JUD EVANS: 

I remember some important work you did some years ago on the AIT (analytical indicant theory)  thing in relation to the identification of an object with and without an adjectival qualifier:

Hence:

(1) *The tall man in the corner waved his arm.*

compared with:

(2) *The man in the corner waved his arm.*

The idea being, from what I remember, that the adjectival positioning of an adjective [say] the word *tall* in (1) imbues and existentially instantiates the man as a man that already incorporates the idea of tall stature as the a priori way he exists as a man, in comparison with tacking on tallness as a predicate in such constructions as:

*The man in the corner is tall.*

with its implication of some abstractional and reificational *property .*

The reason I mention this is that ever since that exchange we had - and your valuable input years ago - I have used that sentential form of construction [way of presenting causal objects as the subjects of sentences] as a cute way of cutting the Georgian knot of *essence* and properties.* with your sharp, bright Neivenesque Alexandrian sword.

I still use the ontological ploy, and am totally dependent upon it in scripting my new theory of *Eliminative Determinism,* which I have decided [two years in advance] will be the subject of my dissertation in 2009. Do you see it as a watertight way of incorporating/attaching what we at AIT call *existential modalities* to the extantal imbuant as an antecedal ontological fait accompli? I have got away with it for years, but now ED is part of the Wikopedia Determinism section, it is possible that I will eventually come up against some critical Wyatt Earp-type trannie Lawman, who might want an ontological shoot-out - specially if he has invested many years of his life to the old English version of *Andgiet* (knowledge) rather than traded in old conceptual versions of *knowingness* and updated himself philosophically as the years have passed by. ;-)

JON NEIVENS

Hi Jud! I'm glad you brought this up, I was going to post something around this topic anyway, since it has huge importance for my current work, so your question has given me much needed impetus. I'll go around the houses in what follows but I hope you'll find it interesting. What I'm looking at right now I call *the mechanics of predication* -- to that extent I've moved away from the discussion of *is,* although the connection is clear enough so I won’t labour that point.

JUD EVANS:
You were absolutely right - I find what you have written extremely interesting, for your *mechanics of predication* addresses a question about which I have pondered for years, and that is: *How did it come about that the reification of verbs and adjectives happened in the first place?*

It is great to hear that you are attempting to answer such questions with impressive investigative tools such as you are doing with such proto-linguistic scenarios as you have done with your model of a *laboratory proto-language.*

Richard did so convincingly by way of another approach in one section of his TWTWI. My own [admittedly intuitive] idea has always been that universalism and the reification of human action-words into abstractions and gerunds developed like any other feature of human physiology and social and communication - as a response to a Darwinian natural selection or the survival of the fittest paradigm, based upon the survival bonuses to be gained from the rapid exchange of information etc.

What you may have now confirmed I think, is that such reification is introduced by the natural, equally powerful and apparently linguistically universal back-door route of predication. One of the features of language as you know is the changes over time that take place in word-order. Indeed there are some modern European languages which are in some respects passing through a twilight zone of change where it is equally acceptable with some phrases to employ constructions - Russian and to some extent Swedish provide examples. I wonder now if these changes from one syntactical structure to another effects the objectification of verbs?

The basic Japanese word order is Subject Object Verb.
*Jon the wall jumps.* Old English word order was much more 'free' than that of Modern English, and even comparing the Early Modern English of the King James Bible with today's English shows differences in word order. For example, the King James Bible translates Matthew 6:28 as

               "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not."

In a more recent translation, the last phrase is translated as "they do not toil". English no longer places not after the verb in a sentence except I believe is such sentences as *Is not that the case* - *Is not that against the law? etc. I just throw the point about word-order into the pot for consideration, and will now pass on to briefly revisit old ground - the gerundialisation of verbs and to perhaps a lesser extent adjectives. I promise to get to the point eventually.

