1 First beginnings: the Greeks, Platonism.
The end of the first beginning - Nietzsche. |
2 Martin Heidegger in section 85 of
his second
magnum opus, says, "the thrust
into
the crossing and thereby the knowing
awareness
that any kind of metaphysics has and
must
come to an end, if philosophy is to
attain
its other beginning" (GA 65, Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939)
p. 171-173, et. p 121). What does this
mean?
Philosophy wants to attain another
beginning.
How is that possible? What are the
conditions
that would allow philosophy to attain
the
other beginning? Answer: basically
any kind
(all forms) of metaphysics must come
to an
end, only then will philosophy be able
to
attain the other beginning. The crossing
goes from the guiding-question to the
grounding-question:
what is the truth of Seyn (Being)?
(GA 65,
Section 85). So, the other beginning
is linked
to the "grounding-question".
This
question (what is the truth of Seyn
(Being)?)
is now Heidegger's essential question.
In
Heidegger's first major work Being
and Time
(1927), he asks the question: what
is the
meaning (Sinn) of Being? In Heidegger's
second
major work, Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom
Ereignis) (1936-1939) GA 65, he has
re-thought
the question in the light of ten years.
His
question now is: what is the truth
of Seyn
(Being)? Heidegger sees himself after
the
end of metaphysics in the attempt at
a new
beginning to philosophy. Sometimes
Heidegger
is ambiguous about his position in
this process.
Perhaps we 'read' too much into Heidegger's
own position. I think Heidegger is
leading
us to this point, he is the guide in
the
process, but somehow this not just
Heidegger's
position. Note: Heidegger is still
showing
us "if philosophy", that
means
that this is not a "done deal".
But this has nothing to do with several
philosophical
lectures delivered in a university
in Germany
60 years ago or written scratches on
paper
in 2003 or bits in a computer. The
historical
epoch -- it happens. To drop back into
metaphysics:
this not a subjective nor psychological
decision.
Is there a knowing awareness that metaphysics
must come to an end? Answer: yes, I
think
so. But there is still a long way to
go in
view of the one issue associated with
value
metaphysics. We are still in the midst
of
value- systems and value metaphysics
- they
are alive and well. There is still
a task
for philosophical (reflective) thinking
at
the end of metaphysics, but Heidegger
is
re-directing us and showing us a new
direction
and new beginning. This is an attempt
at
a contextual interpretation and understanding
of the project of a new beginning for
philosophy.
3 Old beginning to a new, other beginning.
What is the new, other beginning? This
is
the question mark and question thinking
that
these investigations are pursuing.
Do we
have the truth? Perhaps "not".
Do we know the answer? Perhaps "not".
In pursuit of a re-formulated question
-
yes! Is this our new "worldview",
our new "philosophy", our
new "goal",
our new "happiness", our
new "science"?
Answer: no! The process and the thinking
are the "goals". Listening,
reflecting,
elucidations (Erläuterungen), thinking,
musing,
writing, dialogue, turning on the path,
changing
direction, going down the wrong path,
backtracking,
being lost, being knock down, being
on the
Holzwege, being on the Wegmarken, being
on
the Der Feldweg, Unterwegs zur Sprache,
Wege
- nicht Werke, --- these are all part
of
the goal and the process. Staring up
at the
mountain and climbing the mountain.
We humbly
need to be seekers on the pathways.
The seeking,
the process, the philosophizing, the
questioning
- this is often more of the final "goal"
and telos for us than some final "essay"
or an "answer". What are
"answers"
for us now? Who is the one that needs
to
be given an "answer"?
4 What is the subjective and objective
history
of the Being of beings? Heidegger,
in a short
essay on the Recollection in Metaphysics,
says, "The history of Being is
neither
the history of man and of humanity,
nor the
history of the human relation to beings
and
to Being. The history of Being is Being
itself,
and only this." ("Recollection
in Metaphysics", et. p. 82). ("Die
Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte
des Menschen und eines Menschentums
noch
die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs
zum
Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte
ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses."
('Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik'
Nietzsche
II, p. 489). What does this mean for
history?
What does this mean for Being? Heidegger
is trying to understand the nature
of history
and more precisely Being after metaphysics.
This is neither the subjective nor
objective
account of the history of man or mankind,
nor the history of an 'objective"
being;
and in addition, this is not a philosophical
history of man's relation to some external
world. The history of Being stands
uniquely
alone. Can we say that the history
of Being
stands only by itself - pure (but not
absolute
and unmediated, Hegel said "Das
Sein
ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare")?
What is the corresponding object (being)
that the truth of this statement is
correct
in representing the object? The Being
of
beings is no object or being, but rather
the matter for reflective thinking.
How can
a non-object have a history? In what
book
can we look up its history and find
a written
description? Are there primary documents
for research? These questions should
all
sound funny to you, but not because
of some
of problem in "logic" or
"truth".
Traditional logic will not help us
in these
thick woods.
5 Philosophy is not for helping us
switch
channels on the T. V. or to help us
figure
out which program to watch. Philosophy
is
not some great knowledge for us to
live life
here on earth according to the highest
rules
and principles. Philosophy does not
put money
in the bank or help us with the stock
market.
Philosophy will not help us to find
the "truth".
Perhaps "philosophy" is only
a
"perhaps". Philosophy is
linked
with the interrogative. Questioning
thinking
may leap toward philosophy. This is
not to
question thinking. Heidegger said that
"philosophy
accomplishes nothing", namely,
there
is no practical result from philosophical
reflection. Why then do philosophy?
Indeed
what made Kant work on the Critique
of Pure
Reason or Hegel do a Phenomenology
of Spirit
or Science of Logic or Nietzsche start
on
his path of the will to power? If you
tangle
with philosophy, it will tangle with
you.
It will "untertangle" (new
coinage)
you as you know yourself. Do not take
it
lightly or without a dose of 'play'.
6 What is known:
1) The Greeks and Platonism are the
first
beginning.
2) Hölderlin gives us insight into
the future
of a new, other beginning.
3) Nietzsche tried to think anew; he
is both
the end and the transition.
4) Heidegger is not sure, but he is
headed
toward the new, other beginning.
5) Heidegger through Aristotle and
Nietzsche
is headed toward another beginning;
that
is, without the eternal, super-sensuous,
the eternal ideas, the eternal ideals,
namely,
without Platonism (not Übersinnlichen,
Unendlichkeit
and Ewigkeit).
6) This is not Heidegger's personal
philosophy;
he is a guide and a builder of narrow
bridges
toward the other side of metaphysics,
the
time and location that has left metaphysics
behind.
7) Heidegger wants to twist and turn
his
way out of metaphysics and leave it
completely
behind in the dust of time. Is he successful?
We only note what is known in some
outline
form at this point in the history of
Heidegger's
publication and also in the author's
(Daniel
Fidel Ferrer) own thinking and reflections.
This writing is still "about"
Heidegger.
I am not attempting a preparatory exercise
in questioning of the truth of Being
(Seyn)
or the meaning of Being in any way
like what
Heidegger is attempting. Can we say
this
is writing "with" Heidegger?
I
think Heidegger would want us to Auseinandersetzung
with him, since Heidegger, like Nietzsche,
is not looking for "believers"
or disciples ("what matters all
believers?"
This is Nietzsche's question in Thus
Spoke
Zarathustra, "On the Gift-Giving
Virtue").
Heidegger is not producing a proof
or some
kind of special argument or making
some rhetorical
movement of language or a language
game for
us to play on Sunday afternoon; but
rather,
Heidegger is guiding us to a new beginning.
7 The abandonment of beings by Being
gives
Heidegger the need and the distress
to move
his questioning toward the truth of
Being.
But Being does not overstep its own
possibilities
- just like a tree that grows from
a little
seed to a great tree, all of this starts
within its own possibilities. There
is nothing
added by man or humanity that makes
the tree
more than it is.
8 We are trying to transform the questions:
1) What is the truth of Being (Seyn)?
2) What is the meaning (Sinn) of the
Being
of beings?
3) What does this mean to overcome
metaphysics?
4) What is the new, other beginning
for philosophy?
9 In a different context, Heidegger
said,
"I write all of this in the form
of
questions; for, as far as I can see
[he saw
a lot], thinking can today do more
than to
continually ponder what evoked in the
said
questions." (On The Question of
Being,
Letter to Ernst Jünger, "Zur Seinsfrage
(1955) / Über die Linie" in GA
9 Pathmarks
et. p. 306). ("Ich schreibe dies
alles
in der Form von Fragen; denn mehr vermag
heute, soweit ich sehe, ein Denken
nicht,
als unablässig eig das zu bedenken,
was die
angeführten Fragen hervorruft.").
What
does this mean? Heidegger does not
have some
jar of knowledge where he pulls out
the "truth".
Philosophical questioning in Heidegger's
hands can leap ahead into an opening
of the
truth of Being, but not some special
ontological
knowledge that Heidegger acquired in
the
Black Forest of Germany. For Heidegger,
philosophical
questioning is not being used to come
up
with a philosophical worldview in order
to
see a new world arrangement. Heidegger's
questioning is setting part of the
context
for us to see his pathways and byways
as
he seeks Being. Heidegger wrote, "that
every thinking of Seins, all philosophy
can
never be confirmed by "facts",
i. e. by beings. Making itself intelligible
is suicide (Selbstmord) for philosophy."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
p. 435, et. p. 307). So, philosophical
thinking
is neither realism nor empiricism,
nor is
it the construction of a worldview
based
on values or facts. We are not looking
to
some science for help in doing philosophy.
For Heidegger "intelligible"
means
trying to find the truth of Being among
beings
or in other words not ontic truths
(intelligible)
as in some kind of science. For Heidegger
this is suicide for philosophy, since
it
is not on the way to Being or the opening
of Being or the truth of Being (Seyn).
Heidegger called this time, "In
that
age of total lack of questioning anything,
it is sufficient as a start to inquire
into
the question of all questions."
(GA
65, et. p. 8).
10 Thinkers can try to overstep their
own
limitations. Heidegger said, "This
again
consists in the fact that the thinker
can
never himself say what is most of all
his
own. It must remain unsaid, because
the sayable
(Word, German=Wort) receives its determination
from what is not sayable (inexpressible)"
(Recollection in Metaphysics, et. p.
77-78).
("Diese wiederum besteht darin,
daß
der Denker sein Eigenstes selbst nie
sagen
kann. Es muß ungesagt bleiben, weil
das sagbare
Wort aus dem Unsagbaren seine Bestimmung
empfängt." ('Die Erinnergung in
der
Metaphysik' Nietzsche II, p. 484).
What does this mean? Is this some sort
of
mysticism or it is just another one
of those
connections between Heidegger and Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1889-1951)? Heidegger
is driving
the point toward the "unsaid,"
which he uses as a way to get at what
thinkers
were right on the edge of saying, but
did
not actually say. If we want to say
what
Heidegger or any other philosopher
said,
then it is philology and not philosophy.
If we want to have a live dialogue
with another
thinker, another philosopher, then
we bring
them into our thinking, our dialogue,
our
critical confrontation and encounter
them
with the issues for thinking. Not as
what
is dead and long dead in a thinker,
but rather
to bring their thinking in close to
us. Heidegger
wants us to think about the first beginning
and the new, other beginning; but we
need
to see what is also unsaid in Heidegger's
thinking. Heidegger started a movement
away
from the first beginning, which started
with
the Greeks and Platonism, and now moves
on
to a new and entirely different beginning.
