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DOES PURE OR SIMPLE "PRESENCE"
"BEING" OR "EXISTENCE"
EXIST?
JUD EVANS
|
INTRODUCTION
Question: Does Simple or Pure Presence Exist?
.
Answer: No. Not at all. Only that which
is present exists.
The presence of that which is present does
not exist.
Question: Does Existence or Being exist?
Answer: No. Not at all. Only that which exists
exists.
The existence of that which exists does not
exist.
The so-called presence, existence or being of that
which is what it is does not exist.
Question: Does nuclear fission exist?
Answer: No. Not at all. Only
the energised, fissionable material
itself exists.
What exists is splittable, nuclear reactive
material in which a massive nucleus
separates into smaller energetic
nuclei which are simultaneously
released.
|
THE ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF ACTION AND CHANGE ARE A MEDIEVAL MYTHS
 |
Peter tries the soap that Tinkerbell
gave him to
stick his shadow back on - but
it does not work. |
The pseudo " subject of study"
called Ontology is claimed by transcendentalists both religious,
agnostic and atheistic to be the metaphysical
study of the nature of "being"
and "existence." (Yes, atheists
and agnostics can be just as dualistically
imprinted in childhood as religionists with
what the Nazi philosopher Heidegger notoriously
called "the ontological difference.")
If the people involved in such tool-foolery
are academics, then they are not only wasting
their time and their student's, but more
seriously, they are squandering the tax-payers'
money, for neither /presence/ nor /being/
nor /existence/ exist - either to be
studied or ignored. For those who have faith
in such reificative wraiths -
let them step forward and provide convincing
evidence for their meretricious metaphysical
claims.
Only material corporeal entities exist and
are found in the world. Matter is a general term for the substance of which
all physical concreta consist. A Nobel Prize for contributions to science
awaits anyone who proves that non-material,
insubstantial enties exist as well as real
ones. And up to now nobody from the "Things that go bump-in-the-night" brigade have managed to convince anybody
at all to the satisfaction of the Nobel Prize Awards Committee.
| Typically, matter includes atoms and other
particles which have mass. A common way of
defining matter is as anything that has mass
and occupies volume. [1] (Mongillo 2007. p.30) |
A palpable object's so called reified
"presence" does not exist in addition to the
palbable object, whether that object be a meaty
human object or a church steeple. There
is no such thing as a mentalised spiritualised
doppelganger of a living human.
No gerundial abstraction called presence or absence or existence or being haunts its living or insentient counterpart
and tags along in a human's corporeal landlord's
wake like some spooky, spectral pal.
What I write is not some specious attack
on our beautiful English language -
but its many abusers - those that
Foucault depicts as being: “a caged
animal” caught in a prison of language.
[2] (Foucault. Appleby, Jacob, Hunt 1994)
Existence, presence, being, beauty, love,
energy, motion, dancing and stamp-collecting are not attached to material objects like Peter Pan's shadow
that Wendy kindly sewed back on after Nana
the Darling family dog bit
it off.
What can be found in the world is energised matter - material existents - moving objects.
What exist is thinking-meat like: lovers, dancers, stamp-collectors, together with the stamp albums and the stamps they stick in
them. The rest of the words in human vocabularies
and dictionaries are extremely important
symbols employed for communicating,
talking about and describing
the various existential modalities of
genuine denotata. Denotata are the existing (rather than
the imaginary) objects referred to by a word,
sign, or linguistic expression. or
that which is named by a word that selects
or denotes materio-spatial objects.
We also use such verbs, adjectives,
adverbs, definite/indefinite articles
and other words to comment
upon designata. Designata are much less strictly defined, for
they can also be used to
designate concepts that do not exist. The trouble is that many
folk continue to confuse their nominata with their designata.
1. We can define a denotatum (plural denotata) as: "An actual object referred to by a linguistic expression." 2. We can define a designatum (plural designata) as: "Any object or so-called object - whether existing
or not - that the linguistic expression labels.
Matergy is the modern term for energised matter. It is portmanteau word - a new word formed
by joining two other words (in this
case) "matter" and "energy"
and combining their dual, irrealist
meanings into that of a scientifically and
ontologically more appropriate matergic singularity.
A lot of people (not all) have great
difficulty in grasping what is going on here
- even when the underlying principle of abstract
nouns and gimcrack gerunds (a noun formed
from a verb) is explained in the most simple
manner.
Explanations encountered later in life
that revealing that no action of any kind exists in the cosmos and that only acting (causal) matergic objects exist is so novel and counter-intuitive,
that when someone is first exposed to eliminative
materialist ideas, it seems so illogical
that one wonders how anyone could have ever
conceived of it or been deceived by)
in the first place.
| EPIGENETIC LINGUISTIC CONDITIONING |
I define Epigenetic Linguistic Conditioning
as the neuro-linguistic imprinting of ontological
dualism in infancy, resulting in an acceptance
of abstract concepts as being real corporeal
entities. Such forms of ontologically bad
language are copied, encoded and internalised
from parents, family, peer groups and greater
society and are continually reinforced during
a child's growth to maturity. A dualistically
orientated lexicon and grammar is interiorised
in infancy in the form of an illogical reification
(concretisation) of abstraction.
Descriptive dualisms in the form of abstract
nouns (nominalisations lacking any nominata)
such as: presence, time, numbers, motion, love, etc. which have neither mass nor occupy
space are ontologically elevated to the status
of real entities which actually exist in
the world. Children are exposed to linguistically
inherited socialised ways of thinking and
speaking which mitigate against reality contactedness.
