1 First beginnings: the Greeks, Platonism. The end of the first beginning - Nietzsche.

2 Martin Heidegger in section 85 of his second magnum opus, says, "the thrust into the crossing and thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to an end, if philosophy is to attain its other beginning" (GA 65, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939) p. 171-173, et. p 121). What does this mean? Philosophy wants to attain another beginning. How is that possible? What are the conditions that would allow philosophy to attain the other beginning? Answer: basically any kind (all forms) of metaphysics must come to an end, only then will philosophy be able to attain the other beginning. The crossing goes from the guiding-question to the grounding-question: what is the truth of Seyn (Being)? (GA 65, Section 85). So, the other beginning is linked to the "grounding-question". This question (what is the truth of Seyn (Being)?) is now Heidegger's essential question. In Heidegger's first major work Being and Time (1927), he asks the question: what is the meaning (Sinn) of Being? In Heidegger's second major work, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939) GA 65, he has re-thought the question in the light of ten years. His question now is: what is the truth of Seyn (Being)? Heidegger sees himself after the end of metaphysics in the attempt at a new beginning to philosophy. Sometimes Heidegger is ambiguous about his position in this process. Perhaps we 'read' too much into Heidegger's own position. I think Heidegger is leading us to this point, he is the guide in the process, but somehow this not just Heidegger's position. Note: Heidegger is still showing us "if philosophy", that means that this is not a "done deal".

But this has nothing to do with several philosophical lectures delivered in a university in Germany 60 years ago or written scratches on paper in 2003 or bits in a computer. The historical epoch -- it happens. To drop back into metaphysics: this not a subjective nor psychological decision. Is there a knowing awareness that metaphysics must come to an end? Answer: yes, I think so. But there is still a long way to go in view of the one issue associated with value metaphysics. We are still in the midst of value- systems and value metaphysics - they are alive and well. There is still a task for philosophical (reflective) thinking at the end of metaphysics, but Heidegger is re-directing us and showing us a new direction and new beginning. This is an attempt at a contextual interpretation and understanding of the project of a new beginning for philosophy.

3 Old beginning to a new, other beginning. What is the new, other beginning? This is the question mark and question thinking that these investigations are pursuing. Do we have the truth? Perhaps "not". Do we know the answer? Perhaps "not". In pursuit of a re-formulated question - yes! Is this our new "worldview", our new "philosophy", our new "goal", our new "happiness", our new "science"? Answer: no! The process and the thinking are the "goals". Listening, reflecting, elucidations (Erläuterungen), thinking, musing, writing, dialogue, turning on the path, changing direction, going down the wrong path, backtracking, being lost, being knock down, being on the Holzwege, being on the Wegmarken, being on the Der Feldweg, Unterwegs zur Sprache, Wege - nicht Werke, --- these are all part of the goal and the process. Staring up at the mountain and climbing the mountain. We humbly need to be seekers on the pathways. The seeking, the process, the philosophizing, the questioning - this is often more of the final "goal" and telos for us than some final "essay" or an "answer". What are "answers" for us now? Who is the one that needs to be given an "answer"?

4 What is the subjective and objective history of the Being of beings? Heidegger, in a short essay on the Recollection in Metaphysics, says, "The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is Being itself, and only this." ("Recollection in Metaphysics", et. p. 82). ("Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses." ('Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik' Nietzsche II, p. 489). What does this mean for history? What does this mean for Being? Heidegger is trying to understand the nature of history and more precisely Being after metaphysics. This is neither the subjective nor objective account of the history of man or mankind, nor the history of an 'objective" being; and in addition, this is not a philosophical history of man's relation to some external world. The history of Being stands uniquely alone. Can we say that the history of Being stands only by itself - pure (but not absolute and unmediated, Hegel said "Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare")? What is the corresponding object (being) that the truth of this statement is correct in representing the object? The Being of beings is no object or being, but rather the matter for reflective thinking. How can a non-object have a history? In what book can we look up its history and find a written description? Are there primary documents for research? These questions should all sound funny to you, but not because of some of problem in "logic" or "truth". Traditional logic will not help us in these thick woods.

5 Philosophy is not for helping us switch channels on the T. V. or to help us figure out which program to watch. Philosophy is not some great knowledge for us to live life here on earth according to the highest rules and principles. Philosophy does not put money in the bank or help us with the stock market. Philosophy will not help us to find the "truth". Perhaps "philosophy" is only a "perhaps". Philosophy is linked with the interrogative. Questioning thinking may leap toward philosophy. This is not to question thinking. Heidegger said that "philosophy accomplishes nothing", namely, there is no practical result from philosophical reflection. Why then do philosophy? Indeed what made Kant work on the Critique of Pure Reason or Hegel do a Phenomenology of Spirit or Science of Logic or Nietzsche start on his path of the will to power? If you tangle with philosophy, it will tangle with you. It will "untertangle" (new coinage) you as you know yourself. Do not take it lightly or without a dose of 'play'.

6 What is known:

1) The Greeks and Platonism are the first beginning.
2) Hölderlin gives us insight into the future of a new, other beginning.
3) Nietzsche tried to think anew; he is both the end and the transition.
4) Heidegger is not sure, but he is headed toward the new, other beginning.
5) Heidegger through Aristotle and Nietzsche is headed toward another beginning; that is, without the eternal, super-sensuous, the eternal ideas, the eternal ideals, namely, without Platonism (not Übersinnlichen, Unendlichkeit and Ewigkeit).
6) This is not Heidegger's personal philosophy; he is a guide and a builder of narrow bridges toward the other side of metaphysics, the time and location that has left metaphysics behind.
7) Heidegger wants to twist and turn his way out of metaphysics and leave it completely behind in the dust of time. Is he successful?

We only note what is known in some outline form at this point in the history of Heidegger's publication and also in the author's (Daniel Fidel Ferrer) own thinking and reflections. This writing is still "about" Heidegger. I am not attempting a preparatory exercise in questioning of the truth of Being (Seyn) or the meaning of Being in any way like what Heidegger is attempting. Can we say this is writing "with" Heidegger? I think Heidegger would want us to Auseinandersetzung with him, since Heidegger, like Nietzsche, is not looking for "believers" or disciples ("what matters all believers?" This is Nietzsche's question in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue"). Heidegger is not producing a proof or some kind of special argument or making some rhetorical movement of language or a language game for us to play on Sunday afternoon; but rather, Heidegger is guiding us to a new beginning.

7 The abandonment of beings by Being gives Heidegger the need and the distress to move his questioning toward the truth of Being. But Being does not overstep its own possibilities - just like a tree that grows from a little seed to a great tree, all of this starts within its own possibilities. There is nothing added by man or humanity that makes the tree more than it is.

8 We are trying to transform the questions:
1) What is the truth of Being (Seyn)?
2) What is the meaning (Sinn) of the Being of beings?
3) What does this mean to overcome metaphysics?
4) What is the new, other beginning for philosophy?

9 In a different context, Heidegger said, "I write all of this in the form of questions; for, as far as I can see [he saw a lot], thinking can today do more than to continually ponder what evoked in the said questions."
(On The Question of Being, Letter to Ernst Jünger, "Zur Seinsfrage (1955) / Über die Linie" in GA 9 Pathmarks et. p. 306). ("Ich schreibe dies alles in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag heute, soweit ich sehe, ein Denken nicht, als unablässig eig das zu bedenken, was die angeführten Fragen hervorruft."). What does this mean? Heidegger does not have some jar of knowledge where he pulls out the "truth". Philosophical questioning in Heidegger's hands can leap ahead into an opening of the truth of Being, but not some special ontological knowledge that Heidegger acquired in the Black Forest of Germany. For Heidegger, philosophical questioning is not being used to come up with a philosophical worldview in order to see a new world arrangement. Heidegger's questioning is setting part of the context for us to see his pathways and byways as he seeks Being. Heidegger wrote, "that every thinking of Seins, all philosophy can never be confirmed by "facts", i. e. by beings. Making itself intelligible is suicide (Selbstmord) for philosophy." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) p. 435, et. p. 307). So, philosophical thinking is neither realism nor empiricism, nor is it the construction of a worldview based on values or facts. We are not looking to some science for help in doing philosophy. For Heidegger "intelligible" means trying to find the truth of Being among beings or in other words not ontic truths (intelligible) as in some kind of science. For Heidegger this is suicide for philosophy, since it is not on the way to Being or the opening of Being or the truth of Being (Seyn).

Heidegger called this time, "In that age of total lack of questioning anything, it is sufficient as a start to inquire into the question of all questions." (GA 65, et. p. 8).

10 Thinkers can try to overstep their own limitations. Heidegger said, "This again consists in the fact that the thinker can never himself say what is most of all his own. It must remain unsaid, because the sayable
(Word, German=Wort) receives its determination from what is not sayable (inexpressible)" (Recollection in Metaphysics, et. p. 77-78).
("Diese wiederum besteht darin, daß der Denker sein Eigenstes selbst nie sagen kann. Es muß ungesagt bleiben, weil das sagbare Wort aus dem Unsagbaren seine Bestimmung empfängt." ('Die Erinnergung in der Metaphysik' Nietzsche II, p. 484).

What does this mean? Is this some sort of mysticism or it is just another one of those connections between Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)? Heidegger is driving the point toward the "unsaid," which he uses as a way to get at what thinkers were right on the edge of saying, but did not actually say. If we want to say what Heidegger or any other philosopher said, then it is philology and not philosophy. If we want to have a live dialogue with another thinker, another philosopher, then we bring them into our thinking, our dialogue, our critical confrontation and encounter them with the issues for thinking. Not as what is dead and long dead in a thinker, but rather to bring their thinking in close to us. Heidegger wants us to think about the first beginning and the new, other beginning; but we need to see what is also unsaid in Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger started a movement away from the first beginning, which started with the Greeks and Platonism, and now moves on to a new and entirely different beginning. How are these two beginnings related? What is unsaid in Heidegger that points to this relationship? We are attempting to bring out the unsaid in Heidegger and to name this relationship. Although Heidegger is hesitant on this point because as he remarks, this is up to Being and not in our "heads". The unsaid drives us to "speak;" but, in some ways, there are limitations on what we can say, because some part always remains unsaid
- we must always attempt to say the unsayable.