How are these two beginnings related?
What
is unsaid in Heidegger that points
to this
relationship? We are attempting to
bring
out the unsaid in Heidegger and to
name this
relationship. Although Heidegger is
hesitant
on this point because as he remarks,
this
is up to Being and not in our "heads".
The unsaid drives us to "speak;"
but, in some ways, there are limitations
on what we can say, because some part
always
remains unsaid - we must always attempt
to
say the unsayable.
11 Scholarship issues with Heidegger
and
the other beginning. While Heidegger
was
working on his second major writing
project
(as opposed to just simply lectures
or seminars
or essays), the work is entitled: Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939)
(GA 65), he was also, during the winter
semester
of 1937-1938, working on a lecture
course
series, entitled: "Grundfragen
der Philosophie.
Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'
[Vorlesung]".
In section 31 we have the title of
"The
end of the first beginning and the
preparation
for another beginning." (Basic
Questions
of Philosophy. Selected "Problems"
of "Logic GA 45, p. 124, et. p
108).
("Das Ende des ersten Anfangs
und die
Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs")
and
Subsection a), which is subtitled:
"Our
situation at the end of the beginning
and
the demand for a reflection on the
first
beginning as a preparation for another
beginning."
(GA 45 p. 124, et. p 108). ("Unser
Stand
im Ende des Anfangs und die Forderung
einer
Besinnung auf den ersten Anfang als
Vorbereitung
des anderen Anfangs").
Although Heidegger may have been thinking
about the issue of the new, other beginning,
it may have been during this lecture
series
that we have the first written communication
about this topic. Although this whole
lecture
series seems in many ways different
than
most of his historical lectures, it
seems
much closer to Heidegger's own thought
than
to be normally acting as a "guide"
for us in the history of philosophy.
Case
in point: Heidegger writes, "That
is,
we are standing before the decision
between
the end (and its running out, which
may still
take centuries) and another beginning,
one
which can only be a moment, but whose
preparation
requires the patience "optimist"
are no more capable of than "pessimists."
(GA 45 g 124, et. p. 108). ("Und
dies
sagt: Wir stehen vor der Entscheidung
zwischen
dem Ende und seinem vielleicht noch
Jahrhunderte
füllenden Auslauf - und dem anderen
Anfang,
der nur ein Augenblick sein kann, dessen
Vorbereitung aber jener Geduld bedarf,
der
"Optimisten" gleichwenig
wie "Pessimisten"
je gewachsen sind"). Heidegger
is unsure
of himself at this point as to the
question
of exactly how long this period of
history
will last. Nietzsche is the end point
of
the history of metaphysics, but it
is not
certain that Heidegger is at the point
of
the new, other beginning - or, Heidegger
is still a transitional stage. Evidently,
Heidegger is pointing out the general
structure
of the history of metaphysics and the
end
of metaphysics, which is a movement
to a
new, other beginning; however, the
judgment
about Heidegger's own position in this
history
is not yet clear.
12 Nietzsche said, "Epistemologist
who
becomes entangled in the snares of
grammar
(the metaphysics of the people)"
(Gay
Science, "la gaya scienza"
#354).
Would Nietzsche point this critical
analysis
toward Heidegger if he knew about Heidegger's
grounding question of the truth of
Being
(Seyn)? Nietzsche himself sees how
close
he is to a philosopher such as Benedictus
De Spinoza (1632-1677), but how would
Nietzsche
see Heidegger's project? Heidegger
speaks
on Spinoza in his Schelling lectures
(GA
42), but it seems that both Heidegger
and
Schelling would be very far from an
eagle's
point of view like Spinoza's. Heidegger
points
toward the basic tendency of Schelling
to
be anti-Spinoza. Nietzsche is strongly
anti-grammar
as creating metaphysics - how does
this sort
out Spinoza, Schelling, and Heidegger?
Nietzsche's
vapor and wisp of Being (empty fiction)
and
Reality, all of these are mere concepts-mummies.
(Twilight of Idols: or How one Philosophizes
with a Hammer, "Reason in Philosophy").
Heidegger must twist his way out of
this
pathway to a different dwelling and
meaning
of the earth.
13 What kind of sea does Heidegger
want to
venture out to be in the new beginning?
Nietzsche
says, "At long last the horizon
appears
free to us again, even if it should
be bright;
at long last our ships may venture
out again,
venture out to face any danger; all
daring
of the lover of knowledge is permitted
again;
the sea, our sea, lies open again;
perhaps
there has never yet been such an "open
sea". (Gay Science, "la gaya
scienza"
First aphorism of Book Five, "We
fearless
Ones", #343, 1886). Heidegger
wants
to get on Nietzsche's ships and attempt
(Versuch)
that venture out into those open seas.
Heidegger
has this knowledge of how the first
beginning
started western philosophy; Kant was
the
next decisive step, Nietzsche as the
final
step, the end; the end that speaks
to the
transition across a narrow footbridge
(Die
Stegen) to another, new beginning (Anfang).
This horizon is bright and clear. From
on
the top of the mountains you can see
the
horizon in all directions. Supposedly
on
top of Mount Everest the sky is very
dark
blue (almost black) and you can see
the planets
during the day; of course, the horizon
is
open like the open sea. Part of the
problem
of being on an open sea is that it
is hard
to know which direction you are going
or
the image of a snake in a bamboo shoot
(i.
e., you are going very fast in one
direction,
but you do not know which direction).
The
issue of direction is also an issue
with
Heidegger's as well. Some of the outline
of the future is becoming clear out
of the
mist. But Heidegger does not posit
this as
a goal, not does he "will' the
new,
other beginning (non-willing Will or
Gelassenheit).
The non-willing Will leads to releasement.
This is neither a subjective nor an
objective
analysis of beings or history, rather
this
is where philosophy hits the road.
Even that
use of rhetoric kills the meaning.
The thumping
of grammar and rhetoric stands behind
the
shimmering curtain.
14 Heidegger was interviewed by Rudolf
Augstein
and Georg Wolff, which took place September
23, 1966 and was published in Der Spiegel
(31 May 1976), after Heidegger's death
as
per his request. The last two sentences
that
Heidegger says in the interview are,
"For
us today the greatest of what is to
be thought
is too great. We can perhaps struggle
with
building a narrow and not very far
reaching
footbridge for a crossing." ("Für
uns Heutige ist das Große des zu Denkenden
zu groß. Wir können uns vielleicht
daran
abmühen, an schmalen und wenig weit
reichenden
Stegen eines Überganges zu bauen.").
Heidegger is speaking of the greatest
of
the new beginning for philosophy; he
thinks
it is going to be very difficult for
us.
So, Heidegger thinks we can only build
a
footbridge (Stegen) to a new crossing
(Übergang),
to a new beginning (Anfang). Furthermore,
he adds that it will be "not very
far
reaching". Thus, Heidegger is
placing
us in a 'precarious' position and he
is not
giving us a lot of hope that he has
the "answer"
for us. Plus, even if he has the "answer,"
it is not far reaching, so we are stuck
with
having to work out our own crossing.
In another
place, Heidegger says, "And he
who will
someday grasp it does not need "my"
attempt (Versuch). For he must have
laid
out his own path thereunto." (Und
der,
der es einstmals begreifen wird, braucht
"meinen" Versuch nicht; denn
er
muß selbst den Weg dahin sich gebahnt
haben.).
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),
p. 8, et. p. 7). For Heidegger, the
other,
new beginning needs to be unfolded
in our
lived space and time, but for the future
ones they may not need Heidegger's
attempts.
In as much as Heidegger wants to unriddle
the riddle of future philosophers,
they may
not need Heidegger's attempts (Versuch)
or
even follow in his pathways.
Readers Note: Aphorisms 15 to 45 are
detailed
reflections on specific passages from
Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65).
Each
aphorism starts with the English translation
and then the original German. The English
translations are based on the translations
of Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (thanks),
but there are many changes by Daniel
Fidel
Ferrer. The idea is, by working through
in
detail many of the important passages,
those
specific facets and aspects of Heidegger's
reflections on the new, other beginning
will
become clear. They are presented here
in
the order of the sections in Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis) and then
the
German version is also given. The German
title is: Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis)
GA 65. This most likely is not in chronological
order, since Heidegger started this
in
1936/37, the last section on 'Being'
was
done in 1938, and the very final handwritten
version completed in May of 1939. Given
the
nature of the writing and re-writing
process,
it is not clear how chronological the
actual
order of the sections was developed.
Can
we say the methodology in this section
is
scholia and not actually the aphorism?
14.5 Getting Heidegger 'right' is to
be left
to Heideggerian philology - philosophizing
with Heidegger that is our singular
task.
Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant
in
himself' is to be left to Kant philology"
(Kant and the problem of metaphysics,
ET
p. 175). What is philosophy? How are
we to
do philosophy with or against Heidegger?
Heidegger, in an early insightful remark,
said, "All philosophical interpretation
is destructive, controversy, and radicalization,
which is not equivalent to skepticism.
Or
else it is nothing at all; mere chatter
that
repeats more laboriously what was said
in
simpler and better fashion by the author
himself." (The Essence of Human
Freedom:
an introduction to philosphy. GA 31
Vom Wesen
der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung
in
die Philosophie (Sommersemester 1930,
et
p. 118). Through the seeking of a dialogue
with Heidegger we are also attempting
to
engage in philosophizing. The matter
for
thought brings us forward toward actually
doing philosophy. Heidegger wants us
to do
more than just get it "right".
From a different point of view are
the excellent
remarks from Kant, when he said through
his
students' notes: "How should it
be possible
to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical
thinker builds his own work, so to
be speak,
on someone else's ruins, but no work
has
ever come to be that was to be lasting
in
all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn
philosophy,
then, just because it is not yet given.
But
even granted that there is a philosophy
actually
at hand, no one who learned it would
be able
to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively
his cognitions of it would always be
only
historical." (Lectures on Logic,
et.
p. 538). This thought of Kant should
be read
and re-read, since it makes the critical
path and real philosophy much more
than just
reading philosophy or learning someone
else's
philosophical "system". Rather,
it points to the nature of the philosophical
task as philosophizing beyond the representing
of a historical philosophy. We need
to think
the thoughts, not just repeat the language.
For Nietzsche, Kant was just building
a system
with historical concepts that Kant
thought
were given, whereas, Nietzsche knew
these
concepts were not given at all. Heidegger
knows we need to look at these concepts
through
the process of destruction and radicalization
- that is, the concepts need to be
shaken
and touched with the hammer.
15 Beginning of the very first section
number
1 (GA 65, p. 4, et. p. 3), the first
sentence
reads:
"Contributions" enact a questioning
along a pathway which is first traced
out
by the crossing to the other beginning,
into
which Western thinking is now entering.
This
pathway brings the crossing into the
openness
of history and establishes the crossing
as
perhaps a very long sojourn, in the
enactment
of which the other beginning of thinking
always remains only intimation, but
already
decisive." (Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 3). "Die
"Beiträge"
fragen in einer Bahn, die durch den
Übergang
zum anderen Anfang, in den jetzt das
abendländische
Denken einrückt, erst gebahnt wird.