This acceptance of hypostasisation results
from an evolutionary imperative to conserve
resources for their own survival and provide
sufficient nourishment for their progeny.
Epigenetic Linguistic Conditioning enables
individuals and groups to overcome empathy
and alienate human competitor groups on the
basis of their physical appearance, colour,
religion, culture, social class, economic
position and behavioral differentiation.
| INFANTILE IMPRINTING AND INTERIORISATION |
We humans are animals and I believe the ontological
fallacy of dualism to have been sensorially
and linguistically internalised, incorporated
within ourselves and made subjective or personal
in early infancy via human imprintation in
the manner observed in other animals by Konrad
Lorenz.
Working with non-human animals - geese, Lorenz
rediscovered the principle of imprinting
(originally described by Douglas Spalding
in the 19th century) in the behaviour of
nidifugous birds. Judith K. Blackshaw the
celebrated author of Notes on Some Topics of Applied Animal Behaviour, a book designed to deliver information about
the behaviour of domestic and captive animals
writes in an article available at:
http://animalbehaviour. net/Imprinting. htm
|
"First described by Konrad Lorenz, imprinting
is said to occur when innate behaviours are
released in response to a learnt stimulus.
Most imprinting promotes survival of newborn
animals and shapes their future breeding
activities. Imprinting has a number of characteristics.
Characteristics of imprinting
1. Critical sensitive period
Imprinting occurs at a particular time (termed
the sensitive period) during early postnatal
life. For example, in anserine birds such
as ducks and geese, the time for imprinting
is 24-48 hours after hatching when the "following
response"is learnt. At this time a gosling
learns to follow his mother who is normally
the first large moving creature in his world.
In fact, of course, the visual stimulus that
he imprints on does not necessarily have
to be Mother Goose. In these species imprinting
can occur on any object within a certain
size range regardless of its colour or shape.
Movement helps to attract attention but is
by no means essential.
Although the dominant sense involved in imprinting
is sight, sound and olfaction are also involved.
In a variety of experiments, young chicks
and ducklings were imprinted on humans, wooden
blocks and classically even old gum boots.
They bonded with a single item and would
follow it wherever it went. Rather like Mary
and her little lamb, Konrad and his little
gosling were to go on to form a life long
association. Although Lorenz was the first
to record his observations in a scientific
manner, the essence of imprinting had long
been recognised. Indeed, Chinese peasants
have for centuries capitalised on the tendency
to imprint in making ducks more effective
in the control of snails that otherwise damage
rice crops. By imprinting ducklings onto
a special stick, the peasants can not only
take their brood out to the paddy fields
as required but, by planting the stick sequentially
in different parts of the plantation, they
can ensure that molluscs in all areas can
be subjected to predation.
Imprinting seems more important in precocial
species, in which the offspring are less
dependent on their mothers for food and warmth,
than in altricial species which often confine
their more vulnerable, and often hairless,
young to nests. This is why many horse breeders
are recognising the life-long benefits of
thorough handling of their foals during the
first 24 hours of life. Altricial neonates,
on the other hand, are unlikely or unable
to stray from their home base in the first
few days of life and therefore do not need
the same response. They learn similar lessons
rather later in life during what are called
"socialisation periods". These
apply when the animal's sensory, motor and
thermoregulatory systems are fully functional
and they learn to move away from their mother
and to interact with others of the same and
other species. The window of opportunity
for learning varies according on the species.
In dogs it is from 3-10 weeks and in cats
2-7 weeks, while in primates it is usually
6-12 months. Stimuli that the youngsters
of each species are exposed to during these
window periods will be accepted as being
"normal". We do well to exploit
this limited learning opportunity in our
companion animals.
2. Imprinting is irreversible:
The imprinted knowledge is retained for life.
Of all forms of learning, imprinting is the
least likely to be forgotten or unlearned.
3. Imprinting
establishes an individual animal's preference
for a certain species
Contrary to what one might predict to be
their genetic tendency, once they have imprinted,
animals will always prefer to follow the
learned stimulus rather than a member of
their own species. The following response
in ducks that have imprinted on humans means
that the ducks will preferentially follow
any human rather any duck.
4. Some behaviours are affected
by imprinting more than others
Not all behaviours are affected by imprinting.
Lorenz noted with some amusement that jackdaws
that had imprinted on him would court his
favour by presenting him with juicy fresh
earthworms and would even attempt to introduce
these into his ear-holes. However, when not
sexually aroused, these birds would happily
join other jackdaws in flight. In sexually
dimorphic species (in which the external
appearance of males and females differ),
sexual imprinting varies depending on whether
the youngster is male or female. So, while
a male mallard duckling will identify his
future mate by relating it to the appearance
of his mother (or attachment figure), the
same does not apply for a female. While falcons
imprinted on humans require a combination
of human and avian stimuli to elicit sexual
responses." [3] (Blackshaw. 1986.)
|
ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM
The Eliminative Determinist views all forms
of ontological dualism including mind-body, substance, property and religious
dualism as the result of human imprintation which
occurs initially within the (previously imprinted)
family unit. There are people who say that
such beliefs in the existence of incorporeal
entities are variants of the nature or nurture
argument and that some people are born with
a genetical make-up which renders them altogether
incapable of ever understanding that the
reifications in which they believe are the
result of childhood imprintation and that
like other animals the imprinted knowledge
is retained for life and that as Judith K
Blackmore writes of the animals she has studied,
of all forms of learning, imprinting is the
least likely to be forgotten or unlearned.
