Progress is being made in the field of feedback and tactile sensors which allow a robot to sense their actions and adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is vital to enable robots to perform complex physical tasks that require some active control in response to the situation.Some scientists believe that robots will be able to approximate human-like intelligence in the first half of the 21st century. The cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener discussed the issue of robots replacing humans in fields of work in his book The human use of human beings (1950), in which he speculated that robots taking over human jobs may initially lead to growing unemployment and social turmoil, but that in the medium-term it might bring increased material wealth to people in most nations. Human perception and acceptance of robots has been considered and has led to the proposition of the Uncanny Valley in analyzing human feelings about robots.
                                                http://www.answers.com/topic/robot

After an initial definition of the meaning of qualia, the first section of this essay will address Churchland's pertinent observation that it would be irresponsible to ignore those who understandably insist that they experience pleasurable feelings and suffer pain.. Any serious exploration of qualia would be equally negligent if it refused to acknowledge those who claim that the actual qualia or feelings do not exist, and that only the affected painful areas of the human body and the brain which registers such phenomena. exists. An ironist or a harassed family practitioner might correctly point out that whichever theory regarding the origin and ontological analysis of such experiences is correct - we all suffer pain or enjoy pleasure despite what anybody thinks. I will then move on to address the question directly and consider if 'qualia' might be experienced by advanced androids, and in line with Gwaltney's suggestion, employ humanoid artificial intelligence as a device to explore what the term 'human being' actually means and whether non-biologic matter could feel pain. Consideration will be given to how a robotic sensory system might be engendered, incorporated and made operative. [2. Gwaltney. 32.] A brief outline of my own position will be provided in the conclusion.

                                                  DEFINITION OF QUALIA.
The properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable. The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind. [3. classes. colgate. edu]

                                                   QUALIA DOES IT EXIST?
What follows has been inspired by Nagel's bat-question in which he asks if there is: 'something it is like' to be that animal organism?' [4. Nagel 1974.] Whether these epistemically intractable phenomena exist as abstruse mentalisations or are explicable conditions of the tangible flesh to be experienced by humans, bats or any other organically constituted being, is a fascinating speculation based upon incomplete evidence and supposition. We now consider the same question concerning inorganically composed robots. Such an essay in the consideration of whether a non-biologic entity could feel pain, provides a portal through which we can examine the possibility of androidal feeling in particular and qualia in general.

     Alternative physicalist views to the historical Folk Philosophy version can be described briefly as:

     Eliminative Materialism depicts what is called 'qualia' in terms of the existential modalic states of the experiencer and is essentially descriptively adjectival - and identifies the participant in the experiential feeling, the sensing human, the suffering bat, or the rusting robot, etc., as that which really exists, rather than that which accounts for 'qualia' in terms of metaphysical properties. In an ontological nutshell, does a human nociceptive system ( a reflex caused by or in response to pain) register a 'pain in the toe,' or 'a painful toe?' Does an android's main processor chip feel 'an unpleasant feeling of compression ' within the innards of its plastic solar plexus' when it bumps into a table, or does it sense 'an unpleasantly compressed metal and plastic solar plexus?'

Frank Jackson (who describes himself as a 'Qualia freak,') wrote the following powerful paragraph:

      If we analyse the phrase ‘something it is like’ what does it mean? What are we being asked to describe? A hasty eliminativist answer would be to respond loftily that ‘qualia’ do not exist, and the *something that it is like' to feel qualia is nothing more than the human, bat or robot that exists in that state of feeling, and that the designatum ‘something,’ which is referred to by the linguistic expression – ‘‘something it is like’ does not refer to anything other than the entity which feels the pain. Does pain-qualia continue to exist after analgesics have zapped the pain impulses before they reach the brain? How could a chemical kill, mask or eliminate something which didn't exist to be extinguished in the first place? Surely that which is chemically suppressed is the damaged toe tissue and the electro-chemical carrier-nerve cells which can be observed microscopically in vivo as they facilitate the communication of the action potential that notify the local damage for registration in the central nervous system which is the brain? From a folk psychology point of view, if pain does exist, does it retire into a 'lurking mode' whilst there are sufficient aspirin or morphine chemicals present to temporarily suppress it 'out of existence' ontologically? Are we not entitled to ask ourselves if it is the human tissue damage-control system and the nervous pipelines which are being chemically inhibited, rather than some modern-day metaphysical phlogiston which has been pro tempore anaesthetised?