Diese
Bahn bringt den Übergang ins Offene
der Geschichte
und begründet ihn als einen vielleicht
sehr
langen Aufenthalt, in dessen Vollzug
der
andere Anfang des Denkens immer nur
das Geahnte
aber doch schon Entschiedene bleibt."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 4).
Heidegger begins and ends his second
major
work (Contributions to Philosophy (Vom
Ereignis),
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938)
(GA 65), with a discussion of language.
He
starts with the issue of the public
title,
which, I think, means the title Contributions
to Philosophy. However, he says that
the
proper title (gemäße Überschrift) is
Vom
Ereignis (from enowning, the event
of appropriation,
the event, properizing event, appropriating
event, the happening). Therefore, we
should
really read this work as an expression
of
"from" Ereignis. In section
35,
Heidegger says, "Das Ereignis
would
be the proper title for the "work"
that can only be prepared for; and
therefore,
instead of that the title must be:
Beiträge
zur Philosophie." (et. p. 54).
Now,
it is important to note that in the
future
we will be seeing a publication by
Heidegger
called: GA71 Das Ereignis (1941/42).
What
is the purpose of Heidegger's major
work
called: Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom
Ereignis)? Heidegger is giving us an
example
of his anfängliche Denken about Ereignis.
In addition, we should note that Heidegger
calls this a "preparatory exercise".
This is not a complete and final or
finished
work (Werke). Heidegger seems to back
away
from the idea in general of a published
work
(cf. GA 66, p. 427). Why is that? A
partial
answer is that we are always underway
toward….
Now let us look at the way Heidegger
speaks
to the matter for thought - the other
beginning.
What does he mean by the remark, "pathway
"(Bahn) which is first traced
out by
the crossing to the other beginning"?
I think this means that Heidegger is
showing
us this "pathway" and is
guiding
us toward that other beginning. Where
does
Heidegger stand? How does Heidegger
see himself
within the history of Being (Geschichte
des
Seyn)? For example, it was Heidegger
who
pointed out the forgottenness of Being
or
the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit).
So, we must ask where Heidegger himself
sees
his own questioning and thinking within
his
own philosophy. Where does Heidegger
see
himself standing in the tradition of
western
philosophy? Does Heidegger break history
with the first beginning to start an
entirely
new, unique, and original (primordial)
beginning
to philosophy? Again, please note that
Heidegger,
in this first section of this publication
(note: I do not call this a work or
a book),
is giving us the importance of the
other
beginning. The purpose of this publication
is partially to give us a passageway
toward
some "x", and that means
some kind
of a location as this other beginning.
This
"crossing as perhaps a very long
sojourn"
means he is not sure how long this
process
will take. I think in other passages
we might
find him even more hesitant. How can
we know
how long this process might take? Would
you
consider this to be ontological historical
knowledge of some coming event or happening?
How are we to consider this period
or epoch
of our current historical placement
in our
historical time era with regard to
our (Da-Sein)
relationship to Being (Seyn)? We are
not
trying to predict or improve our relationship
nor can we 'will it' or request some
kind
of change in humans. Sometimes Heidegger
speaks of us falling silent (Verschweigung),
which puts us in a location for listening
and belonging (Zugehörigkeit). Perhaps
this
will work for us. What do you hear?
Heidegger is clear that the other beginning
is what Western thinking is now entering
and I think that means for us that
it is
just beginning or in other words, if
you
like, the beginning of the beginning
or the
prelude to historical thinking of Being.
This is decisive for Heidegger, but
has it
become decisive for us? How can it
become
decisive for us? In what direction
must our
thinking take for us to participate
in this
preparation for a new kind of thinking
(enthinking,
Er-Denken, GA 65 section 265)? The
decision
is not just with "us" (Da-Sein),
but with the epoch. There is neither
a subjective
nor an objective ahistorical argument
nor
proof given here.
16 "In the meantime, in crossing
to
another beginning, philosophy has to
have
achieved one crucial thing: projecting-open,
i. e., the grounding enopening of the
free-play
of the time-space of the truth of Seyn."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 4)
"Inzwischen muß die Philosophie
im Übergang
zum anderen Anfang ein Wesentliches
geleistet
haben: den Entwurf, d. h. die gründende
Eröffnung
des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes der Wahrheit
des Seyns."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 5).
We can re-think Heidegger's thinking
here
by a re-wording and try another kind
of translation
into English. For example, a reverse
reading
then becomes: the Time-Play- Space
is the
general opening of the truth of Being;
this
must be so for philosophy in order
for the
projecting-open, which is achieved
by crossing
to the other beginning. The other beginning
archives the projecting-opening (Entwurf),
which means the Time-Play-Space of
the truth
of Being (Wahrheit des Seyns). We can
force
the issue and say, "the other
beginning
is projecting open as Time-Play-Space
as
the truth of Being"or the "the
truth of Being is the opening of the
Time-Play-Space
(and this happens as the crossing (Übergang)
to the other beginning) ". We
are getting
inside Heidegger's language play and
hopefully
this is more than just rhetoric on
our part
and Heidegger's as well. What are the
ideas
here? Heidegger says, "This saying
does
not describe or explain, does not proclaim
or teach. " (GA65, p. 4, et. p.
4).
There is no proof here and none is
attempted.
This attempt (Versuch) is in a different
direction. Note that Heidegger uses
a term
like attempt (Versuch) with its Nietzschean
overtones on the first page of this
work.
All future thinking is under way (Gedanken-gang).
This means that there is no final philosophical
"work" or complete system.
If we
have no questions and we want to describe
the world in some systematic way, then
we
must return to do battle with Hegel
over
the nature of those expanding moments
in
history, which become the absolute
spirit
unfolding in human history. Our point
here
is that Heidegger's philosophy is different
than the past and that it is clearly
not
a Hegelian system nor is it a series
of Nietzschean
aphorisms. Back to the point: the other
beginning
has this character of Time-Play-Space
of
the truth of Being as the projecting
open.
The opening (Lichtung) that allows
the Time-Play-Space
to be with beings.
Heidegger is in dialogue with himself
here.
This is neither Nietzsche nor Schelling;
and certainly not Hegel or Kant. However,
in general, the thinkers in the background
are Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900),
Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775-1854),
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), and
perhaps
deeper in the background is Ernst Jünger
(1895-1998). Ernst said that his brother
Friedrich Georg Jünger (1898-1977)
was closer
to Heidegger than himself. There is
someone
else that is very much part of this
text
-- right up front is the other one
that is
some how unnamed and yet standing on
every
page - Heidegger's own thinking and
writing
before this attempt.
Other philosophers and poets that are
mentioned
are the normal cast of characters for
Heidegger,
namely, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
(1770-1831),
Anaximander, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911),
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), Heraclitus,
Parmenides,
Plato, Aristotle, Søren Kierkegaard
(1813-1855),
Pindar, Rene Descartes (1596-1650),
Emil
Lask (1875-1915), Heinrich Rickert
(1863-1936),
Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), Nicolai
Hartmann
(1882-1950), Johann Gottlieb Fichte
(1762-1814),
Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz
(1646-1716)
and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Plus,
he mentions
Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller
(1759-1805),
Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe (1749-
1832), Walter Gerlach (1889-1979),
and Karl
Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841).
But it seems that Heidegger quotes
and references
himself the most. This is self-reflexive
and a self-dialogue with two great
philosophers,
Heidegger and Heidegger. In some cases,
he
poses questions and answers in his
dialogue.
How does Heidegger see the reader as
a third
partner in our dialogue? Should we
just follow
along where Heidegger is taking us
or should
we try to confront Heidegger with Heidegger?
In some ways, it feels like Nietzsche's
Ecce
Homo, but it is much more than a self-review
of Heidegger's own thinking to that
date.
17 "The other beginning of thinking
is named thus, not because it is simply
shaped
differently from any other arbitrarily
chosen
hitherto existing philosophies, but
rather
because it must be the only other beginning
according to the relation to the one
and
only first beginning. The style of
thoughtful
mindfulness in the crossing from one
beginning
to the other is also already determined
by
the allotment of the one beginning
to the
other beginning." (Contributions
to
Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p. 4).
"Der andere Anfang des Denkens
ist so
genannt, nicht weil er nur andersförmig
ist
als beliebige andere bisherige Philosophien,
sondern weil er der einzig andere aus
dem
Bezug zu dem einzig einen und ersten
Anfang
sein muß. Aus dieser Zugewiesenheit
des einen
und des anderen Anfangs zueinander
ist auch
schon die Art der denkerischen Besinnung
im Übergang bestimmt." (Beiträge
zur
Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA
65, p. 5).
What is the relationship between the
first
beginning of western philosophy (the
Greeks)
and the new, other beginning (Heidegger)?
Heidegger is not just recasting the
Greeks
for the modern period and calling it
a new
beginning in philosophy. When Heidegger
in
another place speaks of the "end
of
philosophy and the task for thinking"
and when he talks about the end of
metaphysics,
he is talking about the end of the
first
beginning. In more detail, he says
that Platonism
is the beginning of metaphysics and
Nietzsche's
reversal of Platonism is the final
end of
metaphysics (the omega of metaphysics).
So,
in a way, the formula would be Platonism
is the first beginning and Heidegger
is the
new, other beginning for western philosophy.
Heidegger is not saying that this is
a new
metaphysics or a new ontology; no,
that is
not it at all. The relationship between
the
two beginnings as seen from the new,
other
beginning can be expressed as one of
Heidegger's
beloved terms - Auseinandersetzung
(a struggle
-kampf, a critical debate and encounter,
a fight between heavyweights). But
this is
neither a countermovement nor an anti-movement
to the first beginning. Heidegger wants
to
be free and clear of the first beginning.
Has he made it? Has Heidegger twisted
clear
of the first beginning and metaphysics?
As
Heidegger expresses it in the title
to section
87, "History of the first beginning
(the history of metaphysics)."
(GA 65
et., p. 123, G, p. 175). Back to the
question:
has Heidegger twisted clear of metaphysics?
18 "Because the other beginning
(from
within the truth of Sein) has become
necessary?
Why a beginning at all? (Cf. Überlegungen
IV on the beginning and crossing.)."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et p. 40)
"Weil der andere Anfang (aus der
Wahrheit
des Seins) notwendig geworden? Warum
denn
überhaupt Anfang? (Vgl. Überlegungen
IV über
Anfang und Übergang)." (Beiträge
zur
Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA
65, p. 57).
Here Heidegger references one of his
own
writings, Überlegungen IV (GA 94)(English
translation might be Considerations).
This
series of notebooks is one of Heidegger's
mostly closely kept writings. According
to
his son and main editor of the Gesamtausgabe,
Dr. Hermann Heidegger, these will not
be
open for publication until at least
2005
and will be the last materials published
in the collected writings. These are
not
part of any lecture series etc., but
rather
consist of some of Heidegger's most
personal
philosophical reflections. In the Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger
makes the most references to himself.
This
is clearly a self-reflexive dialogue
that
Heidegger has entered in with himself
and
his writings. Heidegger is writing
this in
the period of 1936-1938 with the handwritten
version completed May, 1939. In the
Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger
makes references to over 15 volumes
of the
Gesamtausgabe (GA) that as of 2003
had not
been published yet even in German.
So, we
have a way to go before we can read
any of
the Überlegungen (GA 94, 95, 96).
Why has the other beginning become
necessary?
The basic question: why a beginning
in general?
What is behind and pushing toward another
beginning? This is not something behind
the
world or outside of the world like
the supersensuous.