11 Scholarship issues with Heidegger and the other beginning. While Heidegger was working on his second major writing project (as opposed to just simply lectures or seminars or essays), the work is entitled: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939) (GA 65), he was also, during the winter semester of 1937-1938, working on a lecture course series, entitled: "Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik' [Vorlesung]". In section 31 we have the title of "The end of the first beginning and the preparation for another beginning." (Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic GA 45, p. 124, et. p 108). ("Das Ende des ersten Anfangs und die Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs") and Subsection a), which is subtitled: "Our situation at the end of the beginning and the demand for a reflection on the first beginning as a preparation for another beginning." (GA 45 p. 124, et. p 108). ("Unser Stand im Ende des Anfangs und die Forderung einer Besinnung auf den ersten Anfang als Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs").

Although Heidegger may have been thinking about the issue of the new, other beginning, it may have been during this lecture series that we have the first written communication about this topic. Although this whole lecture series seems in many ways different than most of his historical lectures, it seems much closer to Heidegger's own thought than to be normally acting as a "guide" for us in the history of philosophy. Case in point: Heidegger writes, "That is, we are standing before the decision between the end (and its running out, which may still take centuries) and another beginning, one which can only be a moment, but whose preparation requires the patience "optimist" are no more capable of than "pessimists." (GA 45 g 124, et. p. 108). ("Und dies sagt: Wir stehen vor der Entscheidung zwischen dem Ende und seinem vielleicht noch Jahrhunderte füllenden Auslauf - und dem anderen Anfang, der nur ein Augenblick sein kann, dessen Vorbereitung aber jener Geduld bedarf, der "Optimisten" gleichwenig wie "Pessimisten" je gewachsen sind"). Heidegger is unsure of himself at this point as to the question of exactly how long this period of history will last. Nietzsche is the end point of the history of metaphysics, but it is not certain that Heidegger is at the point of the new, other beginning - or, Heidegger is still a transitional stage. Evidently, Heidegger is pointing out the general structure of the history of metaphysics and the end of metaphysics, which is a movement to a new, other beginning; however, the judgment about Heidegger's own position in this history is not yet clear.

12 Nietzsche said, "Epistemologist who becomes entangled in the snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people)" (Gay Science, "la gaya scienza" #354). Would Nietzsche point this critical analysis toward Heidegger if he knew about Heidegger's grounding question of the truth of Being (Seyn)? Nietzsche himself sees how close he is to a philosopher such as Benedictus De Spinoza (1632-1677), but how would Nietzsche see Heidegger's project? Heidegger speaks on Spinoza in his Schelling lectures (GA 42), but it seems that both Heidegger and Schelling would be very far from an eagle's point of view like Spinoza's. Heidegger points toward the basic tendency of Schelling to be anti-Spinoza. Nietzsche is strongly anti-grammar as creating metaphysics - how does this sort out Spinoza, Schelling, and Heidegger? Nietzsche's vapor and wisp of Being (empty fiction) and Reality, all of these are mere concepts-mummies. (Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes with a Hammer, "Reason in Philosophy"). Heidegger must twist his way out of this pathway to a different dwelling and meaning of the earth.

13 What kind of sea does Heidegger want to venture out to be in the new beginning? Nietzsche says, "At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea". (Gay Science, "la gaya scienza" First aphorism of Book Five, "We fearless Ones", #343, 1886). Heidegger wants to get on Nietzsche's ships and attempt (Versuch) that venture out into those open seas. Heidegger has this knowledge of how the first beginning started western philosophy; Kant was the next decisive step, Nietzsche as the final step, the end; the end that speaks to the transition across a narrow footbridge (Die Stegen) to another, new beginning (Anfang). This horizon is bright and clear. From on the top of the mountains you can see the horizon in all directions. Supposedly on top of Mount Everest the sky is very dark blue (almost black) and you can see the planets during the day; of course, the horizon is open like the open sea. Part of the problem of being on an open sea is that it is hard to know which direction you are going or the image of a snake in a bamboo shoot (i. e., you are going very fast in one direction, but you do not know which direction). The issue of direction is also an issue with Heidegger's as well. Some of the outline of the future is becoming clear out of the mist. But Heidegger does not posit this as a goal, not does he "will' the new, other beginning (non-willing Will or Gelassenheit). The non-willing Will leads to releasement. This is neither a subjective nor an objective analysis of beings or history, rather this is where philosophy hits the road. Even that use of rhetoric kills the meaning. The thumping of grammar and rhetoric stands behind the shimmering curtain.

14 Heidegger was interviewed by Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff, which took place September 23, 1966 and was published in Der Spiegel (31 May 1976), after Heidegger's death as per his request. The last two sentences that Heidegger says in the interview are, "For us today the greatest of what is to be thought is too great. We can perhaps struggle with building a narrow and not very far reaching footbridge for a crossing." ("Für uns Heutige ist das Große des zu Denkenden zu groß. Wir können uns vielleicht daran abmühen, an schmalen und wenig weit reichenden Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen."). Heidegger is speaking of the greatest of the new beginning for philosophy; he thinks it is going to be very difficult for us. So, Heidegger thinks we can only build a footbridge (Stegen) to a new crossing (Übergang), to a new beginning (Anfang). Furthermore, he adds that it will be "not very far reaching". Thus, Heidegger is placing us in a 'precarious' position and he is not giving us a lot of hope that he has the "answer" for us. Plus, even if he has the "answer," it is not far reaching, so we are stuck with having to work out our own crossing. In another place, Heidegger says, "And he who will someday grasp it does not need "my" attempt
(Versuch). For he must have laid out his own path thereunto." (Und der, der es einstmals begreifen wird, braucht "meinen" Versuch nicht; denn er muß selbst den Weg dahin sich gebahnt haben.). (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), p. 8, et. p. 7). For Heidegger, the other, new beginning needs to be unfolded in our lived space and time, but for the future ones they may not need Heidegger's attempts. In as much as Heidegger wants to unriddle the riddle of future philosophers, they may not need Heidegger's attempts (Versuch) or even follow in his pathways.

Readers Note: Aphorisms 15 to 45 are detailed reflections on specific passages from Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65). Each aphorism starts with the English translation and then the original German. The English translations are based on the translations of Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (thanks), but there are many changes by Daniel Fidel Ferrer. The idea is, by working through in detail many of the important passages, those specific facets and aspects of Heidegger's reflections on the new, other beginning will become clear. They are presented here in the order of the sections in Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) and then the German version is also given. The German title is: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) GA 65. This most likely is not in chronological order, since Heidegger started this in
1936/37, the last section on 'Being' was done in 1938, and the very final handwritten version completed in May of 1939. Given the nature of the writing and re-writing process, it is not clear how chronological the actual order of the sections was developed. Can we say the methodology in this section is scholia and not actually the aphorism?

14.5 Getting Heidegger 'right' is to be left to Heideggerian philology - philosophizing with Heidegger that is our singular task. Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics, ET p. 175). What is philosophy? How are we to do philosophy with or against Heidegger? Heidegger, in an early insightful remark, said, "All philosophical interpretation is destructive, controversy, and radicalization, which is not equivalent to skepticism. Or else it is nothing at all; mere chatter that repeats more laboriously what was said in simpler and better fashion by the author himself." (The Essence of Human Freedom: an introduction to philosphy. GA 31 Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie (Sommersemester 1930, et p. 118). Through the seeking of a dialogue with Heidegger we are also attempting to engage in philosophizing. The matter for thought brings us forward toward actually doing philosophy. Heidegger wants us to do more than just get it "right". From a different point of view are the excellent remarks from Kant, when he said through his students' notes: "How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds his own work, so to be speak, on someone else's ruins, but no work has ever come to be that was to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there is a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical." (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538). This thought of Kant should be read and re-read, since it makes the critical path and real philosophy much more than just reading philosophy or learning someone else's philosophical "system". Rather, it points to the nature of the philosophical task as philosophizing beyond the representing of a historical philosophy. We need to think the thoughts, not just repeat the language. For Nietzsche, Kant was just building a system with historical concepts that Kant thought were given, whereas, Nietzsche knew these concepts were not given at all. Heidegger knows we need to look at these concepts through the process of destruction and radicalization - that is, the concepts need to be shaken and touched with the hammer.
15 Beginning of the very first section number 1 (GA 65, p. 4, et. p. 3), the first sentence reads:

"Contributions" enact a questioning along a pathway which is first traced out by the crossing to the other beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering. This pathway brings the crossing into the openness of history and establishes the crossing as perhaps a very long sojourn, in the enactment of which the other beginning of thinking always remains only intimation, but already decisive." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 3). "Die "Beiträge" fragen in einer Bahn, die durch den Übergang zum anderen Anfang, in den jetzt das abendländische Denken einrückt, erst gebahnt wird. Diese Bahn bringt den Übergang ins Offene der Geschichte und begründet ihn als einen vielleicht sehr langen Aufenthalt, in dessen Vollzug der andere Anfang des Denkens immer nur das Geahnte aber doch schon Entschiedene bleibt." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 4).