Could it be that there are some people who
are simply neuro-physiologically incapable
of dealing with the idea at all? One
encounters others who hold to similar opinions
that some are born with a gene that predisposes
them towards religious and transcendentalist
appetites rather than being imprinted to
believe such things as young people. Could
the condition be a bit of both?
Logically eliminative materialism is compellingly simple.
Only material entities exist. Thus a standing tree exists (is present
in a form we call "tree") and if
it falls it exists as a falling tree. When it lies on the ground it exists as
a fallen tree. It can be described as a fallen tree because it exists (or is present in the world)
in the existential modality or manner of
what in the English language we refer to
as: a fallen tree.
But beware! That is not to say that existential modality itself actually exists, for only the existent
tree, the human descriptor and the material
world and greater cosmos actually exist.
Because whilst it is falling a tree is described
as a falling tree is not because it has assumed, taken-on,
adopted or acquired the characteristics of
a Platonic-style abstract template of fallingness, for fallingness, and the falling of a tree does not exist as a separate entity. Only the standing, falling, or fallen tree really exists.
The reader who is perusing these words right
now exists - but his reading does not. If I travelled to wherever you
live and met the reading you, or the you who read, I would not meet up with your reading - I would meet the reader - you.
Humans refer to a falling tree as a falling tree because that is the way that we describe
the manner in which an object exists whilst
it is crashing down under the influence of gravitational force.
But the falling down (or the descent to ground
level) does not exist - only the descending
tree exists.
The seamless change by/of the tree from existing
as an upright tree to that of being present
as a horizontally prone tree is simply the
way that humans linguistically describe the
tree's existential spatial position -
but that does not mean that either uprightness, falling, lying horizontally
prone, or even the tree's existential spatial position itself actually exists. Only the changing
tree exists.
The useful religio-scientific fictions created
to describe and account for the behaviour
of objects when they impinge or are impinged
upon by other objects and the powerful effects
or influences or intensity that produces
a change in a physical quantities are represented
in a huge variety of imaginative words. Energy is usually defined as: the capacity for doing work and is described as being a variety
of transformative forms capable of changing
from one type of energy to another. "Energy"
transformations are constrained by a Conservation of Energy principle which states that Energy can neither be created nor destroyed.
Most synonyms and similes of the word "energy"
describe exactly the same fictive farce,
or vary slightly in accordance with the precise
nature of the specific incident described
concerning the particular impingement of
the causal objects involved.
|
>Thus it [energy] represents a primitive statement
about a primitive concept. [4] (Abbott, & Van Ness 1988)
|
None of these counterfeit conceptual reificative
terms signify anything (has an actual denotatum)
that actually exists:
|
energy, power, impulsion, work, cause, transformation,
effect, drive, movement, speed, time, heat, radiation,
vitality, etc.
|
Solely energised objects exist.
|
Only powerful, impulsive, working, causal, transformative,
effective, effected, driving, driven, moving,
speeding, timed, heated, radiating, vitalised entities exist - there exists no biblical-style
entia - entitative duality [See notes: 1 and 2 ] - no fraudulent Heideggerian "ontological
duality"
|
Commonsense informs us it is physically impossible
to exist (to be present in the world) purely or entitatively - bereft of any existential modality or property at all. It is infeasible to be here in the
world and be physically propertyless at the
same time, in the absence of a single characteristic,
attribute, essence or state.
REIFICATIONAL RUN-AROUNDS
Anyone who looks up the word "energy"
in any dictionary will soon get my drift,
for to seek a definition of "energy"
is to step aboard a lexicographical merry-go-
round from which on alights at precisely
the same point where one embarked - back
to the word energy. Such a definition synonymy-fest
is in fact the semantic equivalent of the
oogly woogly bird which spins at ever increasing
velocity in ever diminishing circles, ultimately
vanishing up its own fundamental orifice
in a puff of smoke, completely baffling its
pursuers.
As is the case regarding all so-called
force, Gravitational force doesn"t exist - only the gravitationally
captured matergic object [the tree] exists
in the state or mode of changing its spatial
position under the influentially greater
attraction of the capturing energised planet
- the matergic earth itself.
Change and changing does not exist either.
The ontologically corrupt but useful bundles
of human communicative fiction that promote
such imagined duality is initially imprinted
and internalised by the human child within
the family in infancy. Such transcendentalism
is comprehensively reinforced later by an
similarly antecedently imprinted society.
This explains the claim pointed to above
in my opening remarks that there are some
who are simply neuro-physically incapable
of dealing with the idea at all for they
have been brainwashed to accept concepts
of ontological duality in their
latency phase.
Such ubiquitous internalisation of reification
forces me to correct and qualify each phrase
I write which may suggest that action and
change exists dualistically as well as -
or in addition to - the actor
or the changing material entity. All human
languages are the end product of the millennia-old
reification of transcendental abstraction.
As far as western society is concerned the
main culprits are religionists and false
philosophers like Socrates and Plato his
puppeteer and their ilk. It was principally
they who reified their abstruse abstractions
into so-called aspirational behavioural templates,
or shadowy Forms designed to torment their
younger ingenuous discussants using a highly
repetitive inquisitorial form of elenchus
worthy of a Gestapo interrogator.