I think Heidegger is looking for a
process
within history (not human history).
This
again is related to the issue of Heidegger's
own questioning of the truth of Being
(Seyn),
which relates to how Heidegger sees
his own
opening up to Being as part of the
history
of Being. If we have abandoned Being
(or
Being has abandoned itself) (Seinsverlassenheit)
and now Heidegger is asking about Being,
then Being is no longer abandoned.
Perhaps
it is not "we" nor Heidegger
and
neither one of us can merely talk about
Being
or ask about the truth of Being; then
the
sound of Being maybe heard and, all
of sudden,
Being itself is no longer abandoned.
No,
it is more complicated that just simply
engaging
in philosophical writing or with Heidegger
in the Black Forest. I think Heidegger
would
say this is like the world stage. This
is
not Hegel's world-spirit (die Weltgeist),
but hopefully you are getting the picture
that it is more than just some empirical
data or a news report ("Being
has returned",
newspaper headline).
Back to the point: Heidegger is driving
us
back to the ground of why there is
an "other
beginning". Why a beginning at
all?
Why bring up this issue at all? Why
not leave
it in the background or un-discussed?
Why
did we have the first beginning with
the
Greek philosophers and now a new, other
beginning?
Why are there also ancient philosophical
schools in India and China? Of course,
there
are the religions traditions that have
background
with philosophy - for example, Buddhism.
What is the necessity that makes all
of this
happen? So then, the next question:
has this
time come again that the necessity
of making
(can we use that term here?) a new,
other
beginning must happen again in this
epoch?
Can we go ahead and live unexamined
lives
and not respond to the call of the
asking
the question (the question draws us)
about
the truth of Being? Heidegger even
speaks
of distress (Not, Notlosigkeit, Not-losigkeit)
and specifically distress over the
abandonment
of Being
(Seinsverlassenheit) (cf. GA 65, section
60). We are not thinking about something
that occurred to Heidegger only and
somehow
relates to his personal theological
or philosophical
background. This is where Heidegger
is trying
to push aside and leave all metaphysical
concepts and thinking behind.
19 "But this beginning first becomes
enactable as the other beginning when
the
first beginning is put into critical
encounter.
Grasped inceptually, the beginning
is Seyn
itself."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et p. 41)
"Aber dieser Anfang wird erst
vollziehbar
als der andere in der Auseinandersetzung
mit dem ersten. Der Anfang - anfänglich
begriffnen
- ist das Seyn selbst." (Beiträge
zur
Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA
65, p. 58).
It is only after we critically engage
the
first beginning and the entire historical
course of philosophy and metaphysics,
only
after we have purified (Reinigung,
section
110, section 26) these metaphysical
concepts
(this is not the negative sense of
the "destruction"
of history) and finished up the cleaning
up of metaphysics in general. Heidegger
spent
many years working on the history of
philosophy
and so far most of his publications
involve
his Auseinandersetzung (critical encounter)
with metaphysics. At times, Heidegger
also
talks about the struggle (Kampf). So,
we
must do the work of not just reading
and
thinking about the entire history of
western
thought, but we need to move in a critical
way. This does not mean some ahistorical
search for arguments and proofs. Heidegger's
thinking seems to move beyond all of
the
standard methods of phenomenology or
hermeneutics.
What is the philosophical methodology
here?
This is a very complex question with
regard
to Heidegger. One point of interest
is a
remark he made about Kant, "Getting
Kant right is to be left to Kant philology".
I take that to mean that getting Kant
right
is not philosophy. What is the philosophical
task for thinking?
The second part here can be re-translated
and re-thought along different lines.
The
other beginning - conceptualized provisionally
- is Being itself. The means Heidegger's
new term Being (Seyn) (not the metaphysical
Being (Sein)) is the new, other beginning.
The andere Anfang is Being itself.
The other
beginning is Being. This needs to be
unpacked
but packing it also makes it clearer.
Heidegger
said during a lecture course on Aristotle
that the students should read Aristotle
for
15 years before reading Nietzsche.
In a discard
draft by Nietzsche written for the
section
on "Why I Write Such Good Books"
in Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What
One Is,
Nietzsche said, "Usually, one
must condense,
or upset one's digestion; I have to
be diluted,
liquefied, mixed with water, else one
upsets
one's digestion." With Heidegger,
we
also need to take the long drink of
water
and re-think everything; only by this
way
do we watch where Heidegger is guiding
us.
Remember this is still a preparatory
exercise
and all future thinking is underway.
But
we need to engage Heidegger to follow
Heidegger's
own admonishment for thinking. Although
we
must be careful here, since Heidegger
wrote
in a letter to Medard Boss, dated February
21, 1971, Heidegger said, "I would
like
to dissuade you from the literature
on Heidegger."
(Zollikon Seminars, et. p. 290). That
puts
"us" in the middle.
20 "The other beginning has to
be realized
totally from within Seyn as enowning
(Ereignis)
and from the essential swaying of its
truth
and its [truth's] history (cf., e.
g., the
other beginning and its relationship
to German
Idealism)". (Contributions to
Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et p. 41)
"Der andere Anfang muß ganz aus
dem
Seyn als Ereignis und der Wesung seiner
Wahrheit
und ihrer Geschichte erwirkt werden
(vgl.
z. B. der andere Anfang und sein Verhältnis
zum deutschen Idealismus)." (Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA 65, p. 58).
In re-thinking this passage, we need
to clear
about the parts. The other beginning
must
be seen from the whole of Being as
Ereignis,
and the essence of its truth and its
history.
Also, we need to think of the other
beginning
and the relationship to German Idealism.
Heidegger does not elaborate the connection
with German Idealism and the context
does
not give any hints. But can we think
this
out without any kind of hint from Heidegger.
This is very difficult since Heidegger's
relationship to Fichte, early Schelling,
Hegel and the later Schelling is complex;
however, we know that Heidegger reacted
against
the whole issue of the absolute and
the systems
of metaphysics attempted by almost
of all
of German Idealism (except Schelling
writing
on human freedom). Later on, in section
104
of the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom
Ereignis)
on German Idealism, Heidegger says,
"There
is no bridge (Brücke) from here to
the other
beginning." (GA 65, p. 203, et.
p. 142).
Heidegger is the farthest from Hegel's
metaphysics.
In some ways, Heidegger is still part
of
the countermovement to the great Hegelian
metaphysical system. Hegel's famous
essay
at the beginning of the Science of
Logic,
begins with the title is "With
What
Must the Science Begin?" (Wissenschaft
der Logik, "Womit muß der Anfang
der
Wissenschaft gemacht werden?").
This
essay is the exact opposite of what
Heidegger
wants to accomplish. "Remember,"
Heidegger said," to place Hegel's
system
in the commanding view and then to
think
in a totally opposite direction. ("Hegels
Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick
bringen
und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken."
GA 65, p. 176). This is Heidegger's
counterpunch
to the Hegelian metaphysical system.
Is Hegel
still standing? Yes - but weakening.
Hegel
said at the beginning of his major
philosophical
work, the Science of Logic, "With
What
Must the Science Begin?", "It
is
only in recent times that thinkers
have become
aware of the difficulty of finding
a beginning
in philosophy, and the reason for this
difficulty
and also the possibility of resolving
it
has been much discussed. What philosophy
begins with must be either mediated
or immediate,
and it is easy to show that it can
be neither
the one nor the other; thus either
way of
beginning is refuted." Heidegger
has
radically transformed Hegel's question.
Perhaps
Heidegger did not even have this question
in mind, but it certainly came to the
forefront
of my mind that this was indeed a link.
Hegel
has the absolute hidden in the background
but not too deeply. Remember, the absolute
already is given completely a priori.
In
a general sense, if you go along with
Hegel's
starting point (beginning) he has you
locked
into his system. Question: if we go
along
with Heidegger's new, other beginning
are
we locked into being Heideggerians?
Can we
ask the question "what is the
truth
of Seyn?" and not end up as some
kind
of Heideggerian? Can we twist free
of Heidegger's
starting point (new beginning) and
still
be doing non-metaphysical post-modern
philosophy?
This kind of thinking (Er-denken, Inbegrifflichkeit,
anfängliche Denken) is for those who
come
but once (GA 65, section 1).
21 "In the domain of the other
beginning
there is neither "ontology"
nor
"metaphysics" in general.
(Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p.
41)
"Im Bereich des anderen Anfangs
gibt
es weder "Ontologie" noch
überhaupt
"Metaphysik". (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 59).
In this passage Heidegger is making
it clear
that the new, other beginning is not
connected
to ontology or at least one version,
namely,
Hermann Lotze's (1817-1881) version
of ontology
as one discipline among others (GA
65 section
14). Of course, Heidegger wants to
move beyond
and overcome metaphysics, so the new,
other
beginning is not linked to metaphysics.
Metaphysics
never moves beyond beings or beingness,
so
in the new beginning Heidegger asks
about
the truth of Seyn (Being of beings)
and metaphysics
can not follow in his path of thinking.
In
other words, unchain ontology from
metaphysical
thinking. Heidegger is making his thinking
the condition and limits set for the
other
beginning. What is this domain (Bereich)
for Heidegger where there is no traditional
ontology and no metaphysics in general?
Is
this the Kantian version of a critique
(limits,
possibilities, bounds, outlines, Vorriss)?
Is a "domain" a place and
a spatial
location in ahistorical time? I think
this
is a case where Heidegger is not thinking
historical enough. Nietzsche points
out that
philosophers lack a historical sense
(Twilight
of Idols: or How one Philosophizes
with a
Hammer, section "Reason"in
Philosophy").
Nietzsche's tuning fork may have touched
Heidegger on this one, because Heidegger
is attempting to step over his own
shadow
here. He can try, but does not make
it over
the shadow. Heidegger does say it is
important
to jump over one's own shadow.
Sometimes Heidegger mentions the work
of
Nicolai Hartmann who writes about ontology
in the 20th century, but who according
to
Heidegger has it all wrong. For Heidegger,
Hartmann is an ersatz straw man; he
does
not even quote him but merely throws
in a
sharp remark for good measure. Clearly
the
Hartmann version of ontology is not
where
Heidegger is guiding us to and also
ontology
not as discipline (cf. Lotze). Heidegger
wants to stop ontology from becoming
henology.
How many rivers have you stepped in
twice?
Was it the same river? Yes, of course
- so
much for naming and language.
22 "When "decision"
comes
to stand over against "system",
then that is the crossing from modernity
into the other beginning. (Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et p.
62)
"Wenn die "Entscheidung"
gegen
das "System" zu stehen kommt,
dann
ist das der Übergang aus der Neuzeit
in den
anderen Anfang.." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 89).
The other beginning is after the crossing
from modernity (Neuzeit, new time)
and this
will happen when the final decision
is made
against the "system" in general.
Heidegger at some level equates the
Hegelian
"absolute system" and systems
in
general with metaphysics. At a later
time
Heidegger will think the essence of
metaphysics
is nihilism, but the paw of the tiger
(metaphysics)
is as an absolute system. Metaphysics
at
its highest point, in its greatest
manifestation
is as the absolute system. Metaphysics
as
the highest point of the wave is the
Hegelian
system. This is given greater detail
in Heidegger's
Schelling book (GA 42). Heidegger is
contra
the absolute metaphysics system. But
Heidegger
wants to be twisted free of all metaphysics
and leave metaphysics behind in a complete
sense. The notion of system is just
the point
of making the decision before crossing
over.