We have witnessed this happening in our own life-time - for example when the fax first came out it was called a facsimile machine, because it allowed one person to send another a copy, or facsimile, of a document. Later people began using the shorter form *fax* to refer to both the machine and the document; from there, it was just a short step to using the word fax as a verb (as in I'll fax this over to Gary)

Let's take a walk through our village and lo and behold we now see the words *Faxing Service* in the window of a shop next door to a poster advertising a Southport dance-hall with the sign *Dancing Tonight.* A stroll to the river bank reveals the notice: *Fishing requires a permit.* A torn newspaper on a bench is covering the Icelandic complaints about Russian vacuum-cleaner trawlers proclaims the headline.
*Fishing is Iceland's major industry.* and *Tourism provides a major part of Spain's national income.* etc.

JON NEIVENS
You may recall from what I sent you before that I started from an imagined proto-language that has words roughly equivalent to our own nouns and adjectives, but not predication. The point is to see whether predication can develop from the use of these simple resources.


JUD EVANS: 
This is VERY interesting. Richard makes the point in TWTWI: *I assume that language and thought are inextricably bound together as a result of this influence. To quote Ludwig Wittgenstein: “Die Sprache ist ein Teil unseres Organismus” -- “Language is a part of our organism.” He further remarks:

*Objects in the world are of different sizes and of different composition. Mountains are larger than pebbles, and many organisms have the ability to discern these differences in magnitude. In addition, objects in the world have characteristics that may be said to possess magnitudes of those characteristics -- such as color and temperature. (While color does not exist, per se, in the world, the causal effects of different wave-lengths of light on many organisms are unquestionable -- as is the case of different temperatures.)*

One can imagine a non-predicational language emerging in which a sound or word for mountain will have meaning for a group or tribe.
*Mountain* grunts one pointing to the huge landmass on the horizon.
*Big mountain* comes the rejoinder, as his companion accompanies the adjective with a skyward widening of both arms.

In this case *Big mountain* appears to be a straightforward combination of adjective and noun but if this particular proto-language placed the adjective after the noun as in
*Mountain big* [as in modern Russian] and we imagine a covert *is* sandwiched between the two words then it is a predicational format? Am I right here do you think? Do you not think that even the primitive brain would interpret the *Mountain big* utterance as a comment as to the way the mountain exists in the world or appears to him [phenomenologically] to exist in the world?

Next day when the it is time to hunt again one turns to the other and shaking his bow gestures *Where today?
*Big mountain* says the other. Now, as you mention further down, using adjectives in this way by combining words we can combine general terms. I would add that if this combination of words sticks then from henceforth the mountain will be called *big mountain* even if over time the language undergoes change and the words big and mountain are replaced by other terms. A glance at the place-names on a map of England will confirm this.

JON NEIVENS
According to what I say above, it’s actually quite difficult for the proto-language to move away from the model where all words are used to establish the referent. As I see it, it’s only when the ‘free reference’ model enters the scene that there is a functional distinction, and which provides the space where we use word order to represent to mark that functional distinction. If we assume that we cannot make utterances of the form *big mountain* without first having said *mountain (is) big* then I think we are again imposing our more complex structures upon the simpler language. We often tend to do things that way because we have those linguistic resources already available. I would add that the seemingly simple utterance *where today?* which already demands a subject-predicate type response, would most likely be beyond the resources of these language users.

As I see it, the proto-language would be largely tied to a speaker pointing out to a hearer something that is spatio-temporally present. There is some leeway to speak of things that are currently spatio temporally absent from both speaker and hearer, but the possibilities for this are limited—as I see it, it is largely predicative utterances that allow this to happen. Obviously if you can do that (and I'm pretty convinced my analysis works), then it challenges the notion that a predicate refers to a property or a universal. If you start from a language consisting of the elements I described, and show how these presuppose an ontology consisting of nothing more than ‘medium sized dry goods’ (to use Austin’s memorable phrase) then there is no obvious reason to add to that ontology when that language develops more complex forms from out of those simple resources.

One ends up with the peculiar notion that there exists a realm of abstract objects that ‘awaited’ the evolution of creatures with a language sophisticated enough to refer to them. In my opinion, one of the main reasons this kind of notion still survives is that predication is treated as a basic and unanalysable element of language that might just as well have dropped out of the sky and into our speech.


JUD EVANS: 
I may have mentioned that when I was researching Pannini for the AIT project I came across a book on the development of Sanskrit which said that the Indian linguists were divided as to the origin of language. One lot opined that it developed from verbs and that nouns grew out of verbs [growing corn became *a growth*] etc., and seeds that were piled up became *a pile* etc. The opposition believed that it was entirely the other way around and nouns were the lingual element from with language sprang.

