Logophobia: Eric Voegelin on SCIENTISM By
Michael . P. Federici
The core assumptions of scientism are that
reality exists only in the immanent realm
. . and that truth and knowledge of reality
can be derived only as outcomes of the scientific
method
Observers of the contemporary intellectual
climate are all too familiar with the influence
of scientism—also referred to as positivism,
radical empiricism, scientific reductionism,
or scientific naturalism—on conventional
attitudes and scholarly opinion. Much debate
about scientism stems from arguments over
the validity of applying the methods of mathematizing
natural sciences, such as physics, to the
social sciences. the application of the scientific
method to the traditional humanities has
been inspired by the desire to purge such
"subjective" influences as myth,
revelation, and faith from the study of human
nature and human society. the core assumptions
of scientism are that reality exists only
in the immanent (intramundane) realm in the
form of reified external objects and that
truth and knowledge of reality can be derived
only as outcomes of the scientific (or Newtonian)
method. Given these methodological constraints
and assumptions, reality is reduced to phenomena—matter
in motion—observable through the physical
senses. A corollary to the assumption regarding
truth and methodology is that the scientific
method is the only acceptable system for
constructing theory. In its extreme form
scientism posits that truth can be represented
only through quantitative symbols. While
objective knowledge can be expressed this
way, qualitative distinctions about moral
and aesthetic experience are considered subjective
and thus outside the boundaries of science.
In short, scientific knowledge of metaphysical
experience is not possible. Claims about
transcendent nonmaterial reality, especially
the moral dimension of reality, are said
to be mere speculation and are classified
disparagingly as values. Eric Voegelin argued
that positivism "rests on the assumption
that the theological and metaphysical phases
of the mind are transitory and not necessary."
Accepting these doctrines leads to the conclusion
that most of the intellectual and artistic
work that shaped Western civilization is
the product of mere opinion, prejudice, or
tradition. Scientism, in short, undermines
the pre-Enlightenment intellectual, moral,
and cultural foundations of Western civilization.
Defenders of traditional Western civilization,
especially those who argue for the existence
of a universal moral order, have, as a result,
seen scientism as a threat to the cultural
heritage of the West. An impressive group
of scholars attempted to refute scientism:
Eric Voegelin, C. S. Lewis, G. K. Chesterton,
Irving Babbitt, Leo Strauss and Robert Nisbet
[I would add and recommend F. A. Hayek’s
must read The Counter Revolution of Science:
Studies on the Abuse of Reason.]
To most intellectual conservatives, the approach
of scientism to truth and knowledge seems
incomplete, fallacious and misconstrued.
Yet its acceptance of truth, however narrowly
it may be, is sufficient in today’s intellectual
and cultural climate to attract some support
from the intellectual Right. Scientism is
given the illusion of validity in the postmodern
context because of the pervasive acceptance
of ethical relativism (subjectivism) in both
academe and the culture at large. Compared
to postmodern relativism, scientism seems
to some conservatives preferable or at least
a useful intellectual ally. This attraction
is enhanced by the typical encounters with
ethical relativism one experiences in higher
education. Teachers frequently encounter
the subjectivist claim that "what is
true for you isn’t necessarily true for me."
Truth, then, is a purely relative matter
of individual or cultural choice, and the
concept of a universal reality known to all
humans through participation in it has become
increasingly alien to students, intellectuals,
and the larger culture.
Subjectivist assertions lead to disturbing
consequences. Politics—particularly justice—is
reduced to a utilitarian calculation of base
self-interest that removes the common good
(summum bonum) from politics. The prevalence
of subjectivism marks the ascendancy of the
view of justice that was expressed by Thrasymachus
in Plato’s Republic: "might makes right."
Justice, in the classical or Christian sense,
cannot flourish in a society that perceives
it as a selection of competing utilitarian
claims. Utility, choice, and pleasure—the
common denominators of contemporary politics—are
not the measure of justice. To believe otherwise
is to repeat the mistake of Protagoras and
claim that "Man is the measure of all
things." Moreover, without cultural
and ethical impediments to control the will
to power, the strong are apt to choose their
interest over others. Mere utility, choice,
and pleasure are not impediments to the will
to power but rather its animating instruments.
Justice requires a controlling force as an
ethical restraint on will and appetite. This
control, as Irving Babbitt has noted, is
the very essence of humanity and is "ultimately
divine." This divine element provides
a universal ethical standard against which
human behavior can be measured.
