PART 1
ON MARCUS AURELIUS’ RELATIVISM:
Order in the Universe, the Importance
of
God or Gods and their Relation to the
Goddess
Nature, and the Necessity of the Bad
Man
to the Proper Order of Nature as well
as
the Good Man First.
I would like to note my sources, and
ask
if there are any other translations
more
technically correct than what I use.
The
translations I like most are found
in Pierre
Hadot’s THE INNER CITADEL, but that
has severe
inconveniences to use as a text unless
someone
has an idea about that.
The main translation I use is the paperback
Oxford World’s Classics edition by A. S. L.
Farquharson, edited with extremely useful notes and cross
references by R. B. Rutherford who
is the
author of another excellent text.
THE MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS: A Study,
Oxford/Clarendon, 1989/2003. Farquharson’s translation is used in conjunction
with C. R. Haines’ MARCUS AURELIUS in Harvard’s Loeb Classical Library which
has excellent cross referencing in
the text
and excellent indexes in the back as
well
as an excellent introduction to Aurelius’
Stoicism with numerous references to
his
text.
It would have been very nice to have
a computerized
version of this [Is there anything
like such?
INTELEX?]. His translation is dated
[1915]
but sometimes helps clarify Farquharson’s
which Rutherford complains at times
about
being obscure. But Rutherford’s mentions
of Farquharson’s obscurities are more
interesting
than disruptive and help illuminate
who Marcus
Aurelius was within his milieu. Also,
Farquharson’s
commentary that went with his 1944
edition
of his translation is fascinating [I
have
ordered the Everyman 1992 edition of
the
MEDITATIONS which MAY have the commentary
along with the translation, and maybe
line
references?].
I only have the second volume, now,
which
shows the Greek text, at least, of
the first
volume was indexed line by line while
C.
R. Haines’ Greek text unfortunately
is not,
a strange omission considering the
fine detail
of his cross referencing and indexing
and
usually not absent in Loeb Library
editions
as I remember. I have barely glanced
at some
other translations but, other than
using
them to clarify or present different
views
of a passage, found nothing noteworthy
about
them [Hays, Staniforth, and Long -
I do not
have the Dover edition revision]. So
if they
have good points, please tell me. There
are
also Collier- 1887, G. M. A. Grube
- 1983,
Robin Hard -
1997, Hicks - 2002, Jackson - 1948,
Rendall
- 1898. I acknowledge that merely being
the
newest translation does not mean it
is the
best. I was disturbed that the Hays
version,
2003, used italics to note what the
translator
wanted to say was most important. What
I
want is a translation technically correct
for Aurelius’ actual time and place
- Farquharson
can be very prudish - and not Idealized
or
Christianized as C. R. Haines is. I
must
say, though,, Haines makes his Christian
bias very *up front*, seems extremely
honest
considering his own milieu, and never
really
seems to impose it upon Aurelius text.
Does
anyone think differently?
My main problem in approaching Marcus
Aurelius
is his repeated statements *here and
there*
that very literally and explicitly
- so their
direct and immediate implications are
unavoidable
- grind his meaning into, first, his
own
mind repeatedly - a very deliberate
and deliberated
process, and, secondly into our minds
- his
truly unintended audience. Aurelius
is not
at all subtle about this process. As
to what
he really thinks, he makes it plain
as day.
The problem is, first of all, 1] a
much more
intimate and immediate audience near
at hand
for him, close friends and family,
whom he
knows is going to read his jottings
- and
that is truly what they are even if
somewhat
directed to a very limited audience
- and,
secondly, 2] like anyone else, and
especially
someone like Aurelius making himself
‘considerate
of others’ as a strict matter of principle,
he does not want to shock them with
his brutal
truths but instead insulates them literally
in kinder white lies of universally
accepted
Stoic practice - Epictetus did this
also.
So he talks about the ‘goodness’ of
Divine
Providence, of everything in the universe
belonging in its proper place. This
is, superficially
as a white lie usually is, perfectly
true.
But just like other abstractions like
those,
like any word that is examined for
factual
truth, there must be a material referent
in the original context of the word
or phrase,
and somewhere in the word or phrase’s
history.
Now, many times in such a process of
investigation,
the original situation or context cannot
be specifically found. That does not
matter
because numerous clues are left behind
by
the person using those words that point
directly
to the existence of just such a material
referent.
Such a trail is perfectly obvious when
one
concentrates on the structure of memory.
It does not have to be just one’s own
but
can be anyone’s. This is precisely
what Sigmund
Freud did with free association in
psychoanalysis.
No analysis today even questions the
effectiveness
of this process in uncovering hidden
intentions.