The point of the decision is when thinking
moves from beings and beingness to
the question
of the meaning (Sinn von Sein) of Being
or
the truth of Being (Seyn). This does
not
mean we throw out a "system"
or
think in some unsystematic way, but
rather,
that we lay the grounding foundations
of
all beings in a more original way (note
this
is not a transcendental structure or
grounding).
If we can bring the decision against
"systems"
as such, then the crossing will be
made at
this time over to the domain of the
other
beginning.
Kant and then Hegel brought the system
and
Reason together in a speculative identity.
At this point Heidegger does attack
Reason,
but it is clearly part of his overall
critical
encounter with metaphysics. This is
not an
irrational position, but for Heidegger
thinking
is clearly not Reasoning (specifically
in
the narrow sense of Reason). Heidegger
and
Nietzsche are both clear on this point
-
philosophical thinking is not Reasoning.
Some of this appears in Nietzsche's
in Twilight
of Idols: or How one Philosophizes
with a
Hammer, "Reason in Philosophy",
but there are many other similar remarks
in Nietzsche. The question is: has
this news
come to modern philosophy
(where they still teach the real philosophical
thinking in a logic course)?
Heidegger is finding a middle ground
between
systematic phenomenological research
(like
Being and Time; perhaps the extreme
case
of Hegel) and the approach of Nietzsche
to
write in the form of the aphorism.
Nietzsche's
aphorisms are a philosophical methodology
that makes a point of the nature of
philosophical
thinking, but Heidegger does not want
to
follow Nietzsche down this path. On
the other
hand, Heidegger does not follow Hegel
and
it seems he no longer wants to go down
the
path of Being and Time with the phenomenological
methodology. As already noted, Heidegger
has a problem with the concept of a
philosophical
written work (Werke). He is only on
the way,
not yet there, so we do not have such
a thing
as a philosophical written work (Werke).
Heidegger has found a middle path between
Hegel (system) and Nietzsche (aphorisms)
in terms of general methods. He also
writes
essays, articles, dialogues, and poems.
But
consider what Nietzsche said, "the
methods,
one must say it ten times, are what
is essential.
" (The Antichrist, section 59,
"die
Methoden, man muss es zehnmal sagen,
sind
das Wesentliche").
Heidegger sees Hölderlin as the one
who has
"poeticized the furthest ahead"(GA
65, section 105). But Heidegger does
not
elucidate his own poetry or Nietzsche's
poetry;
instead, he sees the connection between
poetry
and his own philosophical thinking.
What
is the connection between Heidegger's
new
kind of thinking (Er-denken, Inbegrifflichkeit,
anfängliche Denken) and poetry? Specific
poetry does not seem to be a large
part of
the Contributions to Philosophy (Vom
Ereignis);
however, Hölderlin is an essential
part of
the project but not any of his specific
poetry.
It seems that Hölderlin is always a
part
of Heidegger's project. Although even
after
reading Heidegger's work on Hölderlin
it
is not clear why Hölderlin, must be
a part
of Heidegger's project.
Back to the question: has the time
come to
decide against system as such? I think
the
answer is "yes". Do we all
agree?
Do not worry we are not making speculative
judgments on history.
23 "The burden of thinking in
the other
beginning of philosophy is different:
It
is Er-denken that which is enowned
as enowning
itself; it is to bring Seyn into the
truth
of its essential swaying. However,
because
Seyn becomes enowning in the other
beginning,
the echo of Seyn must also be history,
must
pass though history by an essential
shock,
and must know and at the same time
be able
to say the moment of this history."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et p. 75-76)
"Anders ist im anderen Anfang
der Philosophie
die Last des Denkens: das Er-denken
dessen,
was sich ereignet als das Ereignis
selbst,
das Seyn in die Wahrheit seiner Wesung
bringen.
Weil aber im anderen Anfang das Seyn
Ereignis
wird, muß auch der Anklang des Seyns
Geschichte
sein, die Geschichte in einer wesentlichen
Erschütterung durchmachen und den Augenblick
dieser Geschichte zugleich wissen und
sagen
können."(Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom
Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p.
108).
We can translate Er-denken as en-thinking
or enthinking. But this does not get
at the
sense of a kind or type of thinking
that
leads us on to Ereignis. In the other
beginning
Being as Seyn becomes Ereignis. This
Being
of beings as Seyn is the truth of Being
(Seyn),
which is Heidegger's expression of
his own
philosophical thinking. Remember the
real
title of Heidegger's writing project
is Vom
Ereignis. Seyn als Ereignis.
In the next part of the passage Heidegger
is bringing his seynsgeschichtliche
Denken
(translated as being-historical thinking)
into play. Aside: seynsgeschichtliche
Denken
still has a sense of Nietzsche about
it.
Hegel and Nietzsche were historical
thinkers
each in their own way (also Wilhelm
Dilthey),
but Heidegger brings this to the forefront
in a different light. This passage
is an
example of seynsgeschichtliche Denken
in
action. The echo or Anklang of Being
is part
history and it is a shock to this moment
in history. Again, what is the historical
location of Heidegger's own philosophical
questioning? Heidegger is himself a
person
in history; he is historical. This
is not
just Heidegger, but it is the age or
epoch
itself that is driving the distress
to push
its point in history. Why is this a
burden
(German=Die Last) for us? Is this a
heavy
burden? Being as Ereignis is too heavy
for
Da-Sein. It weighs us down. Do we need
to
become a Heideggerian version of the
overman
(superman) to handle this burden? Heidegger
says this is different in the other
beginning,
since Being as Ereignis shocks and
breaks
history into two parts: the first beginning
and the new, other beginning to philosophy
(or thinking). Where is history after
Heidegger?
Do we have some kind of historical
relativism?
Remember Nietzsche said, "The
thinker.
- he is a thinker that means, he knows
how
to make things simpler than they are.
"(Gay
Science, "la gaya scienza"
Book
Three, #189). Even though Heidegger
wrote
a great deal, that does not mean that
he
made anything overly complex, for in
fact,
he made it simpler than it really is
in thought.
24 "Therefore this "idealistic"
and moralistic interpretation of nihilism
remains provisional, in spite of its
importance.
Directed toward the other beginning,
nihilism
must be grasped (begriffen) more fundamentally
as the essential consequence (Wesensfolge)
of the abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit)."
(Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 96).
"Deshalb bleibt diese "idealistische"
und moralische Auslegung des Nihilismus
trotz
ihrer Wesentlichkeit vorläufig. In
der Absicht
auf den anderen Anfang muß der Nihilismus
gründlicher als Wesensfolge der Seinsverlassenheit
begriffen werden." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 138).
Heidegger is attacking the more typical
Nietzschean
position. Nietzsche himself viewed
much of
what he was doing was anti-Christian
morality.
For example, Nietzsche said in his
autobiography,
Ecce Homo ("Why I am Destiny",
#7), "Have I been understood?
- What
defines me, what sets me apart from
the rest
of humanity is that I uncovered Christian
morality. "Nietzsche's whole project
of the revaluation of all values can
be seen
within the horizon of his attempt to
engage
in the transformation of morality and
this
is certainly more in line with the
"standard"
reading of Nietzsche. Heidegger is
attacking
the "standard" reading of
Nietzsche's
position of the idealist and moralistic
reading
of nihilism. Heidegger has a deeper
reading
of nihilism as the essence of the history
of metaphysics. Therefore, Heidegger
adds
the second part to this passage by
bringing
into the play the abandonment or forgetting
(forgetting is not to be meant as human
and
not as subjective reading) of Being
through
the other beginning. One can then see
nihilism
as a consequence of the Seinsverlassenheit.
But this is tied to the other beginning.
We can say that it is through the other
beginning
that one can see the whole issue of
the abandonment
of Being of beings (Seinsverlassenheit).
This is not beingness (Seiendheit)
as thought
by metaphysics. Heidegger points out
the
abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit).
Does that mean that Being is no longer
abandoned?
Where does Heidegger stand with the
new,
other beginning? Does he make it in
a new
domain?
25 "But the playing-forth (Zuspiel)
of the history of the first-ever-inceptual
thinking, however, is not an historical
[historische]
addendum to and a portending of a "new"
"system" but rather is in
itself
essentially a transformation-initiating
preparation
for the other beginning." (Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p.
119)
"Das Zuspiel der Geschichte des
erstanfänglichen
Denkens ist aber keine historische
Bei- und
Vorgabe zu einem "neuen"
"System",
sondern in sich die wesentliche, Verwandlung
anstoßende Vorbereitung des anderen
Anfangs."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 169).
We need to do a re-reading of this
statement
in English through a different set
of eyes.
The forward-playing of history in the
first
inceptual thinking is a transformation
in
preparation for the other beginning.
Right
at the beginning of this writing project,
in fact in section 1 (GA65, p. 5, et.
p.
4). Heidegger uses the expression,
"the
Time-Play- Space is the general opening
of
the truth of Being" (des Zeit-Spiel-Raumes
der Wahrheit des Seyns). The above
passage
starts with the forward-playing of
history
(Zuspiel) with the first inceptual
thinking.
But again Heidegger tells us this not
a constructing
of a new "system" in philosophy.
This is certainly not the construction
of
new worldview that includes the other
beginning
as the next school of philosophy to
be taught
at universities and conferences. Why
did
Sartre go in this direction? Heidegger
went
in another direction. How does thinking
drive
the playing of history toward a direction
that has nothing to do with the latest
headlines
and the need for a story to have an
ending?
What is the story of metaphysics? Nietzsche
gave us one with his vision of "How
the 'True World' Finally Become a Fable:
The history of an Error"(Twilight
of
Idols: or How one Philosophizes with
a Hammer).
How can we get underway with the "essentially
a transformation-initiating preparation
for
the other beginning"? It is related
to the Zuspiel of history of inceptual
thinking.
This is getting us ready during the
time
of transition or crossing (Zeitalter
des
Übergangs). This is getting our (not
personal)
thinking ready for the other beginning.
Even
in this writing we can tell that the
subjective
aspect of metaphysics still govern
us in
our attempt to move beyond all of the
subjective-objective
thinking. Inceptual thinking thinks
the other
beginning as the epoch of the play
of history.
How do we know this is not a new system
or
a new world view or just a new philosophical
position that includes some new, other
beginning
that is just really a re-baked Greek
or German
philosophy? Asking about the new beginning
makes sense for Hegel, but what about
Kant?
Kant wants to lay the foundations pre-metaphysical
for a 'metaphysics of metaphysics'
(Letter
to Marcus Herz (May 11, 1781); but
the actual
beginning of such a project does not
seem
to be at issue for Kant. Kant always
wanted
to start with Reason. But this was
not because
Kant had some personal need to start
with
Reason. We would say it was in the
air at
the time. Heidegger would say it was
the
destiny of Being as Reason for the
epoch.
This was the age of reason and rationality.
26 "85. The Originality (Primordially)
Coming-into-Its-Own of the First Beginning
Means Gaining a Foothold in the Other
Beginning.
" (Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom
Ereignis). et. p. 120).
"85. Die ursprüngliche Zueignung
des
ersten Anfangs bedeutet das Fußfassen
im
anderen Anfang." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 171).
