The last two sections of the Enchiridion are commented on below, my bolds, in Epictetus:


QUOTE:* 50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself. abide by them as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements and follow the distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with which you ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them.
INTERUPTED QUOTE

GARY. C. MOORE:
This, I hope, disposes of the foolishness of not regarding him, at least in his background, as a thoroughly systematic philosopher like Aristotle, Plotinus, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Karl Popper, Wittgenstein, Jacques Derrida, and others. You do not have to like what they say, but what they say, in accord with their fairly explicit personal premises, is comprehensive and consistent, that is, to put it in plain parlance, they have thought about everything in relation to what they think is fundamental reality. Epictetus is knowledgeable in and relies upon just such systematic philosophers as Plato and Chysippus even though at times he makes fun of the latter and especially his intellectually ego-inflated readers.

*** RESUMED QUOTE:* What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything. attending to nothing but reason.

INTERUPTED QUOTE
GARY. C. MOORE:
*Attending to nothing but reason!!!!!!!!!!**


RESUMED QUOTE:*
And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates.*
END QUOTE


RICHARD SANSOM:
Kants maxim was identical: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law.

GARY. C. MOORE:
This would also consequentially conclude all human beings are implicitly the same. This would seemingly contradict Hannibal Lecter’s statement in RED DRAGON that Chapter 36: 266 [348]: “We don’t invent our natures, Will; they’re issued to us along with our lungs and pancreas and everything else. Why fight it?”

Determinism? So this brings up a fundamental problem with determinism, that is, either our individual natures are inherited and each person is physiologically - we are primarily here concerned with the brain - or they are mentally physiologically essentially the same and the differences may be relatively trivial.

    A number of points tie together here. If each individual nature is inherited, in is physiologically hard-wired. This would destroy any basis for any kind of morality because then we each would do what we were physiologically bound to do. But this is not what we experience. What we actually experience is that we change and we see others change as we and they educate themselves.
*** I what to state it precisely in that fashion because, if you think about it, if you think how real education is experience, no one can teach you anything, and it is not a matter of *receiving* anything either, but it is taking knowledgeable advantage of one’s, experience as circumstances and situation which may include a teacher - but unless the pupil is receptive the teacher is literally someone talking to themselves. So education is the moment, the *thick* present of moral decision, to change my ways - any way, any method or path of knowledge - by adapting myself to new understanding - or letting it drop dead in place.


    So I think we can have, with the sly but rational manipulations of words, both freedom here while yet bound in a context of thorough determinism. The Stoics express this as, Do you assent to your situation or not? Do you judge the external impression good and proper to admit, a passive act, merely opening the doors to it, or not? The Stoics consider both acceptance and aversion as acts that can harm the self and therefore should be rationally, morally thoroughly considered before assenting to them. Both acceptance and repulsion, though, are more truly, logically, grammatically opposed to the controlled approach of initial indifference a Stoic is trained, educated in, a state of neutrality within which to be able to rationally judge. In fact, they emphasize repeatedly that you can drop the situation dead right there, and it shall remain indifferent because it has in itself no power over you, whereas only you give it power over your self through your judgment of its being good or evil.
*** So, do we inherit our natures? The Stoics would say, As rational beings, yes! We all have reason. And in that sense, of pure basic human nature, everyone is exactly the same starting out and desires the same general things as each other. This can be seen as the fundamental foundation of society, of community, and any breakdown after that is circumstantial.


    But we must come back to Lecter and his statement because he is making this statement encompassing judgments others have made of him and, in this way at least, he is acknowledging. He is suppose to be a *sociopath*, a *pure sociopath* in fact Dr. Chilton called him. I found two very disappointing articles on the web that essentially say, in sum, it is anti-social behavior. And those two were the only ones worth even noting. Is there not anything good written and well reasoned that is not just a blind list of what have to be obvious aspects of such a person amounting to more than , If he is anti-social, then he does not care about other people and will not hesitate to hurt them for his own ends.