Such was the irritating nature of this Socratic
form of cross-examination, with its constant
dismissal of the conversational partner's
supply of witnessed examples of human "honourable
conduct, good acts, or "pius" behaviour
he almost always alienated his interlocutor.
Socrates"insistence on further qualificatory
statements usually led to the frustrated
addressee becoming annoyed. Few of the Socratic
dialogues ever led to any disclosing of philosophical
or ontological profundity. The dialogues
were more like unequally staged verbal wrestling
matches for reifiers - with points scored
on the basis of which hypostasizer was judged
to have concretised the most abstraction.
.
Platonic elenchus" (exetasis or scrutiny)
was a means of cross-examining a person about
a statement he had hitherto made regarding
an example of some reification under discussion.
This was followed by rejecting any real life
societal examples provided in such statements
and persistently demanding a specific definition
of some abstraction (like "righteousness"
or some other woolly variable) presumably
in the vain the hope that they will magically
determine an absolute meaning and reveal
its truth-value. Often the form of Plato's
question is a ploy which renders the opponent
incapable of providing a reply. But it is
not because the opponent has contradicted
himself, but because the question itself
is ambiguous or equivocal. The ploy succeeds
when both the interlocutor and the reader
of the dialogue fails to spot the difference.
As top-dog transcendentalist and templateur
Plato characterised abstractions such as:
"honour, righteousness or piety,"
as aeriform non-natural "properties"
which, when they were needed as elements
of Socratic argy-bargy drifted down like
heavenly himations from some great platonic
emporium of Forms in the sky to gently alight
upon the shoulders of the deserviingly honourable
and pius man or woman. Thus piety exists
as an intrinsic property that supervenes
on the natural properties of its sanctimonious
bearers.
Such sybilene jabberwocky was eagerly plagiarised
by the early Christian Fathers who grasped
at such straws of subtle speciousness and
metaphysical moth holes of meretriciousness
to camouflage their lack of conceptual credibility
and doctor-up their doctrinal disparities.
For Plato there is a Form for every object, property or quality in
reality. There are Forms for pigs, toilet requisites, human beings,
gold rings, beauty, mountains, colours, courage,
love, and goodness and equivocal truthfulness. The question of universals - or how one
specific object or thing in general could
magically be at the same time
many things in particular (universals) -
was solved with the presumption that a Form (presumably deposited in some capacious
celestial depository of metaphysical models
or conceptual conveniences - Plato remains
significantly stumn on the matter) was a
distinct singular thing but caused plural
representations of itself in particular objects.
For example, there are countless rolls of
toilet soap in the world, but the Form of toilet-soapness is the über-template which is the essence
of all of them and the subject of countless
imperfect ready-made, ready-to-hand imitations
manufactured for frustrated earthlings with
sensitive posteriors. Its a pity that the
supermarkets can"t get their hands on
the master defintional template for toilet-paperness.
But no doubt they would have much trouble
defining toilet-soapness as Meno had defining virtue, or arete, meaning in this case virtue in general, rather than particular virtues,
such as justice or temperance.
A COMPLETE REJECTION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
CATEGORIES.
I am an Eliminative Determinist and such a position
holds that not one of Aristotle's usefully fictitious
categorical mentalisations is ontologically
viable though they make excellent grammatical
categorial fictions for use in human communication
- but that is as far as they can be said
to be meaningful to eliminative ontologists.
En passant, two of the most ontologically
abused signs in human communication are the
"is" sign (and its conjugates of
"am/are") which were originally labelled "copulae" by medieval thinkers.
Such is also the case with the equally notorious ontologically dissolute
and semantically unrestrained existentialiser
- the backward E ( ) of so-called Predicative "Logic."
1. Therefore ontologically the terms "is"
and "exists" are terms are both at the same time
syncategorematic and redundant - for:
(a) no object in the cosmos does not exist.
(b) No object lacks any existential
modalities.
2. Because of (a) and (b) above, in sentential
or propositional forms such usefully
fictional syncategoremes as: /is/ and /exist/
have no meanings other than facilitating
ontological truth claims.
When standing by themselves, as contrasted
with categorematic terms like "elephant, cat and soup spoon" which are cognitive instantiations
of objects (denotata) which CAN be found
in the real world - they are ontologically
meaningless.
As Sten Ebbesen writes:
| A medieval logic book can serve as a list
of reminders, reminders of things we ought
to do one day. Like writing a logic of each
languages' syncategorematic terms ... or
how they work. [5] (Ebbesen. 1998.p.46) |
(For even more curious forms of exercise
in reification and useful fiction employed
in modern philosophy and elsewhere to knowingly/unwittingly
perpetuate ontological dualism please read
my dissertation here: :
What is important is what actually exists. It is ontological nonsense to claim that one can show what is actually present in the world
by arguing that the existence or presence of something needs to be assumed by the employment
of useful fictions in order to justify, resolve
or vindicate certain inherited pseudo-existential
instantiations and override
ontologically counterfeit grammatical or
semantic sense regarding such putative
"existence claims."
In other words it is far more important for
humans to be aware of what is actually present
in the world rather than to transcendentally
existentialise the actantial tool or legitimise
a semantically primitive linguistic model
used to analyze or describe
some objective material actant by
concocting ontological fictions in order
to comply with the grammar of an ontologically
corrupt system of semantic description.
Kant was also aware of the dangers of transcendentalism,
for he wrote:
|
I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much
with objects as with the mode of our knowledge
of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge
is to be possible a priori.