Heidegger declares the title of this
section
to be about the relationship between
the
first and the other beginning. Philosophy
must work toward obtaining the new,
other
beginning; this may take a very long
time.
The shadow of God may play on the cave
wall
for thousands of years (Nietzsche).
The first
beginning viewed from Heidegger's thinking
encompasses the whole of the Greek
beginning.
This is not an ahistorical reading
of some
Greek philosophers to see what their
little
arguments are about or a proof of some
statements.
Heidegger is seeing the Greeks from
historical
thinking of the entire western tradition;
he sees the big picture and what the
real
implications are for the thinking of
Being
(Seyn). How did the first beginning
start
with thought? Why did the great German
thinkers
not really encounter the Greeks? The
great
German thinkers like: Hölderlin, Hegel,
Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Schelling,
and
Nietzsche - who each in their own way
opened
a special relationship to the Greeks,
but
not like Heidegger. Heidegger opens
up the
unthought in Greek thinkers. This does
not
mean we need to "study" the
Greeks.
Rather, Heidegger has considered the
entire
metahistory of Being, metaphysics,
and philosophy
in a radical way.
Heidegger wants to create a narrow
footbridge
toward getting that foothold in the
domain
of the other beginning. Thinking wants
to
gain a foothold in the new, other beginning.
How can we get there? Assuming there
is some
'reason' to reject metaphysics, why
not embrace
the "system"? Heidegger proclaims
in the first section, "The time
of "systems"
is over." (Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 4). Should we
say
"systasis, systema, or synistemi"?
Metaphysics is considered ontotheological
with the highest point being the "absolute
system". So, should we accept
or reject
the idea of the "system"?
But this
is not like deciding on orange juice
for
breakfeast, since the historical epoche
has
already brought the end of the "system".
For Hegel, philosophers come afterward
in
history, but for Heidegger, philosophers
are in the moment and the now - and
can build
those bridges toward a new beginning.
27 "What this question wants to
achieve
is not the clarification and thus rigidifying
of the hitherto necessarily confused
ideas
of "metaphysics" but rather
the
thrust into the crossing and thereby
the
knowing awareness that any kind of
metaphysics
has and must come to an end, if philosophy
is to attain its other beginning.'
(Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p.
121).
"Was diese Frage erzielen will,
ist
nicht die Aufklärung und d. h. Festerhaltung
der bisherigen und dazu notwendig verwirrten
Vorstellung von der "Metaphysik",
sondern ist der Stoß in den Übergang
und
damit in das Wissen, daß jede Art von
Metaphysik
zu Ende ist und sein muß, wenn die
Philosophie
ihren anderen Anfang gewinnen soll."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 172).
Ok, we need to reject metaphysics and
not
spend time sorting out the true nature
of
metaphysics and polishing our understanding
of metaphysics. That is why Heidegger
says
"any kind" of metaphysics.
We need
to nail metaphysics on the head and
end it;
only then, should philosophy attain
its other
beginning. This is not the simple overcoming
of metaphysics, but rather, we need
to end
metaphysics. Some important parts of
metaphysics
are the concept of value metaphysics,
the
system, constructing a world view,
the absolute,
the will, reason, eternal truths, ideas,
ideals, Being as universal, Platonism,
etc.
Philosophy needs to attain its other
beginning!
28 "The talk of the end of metaphysics
should not mislead us into believing
that
philosophy is finished with "metaphysics".
On the contrary: In its essential impossibility
metaphysics must now first be played-forth
into philosophy; and philosophy itself
must
be played over into its other beginning.
If we ponder this task of the other
beginning
(the question of the "meaning"
of Seyn in the formulation of Being
and Time),
then it will also become clear that
all attempts
that react against metaphysics - which
is
everywhere idealistic, even as positivism
- persist in being re-active and thus
are
in principle dependent upon metaphysics
and
thereby remain themselves metaphysics."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 122).
"Die Rede vom Ende der Metaphysik
darf
nicht zur Meinung verleiten, die Philosophie
sein mit der "Metaphysik"
fertig,
im Gegenfall: diese muß ihr jetzt erst
in
ihrer Wesensunmöglichkeit zugespielt
und
die Philosophie selbst so in ihren
anderen
Anfang hinübergespielt werden.
Überdenken wir diese Aufgabe des anderen
Anfangs (die Frage nach dem "Sinn"
des Seyns in der Fromel von "Sein
und
Zeit"), dann wird auch deutlich,
daß
alle Versuche, die gegen die Metaphysik,
die überall - auch als Positivismus
- idealistisch
ist, reagieren, eben re-aktiv und damit
von
der Metaphysik grundsätzlich abhängig
und
somit selbst Metaphysik bleiben."
(Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA 65, p. 173).
Heidegger wants us to still deal with
metaphysics
and work through the whole nature of
metaphysics
to know before we overcome it and finish
it off once and for all. Our relationship
to metaphysics is at different stages;
on
one hand, we need to go through it
and work
on the purification (Reinigung, section
110,
section 26) of metaphysics, and on
the other
hand, our goal is clear - overcome
metaphysics
and try to wipe out the conceptual
metaphysics
from our thinking. Of course, this
means
overcoming nihilism and all goals positing,
and the transformation of values (revaluation
or transvaluation of all values). Morality
is out the door as a metaphysical project.
Theology as a metaphysical project
is done.
The second part of passage means that
Heidegger
sees that his attempt at asking the
meaning
(or sense) of Being (Sinn von Sein)
in Being
and Time, is indeed part of task of
philosophy
to work toward the other beginning.
So, Heidegger
even links his first attempt in Being
and
Time (1927) as his way toward the other
beginning.
Thus, Heidegger's reading of the early
Heidegger
even points toward the other beginning
in
philosophy. I am not sure this was
clear
to Heidegger in 1927, but here in the
timeframe
of 1936-1939, Heidegger is looking
backward
to 1927 and sees his thinking of Being
and
Time as connected with the other beginning.
Heidegger said that perhaps Being and
Time
was too far, too fast, but still it
is connected
to the other beginning.
In the third part of this passage,
Heidegger
is telling us that all of these counter--movements
to metaphysics, all of these thrusts
against
metaphysics, all of the anti- metaphysics,
contra-metaphysics, that is, all of
these
reactions to metaphysics are still
"caught"
in the web and sphere/domain of metaphysics.
Karl Marx (1818-1883) is still caught
in
the metaphysics of Hegel in his attempt
to
react against Hegel (turn him on his
head).
Søren Kierkegaard is totally caught
by the
Hegelian system. Nietzsche is, above
all,
still caught inside metaphysics as
Platonism
even in his reversal of Platonism.
How many
philosophers are still in the web of
neo-Kantianism?
Most philosophers are still within
the horizon
of value metaphysics and the attempts
to
construct some kind of a worldview.
We need
to break out of metaphysics and those
old
tired concept-mummies left behind by
so many
philosophers.
29 "The crossing to the other
beginning
introduces a caesura (Scheidung) that
long
since no longer runs along with directions
of philosophy (idealism - realism,
etc.)
or even along with attitudes of "worldview"
(Weltanschauung). The crossing separates
the emerging of Seyn and its truth-grounding
in Dasein from any occurring and perceiving
of beings." (Contributions to
Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 124).
"Der Übergang zum anderen Anfang
vollzieht
eine Scheidung, die längst nicht mehr
zwischen
Richtungen der Philosophie (Idealismus
-
Realismus u. s. f.) oder gar zwischen
Haltungen
der "Weltanschauung" verläuft.
Der Übergang scheidet die Heraufkunft
des
Seyns und dessen Wahrheitsgründung
im Dasein
von allem Vorkommen und Vernehmen des
Seienden."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 177).
The caesura is a breaking point and
a long
breath of air, a cut that is a pause.
This
crossing (Übergang) and transition
to the
other beginning is not some kind of
-ism,
idealism, realism, positivism, empiricalism,
scientism, anthropomorphism, humanism,
determinism,
existentialism, fatalism, pantheism,
materialism,
naturalism, skepticism, or metaphysical-ism.
All of these -isms are not true to
the matters
themselves and are all part of the
past historical
schools of philosophy. This may help
to pigeonhole
philosophers and philosophical positions,
but in fact, it has nothing to do with
thinking.
The "easy" way of thinking
is by
putting philosophers into a box and
then
you can close the box and throw it
out. Heidegger
makes the point again and again that
this
is not constructing some kind of worldview
(Weltanschauung). Philosophy is not
constructing
a worldview. Think of this point in
all of
the humanities. Kant's critique of
pure reason
project is looking to put bounds and
limits
on reason in the same way Heidegger
is saying
that by not constructing a worldview
- philosophy
has bounds and limits that drive philosophy
through the squeezing point of not
doing
a worldview. The right worldview is
that
philosophy asks questions and it not
giving
out "answers" or directions
or
a manual on how one should live your
life.
We are the point of the "crossing".
In the second part of this passage
the context
is that the crossing is not looking
toward
beings, but rather, Being and the truth,
which is grounded in our being-open
to the
Being of beings. In Hegel's Science
of Logic,
Being (Sein) is given as mediated.
The question
of the truth of Being does not arise
in Hegel,
since with Hegel everything is already
given
to us as philosophers following the
process.
30 "The other beginning experiences
the truth of Seyn and inquires into
the Seyn
of truth in order first to ground the
essential
swaying of Seyn and to let beings as
the
true of that originary truth spring
forth."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 126).
"Der andere Anfang erfährt die
Wahrheit
des Seyns und fragt nach dem Seyn der
Wahrheit,
um so erst die Wesung des Seyns zu
gründen
und das Seiende als das Wahre jener
ursprünglichen
Wahrheit entspringen zu lassen."
(Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA 65, p. 179).
Here Heidegger is stressing the point
of
the other beginning and the experience
(erfährt)
of the truth of Being (Seyn). What
this allows
is that the decisive essence of Being
lets
beings come forth as beings within
the truth
of Being. However, this truth is not
the
correspondence theory of truth. But
rather,
it is truth in Heidegger's sense of
unhiddenness,
unconcealment (Unverborgenheit); and
in other
words as they say in Greek - aletheia.
Truth
happens. Heidegger says, "In the
first
beginning truth (as unconcealment)
is the
mark of beings"(GA 65, section
91).
The point about beings here is that
they
are more than mere objects to be measured,
exploited, and wrapped up in technology
(En-framing,
Ge-Stell). This "thinking about"
beings needs to be more inline with
the truth
of or meaning of Being. But this "inline"
is not a limiting process but rather
a gathering
up and a springing forth in a greater
throwing
open to unlimited possibility.
31 "The other beginning is the
leaping
into Seyn's more original (primordial)
truth."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 128).
"Der andere Anfang ist der das
Seyn
verwandelnde Einsprung in seine ursprünglichere
Wahrheit." (Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 183).
I think this is clear that the new,
other
beginning is a spring and leap into
Being
(Seyn) as its more original (primordial)
truth (ursprünglichere Wahrheit). The
question
"what is the truth of Being"
leads
Heidegger to think the nature of "truth"
in a deeper way and to a question that
has
not been thought by western metaphysics.
Heidegger is making the point that
other
beginning is tied to a more primordial
truth
of Being (Seyn). This has been thought
out
of the earlier question of the meaning
or
sense of Being
(Sinn von Sein).