     Many find such a physicalist response counter-intuitive. Qualia they claim are the manifestations of experiential properties of sensations, feelings - more controversially, thoughts and desires as well. Such uncomprehending dualists often seem to think that the physicalist denier of the existence of qualia either meanspiritedly disbelieves that they experience such pain or pleasure, They seem not to realise that the eliminativist is not accusing them of malingering, but simply agreeing with them, and where appropriate sympathising with their discomfort, and rejoicing in their pleasure, but is merely pointing out that it is the painful toe that exists - and not the toe-pain.

Bearing this in mind, if knowing you have an aching tooth I ask:

‘What is it like to be you with toothache, and is there something it is like?’ I shouldn't be surprised if you answer irritably with the logical tautology:

‘Being me is like being me, and 'something it is like,' is if you imagine what it is like being like me with an aching tooth.'

     But enough of this ontological quibbling. Members of both sides of the discussion undergo painful experiences and have their own definition of qualia and feeling. It is time to turn to the thing that really intrigues us - the question of whether humanoids can experience qualia.

     Arguing here against the 'Identity theory of mind' Patricia Churchland has this to say:

    And now we turn to robots.

                                      QUALIA, ROBOTS AND SCIENCE FICTION.

For me the most outstanding, interesting and thoughtful account of what it could feel like to be an android is Asimov's 'Bicentennial Man.' Here we enjoy a first person narrative which movingly documents the transition from a crude household robot to a fully recognised and acknowledged human being. The robot Andrew wishes to become a human being; which in effect means with the help of human technology and robotic surgeons operating that technology he gradually upgrades his robotic systemic version of qualia to that of a human's experiential states and modalities. Struggling for the right to enjoy human qualia is his ultimate goal and is the whole point of the story. [Asimov 23]

     A nice comparison with the Asimov's would-be human robot is Dennet's tale of the human disembodied brain in the bath, and its robotically controlled underground android-like -like headless body working on a hazardous government recovery project. Here the severed and rewired brain Yorick experiences the bodily qualia which the biological underground fleshy automaton Hamlet undergoes during the dangerous physical exposure which engenders the pain. [8. Dennett 236]

     To respond to the question yet again - it is my belief that an ability and propensity to experience 'feeling' will be undergone by imitative, experiential, feeling androids, and it will come about much quicker than we think. The science of robotics and artificial intelligence has advanced to a stage where such sophisticated artificially equivalent mass-produced versions of human receptors, microprocessors, sensors and inorganic neural pathways are within our grasp. It is my belief that there will be such a time when such devices can be installed into such entities in order to mimic the body's own conveyance mechanisms within nerves - known as axonal transport, or the way that human brains consciously computationally ideate.


     Will robots be developed which artificially simulate the way in which our sensing elements mediate and control intrinsic or extrinsically introduced reactive chemical antibodies to combat invasive chemical agents and pathogens that act on our tissue sensing-elements with the resultant physiological response? I believe that they will. I am convinced that it will come about that we will create robots with the non-biological equivalent of the networked human brain. It is a tall order, for the human brain comprises of 100 billion neurons and 100 to 500 trillion synapses on average with 7,000 synaptic connections to other neurons and according to a recent publication, the number of categorisation of random spatio-temporal patterns that a neuron can implement is several times larger than the number of its synapses. [9. Gütig.-Sompolinsky. 2006] I feel confident that human ingenuity will rise to the occasion in this respect and super-robotic androids almost indistinguishable from human beings will be a commonplace before the end of this century

     As to what a robotic form of qualia might be like and what technical equipment and methodology would be necessary to kit out an android with a sensorial system, I envisage a highly elaborate systema nervosum of advanced microprocessors, receptors, servomechanisms, thermostats, baroreceptors, nipple-shaped electronic protuberances or villi - microscopic finger-like projections - to detect taste, touch, or smell all of which wired to the robotic equivalent of axonal pathways to transport the data to a super-powerful electronic brain which would stimulate most of the unit's behaviour as a result of the detection of existential modalic divergences from an established factory default norm or the latest scan of an acceptable system-state.

     And the function of qualia feedback? The central brain would need to detect errors in the sensory performance of the components and initiate any necessary re-routing adjustments to maintain the integrity of the system.. The sensorial detection schema would incorporate a 'self-learning' facility with regard to these errors and a 'data- awareness mode. In this way what we call 'qualia feedback' will constitute a necessary provider and precondition for existential continuance and it is THIS existential monitor that is actually referred to when we employ the term; 'qualia'.

                                                             Conclusion.

Are we to believe then that there IS 'something that it is 'like' for a human to experience toothache or smell a rose? Or is that 'something' the sufferer himself or another flesh and blood rose-smelling or tooth-ache suffering human 'other,' who, sharing many or most of the other existential modalities of the tooth-ache sufferer, is able to comprehend something of what it feels like to exist as the tooth-ache sufferer is existing at that moment, because he or she has experienced a painful jaw at some previous time?

