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The most difficult issue in philosophy is the concept of being. To solve it would be to answer many complicated questions. However, the most difficult concept, which faces the stability of systems, is the concept of the external world, or other minds. Essentially the problem of other minds is the problem of the external world.

It would not be sufficient to posit the existence of an external world without equally identifying the properties of that world, for if there is an external world; it means that there are objects which exist extraneous to being, and it is very likely that identifying the nature of these objects is just as important as proving the world in which they exist.

Man, in his limited state, can only rely on the most basic axiom of reason, that is, the law of non-contradiction. The reason we have the right to appeal to such a law is that its negation always presupposes its existence, and as such, it is necessary. However, to get from the law of contradiction to the external world is a complicated thing.

How does the philosopher or the theologian know that there is an external world? The answer depends upon the one’s concept of what it means to know. For if knowledge were simply a property of belief, then to believe in an external world would also entail knowledge of its existence. However, if knowledge entails some kind of verification, then the philosopher must be able to provide verification, to prove the existence, and his knowledge of the external world. Once again, we are forced to ask for a definition; what does the philosopher mean by verification, what is the standard of justification for proving the existence of the external world?

It is very possible that not all questions are resolved in the same way; the nature of a question can also determine the method required to answer that question. Thus, in order to solve the problem of other minds it is first necessary for a philosopher to adequately understand the problem, for if we do not adequately understand the problem, then we will not be able to adequately comprehend a method by which to solve the problem. This, I submit, is the reason why we lack the ability to solve the problem of other minds, namely, because we don’t fully understand the specific nature of the problem.

So then, what is the problem of other minds? Quite simply, it is the problem of the external world, but what is the problem of the external world? It is the problem of being, and the problem of being is the problem of objectivity, it is the problem of definition; that is, it is a problem associated with comprehension, universals and identification. It will not be enough to simply say that a particular definition of being is objective, for any philosopher who desires to sustain the authority of his definition will have to do better than that.

So, if we will resolve the problem of other minds we must resolve the problem of being. At present I would argue that there are two dominant views, or theories offered as explanation. However, we must keep such explanations in their proper context, such theories are not rational, they are postulates. By postulates we mean assertions or conjectures. There is the natural view and the religious view. From the basis of the natural view man’s being consists of natural elements, he is a purely biological entity, we might also say, a machine. Thus, from such an axiom, being is explicable on the basis of organic function. The more we come to understand the universe, and the functions of our mind, the more we come to understand our being.

On the other view, which has many variations, man is taken to be a body that contains a soul, whether that soul is eternal depends upon the person you ask. Further, from the religious view life is the product of creation, man is the result of Mind, and therefore, has his purpose in knowing the purpose of the Creating Mind. Thus, from such an axiom, being is explicable on the basis of spiritual identification, and associated identification of, and with, one’s creator. The more we come to understand the creator the more we come to understand our being.

In my opinion both views are faulty, that is, there is no possible way to sustain the objectivity of science or the objectivity of religion, both remain postulates. What then is the answer to the problem of being? And even as the reader was expecting a climatically logical conclusion, I am afraid the only answer we can give in honesty is that we don’t really know. If one is content to affirm postulates, then one can pretend to have an answer, but this will not provide a real solution to the problem of other minds, which as we have noted, is the problem of being. Further, to affirm theory as solution is to presuppose a system of subjection. This must be true, because justification for scientific and religious theory is assumption, that is, the means by which the theologian justifies his theory, is the same means by which the philosopher justifies his. Science and religion both postulate their solution to other minds, which means, that their solution is preferential. This leaves philosophy in a state of subjection. The only way to escape subjectivity when evaluating systems is to utilize the prospect of necessity, but the problem with necessity is that it lacks univocal identification, however, the philosopher can still appeal to necessity on the basis of locality, which is, I think, the very best that any philosopher can do[1].

So, we have not solved the problem of other minds, but we have suggested a method by which to investigate the sustainability of systems. That is, one must considered the concept of necessity in the process of formulating and evaluating systems. However, here the philosopher must be cautious, for there are systems, which claim to possess necessary propositions, which are really not necessary at all. A prime example is that of theism, which seeks to postulate the necessity of some arbitrary concept of deity, but one can easily deny this postulate without doing any significant epistemological damage to one’s system, but what one cannot easily do, is deny the law of contradiction without doing significant epistemological damage. Thus, we have an example of a postulated necessity and an actual necessity.

What we know about knowledge is that it will always be associated with some concept of justification; at least this must be the case, if we will avoid a philosophy of subjective intuition. We are not saying, that intuition is not part of knowledge, but that intuition will never permit the justification of knowledge. Thus, if we will know, and we want to be able to prove that we know, we must examine, as well as utilize, the concept of necessity; for necessity is the key to determining the nature of authority, and authority is the key to settling disputes regarding the nature of truth.

NOTES

[1] This is a very practical solution to the problem of skepticism. Thus, when two skeptics meet they do not deny each other’s minds, and though limited, as well as fallible, it is perhaps the very best we can do to solve the problem of other minds. Indeed, on this basis other minds are even necessary, for one must assume another mind in the process of asking a question, hence, even the skeptic’s objections presuppose the existence of other minds. We might also exemplify this concept when using the law of contradiction; the skeptic will note that we have no possible way to prove its universality, to which we reply, that universality is not necessary in order to use the law of contradiction. For no skeptic can logically deny the law of contradiction without also undermining the conclusions of his skepticism. At least in a local setting the law can be established, which will certainly prove beneficial, as well as necessary to any conversation. Locality in the case of certain concepts is sufficient to warrant, either the use, or existence of those concepts.
(C) 2009 Jersey Flight- may not be posted without express permission by the author.

Published on 12-18-09