Heidegger begins and ends his second major work (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis), Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65), with a discussion of language. He starts with the issue of the public title, which, I think, means the title Contributions to Philosophy. However, he says that the proper title (gemäße Überschrift) is Vom Ereignis (from enowning, the event of appropriation, the event, properizing event, appropriating event, the happening). Therefore, we should really read this work as an expression of "from" Ereignis. In section 35, Heidegger says, "Das Ereignis would be the proper title for the "work" that can only be prepared for; and therefore, instead of that the title must be: Beiträge zur Philosophie." (et. p. 54). Now, it is important to note that in the future we will be seeing a publication by Heidegger called: GA71 Das Ereignis (1941/42). What is the purpose of Heidegger's major work called: Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis)? Heidegger is giving us an example of his anfängliche Denken about Ereignis. In addition, we should note that Heidegger calls this a "preparatory exercise". This is not a complete and final or finished work (Werke). Heidegger seems to back away from the idea in general of a published work (cf. GA 66, p. 427). Why is that? A partial answer is that we are always underway toward..

Now let us look at the way Heidegger speaks to the matter for thought - the other beginning.

What does he mean by the remark, "pathway "(Bahn) which is first traced out by the crossing to the other beginning"? I think this means that Heidegger is showing us this "pathway" and is guiding us toward that other beginning. Where does Heidegger stand? How does Heidegger see himself within the history of Being (Geschichte des Seyn)? For example, it was Heidegger who pointed out the forgottenness of Being or the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit). So, we must ask where Heidegger himself sees his own questioning and thinking within his own philosophy. Where does Heidegger see himself standing in the tradition of western philosophy? Does Heidegger break history with the first beginning to start an entirely new, unique, and original (primordial) beginning to philosophy? Again, please note that Heidegger, in this first section of this publication (note: I do not call this a work or a book), is giving us the importance of the other beginning. The purpose of this publication is partially to give us a passageway toward some "x", and that means some kind of a location as this other beginning. This "crossing as perhaps a very long sojourn" means he is not sure how long this process will take. I think in other passages we might find him even more hesitant. How can we know how long this process might take? Would you consider this to be ontological historical knowledge of some coming event or happening? How are we to consider this period or epoch of our current historical placement in our historical time era with regard to our (Da-Sein) relationship to Being (Seyn)? We are not trying to predict or improve our relationship nor can we 'will it' or request some kind of change in humans. Sometimes Heidegger speaks of us falling silent (Verschweigung), which puts us in a location for listening and belonging (Zugehörigkeit). Perhaps this will work for us. What do you hear?

Heidegger is clear that the other beginning is what Western thinking is now entering and I think that means for us that it is just beginning or in other words, if you like, the beginning of the beginning or the prelude to historical thinking of Being.

This is decisive for Heidegger, but has it become decisive for us? How can it become decisive for us? In what direction must our thinking take for us to participate in this preparation for a new kind of thinking
(enthinking, Er-Denken, GA 65 section 265)? The decision is not just with "us" (Da-Sein), but with the epoch. There is neither a subjective nor an objective ahistorical argument nor proof given here.

16 "In the meantime, in crossing to another beginning, philosophy has to have achieved one crucial thing: projecting-open, i. e., the grounding enopening of the free-play of the time-space of the truth of Seyn."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 4)

"Inzwischen muß die Philosophie im Übergang zum anderen Anfang ein Wesentliches geleistet haben: den Entwurf, d. h. die gründende Eröffnung des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes der Wahrheit des Seyns." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 5).

We can re-think Heidegger's thinking here by a re-wording and try another kind of translation into English. For example, a reverse reading then becomes: the Time-Play- Space is the general opening of the truth of Being; this must be so for philosophy in order for the projecting-open, which is achieved by crossing to the other beginning. The other beginning archives the projecting-opening (Entwurf), which means the Time-Play-Space of the truth of Being (Wahrheit des Seyns). We can force the issue and say, "the other beginning is projecting open as Time-Play-Space as the truth of Being"or the "the truth of Being is the opening of the Time-Play-Space (and this happens as the crossing (Übergang) to the other beginning) ". We are getting inside Heidegger's language play and hopefully this is more than just rhetoric on our part and Heidegger's as well. What are the ideas here? Heidegger says, "This saying does not describe or explain, does not proclaim or teach. " (GA65, p. 4, et. p. 4). There is no proof here and none is attempted. This attempt (Versuch) is in a different direction. Note that Heidegger uses a term like attempt (Versuch) with its Nietzschean overtones on the first page of this work. All future thinking is under way
(Gedanken-gang). This means that there is no final philosophical "work" or complete system. If we have no questions and we want to describe the world in some systematic way, then we must return to do battle with Hegel over the nature of those expanding moments in history, which become the absolute spirit unfolding in human history. Our point here is that Heidegger's philosophy is different than the past and that it is clearly not a Hegelian system nor is it a series of Nietzschean aphorisms. Back to the point: the other beginning has this character of Time-Play-Space of the truth of Being as the projecting open. The opening
(Lichtung) that allows the Time-Play-Space to be with beings.

Heidegger is in dialogue with himself here. This is neither Nietzsche nor Schelling; and certainly not Hegel or Kant. However, in general, the thinkers in the background are Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775-1854), Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), and perhaps deeper in the background is Ernst Jünger (1895-1998). Ernst said that his brother Friedrich Georg Jünger
(1898-1977) was closer to Heidegger than himself. There is someone else that is very much part of this text -- right up front is the other one that is some how unnamed and yet standing on every page - Heidegger's own thinking and writing before this attempt.

Other philosophers and poets that are mentioned are the normal cast of characters for Heidegger, namely, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Anaximander, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Karl Jaspers
(1883-1969), Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Pindar, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Emil Lask (1875-1915), Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Plus, he mentions Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller
(1759-1805), Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe (1749-
1832), Walter Gerlach (1889-1979), and Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841).

But it seems that Heidegger quotes and references himself the most. This is self-reflexive and a self-dialogue with two great philosophers, Heidegger and Heidegger. In some cases, he poses questions and answers in his dialogue. How does Heidegger see the reader as a third partner in our dialogue? Should we just follow along where Heidegger is taking us or should we try to confront Heidegger with Heidegger? In some ways, it feels like Nietzsche's Ecce Homo, but it is much more than a self-review of Heidegger's own thinking to that date.

17 "The other beginning of thinking is named thus, not because it is simply shaped differently from any other arbitrarily chosen hitherto existing philosophies, but rather because it must be the only other beginning according to the relation to the one and only first beginning. The style of thoughtful mindfulness in the crossing from one beginning to the other is also already determined by the allotment of the one beginning to the other beginning." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 4).

"Der andere Anfang des Denkens ist so genannt, nicht weil er nur andersförmig ist als beliebige andere bisherige Philosophien, sondern weil er der einzig andere aus dem Bezug zu dem einzig einen und ersten Anfang sein muß. Aus dieser Zugewiesenheit des einen und des anderen Anfangs zueinander ist auch schon die Art der denkerischen Besinnung im Übergang bestimmt." (Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 5).

What is the relationship between the first beginning of western philosophy (the Greeks) and the new, other beginning (Heidegger)? Heidegger is not just recasting the Greeks for the modern period and calling it a new beginning in philosophy. When Heidegger in another place speaks of the "end of philosophy and the task for thinking" and when he talks about the end of metaphysics, he is talking about the end of the first beginning. In more detail, he says that Platonism is the beginning of metaphysics and Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism is the final end of metaphysics (the omega of metaphysics). So, in a way, the formula would be Platonism is the first beginning and Heidegger is the new, other beginning for western philosophy. Heidegger is not saying that this is a new metaphysics or a new ontology; no, that is not it at all. The relationship between the two beginnings as seen from the new, other beginning can be expressed as one of Heidegger's beloved terms - Auseinandersetzung (a struggle
-kampf, a critical debate and encounter, a fight between heavyweights). But this is neither a countermovement nor an anti-movement to the first beginning. Heidegger wants to be free and clear of the first beginning. Has he made it? Has Heidegger twisted clear of the first beginning and metaphysics? As Heidegger expresses it in the title to section 87, "History of the first beginning (the history of metaphysics)."
(GA 65 et., p. 123, G, p. 175). Back to the question: has Heidegger twisted clear of metaphysics?

18 "Because the other beginning (from within the truth of Sein) has become necessary? Why a beginning at all? (Cf. Überlegungen IV on the beginning and crossing.)." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 40)

"Weil der andere Anfang (aus der Wahrheit des Seins) notwendig geworden? Warum denn überhaupt Anfang? (Vgl. Überlegungen IV über Anfang und Übergang)." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 57).

Here Heidegger references one of his own writings, Überlegungen IV (GA 94)(English translation might be Considerations). This series of notebooks is one of Heidegger's mostly closely kept writings. According to his son and main editor of the Gesamtausgabe, Dr. Hermann Heidegger, these will not be open for publication until at least 2005 and will be the last materials published in the collected writings. These are not part of any lecture series etc., but rather consist of some of Heidegger's most personal philosophical reflections. In the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger makes the most references to himself. This is clearly a self-reflexive dialogue that Heidegger has entered in with himself and his writings. Heidegger is writing this in the period of 1936-1938 with the handwritten version completed May, 1939. In the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger makes references to over 15 volumes of the Gesamtausgabe (GA) that as of 2003 had not been published yet even in German. So, we have a way to go before we can read any of the Überlegungen (GA 94, 95, 96).

Why has the other beginning become necessary? The basic question: why a beginning in general? What is behind and pushing toward another beginning? This is not something behind the world or outside of the world like the supersensuous. I think Heidegger is looking for a process within history (not human history). This again is related to the issue of Heidegger's own questioning of the truth of Being (Seyn), which relates to how Heidegger sees his own opening up to Being as part of the history of Being. If we have abandoned Being (or Being has abandoned itself) (Seinsverlassenheit) and now Heidegger is asking about Being, then Being is no longer abandoned. Perhaps it is not "we" nor Heidegger and neither one of us can merely talk about Being or ask about the truth of Being; then the sound of Being maybe heard and, all of sudden, Being itself is no longer abandoned. No, it is more complicated that just simply engaging in philosophical writing or with Heidegger in the Black Forest. I think Heidegger would say this is like the world stage. This is not Hegel's world-spirit (die Weltgeist), but hopefully you are getting the picture that it is more than just some empirical data or a news report ("Being has returned", newspaper headline).