A desire to preserve the foundations of Western
order can lead to frustration that invites
the invocation of at least part of the Newtonian
tradition. After all, that some truth is
better than none undoubtedly provides an
epistemological starting point. Yet, one
should be cautious before entering an intellectual
alliance with the advocates of scientism.
The end of the twentieth century affords
an opportunity to revisit the debate over
scientism in light of recent intellectual
trends. Postmodernism, for example is characterized
by its rejection of modern science, classical
reason, and Judeo-Christian faith. Any claim
of universality, according to the postmodern
mind, whether classical, Christian, or modern,
has dangerous implications. In fact, such
horrific events of the twentieth century
as mass murder stem from joining moral universalism
and modern science. Hence, some are tempted
to embrace the postmodern rejection of rationally
and scientifically derived universal moral
standards.
Voegelin’s thought avoids the extremes of
both postmodern relativism and modern scientism
and provides a penetrating source for understanding
the historical and theoretical development
of scientism (which he usually calls positivism).
He links it to a range of thinkers: Hobbes,
Hegel, Marx, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte,
and Bakunin. Such historical examples make
the dangers of positivism clearer. Voegelin’s
work is itself a response to the modern desire
to be "scientific" and an attempt
to restore political science to its classical
roots. His arguments are grounded in human
experiences rather than the authority of
reified traditions, dogmas, or doctrines.
And because he offers a more complete understanding
of knowledge and truth than does positivism,
he establishes a philosophical foundation
for a universal reality that humans experience
through participation. Consequently, he presents
a rich and penetrating historical analysis
of human experience with transcendent reality
that is a powerful antidote to postmodern
relativism.
Scientism is an ideology grounded on the
assumption that facts can be distinguished
from values. Facts, it is claimed, are derived
from the scientific method, whereas values
are the products of uncritical human constructions
(opinions) such as religion, tradition ,
or prejudice. The fact/value distinction
assumes that reality can be known by fragmenting
its parts from the universal whole. Once
separated from the whole and viewed as objects,
facts are classified as empirical knowledge.
According to the tenets of scientism, if
human reason is liberated from the constraints
of values and properly grounded in scientific
method, it is capable of discovering empirical
truths instrumental not only to material
progress, but to political and social advancement.
Such progress is therefore predicated on
the belief that the scientific method provides
a universal standard for the discovery of
truth. Scientifically derived truth, then,
provides a body of knowledge that forms the
foundation of political and social consensus.
All humans are assumed to be rational and
equally capable of both employing the scientific
method and understanding the knowledge that
results from its use.
In this scheme, conflict in human society
is caused by mere differences of opinion;
a confrontation of values rather than facts.
The scientific method eliminates such conflicts
because it provides a "scientific"
understanding of reality on which rational
individuals agree. Once the scientific method
is widely utilized, differences of opinion
, and the corresponding political and social
conflict that is caused by them, wither away.
Disagreement and conflict disappear in the
same way as they do among mathematicians
who present mathematical proofs. Given an
accepted body of mathematical principles
and methods, the proof either works or fails.
In the process of discovering mathematical
truth, there is no place for opinion or subjective
judgment. The structure of mathematical reality,
represented by its principles and laws. is
fixed. Erroneous application of principle
is possible, but that is not the same as
an opinion that causes disagreement. Once
the truth or failure of the proof is established,
there is no legitimate basis for disagreement.
Although the methodological approach may
be appropriate for mathematics and the mathematical
sciences, its application to the human sciences
has been the subject of intense debate.
Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Rene Descartes
influenced the early development of positivism
in important ways. Bacon advocated the scientific
method as the foundation for a new civilization.
Proper use of the scientific method would
purge the mind of personal unscientific influences
and lead to the acquisition of knowledge.
Bacon provided much of the theoretical foundation
for the scientific revolution. Its social
and political implications, while recognized
by Bacon, were more explicitly developed
by Hobbes and such later positivists as Saint-Simon
and Auguste Comte. The common ideological
thread of the positivist movement is belief
that the scientific method will lead to human
domination of nature and that subsequent
social, political, and economic transformation
is inevitable.
Yet the historical development of positivism
was more complex. As developing positivism
fueled industrialization, material progress
occurred, but the anticipated social and
moral improvement was illusive. A key cause
of the lack of moral progress was illusive.