[6] (Kant. Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? P. 220)
|
Here is a résumé of Aristotle's treatment
of the subject from wikipedia
THE ANTEPRAEDICAMENTA See notes [3] and [4]
The text begins with an explication of what
is meant by "synonymous," or univocal
words, what is meant by "homonymous,"
or equivocal words, and what is meant by
"paronymous," or denominative (sometimes
translated "derivative") words.
It then divides forms of speech as being:
(a) Either simple, without composition or
structure, such as "man," "horse,"
"fights," etc.
(b) Or having composition and structure,
such as "a man fights," "the
horse runs," etc.
Only composite forms of speech can be true
or false.
Next, he distinguishes between what is said
"of" a subject and what is "in"
a subject. What is said "of" a
subject describes the kind of thing that
it is as a whole, answering the question
"what is it?". What is said to
be "in" a subject is a predicate
that does not describe it as a whole but
cannot exist without the subject, such as
the shape of something. The latter has come
to be known as inherence.
Of all the things that exist,
1.Some may be predicated of a subject, but
are in no subject; as man may be predicated
of James or John, but is not in any subject.
2. Some are in a subject, but cannot be predicated
of any subject. Thus a certain individual
point of grammatical knowledge is in me as
in a subject, but it cannot be predicated
of any subject; because it is an individual
thing.
3. Some are both in a subject and able to
be predicated of a subject, for example science,
which is in the mind as in a subject, and
may be predicated of geometry as of a subject.
4. Last, some things neither can be in any
subject nor can be predicated of any subject.
These are individual substances, which cannot
be predicated, because they are individuals;
and cannot be in a subject, because they
are substances.
THE PRAEDICAMENTA
See notes
[4] and [5]
Then we come to the categories themselves,
whose definitions depend upon these four
forms of predication. Aristotle's own text
at in Ackrill's standard English version
is:Of things said without any combination, each
signifies either substance or quantity or
qualification or a relative or where or when
or being-in-a-position or having or doing
or being-affected. To give a rough idea,
examples of substance are man, horse; of
quantity: four-foot, five-fold; of qualification:
white, grammatical; of a relative: double,
half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in
the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-
year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting;
of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of
doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected:
being-cut, being-burned. (1b25-2a4) A brief
explanation (with some alternative translations)
is as follows:
|
1. Substance (ousia, essence or substance).[6]
Substance is that which cannot be predicated
of anything or be said to be in anything.
Hence, this particular man or that particular
tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle
calls these particulars "primary substances",
to distinguish them from secondary substances,
which are universals and can be predicated.
Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while
man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated
of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated
of man is predicated of Socrates.
2. Quantity (poson, how much).
This is the extension of an object, and may
be either discrete or continuous. Further,
its parts may or may not have relative positions
to each other. All medieval discussions about
the nature of the continuum, of the infinite
and the infinitely divisible, are a long
footnote to this text. It is of great importance
in the development of mathematical ideas
in the medieval and late Scholastic period.
Examples: two cubits long, number, space,
(length of) time.
3. Qualification or Quality (poion, of what kind or quality).
This determination characterizes the nature
of an object. Examples: white, black, grammatical,
hot, sweet, curved, straight.
4. Relative or Relation (pros ti, toward something).
This is the way one object may be related
to another. Examples: double, half, large,
master, knowledge.
5. Where or Place (pou, where).
Position in relation to the surrounding environment.
Examples: in a marketplace, in the Lyceum.
When or Time (pote, when). Position in relation
to the course of events. Examples: yesterday,
last year.
6. When or Time (pote, when).
Position in relation to the course of events.
Examples: yesterday, last year.
7. Being-in-a-position, posture, attitude (keisthai, to lie).
The examples Aristotle gives indicate that
he meant a condition of rest resulting from
an action: "Lying", "sitting",
"standing". Thus position may be
taken as the end point for the corresponding
action. The term is, however, frequently
taken to mean the relative position of the
parts of an object (usually a living object),
given that the position of the parts is inseparable
from the state of rest implied.
8. Having or state, condition (echein, to have or be).
The examples Aristotle gives indicate that
he meant a condition of rest resulting from
an affection (i. e. being acted on): "shod",
"armed". The term is, however,
frequently taken to mean the determination
arising from the physical accoutrements of
an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc.
Traditionally, this category is also called
a habitus (from Latin habere, to have).
9. Doing or Action (poiein, to make or do).
The production of change in some other object
(or in the agent itself qua other).
10. Being-affected or Affection (paschein, to suffer or undergo).
The reception of change from some other object
(or from the affected object itself qua other).
Aristotle's name paschein for this category has traditionally been
translated into English as "affection"
and "passion" (also "passivity"),
easily misinterpreted to refer only or mainly
to affection as an emotion or to emotional
passion. For action he gave the example,
"to lance", "to cauterize";
for affection, "to be lanced",
"to be cauterized."His examples
make clear that action is to affection as
the active voice is to the passive voice
- as acting is to being acted on.
[7] (Aristotle. Smith 1995)
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THE ELIMINITIVIST
REJECTION OF TRADITIONAL ONTOLOGY
Eliminative determinism holds that not one of Aristotle's categorical mentalisations
are ontologically viable. They make
excellent grammatical categories - but that
is as far as they can be said to be meaningful
to eliminative ontologists.