Back to the point: Heidegger is driving us back to the ground of why there is an "other beginning". Why a beginning at all? Why bring up this issue at all? Why not leave it in the background or un-discussed? Why did we have the first beginning with the Greek philosophers and now a new, other beginning? Why are there also ancient philosophical schools in India and China? Of course, there are the religions traditions that have background with philosophy - for example, Buddhism. What is the necessity that makes all of this happen? So then, the next question: has this time come again that the necessity of making
(can we use that term here?) a new, other beginning must happen again in this epoch? Can we go ahead and live unexamined lives and not respond to the call of the asking the question (the question draws us) about the truth of Being? Heidegger even speaks of distress (Not, Notlosigkeit, Not-losigkeit) and specifically distress over the abandonment of Being
(Seinsverlassenheit) (cf. GA 65, section 60). We are not thinking about something that occurred to Heidegger only and somehow relates to his personal theological or philosophical background. This is where Heidegger is trying to push aside and leave all metaphysical concepts and thinking behind.

19 "But this beginning first becomes enactable as the other beginning when the first beginning is put into critical encounter. Grasped inceptually, the beginning is Seyn itself."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 41)

"Aber dieser Anfang wird erst vollziehbar als der andere in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem ersten. Der Anfang - anfänglich begriffnen - ist das Seyn selbst." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-
1938) (GA 65, p. 58).

It is only after we critically engage the first beginning and the entire historical course of philosophy and metaphysics, only after we have purified (Reinigung, section 110, section 26) these metaphysical concepts
(this is not the negative sense of the "destruction" of history) and finished up the cleaning up of metaphysics in general. Heidegger spent many years working on the history of philosophy and so far most of his publications involve his Auseinandersetzung (critical encounter) with metaphysics. At times, Heidegger also talks about the struggle (Kampf). So, we must do the work of not just reading and thinking about the entire history of western thought, but we need to move in a critical way. This does not mean some ahistorical search for arguments and proofs. Heidegger's thinking seems to move beyond all of the standard methods of phenomenology or hermeneutics.

What is the philosophical methodology here? This is a very complex question with regard to Heidegger. One point of interest is a remark he made about Kant, "Getting Kant right is to be left to Kant philology". I take that to mean that getting Kant right is not philosophy. What is the philosophical task for thinking?

The second part here can be re-translated and re-thought along different lines. The other beginning - conceptualized provisionally - is Being itself. The means Heidegger's new term Being (Seyn) (not the metaphysical Being (Sein)) is the new, other beginning. The andere Anfang is Being itself. The other beginning is Being. This needs to be unpacked but packing it also makes it clearer. Heidegger said during a lecture course on Aristotle that the students should read Aristotle for 15 years before reading Nietzsche. In a discard draft by Nietzsche written for the section on "Why I Write Such Good Books" in Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, Nietzsche said, "Usually, one must condense, or upset one's digestion; I have to be diluted, liquefied, mixed with water, else one upsets one's digestion." With Heidegger, we also need to take the long drink of water and re-think everything; only by this way do we watch where Heidegger is guiding us. Remember this is still a preparatory exercise and all future thinking is underway. But we need to engage Heidegger to follow Heidegger's own admonishment for thinking. Although we must be careful here, since Heidegger wrote in a letter to Medard Boss, dated February 21, 1971, Heidegger said, "I would like to dissuade you from the literature on Heidegger." (Zollikon Seminars, et. p. 290). That puts "us" in the middle.

20 "The other beginning has to be realized totally from within Seyn as enowning (Ereignis) and from the essential swaying of its truth and its [truth's] history (cf., e. g., the other beginning and its relationship to German Idealism)". (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 41)

"Der andere Anfang muß ganz aus dem Seyn als Ereignis und der Wesung seiner Wahrheit und ihrer Geschichte erwirkt werden (vgl. z. B. der andere Anfang und sein Verhältnis zum deutschen Idealismus)."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 58).

In re-thinking this passage, we need to clear about the parts. The other beginning must be seen from the whole of Being as Ereignis, and the essence of its truth and its history. Also, we need to think of the other beginning and the relationship to German Idealism. Heidegger does not elaborate the connection with German Idealism and the context does not give any hints. But can we think this out without any kind of hint from Heidegger. This is very difficult since Heidegger's relationship to Fichte, early Schelling, Hegel and the later Schelling is complex; however, we know that Heidegger reacted against the whole issue of the absolute and the systems of metaphysics attempted by almost of all of German Idealism (except Schelling writing on human freedom). Later on, in section 104 of the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) on German Idealism, Heidegger says, "There is no bridge (Brücke) from here to the other beginning." (GA 65, p. 203, et. p. 142). Heidegger is the farthest from Hegel's metaphysics. In some ways, Heidegger is still part of the countermovement to the great Hegelian metaphysical system. Hegel's famous essay at the beginning of the Science of Logic, begins with the title is "With What Must the Science Begin?"
(Wissenschaft der Logik, "Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?"). This essay is the exact opposite of what Heidegger wants to accomplish. "Remember," Heidegger said," to place Hegel's system in the commanding view and then to think in a totally opposite direction. ("Hegels Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken." GA 65, p. 176). This is Heidegger's counterpunch to the Hegelian metaphysical system. Is Hegel still standing? Yes - but weakening. Hegel said at the beginning of his major philosophical work, the Science of Logic, "With What Must the Science Begin?", "It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty and also the possibility of resolving it has been much discussed. What philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted." Heidegger has radically transformed Hegel's question. Perhaps Heidegger did not even have this question in mind, but it certainly came to the forefront of my mind that this was indeed a link. Hegel has the absolute hidden in the background but not too deeply. Remember, the absolute already is given completely a priori. In a general sense, if you go along with Hegel's starting point (beginning) he has you locked into his system. Question: if we go along with Heidegger's new, other beginning are we locked into being Heideggerians? Can we ask the question "what is the truth of Seyn?" and not end up as some kind of Heideggerian? Can we twist free of Heidegger's starting point (new beginning) and still be doing non-metaphysical post-modern philosophy? This kind of thinking (Er-denken, Inbegrifflichkeit, anfängliche Denken) is for those who come but once (GA 65, section 1).

21 "In the domain of the other beginning there is neither "ontology" nor "metaphysics" in general. (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 41)

"Im Bereich des anderen Anfangs gibt es weder "Ontologie" noch überhaupt "Metaphysik". (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 59).

In this passage Heidegger is making it clear that the new, other beginning is not connected to ontology or at least one version, namely, Hermann Lotze's (1817-1881) version of ontology as one discipline among others (GA 65 section 14). Of course, Heidegger wants to move beyond and overcome metaphysics, so the new, other beginning is not linked to metaphysics. Metaphysics never moves beyond beings or beingness, so in the new beginning Heidegger asks about the truth of Seyn (Being of beings) and metaphysics can not follow in his path of thinking. In other words, unchain ontology from metaphysical thinking. Heidegger is making his thinking the condition and limits set for the other beginning. What is this domain (Bereich) for Heidegger where there is no traditional ontology and no metaphysics in general? Is this the Kantian version of a critique (limits, possibilities, bounds, outlines, Vorriss)? Is a "domain" a place and a spatial location in ahistorical time? I think this is a case where Heidegger is not thinking historical enough. Nietzsche points out that philosophers lack a historical sense (Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes with a Hammer, section "Reason"in Philosophy"). Nietzsche's tuning fork may have touched Heidegger on this one, because Heidegger is attempting to step over his own shadow here. He can try, but does not make it over the shadow. Heidegger does say it is important to jump over one's own shadow.

Sometimes Heidegger mentions the work of Nicolai Hartmann who writes about ontology in the 20th century, but who according to Heidegger has it all wrong. For Heidegger, Hartmann is an ersatz straw man; he does not even quote him but merely throws in a sharp remark for good measure. Clearly the Hartmann version of ontology is not where Heidegger is guiding us to and also ontology not as discipline (cf. Lotze). Heidegger wants to stop ontology from becoming henology. How many rivers have you stepped in twice? Was it the same river? Yes, of course - so much for naming and language.

22 "When "decision" comes to stand over against "system", then that is the crossing from modernity into the other beginning. (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p.
62)

"Wenn die "Entscheidung" gegen das "System" zu stehen kommt, dann ist das der Übergang aus der Neuzeit in den anderen Anfang.." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 89).

The other beginning is after the crossing from modernity (Neuzeit, new time) and this will happen when the final decision is made against the "system" in general. Heidegger at some level equates the Hegelian "absolute system" and systems in general with metaphysics. At a later time Heidegger will think the essence of metaphysics is nihilism, but the paw of the tiger (metaphysics) is as an absolute system. Metaphysics at its highest point, in its greatest manifestation is as the absolute system. Metaphysics as the highest point of the wave is the Hegelian system. This is given greater detail in Heidegger's Schelling book (GA 42). Heidegger is contra the absolute metaphysics system. But Heidegger wants to be twisted free of all metaphysics and leave metaphysics behind in a complete sense. The notion of system is just the point of making the decision before crossing over. The point of the decision is when thinking moves from beings and beingness to the question of the meaning (Sinn von Sein) of Being or the truth of Being
(Seyn). This does not mean we throw out a "system" or think in some unsystematic way, but rather, that we lay the grounding foundations of all beings in a more original way (note this is not a transcendental structure or grounding). If we can bring the decision against "systems" as such, then the crossing will be made at this time over to the domain of the other beginning.