A key cause of the lack of moral progress
was positivism’s undermining of Judeo-Christian
moral consciousness. That the rational-scientific
approach of the early positivists displaced
Christianity in public life is hardly surprising,
for the incompatibility of positivism and
Christianity is apparent. The metaphysical
elements of Christianity that pint toward
the existence of a transcendent reality cannot
be reconciled with the immanentist methods
or the principles of positivism. And the
destructiveness of positivism to the existing
social order was heightened through its emergence
at a time when the engendering experiences
of Christian faith were losing their cultural
strength. As a result, Western society became
vulnerable to the emerging modern ideologies
and in particular could not withstand Newtonian
materialism. Voegelin explains, for example,
the effect of the publication in 1687 of
Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematica.
To a spiritually feeble and confused generation,
this event transformed the universe into
a huge machinery of dead matter, running
its course by the inexorable laws of Newton’s
mechanics. The earth was in insignificant
corner in this vast machinery, and the human
self was a still more insignificant atom
in this corner. Christian faith in metaphysical
reality—the unseen realm of life—lost its
vitality under the pressure of Newtonian
materialism. Consequently, the development
of positivism undermined the philosophical
foundations of Christian truth.
According to Voegelin, Christianity was displaced
in two phases: "despiritualization"
and "respiritualization." Once
positivism destroyed Judeo-Christian consciousness,
individuals where open "to respiritualization
from non-Christian sources" that included
such radical political ideologies as nationalism,
humanitarianism, biologism, and psychologism.
If the early positivists removed spiritual
matters from science, their intellectual
heirs filled the spiritual void with immanentizing
political religions. Saint-Simon and Comte
filled the spiritual void with a new intramundane
religion of humanity in which they assume
the role of priest, prophet, pope, and god-incarnate.
These religious positivists pushed the Western
crisis to a new level of spiritual deformation.
Voegelin concisely explains the displacement
of Christianity by modern political ideologies
as language symbols separated form their
experiential roots. Rationalism, he wrote:
destroys the transcendental meanings of symbols
taken from the world of the senses. In the
course of this de-divinization (Entg: otterung)
of the world, sensual symbols have lost their
transparency for transcendental reality;
they have become opaque and are no longer
revelatory of the immersion of the finite
world in the transcendent.
Christian symbols became opaque because "the
active center of intellectual life"
shifted "to the plane of our knowledge
of the external world." Consequently,
the symbols of transcendent reality lost
their relevance or judged by utilitarian
criteria, were not considered to express
truth about reality. Once Christianity lost
its authoritative and unifying place in Western
civilization, the spiritual void could be
filled by pseudo-religions of modern ideology.
Viewed in this historical and philosophical
context, scientism is a deformation of reality
and part of a larger historical movement
that contributed to the loss of transcendental
consciousness. It is a major part of the
disorder of the modern age and not a means
to restore the West. Voegelin identifies
the eighteenth century, the Age of Enlightenment,
as the context in which scientism must be
understood. Three attributes of the Enlightenment
are particularly important: "a denial
of cognitive value to spiritual experiences,
the atrophy of Christian transcendental experiences,"
and the attempt "to enthrone the Newtonian
method of science as the only valid method
of arriving at truth." What makes scientism
so dangerous, Voegelin claims is the fusion
of two modern assumptions: that the methodology
of the mathematizing sciences is inherently
superior to all others and that the success
of the natural sciences can be duplicated
by other areas of science if such methodology
is employed; and, more dangerously, that
the methods of the natural sciences are the
standards for theoretical relevance in all
areas of science. The combination of these
assumptions lead to the belief that:
a study of reality could qualify as scientific
only if it used the methods of the natural
sciences, that problems couched in other
terms were illusionary problems, that in
particular metaphysical questions which do
not admit of answers by the methods of the
sciences of phenomena should not be asked,
that realms of being which are not accessible
to exploration by the model methods were
irrelevant, and, in the extreme, that such
realms of being did not exist.
While scientism is open to truth and the
existence of an objective material reality,
it is closed to the spiritual reality of
the inner life as experienced through participation
in transcendence and expressed symbolically
through myth, revelation, history, or philosophy.
While such positivists as Comte included
spiritual matters in their work, this spirituality
is not transcendent but secular-immanent—a
pseudo-spirituality. As Voegelin explains:
"The horizon of man is strictly walled
in by the facts and laws of the phenomena.
