JUD EVANS
Copyright © aug. 2008 Jud Evans. Permission
granted to distribute in any medium, commercial
or non-commercial, provided author attribution
and copyright notices remain intact.
With the help of my three young boys who
are on school holidays at the moment, I have
been working hard on the removal of twenty-years
of growth of a mixture of Russian vine, ivy,
and honeysuckle from the roof of my garage.
A hell of a job, but an interesting opportunity
to observe the vegetative domain of nature’s
fight for 'the survival of the fittest.'
Sometimes, opportunistically, to gain advantage,
a species will wind itself around another
of its own parental furcates, woody siblings
or bifurcated offshoots for support, but
never in a detrimental way that eliminates
its own supporting siamese connective branch.
It seems that 'the will to thrive,' the 'life-force,'
'the conatus' as (Leibniz and Mad Madge [Margaret
Cavendish] called it) is ruthless, but not
eliminative in seeking advantage over the
variegated parts of its own holism.
Sitting there, my hands aching with the constant
cutting of the woody fibres caused me to
muse upon the possibility that perhaps all
living organisms whose component parts are
thought to exist in an apparent holistic
balance of mutual dependency, in fact exist
in a kind of beneficially induced contestation.
Could there be a rivalry for nutriments between
the various parts of plants and the organs
and body-parts of human beings, and other
animals, which is 'ruthless,' but by a mechanism
of inbuilt genetic compromise falls short
of initiating a familial necrosis at the
first sign of the mutual extinction of the
macro unity and diverts part of the nutritional
flow to weaker areas of the assemblage of
parts?
Is all biological life a compromise or a
successful existential equilibrium between
an allopoiesistic process, whereby a system
is concerned with producing something other
than the system itself? For example is an
individual branch, an individuate hand, a
liver or a brain primarily concerned with
its own respective requirements - in contrast
to an autopoiesistic process, which is characterised
as a self-governing and self-maintaining
unity which contains subservient, component-producing
processes genetically dedicated to the greater
holism?
Such a new 'symbio-poiesistic theory' (a
neologism I have coined, for I have never
heard such ideas expressed elsewhere) would
add further interesting ontological dimensions
to modern concepts of autopoiesis and allapoiesis.
The term symbiosis has been applied to a wide range of biological
interactions. The symbiotic relationship
may be categorised as being mutualistic,
parasitic, or commensal in nature.
A cell,
an organism, and perhaps a corporation
are
examples of autopoietic systems - the
process
whereby an organisation produces itself,
but perhaps organisations are in fact
disguised
symbiotic relationships?
Is it possible that plants can communicate?
If so, is this communication species-specific
and is this communication observed in and
confined to within the plant organism? According
to Günther Witzany
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Among plants, communication is observed within
the plant organism, i. e. within plant cells
and between plant cells, between plants of
the same or related species, and between
plants and non-plant organisms, especially
in the rootzone. Plant roots communicate
in parallel with rhizobia bacteria, with
fungi and with insects in the soil. This
parallel sign-mediated interactions which
are governed by syntactic, pragmatic and
semantic rules are possible because of the
decentralized "nervous system"
of plants. As recent research shows 99% of
intraorganismic plant communication processes
are neuronal-like. Plants also communicate
via volatiles in the case of herbivory attack
behavior to warn neighboring plants. In parallel
they produce other volatiles which attract
parasites which attack these herbivores.
In Stress situations plants can overwrite
the genetic code they inherited from their
parents and revert to that of their grand-
or great-grandparents.
[1] (Witzany. 2006. pp.169-178)
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Although a wart, a cancerous tumour,
a carbuncle
is undoubtably a part of the person
(note
the physicians attributive term 'your
cancer')
and does not 'belong' to somebody else
–
it is often characterised as being
invasively
'foreign' to the human bodily structure.
Is this because the relationship is
one of
a unilateral dependency on the part
of the
overtly 'selfish' cancer, rather than
a commensal
sharing of the nutritional blood supply
with
the host? This is evidenced by the
fact that unless the tumour has already metastasised,
the cancerous growth can be removed
without
the host body dying – yet the tumour
itself
is considered dead flesh as soon as
the surgeon
separates it from its venous host.