     This applies to everybody at some time in their lives. It is hardly someone’s *inherited nature*. If it is circumstantial and a matter of experience as education, then it is a reasoned process. If it is a reasoned process from mistaken premises, that is, it is against their own best self-interest, how is it so? Hannibal Lecter does what he wants to - I do not think there can be any such thing as a truly fictional character, that the imagination works exactly as Hume says it does, a piecing of rationally coherent facts together into a recognizable whole - and yet he is fully cognizant that in a rational society, it would kill him, chapter 54, RED DRAGON. So, if he acknowledges such a consequence from his action, how can he be a sociopath?

      This is assuming a sociopath is supposed to have some uncontrollable psychological condition that makes him act the way he does - which sounds totally absurd as I write it. Obviously it is controllable or no sociopath in real life crime like Ted Bundy would get as far in his career as he did. So it is obviously nothing like schizophrenia or even neurosis. And, on top of that, controlled and adaptive sociopaths have great use for society, or at least its political, business, and military aspect of it. So if a *sociopath* is *sick*, who then is well?


RICHARD SANSOM:]
Was Kant a stoic? Certainly not based on this single instance of agreement with Epictetus. I believe their connection, if it exists, rests in what they both mean by
*reason.* Kant believed that it is through reason that one finds the a priori existence of moral law, and further, that it is in everyone to find. Did Epictetus believe this? Are those *philosophical theorems* the source for reason? But are they not taught, as opposed to a priori or intuitional? And, they are external things, out of ones control. Unless of course Epictetus believes that such theorems are representative of some universal truth?

GARY. C. MOORE:
I have never been that interested in Kant’s morality although, considering his other great accomplishments, I should take more seriously. I think every thinker after Epictetus is heavily influenced heavily by Stoicism because A] they all read Plato and Aristotle with lenses ground by Epictetus, and this is because B] Stoicism is a major force within Christianity and one of the things even non-Christian philosophers respect in it when they respect nothing else about it - except Hume which is something well worth considering. But in considering him, one must remember in the Real Hellenistic/Roman world all the schools of philosophy generally agreed in their principles And their goals, something which drastically changed in the nineteenth century and proliferated in the twentieth. So their basic mind set was, We agree on basic method, logic, and we agree on the basic subject matter and goal, eudemonia, happiness for the individual [which leaves out segments of Christianity] , and we only disagree about accomplishing this is the best and most effective way.

    A lot of this is totally inane, but I wanted to get started on something. Sorry for all the blather.
*** Bye, bye, A Stoic Psychopath

                       EPICTETUS DISCUSSES MORAL THEOREMS

RICHARD SANSOM:
Epictetus discusses *moral theorems* that relate to this in the following section:

51 [52? What translation are you using? It may be better than what I have.].

QUOTE:
*The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration. " For what is demonstration? What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.*
END QUOTE


RICHARD SANSOM:
What is he talking about here? He seems to be opening up the use of moral theorems to examination by a reduction of meanings: *What truth?* and goes on to say that we spend too much time in such analysis and ignore the basic tenet: *We ought not to lie.* But then, there is the kicker: Go ahead and lie, but understand that what you have done is wrong! Or: You can disobey the moral theorem if you choose, if you accept the fact that you are doing wrong and, presumably do not care since it is your best interests in the moment to do so.


GARY. C. MOORE:
My translations have *of the principles*, *toon theooreematoon*, which C. R. Haines translates in Marcus Aurelius as *a truth perceived in science* which, in Aurelius anyway, means *theorem* precisely, just as your translation has it. This would be the same as a premise or, better yet, an axiom as in geometry where, if you were starting at the beginning, without knowing any geometry but knowing approximately what you want to accomplish - this is purely imaginary since I do not know how anyone would not *always already* know something about geometry and *always already* be told they *must* *always already* accept Euclid’s axioms unquestioningly - but that is what we are trying to do here precisely, that is, question the axioms or at least bring them to light - and it is *axiomatic* with every child as taught by their parents *Do not lie*. It is, like Euclid’s axioms, obviously true in the sense at least of *Do not lie to yourself* simply because only by knowing the truth of circumstances can you act according to what you know of objective reality as experienced or even be able to lie to others.