. . . If god exist, they certainly are not
permitted to participate in history or society."
Comte attempts to eliminate transcendent
reality from human consciousness when he
"declares as illegitimate all questions
that cannot be answered by the sciences of
the phenomena." In this aspect of positivism
there is an existential unwillingness to
engage in the search for transcendent reality.
Voegelin call this aversion to philosophy
"logophobia" (fear and hatred of
philosophy). The political and social consequences
of positivist logophobia include the destruction
of human consciousness of the Agathon (the
Good), which in turn severs any connection
between the order of the soul and the order
of the political community. In short, politics
loses it transcendent foundation. Voegelin
recognizes scientism as a primary obstacle
to the restoration of Western civilization.
In The New Science of Politics he analyzes
modern positivism to demonstrate its fallacious
assumptions and contrasts it to Aristotle’s
episteme politike. Aristotle’s political
science examines symbols as they occur in
reality—a benchmark of the Aristotelian procedure.
All societies create symbols to express their
place in the larger order of reality. "Elaborate
symbolism" is used to express the meaning
of society that includes its place in history
and the larger reality
(cosmos). Such self-interpretation provides
humans with a sense of the abiding and permanent
features of life that form the basis for
a just social and political order. It is
precisely these experiences with self-interpretative
symbols that articulate experience with transcendent
reality that modern positivism attempts to
exclude from scientific discovery. Because
the symbolism takes the form of rite, myth,
and theory and its content is metaphysical
experience, it fails to meet the positivist
definition of scientific fact. Consequently,
what Voegelin considers "an integral
part of reality" isn’t real at all in
the eyes of the positivist. Yet as he explains,
"when political science begins, it does
not begin with a tabula rasa on which it
can inscribe its concepts; it will inevitably
start form the rich body of self-interpretation
of a society and proceed by critical clarification
of socially pre-existent symbols. Voegelin’s
creation of a new science of politics is
meant to recover human experience as metaphysical
reality, to establish the process of this
recovery as scientific, and to restore human
consciousness of metaphysical reality.
The awareness of a divine presence in human
consciousness, differentiated by Plato and
Aristotle as nous is akin to right reason
or the ability to understand truth. Nous,
therefore, aids in this effort to express
truths about nonmaterial reality. Human understanding
of truth requires the participation of the
divine in the process of knowing. Nous is
not a tangible object in the external world
and, therefore, the ideology of scientism
declares that it is not part of reality.
For Voegelin, however, it is real because
it is experienced. Symbols such as "nous’
are articulations of experience with transcendence
that can be discovered. Acceptance of Voegelin’s
argument about science and the scientific
validity of such symbols as nous depends
on a certain openness to the transcendent
reality he discusses. Scientism is incompatible
with Voegelin’s philosophical approach because
the former begins with closure to transcendent
reality; scientism refuses to engage in the
philosophical search for higher truth. Consequently,
open discussion is impossible with positivist
ideologues because they cannot transcend
their ideological dogmas; they are unwilling
to put aside the obstacle to open discussion,
i. e., the propositions of scientism. Rational
debate is impossible among true ideologues
because the ideological dogmas prevent open
discussion.
Voegelin’s new science of politics enables
him to rediscover human experience with a
transcendence that has become opaque in the
modern world because of such gnostic political
ideologies as scientism, Marxism, and National
Socialism. Restoration requires that gnostic
ideologies be seen for what they are and
that souls closed as a result of their influences
be opened by the renewal of experiences with
and insights about transcendence. This cannot
occur unless a consciousness of transcendent
principles exists. Yet restoration is necessary,
Voegelin points out, because of the destruction
of science by positivism in the second half
of the nineteenth century. Positivism has
contributed to the Western crisis because
it determines theoretical relevance based
on method rather than choosing methods based
on the search for truth. Voegelin considers
this a perversion of the meaning of science.
Properly understood, "science is a search
for truth concerning the nature of the various
realms of being .. . . Facts are relevant
in so far as their knowledge contributes
to the study of essence, while methods are
adequate in so far as they can be effectively
used as a means for this end. Different objects
require different methods." When method
is elevated to become the ultimate standard
for truth, the search for truth is subordinated
to the particular methods used in the discovery
of reality. Voegelin argues that if "the
use of a method is made the criterion of
science, then the meaning of science as a
truthful account of the structure of reality,
as the theoretical orientation of man in
his world, and as the great instrument for
man’s understanding of his own position in
the universe is lost." Because scientism
is responsible for the loss of transcendental
consciousness and the destruction of science
as the search for truth, it cannot be a source
for the restoration of science or the recovery
of the Western social and political order.