But in psychoanalysis it is a finite
tool
that can only do so much considering
the
complexity of the problems and counter-forces
it faces. However, even saying this
much
in relation to Marcus Aurelius is ‘overkill’
because the whole MEDITATIONS is a
process
TO MEMORIZE LITERALLY TO DEATH the
truths
he has learned and to subject them
to various
viewpoints and situations without ever
leaving
the core of what he wants to say. The
point
then is his process is incredibly lucid,
coherent, rational, and consistent.
It bears
up under the most intense scrutiny.
He truly
says what he means, knowingly, exactly,
in
a way few another people in all of
history
have been able to accomplish.
So, having said that, having emphasized
his deliberate and well educated and
often
tested rationality in philosophy, rhetoric,
and hard core politics, I come to the
primary
problem resolvable either as white
lies,
poetic metaphors, or outright irony
that
blunts the initial brutality of what
he believes.
He says he believes in the ‘goodness’
of
Divine Providence, that the gods have
arranged
things in the best possible way for
every
human being, that ‘this is the best
possible
of all possible worlds’ as Liebnitz
would
say - and Voltaire satirized. But it
is the
best possible way only because it is
the
ONLY possible way, and Aurelius says
this
repeatedly also. He accords with Hegel’s
snippet, ‘What is, is rational’. Aurelius
would have no problem with the factual
existence
of concentration camps. What he would
make
of them personally he would and did
say was
his, or anyone else’s, personal problem.
Since they exist in a rational universe,
they have a rational explanation. Since
they
have a rational explanation, they have
a
natural place in the overall scheme
of Nature
- which is exactly what the ‘goodness’
of
divine providence, in the end, boils
down
to.
One main form of the problem is this.
Aurelius
will make statement ‘A’ saying something
very specific and delimited, strictly
defined
and graphically exampled, to which
cross
references can be found with no jarring
contradictions
whatsoever. And then he will make statement
‘B’ qualified the same way and in every
way
consistent and fully supporting statement
A. And then he will make statement
‘C’ that
is neither specific nor delimited nor
strictly
defined nor graphically exampled. Aurelius
makes it very clear who and of what
value
he, as an individual and as a member
of the
human species, is - which is quite
literally
and all inclusively NOTHING in every
respect,
in fact, disserving of no respect whatsoever
as a fact. Taken literally as he should
be,
unless he is lying to us [and is he?],
there
are a number of what might seem drastic
consequences
from this for the average person as
he again
repetitively states and demonstrates
from
Stoic physics for the Goddess Nature
or Mother
Nature or just Nature capitalized.
Everything
and everyone and all of their acts
are necessarily
a natural part of nature.
If my existence
is a
mere ‘point’ [ii, 17], and I think
he clearly
means just mathematic, that is, pragmatically
imaginary, if, of bad people he says
- QUOTE
- *These are natural and necessary
results
from creatures of this kind, and one
who
wants this to be otherwise wants the
fig
tree not to yield its acrid juice.
And in
general remember this, that within
a very
little while both he and you will be
dead,
and a little after not even your name
nor
his will be left;* END QUOTE [iv, 6],
then
Nature alleviates - as Ideals, as Absolutes
in any Platonic sense which almost
everyone
accepts both now and THEN when he lived
-
morality, social duties, worship of
the gods
or God, and everything else considered
virtue
or vice. Aurelius’ identification of
Nature
with God should be obvious.
And this ‘Nature’
is
in no way different from the ‘dog eat
dog’
savagery explicitly described by Thomas
Huxley
for evolution and fully implicit in
Charles
Darwin. When speaking of the ‘survival
of
the fittest’, though philosophically
Aurelius
would not disagree without tremendous
contradictions
to his own stated premises, he would
reply
[vi, 46, pg. 53] - QUOTE _ *Just as
performances
in the amphitheater and such places
pall
upon you, being forever the same scenes,
and the similarity makes the spectacle
nauseating,
so you feel in the same way about life
as
a whole; for all things, up and down,
are
the same and follow from the same.
How long
will it last?* END QUOTE
There are several notable things in
this
QUOTE. First, it perfectly accords
with something
I often emphasize personally, that
is, ‘survival
of the fittest’ IN FACT MEANS survival
in
a specific point in time under specific
circumstances.
It is not permanent. It is not only
temporary,
it is also basically accidental. The
nerd
may well survive where the warrior
dies.
Nothing is advanced, nothing in actuality
‘progresses’ is ‘better’, therefore
the survivor
is not better or ‘good’ simply because
they
survived. Next time around, they probably
did not. Evolution, then, is no upward
advance
but is simply *forever the same scenes,
and
the similarity makes the spectacle
nauseating*.