Kant and then Hegel brought the system and Reason together in a speculative identity. At this point Heidegger does attack Reason, but it is clearly part of his overall critical encounter with metaphysics. This is not an irrational position, but for Heidegger thinking is clearly not Reasoning (specifically in the narrow sense of Reason). Heidegger and Nietzsche are both clear on this point - philosophical thinking is not Reasoning. Some of this appears in Nietzsche's in Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes with a Hammer, "Reason in Philosophy", but there are many other similar remarks in Nietzsche. The question is: has this news come to modern philosophy
(where they still teach the real philosophical thinking in a logic course)?

Heidegger is finding a middle ground between systematic phenomenological research (like Being and Time; perhaps the extreme case of Hegel) and the approach of Nietzsche to write in the form of the aphorism. Nietzsche's aphorisms are a philosophical methodology that makes a point of the nature of philosophical thinking, but Heidegger does not want to follow Nietzsche down this path. On the other hand, Heidegger does not follow Hegel and it seems he no longer wants to go down the path of Being and Time with the phenomenological methodology. As already noted, Heidegger has a problem with the concept of a philosophical written work (Werke). He is only on the way, not yet there, so we do not have such a thing as a philosophical written work (Werke). Heidegger has found a middle path between Hegel
(system) and Nietzsche (aphorisms) in terms of general methods. He also writes essays, articles, dialogues, and poems. But consider what Nietzsche said, "the methods, one must say it ten times, are what is essential. " (The Antichrist, section 59, "die Methoden, man muss es zehnmal sagen, sind das Wesentliche").

Heidegger sees Hölderlin as the one who has "poeticized the furthest ahead"(GA 65, section 105). But Heidegger does not elucidate his own poetry or Nietzsche's poetry; instead, he sees the connection between poetry and his own philosophical thinking. What is the connection between Heidegger's new kind of thinking (Er-denken, Inbegrifflichkeit, anfängliche Denken) and poetry? Specific poetry does not seem to be a large part of the Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis); however, Hölderlin is an essential part of the project but not any of his specific poetry. It seems that Hölderlin is always a part of Heidegger's project. Although even after reading Heidegger's work on Hölderlin it is not clear why Hölderlin, must be a part of Heidegger's project.

Back to the question: has the time come to decide against system as such? I think the answer is "yes". Do we all agree? Do not worry we are not making speculative judgments on history.

23 "The burden of thinking in the other beginning of philosophy is different: It is Er-denken that which is enowned as enowning itself; it is to bring Seyn into the truth of its essential swaying. However, because Seyn becomes enowning in the other beginning, the echo of Seyn must also be history, must pass though history by an essential shock, and must know and at the same time be able to say the moment of this history." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 75-76)

"Anders ist im anderen Anfang der Philosophie die Last des Denkens: das Er-denken dessen, was sich ereignet als das Ereignis selbst, das Seyn in die Wahrheit seiner Wesung bringen. Weil aber im anderen Anfang das Seyn Ereignis wird, muß auch der Anklang des Seyns Geschichte sein, die Geschichte in einer wesentlichen Erschütterung durchmachen und den Augenblick dieser Geschichte zugleich wissen und sagen können."(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p.
108).

We can translate Er-denken as en-thinking or enthinking. But this does not get at the sense of a kind or type of thinking that leads us on to Ereignis. In the other beginning Being as Seyn becomes Ereignis. This Being of beings as Seyn is the truth of Being (Seyn), which is Heidegger's expression of his own philosophical thinking. Remember the real title of Heidegger's writing project is Vom Ereignis. Seyn als Ereignis.

In the next part of the passage Heidegger is bringing his seynsgeschichtliche Denken (translated as being-historical thinking) into play. Aside: seynsgeschichtliche Denken still has a sense of Nietzsche about it. Hegel and Nietzsche were historical thinkers each in their own way (also Wilhelm Dilthey), but Heidegger brings this to the forefront in a different light. This passage is an example of seynsgeschichtliche Denken in action. The echo or Anklang of Being is part history and it is a shock to this moment in history. Again, what is the historical location of Heidegger's own philosophical questioning? Heidegger is himself a person in history; he is historical. This is not just Heidegger, but it is the age or epoch itself that is driving the distress to push its point in history. Why is this a burden (German=Die Last) for us? Is this a heavy burden? Being as Ereignis is too heavy for Da-Sein. It weighs us down. Do we need to become a Heideggerian version of the overman (superman) to handle this burden? Heidegger says this is different in the other beginning, since Being as Ereignis shocks and breaks history into two parts: the first beginning and the new, other beginning to philosophy (or thinking). Where is history after Heidegger? Do we have some kind of historical relativism? Remember Nietzsche said, "The thinker. - he is a thinker that means, he knows how to make things simpler than they are. "(Gay Science, "la gaya scienza" Book Three, #189). Even though Heidegger wrote a great deal, that does not mean that he made anything overly complex, for in fact, he made it simpler than it really is in thought.

24 "Therefore this "idealistic" and moralistic interpretation of nihilism remains provisional, in spite of its importance. Directed toward the other beginning, nihilism must be grasped (begriffen) more fundamentally as the essential consequence (Wesensfolge) of the abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit)." (Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 96).

"Deshalb bleibt diese "idealistische" und moralische Auslegung des Nihilismus trotz ihrer Wesentlichkeit vorläufig. In der Absicht auf den anderen Anfang muß der Nihilismus gründlicher als Wesensfolge der Seinsverlassenheit begriffen werden." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 138).

Heidegger is attacking the more typical Nietzschean position. Nietzsche himself viewed much of what he was doing was anti-Christian morality. For example, Nietzsche said in his autobiography, Ecce Homo
("Why I am Destiny", #7), "Have I been understood? - What defines me, what sets me apart from the rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality. "Nietzsche's whole project of the revaluation of all values can be seen within the horizon of his attempt to engage in the transformation of morality and this is certainly more in line with the "standard" reading of Nietzsche. Heidegger is attacking the "standard" reading of Nietzsche's position of the idealist and moralistic reading of nihilism. Heidegger has a deeper reading of nihilism as the essence of the history of metaphysics. Therefore, Heidegger adds the second part to this passage by bringing into the play the abandonment or forgetting (forgetting is not to be meant as human and not as subjective reading) of Being through the other beginning. One can then see nihilism as a consequence of the Seinsverlassenheit. But this is tied to the other beginning. We can say that it is through the other beginning that one can see the whole issue of the abandonment of Being of beings (Seinsverlassenheit). This is not beingness (Seiendheit) as thought by metaphysics. Heidegger points out the abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit). Does that mean that Being is no longer abandoned? Where does Heidegger stand with the new, other beginning? Does he make it in a new domain?

25 "But the playing-forth (Zuspiel) of the history of the first-ever-inceptual thinking, however, is not an historical [historische] addendum to and a portending of a "new" "system" but rather is in itself essentially a transformation-initiating preparation for the other beginning." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 119)

"Das Zuspiel der Geschichte des erstanfänglichen Denkens ist aber keine historische Bei- und Vorgabe zu einem "neuen" "System", sondern in sich die wesentliche, Verwandlung anstoßende Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 169).

We need to do a re-reading of this statement in English through a different set of eyes. The forward-playing of history in the first inceptual thinking is a transformation in preparation for the other beginning. Right at the beginning of this writing project, in fact in section 1 (GA65, p. 5, et. p. 4). Heidegger uses the expression, "the Time-Play- Space is the general opening of the truth of Being" (des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes der Wahrheit des Seyns). The above passage starts with the forward-playing of history
(Zuspiel) with the first inceptual thinking. But again Heidegger tells us this not a constructing of a new "system" in philosophy. This is certainly not the construction of new worldview that includes the other beginning as the next school of philosophy to be taught at universities and conferences. Why did Sartre go in this direction? Heidegger went in another direction. How does thinking drive the playing of history toward a direction that has nothing to do with the latest headlines and the need for a story to have an ending? What is the story of metaphysics? Nietzsche gave us one with his vision of "How the 'True World' Finally Become a Fable: The history of an Error"(Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes with a Hammer).

How can we get underway with the "essentially a transformation-initiating preparation for the other beginning"? It is related to the Zuspiel of history of inceptual thinking. This is getting us ready during the time of transition or crossing (Zeitalter des Übergangs). This is getting our (not personal) thinking ready for the other beginning. Even in this writing we can tell that the subjective aspect of metaphysics still govern us in our attempt to move beyond all of the subjective-objective thinking. Inceptual thinking thinks the other beginning as the epoch of the play of history.

How do we know this is not a new system or a new world view or just a new philosophical position that includes some new, other beginning that is just really a re-baked Greek or German philosophy? Asking about the new beginning makes sense for Hegel, but what about Kant? Kant wants to lay the foundations pre-metaphysical for a 'metaphysics of metaphysics' (Letter to Marcus Herz (May 11, 1781); but the actual beginning of such a project does not seem to be at issue for Kant. Kant always wanted to start with Reason. But this was not because Kant had some personal need to start with Reason. We would say it was in the air at the time. Heidegger would say it was the destiny of Being as Reason for the epoch. This was the age of reason and rationality.

26 "85. The Originality (Primordially) Coming-into-Its-Own of the First Beginning Means Gaining a Foothold in the Other Beginning. " (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 120).

"85. Die ursprüngliche Zueignung des ersten Anfangs bedeutet das Fußfassen im anderen Anfang." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 171).

Heidegger declares the title of this section to be about the relationship between the first and the other beginning. Philosophy must work toward obtaining the new, other beginning; this may take a very long time. The shadow of God may play on the cave wall for thousands of years (Nietzsche). The first beginning viewed from Heidegger's thinking encompasses the whole of the Greek beginning. This is not an ahistorical reading of some Greek philosophers to see what their little arguments are about or a proof of some statements. Heidegger is seeing the Greeks from historical thinking of the entire western tradition; he sees the big picture and what the real implications are for the thinking of Being (Seyn). How did the first beginning start with thought? Why did the great German thinkers not really encounter the Greeks? The great German thinkers like: Hölderlin, Hegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Schelling, and Nietzsche - who each in their own way opened a special relationship to the Greeks, but not like Heidegger. Heidegger opens up the unthought in Greek thinkers. This does not mean we need to "study" the Greeks. Rather, Heidegger has considered the entire metahistory of Being, metaphysics, and philosophy in a radical way.

