Evans Experientialism              Evans Experientialism
SEARCH THE WHOLE SITE?SEARCHCLICK THE SEARCH BUTTON

The Academy Library

The Athenaeum Library

The Experientialist Library

                  Here  Taurorhupos speaks:

"If a crow did not display any of the so-called 'essential properties' of crow-hood then it wouldn't exist - either as a crow or anything else, for the so-called 'essential properties' of crow-hood is/are, or result in, or are contemporaneous with - being a crow. The conundrum buried in the sentence: 'Can a crow display none of the essential properties of crow-hood and still be called a crow?' is that in order to either to display actively, or inadvertently, or as the result of an unmediated natural process, the essential properties of crow-hood, it would have to exist - in spite of the fact that it didn't - or rather couldn't. But even that is a riddle within a conundrum, for in order to: "not do," or "be incapable" of "not doing" something, it would also have to exist - as a crow.

This comment and analysis my dear Eutrapelia is based upon my belief that the total essential properties of an entity - IS the entity. We are our modalities... We are what we are... or as Monophthalmos the spinach-eating sailor says: "I am what I am."

Eutrapelia:
"If that is your position - i. e., that if in the sentence: 'We are what we are,' the first 'are' is taken to be the existential, and the second: 'are' is taken to be the attributant of the sum of its existential modalities or essences, then how far is it into, or at what stage in the modalic 'stripping-process' of a crow do we reach an ontological situation when a crow cannot any longer be described as a crow? In other words, When is a crow not a crow?"


Taurorhupos
The only stage when a crow can be un-crowish or 'not a crow' is when it is dead and its body has been destroyed. The fact is my pretty Eutrapelia that the dead body of a crow is still referred to as: "'a crow which is dead.'

If we surgically removed one by one certain existential modalic bodily features of a crow, with the concomitant effect upon the performative modalities and existential states of the bird, the diminishing mereological remains would still be thought of and described [with existential modalic qualifiers] as 'a crow.'

First we remove its beak, and thus the modality of pecking, but it is still a crow that can't peck, if we then remove its voice-box it remains a crow that can't crow, if we remove its legs - it is still a crow that cannot walk, if we remove its stomach - it is a crow that can't digest food - if we remove its feathers it is a featherless crow - if we remove its eyes
- it is a blind crow - if we remove its wings - it is a flightless crow... if we...


Eutrapelia:
Hold on! Hold on bold Taurorhupos! We now have a peckless, voiceless, legless, stomacheless, flightless, featherless blind crow - are you saying the the body and head that remain is a crow?

Taurorhupos:
Yes I am dear Eutrapelia, because if I asked you to take what remained out into the agora and put it out of its misery or give it to some starveling I would say: "Eutrapelia, will you please put down your weaving-work and take this thing out and destroy it?" and you would reply: "What is it Taurorhupos?" and I would reply, "It's a poor bird that's been cut up." and you would say: "What kind of bird is it Taurorhupos?" and I would reply "A crow."