Now to paddle a boat across a stream became *to boat across a stream* etc. I cannot now remember to which camp Pannini himself belonged. I am not sure if a proto-language would develop as a rule-bound manifestation of communication anyway? I imagine it as a hit and miss process rather like we communicate to a foreigner in a combination of a few basic nouns and adjectives and gestures where emphasis also plays an important part. In some tonal languages like Chinese and Japanese as you know rising and falling tones can distinguish between entirely different meanings. *Big harbour?* addressed to a Chinaman in order to find the docks might mean something quite different to him, and the use of the wrong tone might turn the intended question into a statement in answer to which he might just smile and nod in agreement.

JON NEIVENS
Now that you remind me, I do remember the stuff on Pannini. One reason I’d tend to disagree with both noun-first and verb-first analysis is that, when you look closely, both seem to be ‘noun plus predication first’ and ‘verb plus predication first.’ That’s one of the difficulties—trying to imagine such a language without sneaking predication in without realizing it.

All of which is an attempt to set the scene for an answer to your question. The proto-language I discuss consists of utterances of the adjective-noun type.


JUD EVANS: 
This is fascinating stuff and the only slight query I have is on the word-order you have chosen for the proto-language which places the adjective in the same place as English for a critic might say something like OK Jon - now swop the word-order and see if it still works.

JON NEIVENS
As I said, I think it does, because I think it takes more than a change in word order to bring in a whole new language structure. Again the fact that it happens for us when we change word order is because we already have that language structure. I ignore any kind of quantificational devices since it's importance to separate these from predication and thus show that quantification and predication are separate issues
(again there’s no need for me to labour that point.)


JUD EVANS:
I quite agree that to introduce plurals etc would serve no purpose at this stage. I imagine that size though would be of extreme importance in any primitive society and that words to communicate this would have been amongst the first to be introduced into any proto-language.

JON NEIVENS
I was thinking more of quantificational terms like ‘all’ or ‘some’ and determiners like ‘the.’ Logicians tend to analyse predication in terms of quantification which is why I want to keep them separate. Plurals I leave out just to keep the model simple. I should add that what I’m talking about is at best a ‘semi-realistic’ model. Although it’s a proto-language I’m not really using it for anthropological speculation that this is how our ancestors might actually have talked. It’s designed to serve a more limited theoretical purpose of showing how predication can be language specific, which means that the simple model which doesn’t have predication can develop it from its own resources.

     So we have utterances of the type *tall man* used precisely in the same way as the segment of the utterance *the tall man is in the corner*. The issue of universals or properties just doesn't arise in this case, and to show that we just look at the way the elements of the utterance are used. The point of these simple utterances is that they can be used to point out an entity. The word *man* refers to a particular ‘kind’ of thing, i. e., an adult male human. (This does necessitate including ‘kinds’ in my basic ontology, not as an additional entity of course but as how entities themselves are arranged—call it descriptive of the basic ontological geography if you like.) Now the word  *tall* is obviously not a feature of that geography, but that's not really a problem. When we use the word *man* in respect of a particular entity, we are using that word to distinguish that entity from all those that are not adult male humans. When we use the word *tall* in respect of the same entity we make a further distinction between adult male humans that are tall and those that are not. In the first instance we distinguish adult male humans from entities that are not, and in the second we make a distinction within adult make humans.


JUD EVANS:
Quite so. The example I used *Big Mountain* is a similar way of pointing out an entity. But I have a feeling that the FIRST TIME the combination is used something different happens. I remember something I wrote to you many years ago about two escaping POWs hiding in the back of a truck as it is stopped by a German road-block. They peep through the canvas flap at a bunch of talking Germans.