    Thereupon one asks the question *How is it we ought not to lie?* which, in one sense questions the validity of the axiom by asking why should we not lie. You translation, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie?" is in several ways better than mine. But, in order to ask this question and seriously desire an appropriate answer, we have to ask the question truly, that is, we really want a truthful answer. The answer is a demonstration necessarily of the axiom questioned. Epictetus does not state an answer here intentionally. Instead he goes on to the third step *confirmation and analysis*, that is, *How comes it that this is a demonstration? For what is a demonstration, what is logical consequence, what contradiction, what truth, and what falsehood?* Your translation has, *the third gives strength and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration.

     I assume *is* is a mistype for *as* and that it is a question as in my translation. The important point in my preference of your translation is that it is constantly asking for the *origin*. However, the Greek nowhere has the philosophical term *aitia* which is *formal* or *formative cause* or *primary cause*. This may be because Epictetus, I am told for I would not be able to tell the difference, is using common or *koine* dialect used in colloquial conversation as opposed to true, educated classical Greek [which Epictetus had to have known being a slave to Nero’s secretary]. This is reflected in the Greek for *DISCOURSES* which is *diatribai* and which not have a negative connotation in Epictetus’ day. So, *How is it* or *How comes it* is more or less in Greek, *oion pothen oti* which, unless someone knows Greek better than I which would take next to nothing to accomplish, will do in common parlance for *origin*. If Arrian had written a philosophical treatise in his own name, I am sure he would have used Aristotle’s typical *aitia*.


    I know I am going on and on about trivia except I am trying to work out the notion of *moral axiom* clearly myself. It is not easy. But Richard has already said that elsewhere.

    Epictetus real point comes out when he says,

QUOTE:
*For what is demonstration? What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic . . . , *END QUOTE

     We have not examined the premise as we should. We have assumed it was correct and gone on from there when in fact it is still hanging in the air. Therefore,

QUOTE:
*Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.*
END QUOTE

    My translations have, *Therefore we speak falsely, but are quite ready to show how it is demonstrated that one ought not to speak falsely*, that is, We are lying because we do not know what the real truth of the matter is, and yet we believe we actually do know the truth of the matter, nonetheless, and, however absurdly, are ready to prove it. Oldfather has, *Wherefore, we lie, indeed, but are ready with the arguments which prove that one ought not to lie.*


     This is where conflict between action and axiom occurs. *Wine is good. There cannot be too much of a good thing. Therefore the more wine I drink, the more good I have.* Obviously I have misunderstood what *good* is and need to re-examine my premise or axiom.

    Precisely because Arrian has Epictetus not state an answer to the question, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie?" at least at this penultimate point of the ENCHIRIDION, is, I think, a demand to think the process through oneself. Kant, purportedly said we should always tell the truth no matter what the circumstances are. I find this hard to believe, but this is one of the reasons I have not studied Kant on morality much because, I would think, if a burglar, after having tied you up, asks you where your valuables are, you are going to have serious questions in your mind whether to tell the truth and how much of the truth you will tell whereas supposedly Kant’s dictum is unconditional, that is, you should tell him where they are, all of it, and how to find them. Do you owe everyone the truth? Supposedly Kant would say yes but then he was a Jacobin and a head-chopping revolutionary, at least in theory. Epictetus said yes, but he owned nothing. Aurelius said yes and would give everything away except he possessed more than he was able to give away. If someone stopped you on the street and asked, You do you have a hundred dollars you can give me? What do you say? What, then, is your premise or axiom on lying and telling the truth? Everyone says you should always tell the truth, but you know very well the whole truth is only for special people on special occasions and not for everybody.