Secondly, it is historically noted
that
he went to the Games but read his mail
while
people were being slaughtered in the
Arena.
The audience, also historically noted,
was
pissed at his indifference. As Rutherford
says, - QUOTE - *It is striking here
that
he does not criticize the games on
moral
grounds, but only because they bore
him*
[note to vi, 46, pg. 165; ref. Fronto
correspondence
no. 14 in same book; also, x, 8; in
contrast,
see Seneca, LETTERS, vii [Penguin I
think],
or Augustine, CONFESSIONS, vi, 13 -
but on
the later, remember Nietzsche recalling
from,
I think, THE CITY OF GOD that one of
the
great pleasures of Heaven would be
sitting
in the Divine Arena watching those
who had
persecuted the Blessed be tortured
in Hell].
There is no doubt in my mind Aurelius
was
writing primarily to himself to imprint
physically
and finally his precepts upon his own
mind
therefore fixing his own acts in society
permanently. But this does not mean
there
was not a possible audience for his
writing
in his mind. After all, it was on ‘paper’
and therefore, after his death, anyone
with
access and interest could read it even
though
it was never publicly published. Who
could
this audience be? Supposedly his family
and
closest friends. That someone cared
about
the text is evident simply because
it survived,
even though precariously so.
One would suppose that Aurelius had
this
possibility in his mind that some other
may
read his text. After all, he could
have had
it destroyed when he was dying of fever
in
Germany, trying to find *the Final
Solution
to the German Problem* his son Commodus
immediately
wrecked after his death. But he did
not.
If he had had such a thought, certainly
he
would have acted upon it. He did not.
So,
we must conclude there was a limited
audience
it was intended for.
Each book of the text does seem to
have
been created or gathered together in
an individual
bunch. That is initially the best way
I can
see to begin an approach. Was there
organization
and relation, though, from paragraph
to paragraph?
Aphorism to aphorism? Does one paragraph
follow another? Or were they really
just
spontaneous thoughts written down at
random?
The last seems evident to an extent.
But
two considerations compromise such
mere randomness.
Aurelius was a thoroughly trained systematic
rhetorician AND philosopher. He could
not
be perfectly *random* even if he tried.
Secondly, if a limited audience is
in his
mind, he is going to approach common
cultural
concepts in a non-alarming fashion.
He is
going to be truthful but he is also
going
to be palatable. And above all he wants
to
be honest BOTH to himself AND to others
who
might be reading what he wrote. And
above
all else even more, he wants to be
rational.
To be honest you have to be rational,
but
to be rational does not necessarily
mean
you are honest. Even a liar has to
carefully
maintain knowingly a rational thread
of consistency
to his lie. Is this what Aurelius is
doing?
Not really, because his ‘white lies’
are
not confrontable as lies. When confronted
as logical and factually based concepts
they
dissolve immediately into the material
referents
Marcus Aurelius presents elsewhere
in a plain
and straightforward manner. That is
the only
rational way they can work because
there
is no Platonic metaphysics or epistemology
whatsoever in Aurelius. When the balloon
is punctured, you see the actual parts
that
originally kept it together, just exactly
as he says of the ‘seductive melody’
at xi,
2, and demonstrates a white lie immediately
by denying, in the middle of the paragraph,
that ‘virtue and its effects’ are exempt
from this methodological process. AND
YET
he concludes the paragraph saying,
- QUOTE
*Transpose this method, moreover, to
life
in its entirety* [Hadot/Chase trans].
What
could be more plain that, for confused
minds,
he is softening the blow of reality
while
yet communicating what that reality
in fact
is, that is, hoping the truth of the
matter
will eventually seep in?
Now some might say that they are unconvinced
that Marcus does not believe in the
goodness
of Divine Providence.
Actually, this is perfectly true as
his
literally stated words. The problem
comes
in when applying Marcus Aurelius own
methodology
as expressed in ix, 2. Ignoring his
arbitrary
[’arbitrary’ ONLY if one is assuming
he is
NOT being ironical or telling a white
lie]
injunction not to examine *virtue and
its
effects* in the same way since he does
conclude
the paragraph with *transpose this
method,
moreover, to life in its entirety*,
one must
take apart *goodness* exactly the same
way
as he takes apart eating, drinking,
clothing,
and sex in vi, 13. Nature is going
to be
Nature no matter what. He says this
is good
because A] this is the way it has to
be;
B] because it is perfectly rational
just
like Hegel [self note: I must find
my lost
Hegel site that has his history of
philosophy];
C] because it is realistic in the parts
he
finds when he takes it apart just like
QUOTE
*in the matters of sex intercourse,
that
is an attrition of an entrail and a
convulsive
expulsion of mere mucus* [Farquharson]
or
*copulation is a friction of the members
and an ejaculatory discharge* [Staniforth].