Returning to the problem of scientism and
postmodernism: it makes no sense to use scientism
as an intellectual counterweight to postmodernism.
In their common manifestations they are two
variations of the modern secular mind; they
both define themselves by rejecting transcendent
reality. In fact, acceptance of the principles
of scientism does not preclude subjectivism
in matter regarding the transcendent reality.
In rejecting the existence of transcendent
truth, scientism and postmodernism occupy
the same ideological ground. Even if scientism
is accepted as true by postmodern subjectivists,
what has been accomplished? The ideological
presuppositions and dogmas of scientism are
based on a misunderstanding of reality and
truth. Acceptance of these dogmas perverts
science and destroys transcendental consciousness.
That reality can be only material or quantifiable
or that only the scientific method can discover
truth is simply contrary to historical experience
and philosophical insight. In sum, positivism
is an impediment to the philosophical search
for the truth of metaphysical reality.
The restoration of truth and acceptance of
transcendent reality cannot be accomplished
by engaging in ideological warfare. Dogmatic
battles between ideologues who assert propositions
as evidence of the truth of their ideology
will not reestablish consciousness of transcendence.
More philosophically-minded individuals will
recognize that the preconditions for rational
debate include the acceptance of human experience
and transcendence. "Questions of social
order can be discussed rationally only if
the whole concept of the order of human existence,
of which the social order forms a part, is
viewed in its entirety and right back to
its transcendental origin." The failure
to accept this condition is precisely the
logophobia that Voegelin understood to have
corrupted the modern world.
The work of thinkers such as Voegelin has
helped to restore interest in the transcendent
ground of politics and science. Such renewed
interest is an indication that scientism
may be losing its vitality. At the very least,
its core assumptions are being seriously
questioned. While scientism continues to
manifest itself in ways that endanger the
dignity of human life, there is hope Voegelin’s
work will give pause to those who are inclined
to let modern science progress in an ethically
unfettered manner. Moreover, his work serves
as a cautionary note to those who are tempted
to invoke the tradition of scientism as a
remedy for postmodern subjectivism.
Dr. Michael P. Federici Email: mfederici@mercyhurst.edu
Dr. Michael P. Federici is an associate professor
of political science at Mercyhurst College
in Erie, PA where he has taught American
politics and political theory for 10 years.
He has also taught at Dabney Lancaster College
in Virginia and Concord College in West Virginia.
He received his doctoral degree in politics
from Catholic University in Washington, D.
C. in 1990, his master of arts from Catholic
University in 1985, and he received his bachelor
of science in economics from Elizabethtown
College in Pennsylvania in 1983.
Dr. Federici is author of The Challenge of
Populism, published by Praeger in 1991. He
has also authored several articles and book
reviews on various topics. His recent book,
Eric Voegelin: The Restoration of Order,
was published in July 2002 by the Intercollegiate
Studies Institute Press.
In August 2002 Dr. Federici presented a paper
titled, "Irving Babbitt and the Ethical
Foundations of Cultural Relations,"
at a confrence in China. The conference was
held in Nanjing, China August 15-18. It was
the seventh Triennial Congress of the Chinese
Comparative Literature Association.
Dr. Federici is the co-director of the Center
for Constitutional Studies at the National
Humanities Institute in Washington, D. C.
He is co-editor and co-author of NHI's "Who
We Are" project, a history of the American
Constitution. The first phase of the project
was completed in December 2001 as a website
that can be accessed at www. nhinet. org.
Dr. Federici is a former distinguished speaker
for the Pennsylvania Humanities Council.
He is also a speaker for "We the People"
a program created by Congress in 1987 under
the Commission of the Bicentennial of the
United States Constitution. He provides political
analysis for WJET and WICU on a range of
topics dealing with American politics.
Dr. Federici was born and raised in Denville,
N. J.. He now lives in Erie, PA., with his
wife, Frances and their two daughters Elizabeth,
6 years old and Amy, 2 years old.
Sample Syllabi: POLI 221-01 Constitutional
Law (Adobe PDF), POLI 400-01 Political Theory
(Adobe PDF)
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Evans Experientialism 
