contingency.
But Aquinas defines
*God*
as *He who is*, that strange and anomalous
statement out of one of the most ancient
of all documents EXODUS, out of the
burning
bush. This Aquinas relates to his definition
of God as that whose existence is his
essence.
There are lots of problems with this,
but
the initial blunder of creation of
the universe
at a specific point in time [and space?]
is not something one can blame Aquinas
for.
Aquinas/Copleston locate the problem
squarely
where is belongs, that is, Is there
an ultimate
opposition between contingency and
necessity
and which one comes out on top? Thereby
bringing
in *common ideas* like money, power,
knowledge
– though very important – and I am
glad you
brought in money – that is a fascinating
subject in the abstract which, like
God,
postulated as Pure Act, that is, *Money
talks,
bullshit walks* - maybe a law of physics
all of its own if given due recognition
–
are irrelevant because we are talking
in
Aquinas about the ultimate ultimates
- *Why
is there anything, anything at all,
rather
than nothing?* - a question asked by
Liebnitz
long before Heidegger and maybe before
Liebnitz
because I seem to remember a Latin
source.
So, what we need
here
is the proper question before we state
an
answer. What I have tried to say in
the past
is that if one believes in fundamentally
necessary things, one is thinking theologically.
Also, in actual experience, one cannot
experience
anything as fundamentally *necessary*
except
as *necessary* by definition as in
sight.
But I have shown how this *necessity*
is
actually dependant upon a contingency.
If one thinks the universe
is experienced in such a way that a greater
necessity is implied in its contingency –
as in the *question* - may be – then the
answer lies in the belief, and that is what
it is, in *natural law* and *determinacy*.
The necessity of such things is beyond our
finite experience. More than that, since
we cannot experience them, they cannot in
fact be presupposed. The rule of repeatability
of scientific experiment takes their place.
Incomplete, yes – conducive to extreme insecurity,
yes – true, yes. But the existence of the
universe? All we know are accidents, once
again, and worse – Is there order in the
universe?
No. This came to me as
something of a surprise because, once again,
it is a visual fact we manipulate to fall
into our presuppositions about *natural laws*.
The *big bang*, though a fruitful idea, is
extremely misleading since [A] the universe
as seen is extremely chaotic which is *heresy*
to an astrophysicist but obvious to line
of sight, photographs, micro-theories opposed
to macro-theories. Most of the purported
conclusions about the *big bang* are obviously
fallacious. For instance, in a regular explosion
in human physical experience there is a fundamental
difference between what is contained in the
shockwave and what happens at the site of
explosion. Things are thrown out at a more
or less regular distance and debris or a
crater are left at the center. None of this
shape in explosion is viewed in the universe.
The edge of the universe cannot be older
than the center of the universe because both
edge and center happened at the same time
no matter what form they took on. There is
absolutely no regularity whatsoever in the
shapes of the universe that we see though
theories are abundant to account micro-theoretically
for their unique shapes. One wonder in fact
how much mythology has accumulated in astronomy.
Everything we know, because
that is all we can know, is accidental. There
is no physical evidence of a *greater* necessity.
However, I love the fact that a *necessary*
doubt about the matter *necessarily* remains
behind. So, is this also merely a necessity
contained within a contingent situation or
is this contingency actually contained within
a greater necessity? And what would one call
it?

ANTONIO ROSSIN:
See, Gary I never read about Aquinas and
Coplestone. In my first three decades I lived
inside a consciousness limbo (as I realized
later). I did simply do what other people
did. But as a psychiatry practitioner I had
some background of how the people think and
what the sick results of an unbalanced thinking
way could be. Of course some other contingencies
occurred. Among these, I was a stammerer
still, so I had to "synthesize"
(reduce) my own language relationships with
other people to a -- so to say - barebone
structure (stammering offers really a privileged
point of view to observe and acknowledge
human communication)
My troubles with self-consciousness arose
when I became a father of children, and I
felt it heavy the responsibility for growing-up
my children, for "To Give" them
my best. But what had this "my best"
to be, in terms of self-consciousness?
I realized that making them acknowledge what
the four directions of one's sight
(mine included) could be, in order to allow
a well-balanced knowledge of one's own relationships
with the outside reality (ok., ok., all of
knowledge is inside ;-) ) was the best I
could give them. And I behaved accordingly,
thence onwards.
Yet the work is a family hard necessity...
as you can see.
cheers, antonio
|