But a
human hand or leg can be surgically
separated
from the body. It too dies quite quickly
without a blood supply. It figures
therefore
that the contributive hand was as much
dependent
upon the host body as the 'defiantly'
non-contributive
'foreign' tumour.
How then, and in what way, are the
'normal'
cells within an organism to be legitimately
considered a 'property' of the body
and which
part of the body is to be considered
the
'proprietor' or seigniorial 'owner'
of the
organic and ontologically dependent
parasitic
mass? It can be argued that whilst
the hand
is parasitically dependent on the body
for
blood – it does make a contribution
to the
body in that it helps facilitate the
physical
existence of the host – whereas the
tumour
is a negative non-contributive presence.
But the cancer cells are not 'to blame'
–
they are simply a different variety
of 'guest
organism' from the 'healthy' cells.
Are cellular systems in fact disguised
symbiotic
relationships? Is cellular behaviour
a form
of inquilinism - using a second organism
for food and housing? Are human body
cells
epiphytic guests or 'nutritional pirates' that may waylay
and intercept substantial amounts of
mineral
and chemical nutrients that would otherwise
go to the host body?
An autopoietic organisation is an autonomous
and self-maintaining unity which contains
component-producing processes. The
constituents,
through their interaction, generate
recursively
the same network of processes which
produced
them. What I am musing about concerns
the
nature of the interaction between the
elements
which themselves form this network
of processes
which 'bring forth' the greater unity.
If,
for example we compare the finely tuned
balance
between the activities of individual
human
members of society we might perhaps
conclude
that selfishness and otherness are
just variants
of narcissism, namely a devils compact
of
sociopathy and co- dependency.
But perhaps what we call 'selfishness'
and
'narcissism' are no more than clumsy
or ill-concealed
manifestations of conatus, or evolutionary
altruism and people who are really
clever
and dedicated to selfishness, in that
they
realise the damaging or negative aspects
of overt self-interest, are simply
more careful
in concealing their apparent egocentricity
which is actually the drive to donate
the
benizon of their genes to future generations?
Scott and Seglow debate this point
in their
recent publication Altruism (2007) and in doing such supply this interesting
quotation from Sober 1998: 462 who writes:
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Evolutionary altruism can occur in organisms
that don't have minds: and evolutionary altruism
involves the donation of reproductive benefits.
Evolutionary altruism has to do with the
reproductive consequences of behaviour, not
with the proximate mechanisms (psychological
or otherwise) that guides that behavior. [2] (Scott and Seglow. p.40. 2007) |
What we must remember here is that there
is a big difference between one Russian
vine plant, or soldier-ant sacrificing itself
for the plantation or for the nest.
Here we are considering whether it is possible,
or indeed necessary, for one
PART of a vegetable unity to give way - or hold itself back from reaching a situation where it can distribute
its seeds to the environment. Such
sacrifice or selfcentredness would not be
made for some deserving OTHER - but for another part of its self.
Only a plant biologist could provide an authoritive
opinion as to whether a more virile, stronger
and successful branch of a plant has
a stronger physiological or chemical reproductive
potency and broadcasts seeds which are more
likely to hit the genetical reproductive jackpot
or that nature has pre-programmed the
winning branchlet to activate the seed distribution
and written the DNA script to instruct the
weaker one to take a reproductive back-seat.
Due to the inadequate nature of language
in describing the existential modality of
non-human entities there is much in this
essay which smacks of the pathetic fallacy which I hasten to disclaim.
Personification is an ontological
illusion that can be traced back to the early
Greeks who believed that the world of non-human
animate entitiies, vegetables and inanimate
objects is possessed of human feelings, volitions
and desires. It is a phenomenon which Frank
Olin Copley refers to as:
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'The essence of the pathetic fallacy, is
an illusion more or less real,
that the inanimate
world is possessed of human feeling.
Such
an illusion may take several
different forms,
the most common of which is the
everyday
experience of mankind that several
familiar
objects, books, ships, weapons
etc., seem
to have a life of their own which
is objectively
impossible but yet intensly real.