Heidegger wants to create a narrow footbridge toward getting that foothold in the domain of the other beginning. Thinking wants to gain a foothold in the new, other beginning. How can we get there? Assuming there is some 'reason' to reject metaphysics, why not embrace the "system"? Heidegger proclaims in the first section, "The time of "systems" is over." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 4). Should we say "systasis, systema, or synistemi"? Metaphysics is considered ontotheological with the highest point being the "absolute system". So, should we accept or reject the idea of the "system"? But this is not like deciding on orange juice for breakfeast, since the historical epoche has already brought the end of the "system". For Hegel, philosophers come afterward in history, but for Heidegger, philosophers are in the moment and the now - and can build those bridges toward a new beginning.

27 "What this question wants to achieve is not the clarification and thus rigidifying of the hitherto necessarily confused ideas of "metaphysics" but rather the thrust into the crossing and thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to an end, if philosophy is to attain its other beginning.' (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 121).

"Was diese Frage erzielen will, ist nicht die Aufklärung und d. h. Festerhaltung der bisherigen und dazu notwendig verwirrten Vorstellung von der "Metaphysik", sondern ist der Stoß in den Übergang und damit in das Wissen, daß jede Art von Metaphysik zu Ende ist und sein muß, wenn die Philosophie ihren anderen Anfang gewinnen soll."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 172).

Ok, we need to reject metaphysics and not spend time sorting out the true nature of metaphysics and polishing our understanding of metaphysics. That is why Heidegger says "any kind" of metaphysics. We need to nail metaphysics on the head and end it; only then, should philosophy attain its other beginning. This is not the simple overcoming of metaphysics, but rather, we need to end metaphysics. Some important parts of metaphysics are the concept of value metaphysics, the system, constructing a world view, the absolute, the will, reason, eternal truths, ideas, ideals, Being as universal, Platonism, etc. Philosophy needs to attain its other beginning!

28 "The talk of the end of metaphysics should not mislead us into believing that philosophy is finished with "metaphysics". On the contrary: In its essential impossibility metaphysics must now first be played-forth into philosophy; and philosophy itself must be played over into its other beginning.

If we ponder this task of the other beginning (the question of the "meaning" of Seyn in the formulation of Being and Time), then it will also become clear that all attempts that react against metaphysics - which is everywhere idealistic, even as positivism - persist in being re-active and thus are in principle dependent upon metaphysics and thereby remain themselves metaphysics." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 122).

"Die Rede vom Ende der Metaphysik darf nicht zur Meinung verleiten, die Philosophie sein mit der "Metaphysik" fertig, im Gegenfall: diese muß ihr jetzt erst in ihrer Wesensunmöglichkeit zugespielt und die Philosophie selbst so in ihren anderen Anfang hinübergespielt werden.

Überdenken wir diese Aufgabe des anderen Anfangs (die Frage nach dem "Sinn" des Seyns in der Fromel von "Sein und Zeit"), dann wird auch deutlich, daß alle Versuche, die gegen die Metaphysik, die überall - auch als Positivismus - idealistisch ist, reagieren, eben re-aktiv und damit von der Metaphysik grundsätzlich abhängig und somit selbst Metaphysik bleiben." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 173).

Heidegger wants us to still deal with metaphysics and work through the whole nature of metaphysics to know before we overcome it and finish it off once and for all. Our relationship to metaphysics is at different stages; on one hand, we need to go through it and work on the purification (Reinigung, section 110, section 26) of metaphysics, and on the other hand, our goal is clear - overcome metaphysics and try to wipe out the conceptual metaphysics from our thinking. Of course, this means overcoming nihilism and all goals positing, and the transformation of values (revaluation or transvaluation of all values). Morality is out the door as a metaphysical project. Theology as a metaphysical project is done.

The second part of passage means that Heidegger sees that his attempt at asking the meaning (or sense) of Being (Sinn von Sein) in Being and Time, is indeed part of task of philosophy to work toward the other beginning. So, Heidegger even links his first attempt in Being and Time (1927) as his way toward the other beginning. Thus, Heidegger's reading of the early Heidegger even points toward the other beginning in philosophy. I am not sure this was clear to Heidegger in 1927, but here in the timeframe of 1936-1939, Heidegger is looking backward to 1927 and sees his thinking of Being and Time as connected with the other beginning. Heidegger said that perhaps Being and Time was too far, too fast, but still it is connected to the other beginning.

In the third part of this passage, Heidegger is telling us that all of these counter--movements to metaphysics, all of these thrusts against metaphysics, all of the anti- metaphysics, contra-metaphysics, that is, all of these reactions to metaphysics are still "caught" in the web and sphere/domain of metaphysics. Karl Marx (1818-1883) is still caught in the metaphysics of Hegel in his attempt to react against Hegel (turn him on his head). Søren Kierkegaard is totally caught by the Hegelian system. Nietzsche is, above all, still caught inside metaphysics as Platonism even in his reversal of Platonism. How many philosophers are still in the web of neo-Kantianism? Most philosophers are still within the horizon of value metaphysics and the attempts to construct some kind of a worldview. We need to break out of metaphysics and those old tired concept-mummies left behind by so many philosophers.

29 "The crossing to the other beginning introduces a caesura (Scheidung) that long since no longer runs along with directions of philosophy (idealism - realism, etc.) or even along with attitudes of "worldview"
(Weltanschauung). The crossing separates the emerging of Seyn and its truth-grounding in Dasein from any occurring and perceiving of beings." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 124).

"Der Übergang zum anderen Anfang vollzieht eine Scheidung, die längst nicht mehr zwischen Richtungen der Philosophie (Idealismus - Realismus u. s. f.) oder gar zwischen Haltungen der "Weltanschauung" verläuft. Der Übergang scheidet die Heraufkunft des Seyns und dessen Wahrheitsgründung im Dasein von allem Vorkommen und Vernehmen des Seienden." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-
1938) (GA 65, p. 177).

The caesura is a breaking point and a long breath of air, a cut that is a pause. This crossing (Übergang) and transition to the other beginning is not some kind of -ism, idealism, realism, positivism, empiricalism, scientism, anthropomorphism, humanism, determinism, existentialism, fatalism, pantheism, materialism, naturalism, skepticism, or metaphysical-ism. All of these -isms are not true to the matters themselves and are all part of the past historical schools of philosophy. This may help to pigeonhole philosophers and philosophical positions, but in fact, it has nothing to do with thinking. The "easy" way of thinking is by putting philosophers into a box and then you can close the box and throw it out. Heidegger makes the point again and again that this is not constructing some kind of worldview (Weltanschauung). Philosophy is not constructing a worldview. Think of this point in all of the humanities. Kant's critique of pure reason project is looking to put bounds and limits on reason in the same way Heidegger is saying that by not constructing a worldview - philosophy has bounds and limits that drive philosophy through the squeezing point of not doing a worldview. The right worldview is that philosophy asks questions and it not giving out "answers" or directions or a manual on how one should live your life. We are the point of the "crossing".

In the second part of this passage the context is that the crossing is not looking toward beings, but rather, Being and the truth, which is grounded in our being-open to the Being of beings. In Hegel's Science of Logic, Being (Sein) is given as mediated. The question of the truth of Being does not arise in Hegel, since with Hegel everything is already given to us as philosophers following the process.

30 "The other beginning experiences the truth of Seyn and inquires into the Seyn of truth in order first to ground the essential swaying of Seyn and to let beings as the true of that originary truth spring forth."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 126).

"Der andere Anfang erfährt die Wahrheit des Seyns und fragt nach dem Seyn der Wahrheit, um so erst die Wesung des Seyns zu gründen und das Seiende als das Wahre jener ursprünglichen Wahrheit entspringen zu lassen." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 179).

Here Heidegger is stressing the point of the other beginning and the experience (erfährt) of the truth of Being (Seyn). What this allows is that the decisive essence of Being lets beings come forth as beings within the truth of Being. However, this truth is not the correspondence theory of truth. But rather, it is truth in Heidegger's sense of unhiddenness, unconcealment (Unverborgenheit); and in other words as they say in Greek - aletheia. Truth happens. Heidegger says, "In the first beginning truth (as unconcealment) is the mark of beings"(GA 65, section 91).

The point about beings here is that they are more than mere objects to be measured, exploited, and wrapped up in technology (En-framing, Ge-Stell). This "thinking about" beings needs to be more inline with the truth of or meaning of Being. But this "inline" is not a limiting process but rather a gathering up and a springing forth in a greater throwing open to unlimited possibility.

31 "The other beginning is the leaping into Seyn's more original (primordial) truth." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 128).

"Der andere Anfang ist der das Seyn verwandelnde Einsprung in seine ursprünglichere Wahrheit." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 183).

I think this is clear that the new, other beginning is a spring and leap into Being (Seyn) as its more original (primordial) truth (ursprünglichere Wahrheit). The question "what is the truth of Being" leads Heidegger to think the nature of "truth" in a deeper way and to a question that has not been thought by western metaphysics. Heidegger is making the point that other beginning is tied to a more primordial truth of Being
(Seyn). This has been thought out of the earlier question of the meaning or sense of Being
(Sinn von Sein).

32 "But this is what the other beginning wants to and must achieve: leaping into the truth of Seyn so that Seyn itself grounds humanness - not even immediately, but rather grounds humanness (Menschsein) primarily as a consequence of, and as allotment to, Da-sein." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 129).