I like Staniforth’s further rendition
of
vi, 13 that says, just like xi, 2,
QUOTE
*The same process should be applied
to the
whole of life. When a thing’s credential’s
look most plausible, lay it bare, observe
its triviality, and strip it of the
cloak
of verbiage that disfigures it.. Pretentiousness
is the arch deceiver, and never more
delusive
than when you imagine your work is
most meritorious.*
Again he says the same thing. What
that means
is *the goodness of Divine Providence*
SHOULD
ALSO be ‘laid bare, observed in its
triviality,
and stripped of the cloak of verbiage
that
disfigures it.’
In vi, 13, Aurelius makes NO exception
for
*virtue and its effects*, so you are
saying
either Aurelius is contradicting himself
as to *the goodness of Divine Providence*,
or telling a deliberately deceitful
and black
lie, or telling a white lie that might
let
someone gently find the truth for themselves,
or he is being poetical, metaphorical,
and/or
ironical. He obviously is not telling
the
factual and literal truth.
Is it possible that it can be true
that
he does not believe in Progress over
Time.
He is no Hegel. His conception of Time
is
likely the cyclical one shared by most
ancients,
including most Stoics. This is compatible
with "drama" of the cycle
being
a well-crafted (and infinitely repeating)
one.
Hegel DOES imply deliberately he believes
in some kind of idea of *progress*
in his
philosophy of history. But the issue
is complicated
by the issue of Hegel’s political development
from a Jacobin revolutionary to a hard
political
realist that said the Prussian state
is the
best possible state overall at this
time.
It does not mean he loved Prussian
autocracy,
but may mean, as autocrasies go, it
was the
best. Like Henry Kissenger, his supreme
value
at the end of his life was order. His
views
on the French revolution had changed
to be
more like Burke’s. But like Burke,
he still
respected the protection of human rights
and constitutionality, which means
his respect
for the Prussian state was qualified
by comparison
to even more tyrannical states around
it.
At least it respected a real system
of law
and order, and gave lip service to
the future
instillation of a constitution whereas
countries
like France under Charles X had death
lists
made up of its ‘possible’ political
opponents.
And I am sure he did not like the anarchy
of the United States and Great Britain.
The point is, for Hegel as well as
for Marcus
Aurelius, This is the way things are
and
hating them is stupid, so accepting
them
with reverence and respect is the only
positive
viewpoint one can have. THEREFORE you
have
*the goodness of Divine Providence*
because
there is simply no conceivable alternative.
And, of course, both Aurelius and Epictetus
believed deeply in a policy of *LOVE
IT OR
LEAVE IT!* So it can be called *well
crafted*
ONLY in the sense that it is the ONLY
possible
way it can be
*crafted*.
JUD EVANS:
Though I do not believe it personally,
some
remain unconvinced that the Meditations
contain
an element of prevarication or sugar-coating?
Others go further and say that they
don't
believe that he intended his reflections on life to be
for general publication. He did not
advertise
himself as a tutor, unlike some of
the intellectuals
of the day? As for whether his son
Commodus
might pick them up after Marcus was
dead
and benefit morally from them, Many
believe
that Marcus Aurelius had already faced
up
to the fact that his offspring Commodus
was
not of a philosophical bent. He must
have
known that Commodus was not all that
bright,
but even he could not have realized
how abysmal
a ruler he would be.
GARY.C. MOORE:
As to Commodus, Aurelius gave him great
responsibility over a relatively long
period
of time. There is no record of any
abuse
of power during that period that is
backed
up by a reliable historical source.
Aurelius
never took any of these offices away
from
him, and it was the normal process
of recognizing
Commodus was to be the next Emperor
without
any qualifications whatsoever. Dio
Cassius,
the most reliable source - and even
that
has its restrictions, said Commodus
grew
up a normal boy with only one noted
outburst
of temper threatening harm with words
to
a servant but not even trying to physically
do anything to him. So, historically
as far
as we can possibly know, Commodus was
a fine
young man up to the moment of Aurelius’
death.
Also, there is the known example of
Aurelius’
daughter Cornificia [Haines page xiv
referring
to Theoph. ad Auto. iii, 27 which I
could
not find in Haines‘ references] who
reportedly
did hold Stoic tenants.
Also, for those ‘only’ interested in
practical
Stoicism - I am NOT an academic! -
there
is plenty here to ponder on considering
Aurelius
lived in a very forcibly realistic
world.
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