*Look at the size of that blond kraut!* one POW hissed to the other. Later the blond Kraut walks towards the lorry. Now is has become *the blond Kraut* and the term is being used to point out a particular entity. The word *Kraut* refers to a particular ‘kind’ of thing, i. e., a  German human, and when we combine with the word *tall* in respect of the same entity we make a further distinction between German humans that are *blond* and those that are not. I have improvised on the story, for I have long since lost the original text in that catastrophic PC wipe-out I had some years back

JON NEIVENS
Yes I remember that story, I think it was originally part of our discussion of the distinction between ‘a’ and ‘the.’ What I’m not sure about is why the first time a combination is used is important. Assuming I know how to use the words ‘big’ and ‘mountain’ appropriately, and to combine to form a single referring phrase, then surely I can use them in respect of a big mountain without first having ‘the bigness of the mountain’ pointed out to me? What I’m unsure of here is whether you’re effectively saying that we can’t make such utterances without a prior predicative utterance? I remember us having such discussions before—my problem is that it seems to beg the question of where predication comes from, maybe by assuming that an adjective is in some way a tacit predicate?

     Again, the point of these simple utterances is that they can be used to point out an entity. The fact that word *tall* can be used in respect of other kinds of entities is really just a matter of linguistic economy—it would very likely be impossible to have adjectives that were specific to particular nouns; apart from anything else it would place unnecessary strain on our vocabulary.


JUD EVANS:
Absolutely right.

JON NEIVENS
The point of using adjectives in this way is that by combining words we can combine general terms, those which refer to kinds with those which do not, and in this way refer to entities in a way that can approach the specificity of proper names. One can speculate that we develop this linguistic facility since a near infinite stock of proper names is not nearly as economical by comparison.


JUD EVANS:
Again - yes Jon.


JON NEIVENS
I said earlier that such a use of adjectives doesn't refer to universals or properties, and one can add ‘concepts’ to that list too.


JUD EVANS:
This worries me just a little - mainly because of the word-order thing. Of course in a language-lab situation one can simply write one's own grammar and say: *The rule is that adjectives always come before nouns in this language* rather like someone originally made up the rules for monopoly and that way the language will work OK and certain conclusions can be extrapolated from that working I agree. Don't worry I am not suggesting you are playing games for I know that what you are doing is very serious and it may well unlock the door which opens the safe where we can find the explanation of the notion that a predicate refers to a property or a universal.


JON NEIVENS
Hopefully I’ve fully addressed the word order thing above?

    The reason is that a concept is a principle not just of *individuation* but also of *collection*. One can examine this in the particular case of *tall* since obviously a tall man is very likely shorter than a building in respect of which the word ‘tall’ would not be appropriate. But this problem only arises when you attempt to use *tall* as a principle of collection; as a principle of individuation this does not apply since one is not making comparisons. And used in the way I describe above, the adjective is only used to individuate. It's only when we use the adjective predicatively that we can say *that man is tall* and *that building is tall* and go on to compare the two that the notion of collection can really come into play. (Obviously we, with our own linguistic resources, can notice that about the primitive utterances, but it seems unlikely to me that those who only have those limited resources could do this themselves.)


JUD EVANS:
Only if we accept the strict word-order which you impose. I think, for although we have both left the *is* concept in our wake long ago and turned to other things - I think you will find that there is and implicative *IS* hiding between *Mountain and *big* and *Man and tall* if we throw in a definite article too and come up with *The man tall,* and *The mountain big,* then the sneaky little *IS* [always anxious to create predicates] gets a little more visible, even though he doesn't come completely out of the ontological closet in which he is covertly pulling the hidden strings of modal informancy.


JON NEIVENS
As I said, that happens for us because we already have that language mechanism lying ready. When it comes into play there is difference in the functions of the words in each case, in *big mountain* both words establish the referent whereas (for us) in *mountain big* only the word *mountain* establishes the referent and *big* refers to it in a way that is freed from this function. That’s a pretty big structural distinction, I think you’ll agree?

    Now I'm going to backtrack again, this time to a discussion of metaphysics. The most general definition of metaphysics is the enquiry into the ultimate nature of reality. On this basis alone one could include scientific enquiry, and one can see that traditional metaphysics at least provided the question for science. (that's one reason why I tend not to want to criticise historical metaphysics too much, although of course contemporary metaphysics is another matter entirely.)