     I have finished the Farquharson translation of the MEDITATIONS. It was very slow going because it was very much like reading a combination of Shakespeare, Plato, and Aristotle. Each thought, even when supposedly repeating previous thoughts, had such variations and new tacks upon the same point of view that numerous new implications became evident with each new paragraph. Epictetus DISCUSSIONS should be the same way though it has a very different style and approach. Reading the ENCHIRIDION first can be an immense help if, that is, it does not become an end in itself. After all, it is meant as an easy introduction of snippets which I think Arrian intended one to make one hungry for more since many times the snippets in the ENCHIRIDION raise as many questions, as Richard has shown, as they answer.

I need a book that arranges the MEDITATIONS by subject matter and one that does the same emphasizing specifically the philosophical passages in Shakespeare.

Marcus Aurelius, though, like Shakespeare himself, is much harder, harsher, more scientifically/logically analytic even than Epictetus. I have not read any Seneca yet, Richard, but you should be aware politics is always and implicit and sometimes explicit subject in his writings and Tacitus, who was not unfriendly to Stoicism per se, Re: his short book on Agricola, hates Seneca with a purple passion and considers him through and through a corrupt and evil politician that, though he may have controlled Nero's excesses to some extent that became evident went Nero's mother Agrippina got him kicked out of the government and Nero went hog wild, was a thoroughly nasty character in Tacitus view, and this is supported, though very moderately, by Suetonius.

But Epictetus' mastery of logic, though he always emphasizes it is a tool to another end and never an end in itself, is very evident in the ENCHIRIDION but immensely more so in the DISCOURSES where the clash with the sense of *piety* we have grown up with within Christianity is extremely obvious when one reads the DISCOURSES going from first page to the last while remmebering half of it did not survive into modern times. Maybe a whole copy will be found in some obscure monophysite church in Eithiopia like the books of Jubilees and Enoch or Eastern Orthodox monastery like Clement's letter about the secret gospel of Mark, or the Dead Sea Scroles in some cave in Palestine, or some Oxyrynchus trash pile or mummy in Egypt like Menander was or the library tag *The Complete Works of Pindar*.

One strange thing I have noticed merely in passing in the DISCOURSES is that the chapters on logic, usually a pair together, appear in Book 1 at regular intervals. In Book

1, they are chapters 7 and 8, then chapters 17 and 18, then maybe 27 and 28. It possibly continues the same way in Book 2 with 7 and 8, then possibly a variation with 16 and 17, and with 21 and 25 out of my order altogether, This, except for Book 1, merely judging from the titles of the chapters. There may be chapters more in this order whose titles indicate a conscentration on something else primarily than logic. In Books 3 and 4, I see nothing at all obviously relevant to a specific discussion of logic, but that does not mean they are not present. I do not know what the implications of this are other than, at least in Books 1 and 2 logic is extremely important in Epictetus which we have also seen in the ENCHIRIDION.



A CONTRIBUTOR WRITES:
You wrote: "Hindus who understand what Shiva, Kali, and Bharaiva are all above, that is, death is insignificant, not worth thinking about."

You really need to get a better understanding of what Stoic philosophy is about. Hinduism may teach this, I do not know for sure. (It seems that Gandhi, a Hindu, was not much concerned over the death of people, no matter how large the number; and he actually he suggested to the Jews of Germany during WW2 that they should commit mass suicide to protest Nazi policy! As though enough of them were not dying already.)

Stoicism does teach me that my own death is not to be worried over if it is lost for a principled cause, and for the greater good. It does not teach that I should have no concern over the death of others.... quite the contrary.

Certainly the idea of killing people over the inheritance of a royal throne (the topic of discussion in the Bhagavad Gita) would have little appeal for Epictetus; who considered the act of killing to obtain externals moral insanity -- and a type confusion resulting from thinking that external things are goods.

NB: I knew that this message of yours (and many more) was in the forum spam folder, but I chose not to take it out. To me, sending the same message to multiple forums really is spam; even if, as in your case, it is a rather high quality spam.