32 "But this is what the other
beginning
wants to and must achieve: leaping
into the
truth of Seyn so that Seyn itself grounds
humanness - not even immediately, but
rather
grounds humanness (Menschsein) primarily
as a consequence of, and as allotment
to,
Da-sein." (Contributions to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 129).
"Dieses aber ist es, was der andere
Anfang leisten will und leisten muß:
den
Einsprung in die Wahrheit des Seyns,
dergestalt,
daß dieses selbst das Menschsein gründet
und zwar nicht einmal unmittelbar,
sondern
das Menschsein erst als eine Folge
der und
als die Angewiesenheit auf das Da-sein."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 184).
My re-reading of this passage is: the
other
beginning must and will achieve? This
leap
is the truth of Being (Seyn), this
grounds
humanness, but not as immediate; rather,
humanness as consequence and allotment
from
Da-sein (there-being, being open to
the openness
that is Being and humans).
I think the word "will" is
in fact
a slip by Heidegger I do not think
he meant
anything like the metaphysical expression
of "will" from Kant, Schopenhauer,
and Nietzsche. As more of Heidegger's
writings
are published I think we will learn
more
about the transformation of the one
the Heidegger's
key words - Dasein, Da-sein, Da-Sein,
etc.
This word has been untranslatable in
Heidegger's
usage from the very early attempts
to translate
Heidegger from German into English.
He was
upset with the translation of Dasein
into
French. In addition, he seems to have
reused
the word after Being and Time to be
sure
it was always written Da-sein or Da-Sein
or even possibly Da-Seyn. Kant used
the expression
"Dasein" to refer to general
existence
and normally in the sense of objects.
Da-sein
means there-being, being open to the
openness
that is Being and humans. We could
use the
terms of self-consciousness or humans
or
man or mankind; but only if we could
take
out all meanings of anything personal
or
"subjective". The problem
in a
nutshell is that all of these expressions
bring with them the sense of something
"subjective".
Think of a concept without an overtone
of
the "subjective". This is
Heidegger's
problem. He likes the word Da-sein,
since
he can connect it to Sein with the
expression
Da-Sein (there open to Being). Therefore,
the other beginning grounds humanness
for
a leap into the truth of Being. Da-sein
is
that opening which has the question
of Being
as a question (see sections GA 65,
168-203).
In contrast to Being and Time, here
Da-sein
is more a possibility than a structure.
33 "Leaping into the other beginning
is returning into the first beginning,
and
vice versa. Returning into the first
beginning
(the "retrieval"), however,
is
not displacement into what has passed,
as
if this could be made "actual"
or "real" (wirklich) again
in the
usual sense." (Contributions to
Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 130).
"Der Einsprung in den anderen
Anfang
ist der Rückgang in den ersten und
umgekehrt.
Rückgang in den ersten Anfang (die
"Wieder-holung")
ist aber keine Versetzung in Vergangenes,
als könnte dieses im gewöhnlichen Sinne
wieder
"wirklich" gemacht werden."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 185).
We can leap into the other beginning
by a
thoughtful return in the first beginning.
This means that a jump into Greek thought
will help us toward the new, other
beginning.
Heidegger is pointing us toward Greek
thought
when all was fresh and philosophical
thought
was only thinking. It had not become
something
called philosophy or metaphysics. It
had
not gone through the schools or become
Platonism.
But Heidegger brings us back by the
statement
that this does not mean that this kind
of
Greek thought will be real again. Rather,
it is the freshness of the Greek thinking
as it was at the beginning. Note that
this
is pre-Christian thinking, pre-metaphysical
thinking, and this means pre-all-isms
(before
all of the -isms were created). Did
Aristotle
call Anaximander a neo-realist? See
the difference?
This fresh thinking will help us with
the
new, other beginning. On the other
hand,
Heidegger also goes on in this section
(GA
65, section 91) to speak about the
"distant
positioning" (Fernstellung). This
is
not just re-baking the Greek thinking
to
come up with a new beginning. There
is a
distance between us (and Heidegger)
and the
greatest of the fresh Greek thinking
at the
first beginning of western thought.
Of course,
we could re-read and re-think the Greeks
until we are blue in the face and still
not
come up with what Heidegger is doing
with
the Greeks. Heidegger's greatnest is
not
because of some scholarly reading of
philosophical
treatises. At every point, Heidegger
is attempting
a unique and driving force in thinking
with
western thought. This inimitable thinking
is what makes us get underway with
Heidegger's
thought. Heidegger says at the beginning
of this writing, "those who are
but
once" (GA 65, section 1). Heidegger
is but once.
34 "And only this knowing awareness
plays forth to us the necessity of
preparing
the other beginning and, by unfolding
this
preparedness, of experiencing the own
most
distress (eigenste Not) in its full
light,
the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit),
which, deeply hidden, is the mirror-play
(Widerspiel) to that not-happening
and which
therefore cannot be explained according
to
today's and yesterday's abuses and
omissions."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 130).
"Und erst dieses Wissen spielt
uns die
Notwendigkeit zu, den anderen Anfang
vorzubereiten
und in der Ausfaltung dieser Bereitschaft
die eigenste Not in ihrer vollen Helle
zu
erfahren, die Seinsverlassenheit, die
tief
verborgen das Widerspiel ist zu jenem
Nichtgeschehen
und keineswegs daher aus heutigen und
gestrigen
Missständen und Versäumnissen erklärt
werden
kann." (Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom
Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 186).
The concept of "distress"
(die
Not) is important for Heidegger's entire
project, but wait -- is this just Heidegger's
problem? Heidegger says, "The
highest
distress: the distress of lack of distress"
(Die höchste Not: die Not der Notlosigkeit)
(GA 65, section 50). Our distress is
over
the abandonment of Being (Seinsverlassenheit)
but this is not something that gets
much
play in the latest newspapers (headline:
"Being is lost"). Only by
taking
to heart this distress can we prepare
for
the new, other beginning. Has the new,
other
beginning happened or is it just a
possibility?
Is Heidegger that possibility or has
Heidegger
opened up the question of the truth
of Being
(Seyn) and is pointing toward the future
of thinking?
35 "The other beginning is not
counter-directed
(Gegenrichtung) to the first. But rather,
as the other it stands outside the
counter
[Gegen] and outside immediate comparability."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 131).
Der andere Anfang ist nicht die Gegenrichtung
zum ersten, sondern steht als anderes
außerhalb
des Gegen und der unmittelbaren Vergleichbarkeit.
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 187).
In this passage Heidegger is clarifying
the
relationship between the first beginning
and the new, other beginning. Heidegger's
other beginning is not anti-Greek or
anti-
Platonism. Instead Heidegger is trying
to
make the other beginning outside of
any previous
beginnings. Where is the new, other
beginning
standing? What is its location? Can
it stand
by itself without depending on any
outside
support? Heidegger's dwelling in the
unfolding
of the other beginning is what makes
Heidegger's
singular thought afresh.
36 "In commencing preparedness
for crossing
from the end of the first beginning
into
the other beginning, it is not as if
man
simply enters a "period"
that has
not yet been, but it is rather that
man enters
a whole other domain of history (Bereich
der Geschichte). The end of the first
beginning
will for a long time still encroach
upon
crossing
(Übergang), yes, even upon the other
beginning."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 161).
"Mit dem Anheben der Bereitschaft
für
den Übergang aus dem Ende des ersten
Anfangs
in den anderen Anfang tritt der Mensch
nicht
etwa nur in eine noch nicht gewesene
"Periode",
sondern in einen ganz anderen Bereich
der
Geschichte. Das Ende des ersten Anfangs
wird
noch in langer Zeit übergreifen in
den Übergang,
ja sogar in den anderen Anfang."
(Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938)
(GA 65, p. 227).
So, this is not case that we are in
a different
"period" or epoch or that
we have
made some improvement in mankind (cf.
Twilight
of Idols: or How one Philosophizes
with a
Hammer section 'The 'Improvers' of
Mankind')
- no that is not my goal. This does
not mean
some kind of "progress" in
mankind
toward the overman (Übermenschen, this
German
word can be translated into English
with
the expression: superman, overman,
over-man,
beyond man, above man, or man-beyond,
trans-man).
Heidegger wants us to enter a wholly
other
domain of history. The other beginning
means
also the other domain of history.
We are still stuck with working through
the
end of the first beginning. It will
not be
a clean break; it will take a long
time before
we will have a clean break between
the first
beginning and Heidegger's new, other
beginning.
The first beginning is still part of
our
thinking and we are in history even
though
we are in the process of thinking through
the first beginning to get to the new,
other
beginning. It still is a process of
thought.
37 "The "fundamental-ontological"
mindfulness (laying the foundation
of ontology
as its overcoming (Überwindung) is
crossing
from the end of the first beginning
toward
the other beginning. But this crossing
is
at the same time the take-off for the
leap
(Sprung), by which alone a beginning
and
specifically the other beginning, as
constantly
overtaken by the first - can begin."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 162).
"Die "fundamentalontologische"
Besinnung (Grundlegung der Ontologie
als
ihre Überwindung) ist der Übergang
aus dem
Ende des ersten Anfangs zum anderen
Anfang.
Dieser Übergang aber ist zugleich der
Anlauf
für den Sprung, durch den allein ein
Anfang
und zumal der andere, als ständig überholter
vom ersten, anfangen kann."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 228-229).
Here Heidegger is referring to fundamental-ontological
as he developed the notion in Being
and Time
in 1927. This idea is laying the ground
for
the overcoming of ontology in general.
So,
Heidegger is making a point here that
he
is not just doing fundamental ontology
as
some project within ontology as such;
but
rather, he is headed for the overcoming
of
the narrow sense of ontology as perceived
by all previous metaphysicians above
all
by Hegel in the Science of Logic where
metaphysical
ontology reaches its zenith and high
point,
and where theology and ontology reach
their
total fusion in the dialectical movement
of the absolute spirit.
Heidegger's earlier project of Being
and
Time is now seen as the crossing and
transition
from the first beginning to the other
beginning.
The leap can now be seen as a way for
the
other beginning to start and for it
to overtake
the first beginning.
Where is Kant in Heidegger's project
now?
It seems that Kant has been left behind
-
although Kant took a decisive step
after
the Greek, it seems that Nietzsche
and even
Hegel are important now in the project
of
the other beginning. Certainly not
in their
doctrines as followed, but as opponents.
("Such thinking never lets itself
become
a doctrine..." (GA 65, Section
2). Hegel
is the opponent. Nietzsche helps with
defining
the first beginning and the project
of overcoming
of metaphysics. Schelling gives Heidegger
help on the role of freedom and the
last
gods. Hölderlin is helping forward
toward
the future (he could have played a
bigger
role). Ernst Jünger is helping the
project
in terms of the current total mobilization
and technicity (GA 65, section 74).
Now we
need to go "Back to Kant."
Where
is Kant in this project? Heidegger
no longer
wants to make moves at the foundational
level
- at least not in the Kantian sense
of foundations.
38 "What is entirely other in
the other
beginning, in comparison to the first
beginning,
can be clarified by a saying that seems
only
to play with a turning around whereas
in
truth all is transformed (wandelt).
"
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 162).
"Das ganz Andere des anderen Anfangs
gegen den ersten läßt sich verdeutlichen
durch ein Sagen, das scheinbar nur
mit einer
Umkehrung spielt, während in Wahrheit
sich
alles wandelt." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 229).