"Dieses aber ist es, was der andere Anfang leisten will und leisten muß: den Einsprung in die Wahrheit des Seyns, dergestalt, daß dieses selbst das Menschsein gründet und zwar nicht einmal unmittelbar, sondern das Menschsein erst als eine Folge der und als die Angewiesenheit auf das Da-sein." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 184).

My re-reading of this passage is: the other beginning must and will achieve? This leap is the truth of Being (Seyn), this grounds humanness, but not as immediate; rather, humanness as consequence and allotment from Da-sein (there-being, being open to the openness that is Being and humans).

I think the word "will" is in fact a slip by Heidegger I do not think he meant anything like the metaphysical expression of "will" from Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. As more of Heidegger's writings are published I think we will learn more about the transformation of the one the Heidegger's key words - Dasein, Da-sein, Da-Sein, etc. This word has been untranslatable in Heidegger's usage from the very early attempts to translate Heidegger from German into English. He was upset with the translation of Dasein into French. In addition, he seems to have reused the word after Being and Time to be sure it was always written Da-sein or Da-Sein or even possibly Da-Seyn. Kant used the expression "Dasein" to refer to general existence and normally in the sense of objects. Da-sein means there-being, being open to the openness that is Being and humans. We could use the terms of self-consciousness or humans or man or mankind; but only if we could take out all meanings of anything personal or "subjective". The problem in a nutshell is that all of these expressions bring with them the sense of something "subjective". Think of a concept without an overtone of the "subjective". This is Heidegger's problem. He likes the word Da-sein, since he can connect it to Sein with the expression Da-Sein (there open to Being). Therefore, the other beginning grounds humanness for a leap into the truth of Being. Da-sein is that opening which has the question of Being as a question (see sections GA 65, 168-203). In contrast to Being and Time, here Da-sein is more a possibility than a structure.

33 "Leaping into the other beginning is returning into the first beginning, and vice versa. Returning into the first beginning (the "retrieval"), however, is not displacement into what has passed, as if this could be made "actual" or "real" (wirklich) again in the usual sense." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 130).

"Der Einsprung in den anderen Anfang ist der Rückgang in den ersten und umgekehrt. Rückgang in den ersten Anfang (die "Wieder-holung") ist aber keine Versetzung in Vergangenes, als könnte dieses im gewöhnlichen Sinne wieder "wirklich" gemacht werden." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 185).

We can leap into the other beginning by a thoughtful return in the first beginning. This means that a jump into Greek thought will help us toward the new, other beginning. Heidegger is pointing us toward Greek thought when all was fresh and philosophical thought was only thinking. It had not become something called philosophy or metaphysics. It had not gone through the schools or become Platonism. But Heidegger brings us back by the statement that this does not mean that this kind of Greek thought will be real again. Rather, it is the freshness of the Greek thinking as it was at the beginning. Note that this is pre-Christian thinking, pre-metaphysical thinking, and this means pre-all-isms (before all of the -isms were created). Did Aristotle call Anaximander a neo-realist? See the difference? This fresh thinking will help us with the new, other beginning. On the other hand, Heidegger also goes on in this section (GA 65, section 91) to speak about the "distant positioning" (Fernstellung). This is not just re-baking the Greek thinking to come up with a new beginning. There is a distance between us (and Heidegger) and the greatest of the fresh Greek thinking at the first beginning of western thought. Of course, we could re-read and re-think the Greeks until we are blue in the face and still not come up with what Heidegger is doing with the Greeks. Heidegger's greatnest is not because of some scholarly reading of philosophical treatises. At every point, Heidegger is attempting a unique and driving force in thinking with western thought. This inimitable thinking is what makes us get underway with Heidegger's thought. Heidegger says at the beginning of this writing, "those who are but once" (GA 65, section 1). Heidegger is but once.

34 "And only this knowing awareness plays forth to us the necessity of preparing the other beginning and, by unfolding this preparedness, of experiencing the own most distress (eigenste Not) in its full light, the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit), which, deeply hidden, is the mirror-play (Widerspiel) to that not-happening and which therefore cannot be explained according to today's and yesterday's abuses and omissions." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 130).

"Und erst dieses Wissen spielt uns die Notwendigkeit zu, den anderen Anfang vorzubereiten und in der Ausfaltung dieser Bereitschaft die eigenste Not in ihrer vollen Helle zu erfahren, die Seinsverlassenheit, die tief verborgen das Widerspiel ist zu jenem Nichtgeschehen und keineswegs daher aus heutigen und gestrigen Missständen und Versäumnissen erklärt werden kann." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 186).

The concept of "distress" (die Not) is important for Heidegger's entire project, but wait -- is this just Heidegger's problem? Heidegger says, "The highest distress: the distress of lack of distress" (Die höchste Not: die Not der Notlosigkeit) (GA 65, section 50). Our distress is over the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit) but this is not something that gets much play in the latest newspapers (headline: "Being is lost"). Only by taking to heart this distress can we prepare for the new, other beginning. Has the new, other beginning happened or is it just a possibility? Is Heidegger that possibility or has Heidegger opened up the question of the truth of Being (Seyn) and is pointing toward the future of thinking?

35 "The other beginning is not counter-directed (Gegenrichtung) to the first. But rather, as the other it stands outside the counter [Gegen] and outside immediate comparability." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 131).

Der andere Anfang ist nicht die Gegenrichtung zum ersten, sondern steht als anderes außerhalb des Gegen und der unmittelbaren Vergleichbarkeit. (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA
65, p. 187).

In this passage Heidegger is clarifying the relationship between the first beginning and the new, other beginning. Heidegger's other beginning is not anti-Greek or anti- Platonism. Instead Heidegger is trying to make the other beginning outside of any previous beginnings. Where is the new, other beginning standing? What is its location? Can it stand by itself without depending on any outside support? Heidegger's dwelling in the unfolding of the other beginning is what makes Heidegger's singular thought afresh.

36 "In commencing preparedness for crossing from the end of the first beginning into the other beginning, it is not as if man simply enters a "period" that has not yet been, but it is rather that man enters a whole other domain of history (Bereich der Geschichte). The end of the first beginning will for a long time still encroach upon crossing
(Übergang), yes, even upon the other beginning." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 161).

"Mit dem Anheben der Bereitschaft für den Übergang aus dem Ende des ersten Anfangs in den anderen Anfang tritt der Mensch nicht etwa nur in eine noch nicht gewesene "Periode", sondern in einen ganz anderen Bereich der Geschichte. Das Ende des ersten Anfangs wird noch in langer Zeit übergreifen in den Übergang, ja sogar in den anderen Anfang." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA 65, p. 227).

So, this is not case that we are in a different "period" or epoch or that we have made some improvement in mankind (cf. Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes with a Hammer section 'The 'Improvers' of Mankind') - no that is not my goal. This does not mean some kind of "progress" in mankind toward the overman (Übermenschen, this German word can be translated into English with the expression: superman, overman, over-man, beyond man, above man, or man-beyond, trans-man). Heidegger wants us to enter a wholly other domain of history. The other beginning means also the other domain of history.

We are still stuck with working through the end of the first beginning. It will not be a clean break; it will take a long time before we will have a clean break between the first beginning and Heidegger's new, other beginning. The first beginning is still part of our thinking and we are in history even though we are in the process of thinking through the first beginning to get to the new, other beginning. It still is a process of thought.

37 "The "fundamental-ontological" mindfulness (laying the foundation of ontology as its overcoming (Überwindung) is crossing from the end of the first beginning toward the other beginning. But this crossing is at the same time the take-off for the leap (Sprung), by which alone a beginning and specifically the other beginning, as constantly overtaken by the first - can begin." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 162).

"Die "fundamentalontologische" Besinnung (Grundlegung der Ontologie als ihre Überwindung) ist der Übergang aus dem Ende des ersten Anfangs zum anderen Anfang. Dieser Übergang aber ist zugleich der Anlauf für den Sprung, durch den allein ein Anfang und zumal der andere, als ständig überholter vom ersten, anfangen kann."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 228-229).

Here Heidegger is referring to fundamental-ontological as he developed the notion in Being and Time in 1927. This idea is laying the ground for the overcoming of ontology in general. So, Heidegger is making a point here that he is not just doing fundamental ontology as some project within ontology as such; but rather, he is headed for the overcoming of the narrow sense of ontology as perceived by all previous metaphysicians above all by Hegel in the Science of Logic where metaphysical ontology reaches its zenith and high point, and where theology and ontology reach their total fusion in the dialectical movement of the absolute spirit.

Heidegger's earlier project of Being and Time is now seen as the crossing and transition from the first beginning to the other beginning. The leap can now be seen as a way for the other beginning to start and for it to overtake the first beginning.

Where is Kant in Heidegger's project now? It seems that Kant has been left behind - although Kant took a decisive step after the Greek, it seems that Nietzsche and even Hegel are important now in the project of the other beginning. Certainly not in their doctrines as followed, but as opponents. ("Such thinking never lets itself become a doctrine..." (GA 65, Section 2). Hegel is the opponent. Nietzsche helps with defining the first beginning and the project of overcoming of metaphysics. Schelling gives Heidegger help on the role of freedom and the last gods. Hölderlin is helping forward toward the future (he could have played a bigger role). Ernst Jünger is helping the project in terms of the current total mobilization and technicity (GA 65, section 74). Now we need to go "Back to Kant." Where is Kant in this project? Heidegger no longer wants to make moves at the foundational level - at least not in the Kantian sense of foundations.

38 "What is entirely other in the other beginning, in comparison to the first beginning, can be clarified by a saying that seems only to play with a turning around whereas in truth all is transformed (wandelt). "
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 162).

"Das ganz Andere des anderen Anfangs gegen den ersten läßt sich verdeutlichen durch ein Sagen, das scheinbar nur mit einer Umkehrung spielt, während in Wahrheit sich alles wandelt." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 229).