     Will it be physically possible, desirable or ontologically feasible for humans to design or allow a robot ever to experience the joy of smelling a rose or feeling toothache? One might ask why it is necessary for robots to be incorporated with this facility? If a robot were to employed in a commercial horticultural capacity as a rose-grower then it might be a sensible thing to fit him out with such a sensor-pack? But what is to be gained otherwise? I realise that I am entering into the field of anthropocentric ethics here and am in danger of being accused of speciesism, which whilst is a prime subject for another fascinating essay, is not really the subject which I have been called upon to address so I will change the subject and consider Mary for a change.

Mary in her black and white room

Jackson's famous 'thought experiment' goes something like this: There is a girl called Mary who is a brilliant scientist and she is confined to a room completely painted and furnished down to the last detail in black and those are the only colours she gets to see - just plain old boring black, white, and shades of grey. Mary studies the neurophysiology of vision. After some time she assimilates all the information about what goes on in us when we see objects which are red. However Mary does not know all there is to know about our experiences or qualia. When she finally leaves the room, and sees a ripe tomato for the first time, there is something new she will learn about our experiences. She will learn what it is like to see red. This shows that there is more to know about our experiences than is captured by the physical information which Mary had when she was still in the room. So, the conclusion is that the physical information must not be all the information.

      Alas, poor Mary. Are we are expected to believe that the unfortunate girl has demurely averted her bloodshot eyes from her own genitals for a decennia and never seen the colour of her own red menstrual blood  or the redness of a boil after being deprived of natural sunlight for so long doing all that intensive reading about the techicalities of the human aprehension of colour she is supposed to have done? But I will ignore the negatives and play around with the constructive ideas. Dennet says 'qualia' is a confused notion, and that experience does not have the properties designated by it and that it is best to eliminate it. [10. [Drakon. 2000 quoting Dennet. 1988]

     I agree with Dennet. For me it is question of rejecting the ontological suggestions offered by Folk Psychology and the useful fiction that there is a non-physical realm where 'pain' exists. I accept the physical reality of our personal and private suffering from inflictions which painful body-parts involves. Pain and pleasure are very much an individual experiences which can only be very inadequately reported and are heavily influenced by idiosyncratic variables of an biological, environmental, cultural, cognitive, affectional nature.

   I will end by again addressing the essay question. If by using the term 'qualia' the question is positing the Folk Psychology version of 'qualia' then my answer is no. If the question is an 'open question' in the sense that an interpretation of the word ‘qualia’ can be other than the historical version then I would answer yes. Whichever the case though - the existential states which we label 'feelings' and qualia' are an essential feature of our ability to exist as humans and to survive.

     Lastly, I find the philosophy of science-fiction an excellent entrée to a comprehensive exploration of such phenomena and philosophical questioning in general. The profound questions raised in this genre encapsulate all of the questions which thinkers have grappled with since man first began to wonder about himself and the contents of the cosmos in which he found himself.

                                                            REFERENCES

1. Churchland. Paul. ‘Behaviourism, Materialism and Functionalism.’ Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press. 1984. P. 369 in ‘Reason and Responsibility 2002. Joel Fenberg/Russ Shaferman [eds.] Wadsworth
2. Gwaltney, Marilyn. 'Androids as a Device for Reflection on Personhood.' Retrofitting Blade Runner: Issues in Ridley Scott's Blade Runner and Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Judith B. Kerman, ed. Bowling Green, OH: Popular Press, 1991. p. 32.
3. http://classes.colgate.edu/pgregory/phil341/..%5Cglossary.html [accessed 03.03.2000.]
4. Nagel. Thomas. ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ Philosophical Review 83, No. 4. 1974. p. 209
5. Jackson. Frank. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 127-36.]
6. Churchland. Patricia. ‘Neurophilosophy.’ MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass. Eleventh printing 2000. p. 318.
7. Asimov. Isaac. ‘Bicentennial Man.’ p. 23.
8. Dennett. Daniel. 'Brainstorms.' Bradford Books 1978. MIT Press. p. 234. 9.
9. Gütig. Robert and Sompolinsky. Haim. ‘The Tempotron: A Neuron that Learns Spike Timing–Based Decisions.’ Nature Neuroscience 9, 420 - 428 (2006) Published online: 12 February 2006.
10. Drakon. Derek. ‘Philosophical Psychology.’ Routledge, Vol 13, Number 4 / Dec. 1, 2000 P. 505.
11. Coghill,. Robert C. Brain Mechanisms of Pain: Overview. P. 234.