No object in the cosmos undergoes change of any sort whatsoever - there are
no temporal interstices of existential modality
- existential modality does not exist
- only the modulating object is extant-
only changing objects can be found to be
present. Doing things and being something do not exist. Only the stative acting object
exists. There is no spurious ontological
duality. Such transcendentalist occultish nonsense
is an insidious misapprehension that continues
to stalk science and philosophy like some
ontological Banquo's ghost.
The stage direction, "exit ghost"
appears in three of William Shakespeare's
plays: Hamlet, Macbeth and Julius Caesar. Only when similar directions to rid our
thinking of such primitive ontological categories
will humanity understand the social, academic,
political and ghastly intellectual
damage such ignorance has wreaked upon our
world whilst reification rules.
Predicationally language allows us to describe
changing objects in uncountable sentential
variations- but none of these grammatico-semantic
"properties" actually exist. Such communicative
signification is no more than the currently
existing neurological network of the addressor
and the addressee to which the communication is directed, received and understood.
The Existential Noctet (which of course does not actually
exist in itself) is a simplified version
of Aristotle's ontological fantasies. It
is an attempt to update precisely what the
"IS" word actually does in in relation
to the nominatum (the object referred to)
of a sentence from a onto-linguistic point
of view. It is meant as an essay at a further
critique of the Russell/Frege view of the "be-function"
function and not as a modernisation or replacement
for the Aristotelian categories.
Thus the inclusion of the is-word in a sentence
points to the object's:
1. Existential modality.
2. Existential state.
3. Existential numerosity.
4. Existential relative positionality.
5. Existential identification.
6. Existential classification
7. Existential nominality.
8. Existential transcendentality.
9. Existential spatial occupancy.
For an "IS-word" equivalent -
substitute any of the above terms in the
following sentence in place of the "IS"
word:
" features the anthropocentrically
attributed inexistent existential modality
of xxxx."
Example:
"The leaf is green." becomes...
"The leaf features the anthropo-centrically
attributed existential modality of greeness(or
being green) ."
"The apple is red."
becomes...
"The apple features the anthropocentrically
attributed existential modality of being
red."
"The tree is falling." becomes...
"The tree features the anthropocentrically
attributed existential modality of falling."
Therefore redness, greenness, and falling are no more than homocentric attributions
of modality, state, numerosity, positionality,
identification, classification, nominality,
transcendentality,spatial occupancy and do not exist as the
(so-called) medieval properties owned by the tree.
Plainly the photonic wavelengths which
bounce off the surface of an observed object
(such as a tree) are neurologically
moderated perceptions of the transactions
of the human sensorium as to the way that
certain wave-lengths of light are reflected
from the surface of the tree
onto the lens of the observers eye. This
visual data is then transported as electro-chemical
signals attributed to the observed object
which (if required for communication
to other humans ) is converted into linguistic
signs as adjectival descriptives and claimed
to be inherent or intrinsic features of the
manner in which the tree exists.
In fact the so-called properties of objects are in reality no more than neuronal
verbalisations of the manner in which humans
perceive different wavelengths of light.
The same pattern and attribution of properties
is true of the other four senses of mankind
- touch, taste, hearing, and smell.
ARE ALL EDUCATED PEOPLE CAPABLE OF GRASPING SUCH META-ONTOLOGICAL
CONCEPTS?
I do not personally subscribe to the belief
that some people hold - that there are people
who are congenitally incapable of ever grasping
the ontological principle involved here.
My own view is that for tens of thousands
of years the human race has been imprinted in
infancy by their parents and society
to believe (take for granted)
a non-existent duality of object and action
and have internalised the fiction of
action as an apparent existential
norm or a "fact of the cosmos."
To find the "fact" challenged at
first seems utterly incredible. In my experience
of meeting many people who have at first
rejected eliminativism as preposterous, and
who have later seen the light, they all admit
that it was the hardest intellectual problem
that they have ever experienced, and that
it took a lot of concentration.
One man described the experience as being
as if his brain was rebelling against thinking
about it - as if it was "intentionally
avoiding the strain" [his words.]
An "occurrence" cannot happen
because "occurrences" do
not exist to be able to happen. "Accidents"
do not exist. What exists are the two
cars that collide - not the "collision."
Put another way both cars exist in a modality
of colliding - but the "modality of
colliding" does not exist - only
the colliding cars exist. I realise that
this is a VERY DIFFICULT concept to grasp
and there is absolutely no shame to be felt
if one cannot understand it immediately.
Eliminative materialists are the most extreme
anti-reificationalists you will ever encounter.
They are in fact ontological revolutionaries. One way of coming towards an understanding
of the idea is to look at the semantic value
of words - because it is the words we use
that cloak and obscure the ontological reality
that lies behind our imperfect view of the
world around us. This is where I part company
with Hume. You will notice that the eliminativist
assiduously avoids certain states of the
verb. It is a constant struggle for me to
achieve - for I have been exposed to the
old way of thinking all my life
and I have been as much brain-washed as the
next man.
The way we think about the IS-word is a very
important part of the confusion - I constructed
a whole website on the BE-Mechanism alone.
(Analytical Indicant Theory.)
But the BE-word apart, many innocent-looking
words are fraught with ontological problems.
For example verbs that have been turned into
nouns which we call gerunds.
The insidious nature of language and the
way in which it affects our understanding
of ontological actuality can be seen in these
following examples:
I. The gerund is a verbal noun, just as the
participle is a verbal adjective. That is,
just as the participle is a verbal form that
functions as an adjective, the gerund is
a verbal form that functions as a noun. You
must be careful, however, because in English
both the gerund and the present participle
end in -ing. You will have no problem, however,
if you ask yourself whether the verbal form
is adjectival or substantive. Noun or Adjective?