In the passage Heidegger is answering
the
critical remark that somehow the first
beginning
and other beginning are just some simple
play of rhetoric that we have to turn
around
the first beginning into the new, other
beginning.
Take some ideas from the Greeks and
re-do
them with some modern ontology and
you have
Heidegger's other beginning. No, this
is
what Heidegger is telling us that this
is
not what is going on with his thinking
on
the new, other beginning. This is more
radical
project; that is why he says at the
end of
this passage that all (alles) is transformed
by the radical new, other beginning.
39 "But in the other beginning
beings
carry the clearing into which they
are placed,
which clearing (Lichtung) holds sway
as clearing
for self-sheltering and concealing,
i. e.,
Being (Seyn) as enowning (Ereignis)."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 162).
"Im anderen Anfang aber ist das
Seiende,
damit es die Lichtung, in die es hereinsteht,
zugleich trage, welche Lichtung west
als
Lichtung des Sichverbergens, d. h.
des Seyns
als Ereignis." (Beiträge zur Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 230).
The other beginning is beings which
are placed
in the clearing and this clearing as
clearing,
which is self-sheltering and concealing,
that is, Being as Ereignis. So, beings
are
brought into the clearing and that
clearing
is Being as Ereignis. Or, beings are
in the
clearing through the event of Ereignis.
This
event, this happening is the truth
of Being
(Seyn) where Da-Seyn is in a relationship
with Time, Being, and history (domain
of
history). The opening is the clearing.
40 "Therefore in the other beginning
of thinking, as Being (Seyn) is experienced
as enowning, such that this experience,
as
arising, transforms all relations to
"what
is"
(Seienden, beings). (Contributions
to Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 175).
"Deshalb wird im anderen Anfang
des
Denkens das Seyn als Ereignis erfahren,
so
zwar, daß diese Erfahrung als Erspringung
alle Bezüge zum "Seienden"
wandelt."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 248).
The other beginning is this thinking
of Being
(Seyn) as Ereignis as this transforms
all
beings. Can we try the German expression
of Ereignis-Denken? Heidegger has a
writing
project that will be published as GA
73 Zum
Ereignis-Denken (1937). What kind of
thinking
is this? Heidegger speaks about so
many different
kinds of thinking: for example, anfängliche
Denken (inceptual thinking), Er-denken
(En-thinking),
Inbegrifflichkeit (ingrasping), Gedanken-gang
(thinking underway), and seynsgeschichtliche
Denken (Being historical thinking).
What
are we to make of all of these different
types of thinking? Is Heidegger pointing
toward an "answer" for the
methodology
question? Hegel's conceptual thinking
(a
metaphysical fusion of subjective and
objective)
is the perfect counter-example for
Heidegger
on this issue. Also, this is certainly
not
representational thinking.
41 "Therefore, thinking as inceptual
is the other beginning and also is
capable
of coming into the remote nearness
of the
last God (letzten Gottes)." (Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p.
185).
"Also vermag auch das Denken als
anfängliches
des anderen Anfangs in die ferne Nähe
des
letzten Gottes zu kommen." (Beiträge
zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-
1938) (GA 65, p. 262).
To try to put this in better English,
a re-reading
would be: therefore thinking as inceptual
is the other beginning and comes into
the
remote nearness of the last God. Scholarship
note: the expression"letzten Gottes"
(last God) comes from Schelling from
at least
one place in the lectures on the Philosophy
of Art. Schelling said, "He is
there
merely to draw the boundary - the last
god."
(et p. 64).
Also in this context is a general reference
to the biblical book of Exodus, chapter
33.
The other beginning is coming near
to the
last God. Heidegger gives us another
clue,
when he says, "remote nearness".
So, the last God is near, but remote.
I think
we may be able to say the same thing
about
the new, other beginning. The new,
other
beginning is near, but also remote.
It means:
it can be near. Heidegger's saying
about
the last God or last gods is more complex
than a few aphorisms can touch. We
fall short
here.
42 "The neo-Kantianism which is
philosophies
of "life" and of "existence"
also affirms, because both - e. g.,
Dilthey
as well as Jaspers - continue to have
no
inkling of what has actually occurred
in
Western metaphysics and what must be
prepared
for as necessity for the other beginning."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 236).
"Der Neukantianismus, den auch
die "Lebens"-
und "Existenz" philosophie
bejaht,
weil beide, z. B. Dilthey, ebenso Jaspers,
ohne jede Ahnung bleiben von dem, was
in
der abendländischen Metaphysik eigentlich
geschehen ist und was sichvorbereiten
muß
als Notwendigkeit des anderen Anfangs."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 337-338).
Heidegger is being critical of neo-Kantians
and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Karl
Jaspers
(1883-1969), plus the philosophies
of life
and existence. This comes close to
being
critical of Nietzsche as well. So,
since
these philosophies have no metahistories
of philosophy or metahistories of Da-Sein
and Being, then these will not have
a deep
understanding of the true historical
nature
of metaphysics. But all of this can
be prepared
by the necessity (Notwendigkeit) of
the other
beginning. Has any other philosopher
seen
what Heidegger has seen and is guiding
us?
Heidegger himself would point to Hölderlin
and his relationship to language in
general
as perhaps giving Heidegger some clues.
However,
it is hard to see what part of Heidegger's
project in the other beginning involves
Hölderlin
at all. Heidegger's project just simply
put
is Heidegger's project. Looking under
every
rock to see if some thinker has influence
upon Heidegger is becoming a boring
game
for Heideggerians. Heidegger is singularly
unique in his thinking and his project.
43 "Philosophy in the other beginning
is essentially historical (geschichtlich),
and in this respect a more originary
(or
primordial) kind of remembering (Erinnerung)
the history
(Geschichte) of the first beginning
must
now ensue." (Contributions to
Philosophy
(Vom Ereignis). et. p. 251).
"Philosophie im anderen Anfang
ist im
Wesen geschichtlich, und in dieser
Hinsicht
muß sich nun auch eine ursprünglichere
Art
der Erinnerung an die Geschichte des
ersten
Anfangs ergeben." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 359).
This is an important point that Heidegger
is making. Re-reading this passage
shows
that philosophy in the new, other beginning
is historical and this kind of thinking
must
be used to think through the first
Greek
beginning. Heidegger says this philosophy
is essentially historical. I think
here we
find some general connections to Nietzsche.
In this way, perhaps by comparing and
contrasting
Heidegger with Nietzsche they will
both become
clearer. Even Hegel and certainly Marx
were
historical thinkers, but in a different
mode
than Heidegger or Nietzsche. What is
the
nature of that difference?
44 "The last god is not the end,
but
rather the other beginning of immeasurable
possibilities for our history. For
its sake
history up to now should not terminate
but
rather must be brought to its end.
We must
bring about the transfiguration of
its essential
and basic positions in crossing and
in preparedness."
(Contributions to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis).
et. p. 289).
"Der letzte Gott ist nicht das
Ende,
sondern der andere Anfang unermeßlicher
Möglichkeiten
unserer Geschichte. Um seinetwillen
darf
die bisherige Geschichte nicht verenden,
sondern muß zu ihrem Ende gebracht
werden.
Wir müssen die Verklärung ihrer wesentlichen
Grundstellungen in der Übergang und
die Bereitschaft
hineinschaffen." (Beiträge zur
Philosophie
(Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) (GA 65,
p. 411).
This historical domain (Bereich) needs
to
be brought to an end and a new beginning
and a new domain of history needs to
begin.
Our history has immeasurable (endless)
possibilities,
if we can bring about the transfiguration
in the crossing or transition toward
the
new, other beginning. The last God
or last
Gods is not the end of this historical
domain,
but rather, may be a part of the nearness
of the remote last God or last Gods
as the
new, other beginning. Heidegger's problem
here is that we are building a narrow
bridge,
but from our side of the bridge we
can only
see the bridge and perhaps a little
outline
in the distant mist of what is on the
other
side of this narrow bridge. So, not
everything
is known about what is on the other
side
of bridge. Heidegger can only give
us some
general outlines. Remember this is
not representational
thinking. There is not an object on
the other
side where we can have an idea that
matches
that object - no, this philosophizing
is
at its high point. We are by definition
on
thin ice. There are lots of pathways
and
byways that are wrong, there are many
routes
to the top of the mountain; but sometimes
there is only one route and there is
no way
of knowing that ahead of time before
you
climb the mountain. Nevertheless, we
still
have the distress (die Not) and must
start
the climb up the mountain.
45 "Only the crossing into the
other
beginning, the first overcoming (Überwindung)
of metaphysics - by necessarily upholding
the name in the crossing - raises this
difference
to knowing awareness and thus for the
first
time puts it in question, and not into
just
any question, but rather into questioning
what is most question-worthy."
(Contributions
to Philosophy (Vom Ereignis). et. p.
299)
"Erst der Übergang in den anderen
Anfang,
die erste Überwindung der Metaphysik,
unter
übergänglichnotwendiger Beibehaltung
ihres
Namens, hebt diesen Unterschied ins
Wissen
und stellt ihn damit zum ersten Mal
in die
Frage; nicht in eine beliebige, sondern
in
die Frage nach dem Fragwürdigsten."
(Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
(1936-1938) (GA 65, p. 423-424).
Here Heidegger links the new, other
beginning
with the first overcoming of metaphysics
and then he adds that this now points
toward
the most worthy of questioning, namely,
the
meaning or sense of Being and the truth
of
Being (Seyn). The truth of Being is
Ereignis
as properly thought. We can also say
that
the meaning of Being is time as temporality.
All these questions circle the foundational
question of how Being is related to
Da-Sein.
Heidegger is helping us build the narrow
bridge, but the details are still in
the
mist and we still have miles to go.
The question
Heidegger would ask us is simple: are
you
underway? Are you on the pathways and
byways
toward the truth of Being (Seyn)? Are
you
attempting a path and the force of
questioning?
Heidegger says, "For the few who
from
time to time again ask the question…"
(GA 65, p. 11, et. p. 9).
Final Reflections
As Nietzsche said, "with different
eyes
shall I then seek my lost ones; with
a different
love shall I then love you." (Thus
Spoke
Zarathustra, "On the Gift-Giving
Virtue").
We should not fear the love of philosophy
and truth.
This journey and the seeking are certainly
putting us on a path. Heidegger says,
"Seeking
itself is the goal." (Das Suchen
selbst
ist das Ziel). (GA 65, p. 18, et. p.
13).
Or, in another work Heidegger says,"For
our goal is the very seeking itself"
(GA 45, et. p. 6, g. 5). We can take
Heidegger
at his word and try to think through
what
that means for philosophizing. We are
not
revealing "eternal truths"
(GA
45, et. p. 21) nor giving a metaphysical
description of our world nor creating
a grand
"system" nor creating a "worldview"
(Weltanschauung) nor creating a value
system.
But rather, we are seeking and asking
questions,
in other words we are philosophizing.
We
stand together on the journey.
Heidegger said, "The grandeur
of man
is measured according to what he seeks
and
according to the urgency by which he
remains
a seeker (Suchende)." (Grundfragen
der
Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme'
der 'Logik',
GA 45 g. p. 5, et. p. 7).
What do we seek?
Is there any urgency and do we respond
to
the distress of the loss of Being?
Or as
Heidegger calls it the "lack of
distress
is what is utmost in this distress,
which
becomes recognizable primarily as the
abandonment
of beings by Being" (GA 65, et.
p. 303).
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