This phenonomen
which I have called 'The fallacy of natural subjectivity,' is scarcely poetic. Its chief importance
is its demonstration of the facility and
natural ease with which men take a subjective
rather than an objective view of the world
around them.' [3] (Copley. p. 194.1937.) |
I do not mean in human terms that some of
the more flourishing tendrils are more 'merciless'
or 'ruthless' than their fellow cirri in
their fight for access to sunlight and the
nutrients from the soil in the human sense
- but in the 'life-force' or 'conatic' sense
of the genetical script. As yet I have not
come across any examples where the more 'merciless'
tendrils, which often twist themselves around
their fellow-creepers, have strangled their
'relatives' to death.(like some humans occasionally
do.
They employ their own dead body-parts for
support and to gain purchase as a matter
of course, but I have found no evidence of
where they appear to have 'deliberately'
cut off the supply essential of nutrients
by squeezing the other branch in a tight
vegetative tourniquet - nor are there any
signs that the weaker frond fights back.
Could this be a form of vegetative altruism?
I think not, at least not in the human
sense, but if it is, it could only
be that the stronger branch stands more chance
of reaching sunlight and distributing
its seeds and that the weaker one concedes
the fact rather like a weak mountaineer realises
that he is not fit enough to reach the summit
and allows his climbing mate to push on to
the top.
This contemplation of a Russian vine raises
all kinds of interesting philosophical and
ontological questions. What are the implications
for generosity and selfishness? Is altruism
no more than a clever, self-serving device
to elicit individual and societal approval
based upon the anticipated future benefits
for the 'selfish gene?' Is 'morality' no
more than a holding device (a la Nietzsche)
to protect the weaker transcendentalist tendrils
from the self-assertive, agnostical, ruthless
briers of 'being?' Could religion,
which is ubiquitous throughout humanity,
be a mechanism to support the advantages
of mutuality by way of supporting the frailer
twiglets against the strong in the struggle
for genetical advantage. A strategy to support
the weak for the benefit of the whole?
But wait, so often in history the strong
have usurped the levers of religious power
and turned them against the weak for the
benefit of the enstrengthened strong? So
often the combined forces of monarchs' laws
reinforced with the Bishops' ex-cathedra
back-up is to the disadvantage of the weaker
members of society. In both world wars both
the Allied and German religious hierarchy
were urging war and blessing the combatants,
and Pope Pius was said to favour Mussolini
and the Nazis and to be less than helpful
towards the salvation of the Jews. The Reichskonkordat, of 1933, between Germany and the Holy See,
while thus a part of an overall Vatican policy,
was controversial from its beginning.
It took me three days to cut off all
the
foliage and throw it down to the ground,
but now I am faced with a huge tangled
pile
of vegetation. Weather permitting I
sit there
for hours with garden secetuers cutting
and
black-bagging it and then I drive to
the
local Refuse Dump and start again.
There
is no ingress for any kind of mechanised
collection of the mass (a dumper truck
or
whatever) for the heap is at the side
of
the garage behind a wall and not in
the access
drive
The (local authority) refuse dumps are highly
organised in Britain now. By law all the
various types of garbage - food, paper, bottles
and glass, bricks, cloth, stones and soil,
metal, plastic, TVs, white-goods, garden
vegetation, all have to be separated
by the depositor. Domestically, here in the
North at least, if you happen to leave the
lid of your bin or bins open outside your
home you are fined. People complained at
first when these laws were introduced, but
now it has been accepted and become part
of natural behaviour.
Anyway sitting here for hours cutting vine
is not a complete waste of time. I enjoy
physical work and I listen to music and MP3
files of philosophical interest - and anything
is a welcome break from the ineffable but
eminently eff - able Heidegger. ;-)
BTW. As an eliminativist, for purposes of
paraphrastic avoidance (adjectivally re-jigging
sentences to make ontological sense) I have
placed 'scare quotes' around most reifico-abstractions.
References:
[1] Witzany. Günther. Plant Communication from Biosemiotic Perspective.
Plant Signaling and Behavior. 2006. pp.169-178).
[2 ]Scott. Niall and Seglow. Jonathan. Altruism. 2007. p.40. Open University Press. Mc Graw
Hill Education. Mc Graw Hill House.
Shoppenhangers
Road, Maidenhead. Berks, England. SL6
2QL.
[3] Copley. Frank. Olin. The Pathetic Fallacy in Early Greek Poetry The American Journal of Philology, Vol.
58, No. 2 (1937), pp. 194-209.
The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
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