(1) Leaving the theatre, we ran into our
friends. ("Leaving" = adj. modifying "we")
(2) I like running. ("running" = a noun, the direct
object of "like")
(3) We saw a man running across the field. ("running" = an adj. modifying
"man")
(4) Swimming is fun. ("Swimming" = a noun, modified
by the adj. "fun")
So if we look above and pick one example
out at random, we can see that our use of
certain forms of language reinforces our
illusion that action exists, for in (2) the
use of the word running as a noun [the name
of something] suggests that what is named
exists - when plainly it does not - only
the running runner exists. It is all fine
and dandy to use the present participle [continuous
present] form of a verb, but because in English
in the gerundial form of a NOUN (the gerund)
ALSO ends in -ing it continually confuses our ontological
grasp of what really exists and what does
not. The same problem is now recognised in
the field of computerology and ontology-talk
is all the rage within the world of computer
programmers and AI experts and theorists.
Nuclear Reaction

Fig. 1: It is claimed that a "fusion" of hydrogen into helium takes place.
A star is like a gigantic nuclear furnace.
The nuclear reactive matergy within
converts hydrogen into helium by means of
a process known as "fusion." But the fusion process does not exist. It is the
reactive matergy that exists - its "reaction" does not exist - does not have objective reality or being - for objective reality and being do not exist either.
It is the reacting nuclear matergy that actually
exists and reactivates reactive the energised
star its energy. It is only that which reacts
and fuses that exists. Within the star, a
deuterium atom combines with an atom of
tritium forming a helium atom and an aditional
neutron. The combination does not exist -
only that which is combined. An incredible
amount of energised matter (matergy) is then
released.
If one seeks to speak strictly scientifically
rather than in terms redolent
of occult phenomena existing outside
of, or not in accordance with nature,
any word-forms suggesting that anything extra (dualistically speaking) exists over
and in adition to the actual fissionable
energised material itself should be rigorously
avoided.
As I have my linguists-hat on at the moment
I shall be extra-nit-picking and observe
that even in this sentence there is an ontological mistake, for technically speaking:
the simultaneous release of energy doesn"t exist either - what exists is
simultaneously released. energetic material (matergy.)
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>It is important to realize that in physics
today, we have no knowledge of what energy
is. We do not have a picture that energy
comes in little blobs of a definite amount.
[8] (Feynman. 1987)
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But as
Foucault observed, we humans are caged animals
caught in a prison of language.
For thousands of years human semiologological symbols have
semantically distorted our perception of
what exists and what does not exist amongst that which surrounds us in
the environment. Much of what we speak is
no more than useful fiction, lazy non-definitive
abstraction promoting a diminution
of
reality-contactedness.
Abstract nouns and gerunds being no more
than utilitarian bookmarks or avoidance techniques
or alibi excuses cloaking a the
lack of a deeper ontological understanding, or as
Roland Barthe's put it:
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"To let a semiotic relation masquerade
as a natural connection absolves the sender
from being responsible for his utterance,
and from the burden of argument."
[9] (Barthes. quoted by Carlshamre. p.102.
2011
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CONCLUSION
Eliminative materialism seeks to DESCRIBE
the way entities exist WITHOUT reifying the
WAY that they exist into pseudo-entities
in themselves.
Thus whilst the exploding massive nucleus
undoubtedly exists, and the multi-versioned
smaller energetic nuclei that are the new
modality of what was once a conglomerated
singleton exist - the actual process or action or occurrence does not exist, for those sorts of
words are just useful linguistic short-cuts
or useful conveniences that we employ in order
to avoid using a long paraphastic
sentences.
Like Heidegger's phantasy of the existence of simple presence - the word existence is an abstract noun. Existence itself does not exist. What exists are the
ACTUAL MATERGIC OBJECTS in the cosmos.
Put another way - Being does not exist, and like the metaphysical
manikin Dasein neither does simple presence.
Only objects that BE [are] the objects they
are - exist.
Communicating humans exist. The methods they
use to communicate are gestures, signs symbols
and sounds. We can even communicate with
taste and smell. Examples?
An unfaithful wife says to her lover who
sometimes visits the cafe where she works:
If I put sugar in your tea you will know
it is safe to come tonight - no sugar means
that my husband will be at home.
In this case the medium of communication
whereby the message My husband will be away
tonight [the dissolved grains of sugar which
impart the taste-message] to the lover exist.
But what about the lack of sugar which does
not exist in the cup when the message is
the opposite? Then the objects involved
are only the neurons that exist in the heads
of the lovers and the sugarless tea.
You perhaps will see now that symbols like
sugar, or the scent a woman wears as a signal
that she is available sexually whenever she
wears it HAVE TO BE agreed in advance in
order to have any meaning in the brain of
the addressor and the addressee. It is the
same with letters and words and signs and
symbols of all types - there has got to be
antecedally agreed signification.
So while sugar exists, and scent exists,
and the configured graphite particles or
dried ink particles exist on a paper page
[or as pixels on a screen etc.] in the shape
of previously agreed shapes of letters the
meaning of those shapes only exists as an
existential modality of the writer's and
the reader's brain. The words themselves
are MEANINGLESS - like the sugar and the
scent they contain no meaning. The meaning
is attributed to them by the communicators.