In the passage Heidegger is answering the critical remark that somehow the first beginning and other beginning are just some simple play of rhetoric that we have to turn around the first beginning into the new, other beginning. Take some ideas from the Greeks and re-do them with some modern ontology and you have Heidegger's other beginning. No, this is what Heidegger is telling us that this is not what is going on with his thinking on the new, other beginning. This is more radical project; that is why he says at the end of this passage that all (alles) is transformed by the radical new, other beginning.

39 "But in the other beginning beings carry the clearing into which they are placed, which clearing (Lichtung) holds sway as clearing for self-sheltering and concealing, i. e., Being (Seyn) as enowning (Ereignis)."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 162).

"Im anderen Anfang aber ist das Seiende, damit es die Lichtung, in die es hereinsteht, zugleich trage, welche Lichtung west als Lichtung des Sichverbergens, d. h. des Seyns als Ereignis." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 230).

The other beginning is beings which are placed in the clearing and this clearing as clearing, which is self-sheltering and concealing, that is, Being as Ereignis. So, beings are brought into the clearing and that clearing is Being as Ereignis. Or, beings are in the clearing through the event of Ereignis. This event, this happening is the truth of Being (Seyn) where Da-Seyn is in a relationship with Time, Being, and history
(domain of history). The opening is the clearing.

40 "Therefore in the other beginning of thinking, as Being (Seyn) is experienced as enowning, such that this experience, as arising, transforms all relations to "what is"
(Seienden, beings). (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 175).

"Deshalb wird im anderen Anfang des Denkens das Seyn als Ereignis erfahren, so zwar, daß diese Erfahrung als Erspringung alle Bezüge zum "Seienden" wandelt."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 248).

The other beginning is this thinking of Being (Seyn) as Ereignis as this transforms all beings. Can we try the German expression of Ereignis-Denken? Heidegger has a writing project that will be published as GA
73 Zum Ereignis-Denken (1937). What kind of thinking is this? Heidegger speaks about so many different kinds of thinking: for example, anfängliche Denken (inceptual thinking), Er-denken (En-thinking), Inbegrifflichkeit (ingrasping), Gedanken-gang (thinking underway), and seynsgeschichtliche Denken (Being historical thinking). What are we to make of all of these different types of thinking? Is Heidegger pointing toward an "answer" for the methodology question? Hegel's conceptual thinking (a metaphysical fusion of subjective and objective) is the perfect counter-example for Heidegger on this issue. Also, this is certainly not representational thinking.

41 "Therefore, thinking as inceptual is the other beginning and also is capable of coming into the remote nearness of the last God (letzten Gottes)." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 185).

"Also vermag auch das Denken als anfängliches des anderen Anfangs in die ferne Nähe des letzten Gottes zu kommen." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-
1938) (GA 65, p. 262).

To try to put this in better English, a re-reading would be: therefore thinking as inceptual is the other beginning and comes into the remote nearness of the last God. Scholarship note: the expression"letzten Gottes" (last God) comes from Schelling from at least one place in the lectures on the Philosophy of Art. Schelling said, "He is there merely to draw the boundary - the last god." (et p. 64).

Also in this context is a general reference to the biblical book of Exodus, chapter 33.

The other beginning is coming near to the last God. Heidegger gives us another clue, when he says, "remote nearness". So, the last God is near, but remote. I think we may be able to say the same thing about the new, other beginning. The new, other beginning is near, but also remote. It means: it can be near. Heidegger's saying about the last God or last gods is more complex than a few aphorisms can touch. We fall short here.

42 "The neo-Kantianism which is philosophies of "life" and of "existence" also affirms, because both - e. g., Dilthey as well as Jaspers - continue to have no inkling of what has actually occurred in Western metaphysics and what must be prepared for as necessity for the other beginning." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 236).

"Der Neukantianismus, den auch die "Lebens"- und "Existenz" philosophie bejaht, weil beide, z. B. Dilthey, ebenso Jaspers, ohne jede Ahnung bleiben von dem, was in der abendländischen Metaphysik eigentlich geschehen ist und was sichvorbereiten muß als Notwendigkeit des anderen Anfangs." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 337-338).

Heidegger is being critical of neo-Kantians and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), plus the philosophies of life and existence. This comes close to being critical of Nietzsche as well. So, since these philosophies have no metahistories of philosophy or metahistories of Da-Sein and Being, then these will not have a deep understanding of the true historical nature of metaphysics. But all of this can be prepared by the necessity (Notwendigkeit) of the other beginning. Has any other philosopher seen what Heidegger has seen and is guiding us? Heidegger himself would point to Hölderlin and his relationship to language in general as perhaps giving Heidegger some clues. However, it is hard to see what part of Heidegger's project in the other beginning involves Hölderlin at all. Heidegger's project just simply put is Heidegger's project. Looking under every rock to see if some thinker has influence upon Heidegger is becoming a boring game for Heideggerians. Heidegger is singularly unique in his thinking and his project.

43 "Philosophy in the other beginning is essentially historical (geschichtlich), and in this respect a more originary (or primordial) kind of remembering (Erinnerung) the history
(Geschichte) of the first beginning must now ensue." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 251).

"Philosophie im anderen Anfang ist im Wesen geschichtlich, und in dieser Hinsicht muß sich nun auch eine ursprünglichere Art der Erinnerung an die Geschichte des ersten Anfangs ergeben." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 359).

This is an important point that Heidegger is making. Re-reading this passage shows that philosophy in the new, other beginning is historical and this kind of thinking must be used to think through the first Greek beginning. Heidegger says this philosophy is essentially historical. I think here we find some general connections to Nietzsche. In this way, perhaps by comparing and contrasting Heidegger with Nietzsche they will both become clearer. Even Hegel and certainly Marx were historical thinkers, but in a different mode than Heidegger or Nietzsche. What is the nature of that difference?

44 "The last god is not the end, but rather the other beginning of immeasurable possibilities for our history. For its sake history up to now should not terminate but rather must be brought to its end. We must bring about the transfiguration of its essential and basic positions in crossing and in preparedness." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 289).

"Der letzte Gott ist nicht das Ende, sondern der andere Anfang unermeßlicher Möglichkeiten unserer Geschichte. Um seinetwillen darf die bisherige Geschichte nicht verenden, sondern muß zu ihrem Ende gebracht werden. Wir müssen die Verklärung ihrer wesentlichen Grundstellungen in der Übergang und die Bereitschaft hineinschaffen." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 411).

This historical domain (Bereich) needs to be brought to an end and a new beginning and a new domain of history needs to begin. Our history has immeasurable (endless) possibilities, if we can bring about the transfiguration in the crossing or transition toward the new, other beginning. The last God or last Gods is not the end of this historical domain, but rather, may be a part of the nearness of the remote last God or last Gods as the new, other beginning. Heidegger's problem here is that we are building a narrow bridge, but from our side of the bridge we can only see the bridge and perhaps a little outline in the distant mist of what is on the other side of this narrow bridge. So, not everything is known about what is on the other side of bridge. Heidegger can only give us some general outlines. Remember this is not representational thinking. There is not an object on the other side where we can have an idea that matches that object - no, this philosophizing is at its high point. We are by definition on thin ice. There are lots of pathways and byways that are wrong, there are many routes to the top of the mountain; but sometimes there is only one route and there is no way of knowing that ahead of time before you climb the mountain. Nevertheless, we still have the distress (die Not) and must start the climb up the mountain.

45 "Only the crossing into the other beginning, the first overcoming (Überwindung) of metaphysics - by necessarily upholding the name in the crossing - raises this difference to knowing awareness and thus for the first time puts it in question, and not into just any question, but rather into questioning what is most question-worthy." (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p. 299)

"Erst der Übergang in den anderen Anfang, die erste Überwindung der Metaphysik, unter übergänglichnotwendiger Beibehaltung ihres Namens, hebt diesen Unterschied ins Wissen und stellt ihn damit zum ersten Mal in die Frage; nicht in eine beliebige, sondern in die Frage nach dem Fragwürdigsten." (Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 423-424).

Here Heidegger links the new, other beginning with the first overcoming of metaphysics and then he adds that this now points toward the most worthy of questioning, namely, the meaning or sense of Being and the truth of Being (Seyn). The truth of Being is Ereignis as properly thought. We can also say that the meaning of Being is time as temporality. All these questions circle the foundational question of how Being is related to Da-Sein. Heidegger is helping us build the narrow bridge, but the details are still in the mist and we still have miles to go. The question Heidegger would ask us is simple: are you underway? Are you on the pathways and byways toward the truth of Being (Seyn)? Are you attempting a path and the force of questioning? Heidegger says, "For the few who from time to time again ask the question." (GA 65, p. 11, et. p. 9).

Final Reflections

As Nietzsche said, "with different eyes shall I then seek my lost ones; with a different love shall I then love you." (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue"). We should not fear the love of philosophy and truth.

This journey and the seeking are certainly putting us on a path. Heidegger says, "Seeking itself is the goal." (Das Suchen selbst ist das Ziel). (GA 65, p. 18, et. p. 13). Or, in another work Heidegger says,"For our goal is the very seeking itself" (GA 45, et. p. 6, g. 5). We can take Heidegger at his word and try to think through what that means for philosophizing. We are not revealing "eternal truths" (GA 45, et. p. 21) nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand "system" nor creating a "worldview" (Weltanschauung) nor creating a value system. But rather, we are seeking and asking questions, in other words we are philosophizing. We stand together on the journey.

Heidegger said, "The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker (Suchende)." (Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik', GA 45 g. p. 5, et. p. 7).

What do we seek?

Is there any urgency and do we respond to the distress of the loss of Being? Or as Heidegger calls it the "lack of distress is what is utmost in this distress, which becomes recognizable primarily as the abandonment of beings by Being" (GA 65, et. p. 303).