JUD EVANS:
I am not sure that you can lump metaphysics with scientific enquiry Jon? I agree that in the early days [the classical period] ALL human enquiry was dealt with as if it were one homogenous lump. But over the years aspects of the lump peeled off with a wave like spitfires from the main squadron and going off to do their own thing. All that is left now is the rump of ethics and historical philosophy. My philosophy department is dominated by ethics and is part of the health faculty specialising in questions like the morality of abortion, animal rights, environmentalism etc. The is nothing remotely *scientific* about it at all only to the extent that they have appropriated the terminology of the social sciences in order to comment on the main ethical points - to abort or not to abort - are animals or robots sentient or conscious and to what extent? etc.


JON NEIVENS
This isn’t a particularly important point for me, but what I was saying was more that scientific enquiry has its origins in the metaphyisical notion of an enquiry into the ultimate nature of reality. What I was poorly expressing was that science has developed its own distinct and far better way of answering this question. The more important point is that it’s not really this question that’s at fault, but rather the way that traditional metaphysics goes about answering it, which is what I speak about below.

    But the first definition can be added to, in terms of how traditional metaphysics went about answering the question, and this was primarily by means of the proposition. The point here is that traditional metaphysics assumes that since a proposition can tell us about the nature of the world, the structure of the proposition can tell us about the structure of the world. it's on this basis that we encounter the notion of properties—we can see easily enough what the subject refers to, but not what the predicate refers to, so a referent for the predicate is invented, i. e., a property or a universal. The problem arises when one takes subjects and predicates separately. If I ask what the predicate in  *the man is tall* refers to, the answer is simple, the man I'm talking about. that's the main point of my own investigation, asking after the linguistic mechanics of how that happens.


JUD EVANS:
Yes, we all agree that what the predicate refers to is always the same - the subject of the sentence, but it is not quite so simple as that for it doesn't JUST refer to the subject, it makes a claim about the subject as to the nature of the way the subject exists doesn't it? In my view in all the sentences of this type the linguistic mechanics of how that happens are not so simple - though that might be the case in your laboratory model. For me sentences are making two existential claims - two challengeable propositions. Somebody said [it might have been Russell - possibly Wittgenstein] - that all sentences are truth claims or something like that.

take a sample sentence.

(A) Frank is tall.
(1) *Frank* This is the first challengeable claim. The challenge is: *That is NOT Frank* it is Jim! Consider standing at the door announcing guests and shouting: *Ladies and gentlemen - Frank!*

(2) *Frank is Tall.* This is the second challengeable claim. The challenge is *Call THAT tall? I have a dog taller than that! or: *No, you have got it all wrong - it's not FRANK who is tall - its Jim.*


JON NEIVENS
I don’t disagree with that, but I would say that it because the referent refers to the referent established by the subject that it can be made to make these claims. In a sense this is about the distinction between the actual mechanics and the way it can be used. It’s only when it becomes possible to free it from the referent establishing function that these other possibilities emerge. I think you’re correct that the distinction between the mechanics and the way it used is perhaps a ‘laboratory distinction,’ but I’d stick to my guns and say it’s a necessary one. In actual fact though the challenging point is crucial, since *big mountain* can be challenged in the same way. In fact it’s that scenario which I use to develop a simple form of predication from out of those simpler utterances.

    This brings us to a discussion of, something I remain a tad suspicious of. The reason is not one of ontology as one of language analysis and its implications. The danger here is that one still uses the subject predicate distinction to tell oneself about the structure of reality, although in this case one takes subjects as referring to objective entities, and adjectives as referring to subjective concepts.


JUD EVANS:
It only depends on word-order - [as does your model IMO] stick the adjective BEFORE the noun and you won't get a peep from a nominalist .. Stick it AFTER the noun and it ceases to be used acceptably to point out a particular entity. [The blond Kraut* etc.} and it becomes a judgement or claim as to the existential modality of the subject - an existential modality that often becomes generalised or universalised into the reified abstraction of *blondness* or tallness* etc. Then follows the subsequent conversion to nounhood or nominalisation.

*Ladies! Its Here at Last! *Blondness in a Bottle!*

*Men! *Tallness in a Box! Buy our specially crafted built-up shoes
- you will feel like John Wayne next time you walk into your local bar!*

JON NEIVENS
Again I hope I’ve addressed the word order point? Of course nominalization itself depends on the subject-predicate distinction. As it happens I pretty much the nominalist view as to ontology, my problem only arises where it seems to conflate the subject-predicate distinction with the noun adjective distinction. That said, it’s a pretty minor disagreement for all that.