Only the meaningfully communicating addressee
exists and the meaningfully updated human
addressor between which the meaning of one
can be conveyed to the other.
Ontologically debt does not exist. What exists is the human
debtor who owes X-amount of money. You could
certainly try to claim to your bank manager
that your debt did not exist, but I would
not advise it. Bank managers like scientists
are notoriously uneducated in ontology -
he would probably press the secret bell under his desk which signals
for the men in white-coats. ;-)
The reification of money like the reification
of number, mind, consciousness, time, speed,
motion, space and all the rest of the importantly helpful
abstractions which we have dreamed up and
created as essentially useful fictions to
make our lives a lot easier are human ways
of existing which set us apart from the animals
and have allowed us to emerge from the caves
to Cape Canaveral.
Do abstract numbers exist? No - only numerate
humans are present in the world. Numbers
are a brilliantly conceived useful fiction
which has helped us move from
the cave to Cape Canaveral. They allow
us to carry out all kinds of operations and
create all kinds of things that we could
not do if we had not created them. Originally
men used stones or their fingers as counters
- then they made the giant step for mankind
of awarding names to the amount of stones
or fingers that were held up. As time went
by man abstracted and distanced number away
from stones and fingers [broke the link of
cognitive dependency.] But, since numbers
(being abstract names created by man) change
in shape or position from one digit to another,
and since change is a condition that only
real things experience, doesn"t that
make numbers real? If so, what's wrong with
considering that numbers exist -- especially,
since they also have changing relationships
to each other?
No - it does not make the abstract meaning
of numbers real - it does not make them present
in the world. It just means that the
material medium [the pixels, ink stains,
graphite, paint, wood and plastic etc.,]
changes its existential representational
configuration on the page, screen or chequebook.
Only real mathematicians or enumerators are
ontologically present - abstractive numbers
do not - only abstracting humans and
the ink, paint and plastic which represent
them exist:
References:
1. Mongillo. J. Nanotechnology 101. 2007.
Greenwood Publishing. p. 30.
2. Joyce Appleby, Margaret Jacob, and Lynn
Hunt, “Postmodernism and the Crisis of Modernity,”
in Telling the Truth About History, (New
York: W.W. and Norton, 1994), 213-216
3. Blackshaw. Judith K. BSc, MA ED Wash.
(St. Louis), PhD. Animal Behaviour. Notes on Some Topics in
Applied Animal Behaviour. School of Veterinary Science University
of Queensland St. Lucia, Brisbane Queensland,
4067, Australia. Third edition, June 1986,
with an additional chapter by Judith K. Blackshaw
and David J. Allan, QDAii (Hons), BSc (Vet.),
BVSC (Hons), MB, BS.http://animalbehaviour.net/index.htm
4. Abbott. M. M. & Van Ness. H. C. 'Theory
and Problems of Thermodynamics.' McGraw-Hill
Book Company
5. Ebbersen. Sten. Logic - Philosophy of Language and a Whetstone
for the Philosopher's Linguistic Tools, Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu"est-ce
que la philosophie au moyen âge? What is
Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Ed. by Aertsen,
Jan A. / Speer, Andreas. 1998.
6. Kant. Emanuel. Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?" P. 220.
7. Aristotle. Smith, Robin 1995 "Logic".
In J. Barnes (ed) The Cambridge companion
to Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p. 55.
8. Feynman. Richard. 'The Definition of Energy Explained.' 1987. Accessed 01.04.2007. http://www.
ftexploring. com/energy/definition. htm.
9. Carlshamre. Staffan 2011. 'Philosophy of the Cultural Sciences. p.102.
http://people. su. se/~snce/texter/PhilCult_ch6.
pdf
Bibliography:
Smith, Robin 1995 "Logic". In J.
Barnes (ed) The Cambridge companion to Aristotle,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.
55.
Logic - Philosophy of Language and a Whetstone
for the Philosopher's Linguistic Tools, Was
ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu"est-ce
que la philosophie au moyen âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?
Ed. by Aertsen, Jan A. / Speer, Andreas.
1998.
Notes:
1. Entia - Noun. [plural of ens] something that has a real existence; a thing;
a corporeal entity. Entity \En"ti"ty\, n.; pl. {Entities}.
[LL. entitas, fr. L. ens, entis, thing, prop.
p. pr. of esse to be: cf. F. entit["e].
See {Essence}, {Is}.] A real being, whether in thought (as an ideal
conception) or in fact; being; essence; existence. entity n : that which is perceived or known or inferred
to have its own distinct existence (living
or nonliving) Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913)
2. Entitative. Adjective. Considered as pure entity; abstracted from
all circumstances.adverb entitatively, rarely used adjective entitative. "Entitative" was first used in popular English literature:
sometime before 1828. Entitative \En"ti"ta"tive\,
adjective. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913),
3. The forms of predication were called by
the medieval scholastic philosophers the antepraedicamenta.
4. Note, however, that although Aristotle
has apparently distinguished between "being
in a subject", and "being predicated
truly of a subject", in the Prior Analytics
these are treated as synonymous. This has
led some to suspect that Aristotle was not
the author of the Categories. wikipedia
[5. Aristotle 1995)
6.Note that while Aristotle's use of ousia is ambiguous between "essence"and
substance"there is a close link between
them. See his Metaphysics This part was probably
not part of the original text, but added
by some unknown editor, Ackrill (1963) pp.
69-70.
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