    This is a vast improvement of course, but one danger is that this notion is extended to nouns and adjectives per se, with nouns referring to existents and adjectives referring to abstractions. I would say that nouns and adjectives both refer to existents—the difference is that adjectives do not distinguish kinds of entities.


JUD EVANS:
I have to disagree here I'm afraid. For me *blue* itself is not an entity - whereas the hat which is blue is. The words blue and hat both *refer* to the same object but the referentiality is entirely different. One refers to the hat as an existent and the other refers to one feature or existential mode of the way the hat exists in the world. An interesting point here is that if we just say the word *hat* without any qualifying adjective we are then dependent upon our antecedal knowledge of the sort of existent we call *hat* and we then have to image various adjectives that might apply to it. You might imagine a hat like you see a lot in London whilst a Mexican guy might imagine a Stetson or a sombrero. When we supply an individual adjective we supply one of the missing descriptors, but we are still left to go on imagining what sort of size, brim, material etc., the hat might consist of - so any adjective does not point to[refer to] as merely an existent it attributes a *property* of blueness* to the hat and helps us to fill in the gaps and questions we may have as to the nature of its existentiality - NOT just the fact that it exists.

JON NEIVENS
I probably didn’t make myself very clear here. When I said nouns and adjectives both refer to existents, what I meant in terms of adjectives was that they refer to the same existent that the nouns they are combined with refer to. To adapt Plato’s phrase, nouns do approximately ‘carve nature at the joints,’ whereas adjectives don’t. To that very limited extent we can say that there is some relation between the structure of the world and the structure of our language. The problem occurs if we try to extend that observation. In the case of ‘the blue hat’ we have two words that refer to the same entity, so our language pushes us toward the notion that the structural division between the two words in some way refers to a structural division in the blue hat. This observation is extended when we reflect upon the fact that the word ‘blue’ can refer to many other things apart from hats. Some way above we were in agreement that this kind of division is simply a matter of linguistic economy, it saves us from the impossible task of having proper names for everything. I think this still applies here, which is why I’d now tend to avoid talking about ‘modes of existence’ (though all my views on this subject would have been impossible without our original discussions.)

It’s only when one assumes that adjectives do refer to kinds of entities that one needs to introduce new kinds of entities for them to refer to, i. e., properties and/or universals.

That in any case why I think it's important to analyse predication as a *linguistic mechanism*, as something that linguistic from top to bottom and which, although it is the source of many ontological errors, tells us nothing whatsoever about ontology. That does have ontological consequences of course, but mainly in the sense of criticising the view that the subject-predicate distinction does tell us about what exists.


JUD EVANS:
Personally I think to the contrary; that without language we would know nothing of ontology. For language, as you say above, to be the source of many ontological errors, tells us that language does deal with ontology, for how else could it throw up errors, and without language how else could we recognise and deal with those errors, or even discuss those errors?


JON NEIVENS
I’m only really talking about the subject-predicate mechanism here, not language per se. I hope I've answered your question somewhere in amongst all of this? I guess for me the answer is more the convergence of a number of issues.


JUD EVANS:
I found the discussion fascinating Jon, though it would be silly of me to pretend that we do not have differences of opinion. Viva la difference as far as I am concerned - for it is only through the medium of friendly divergence that we learn, and either modify or discard old ideas, or defend and hone our position into a more rounded world view


JON NEIVENS

This is a vast improvement of course, but one danger is that this notion is extended to nouns and adjectives per se, with nouns referring to existents and adjectives referring to abstractions. I would say that nouns and adjectives both refer to existents—the difference is that adjectives do not distinguish kinds of entities.
[regarding yours above] *It is only through the medium of friendly divergence that we learn, and either modify or discard old ideas, or defend and hone our position into a more rounded world view* We’re in total agreement there!

JUD EVANS:
For me *blue* itself is not an entity - whereas the hat which is blue is. The words blue and hat both *refer* to the same object but the referentiality is entirely different. One refers to the hat as an existent and the other refers to one feature or existential mode of the way the hat exists in the world. An interesting point here is that if we just say the word *hat* without any qualifying adjective we are then dependent upon our antecedal knowledge of the sort of existent we call *hat* and we then have to image various adjectives that might apply to it. You might imagine a hat like you see a lot in London whilst a Mexican guy might imagine a Stetson or a sombrero. When we supply an individual adjective we supply one of the missing descriptors, but we are still left to go on imagining what sort of size, brim, material etc., the hat might consist of - so any adjective does not point to[refer to] as merely an existent it attributes a *property* of blueness* to the hat and helps us to fill in the gaps and questions we may have as to the nature of its existentiality - NOT just the fact that it exists.


JON NEIVENS
Thanks for your kind response. Yes there are differences in our views but of course that’s what makes life interesting.

I’ll address your most important point straight away, that of word order. As I said, the original proto-language has no predication, so strictly speaking there is no role available for word order to play there. I could say *tall man* or *man tall* and it would mean the same thing. Of course to our ears in the second case we hear a nascent predication, presumably people who speak VSO languages would hear it in the first utterance. I remember Richard saying that there does have to be a kind of ‘suspension of disbelief’ when dealing with possible proto-language, in this case we have to overcome the instinctive tendency to impose our own more complex language structures onto the proto-language. You’ll recall that in the piece I originally sent to you, I use a much more formalized system to represent the language, all those letters and symbols etc, and the reason I did this was to create a kind of intellectual distance that you obviously don’t get when using contemporary English words as part of a simpler proto-language. I used a word based presentation in my previous post for ease of understanding. All of which means I’m fully prepared for the word order objection. J

Actually this is a good place to say a little more about how I see the actual structure of a predicative utterance. Here we can use the English phrases in all their contemporary glory, and compare the role of *tall* in the utterance *the man is tall* with its role in *the tall man* as part of *the tall man is in the corner.* The point itself is fairly straightforward. In *the tall man* the words *tall* and *man* obviously both refer to the same referent (the tall man we’re talking about) but more importantly they are both used to establish the referent for conversational purposes (I’m sure you can see that this is pretty close to our original concept of Extantal Imbuance.) In the case of *the man is tall* however, whilst the word *tall* still refers to the referent to the same extent as in *the tall man*, it is no longer tied the referent establishing function. It has a ‘free reference’ in the sense that because it is freed from the establishing function, it can take on other referential functions. Thus in the case of the proto-language, we can see that noun-adjective combinations are possible, but they are all tied to the referent establishing function, and that language hasn’t yet developed the ‘free reference’ structure required for predication. But the advantage of looking at it this way is that you can see what kind of a leap it is for this to happen.

Before I go on to particular responses, I agree with the analysis of reification with which you began your response. It does seem fairly clear to me that this process cannot begin to take hold until after predication has already entered the scene.



RICHARD SANSOM
Of course *blue* is not an entity, but is not a BLUEHAT an entity? Is it not profoundly and permanently different from a REDHAT? It seems to me that adjectival conditioning is more than conditioning, it is often, if not always, integral to the identity of the entity. While we can cognitively bifurcate [at least in our language and culture] HAT from BLUE, I would venture that in some cultures/languages this is not done – i. e. there might all the difference in the world between entities that have different features that we, in our language/culture might separate. Some cultures might see lake water as a completely different thing from river water; MOVINGWATER being entirely a different entity from STILLWATER. Aristotle supposedly gets us out of this – but he really does not. Right?


JON NEIVENS
Richard, I think this is spot on. My point is that the adjective/noun distinction is language specific, so the difference between BLUEHAT and REDHAT is marked by the linguistic distinctions we have to hand. If all hats were blue, we could just call them hats and leave it at that, rather like we don’t have a word SPOTTEDLEOPARD. On a more general point, we don’t have adjectives that are only used with one particular noun and no others. This would simply be a waste of linguistic resources, so the adjectives we have are general ones. It’s this that determines how we divide up our language into words like ‘red’ and ‘hat’ rather than anything to do with hats themselves. This is still the most important point for me, that whilst language is used to give us information of the world, the structure of language has nothing to do with the structure of the world. Aristotle assumes it does, though his is probably the most elegant version of this mistake.