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Adversarial Games
Mildly adversarial games such as Tic-tac-toe
were played in the Roman Empire, around the
first century BC. Tic-tac-toe was called
Terni Lapilli and instead of having any number of pieces,
each player only had three, thus they had
to move them around to empty spaces to keep
playing. The game's grid markings have been
found chalked all over Rome. However, according
to Claudia Zaslavsky's book Tic Tac Toe: And Other Three-In-A Row Games
from Ancient Egypt to the Modern Computer, Tic-Tac-Toe could originate back to ancient
Egypt.
Such pastimes are pleasant and help pass
away the time, and despite its apparent competitive
simplicity, Tic-tac-toe requires detailed
analysis to determine even some elementary
combinatorial facts, the most interesting
of which are the number of possible games
and the number of possible positions. A position
is merely a state of the board, while a game
usually refers to the way a terminal position
is obtained.
Unlike the ability for most people to work
out the combinative benefits of aligning
the X and O symbols of Tic-tac-toe to best
effect, there is no way to convince a believer
that if one religion, or one form of transcendentalism
is combinatorily coalesced with another,
or that if slight differences of religious
observance are ignored, that peaceful, advantageous
results will follow. As history demonstrates,
lining up the theological X's or the O's
for Christians and other religionists does
not seem possible.
The Chomskian revolution in linguistics is
comprised of three elements. The first is
finding common structures and formulating
common rules that apply to all human languages. The second is relating linguistics to studying
and making hypotheses about the way children
acquire languages. And the third is studying
mathematically very abstract forms of languages.
Chomsky's theory of generative grammar is
important in all three combinative
aspects, but the religious seem to go out of their way
to design structures and styles of worship,
dress, ritual and rules as
different as possible from other belief systems.
It remains a curious fact that, often, if
pressed, they will (with a certain degree
of embarrassment) admit that everyone worships
the same God, though the names of the deity
may differ.
Look at any area of the world for recent
examples of internecine, doctrinally based
conflict characterized by bloodshed and carnage
for both sides.
The only alternative, as I see it, is for more
influential figures, (a group of which
I am not claiming membership by any means) and respected
academics (like Dawkins and others have already
courageously done) to come out of the closet
before it is too late and publicly declare
that metaphysical "objects" or
"occult entities do not exist AT ALL
and thereby set an example to the less intellectually
developed elements in all societies.
Quick-wittedness, long-held positions in
academic institutions and a high I.Q wedded
to a wide knowledge-base does not automatically
mean that wisdom is a guaranteed feature
of the educated - as a perusal of any history
book will soon confirm.
The discussions I have with others of a transcendentalist
mind set are certainly not petty, but manifest
two sides of an unbridgeable chasm between
a scientific approach to the human condition
and an archaic reificationalism which has
existed and been argued over for millennia.
This existential division has certainly been
evident since the time of Parmenides and
the Eleatics, who explained how what is real
is at the same time a "one" and
at the same time a matergic collective, and
the human-neuro-induced ontological change
via any "effort of the will" (a
la Nietzsche - Hitler and others) is impossible,
such obvious nonsense as psychokinesis, televisualization,
but most importantly the physical existentialisation
of the inexistent and that, "that which
is what it is" (insert your own covert
predication here) exists or as the Germans
say: "es gibt - it is given"
Parmenides adds - that the cosmic constituents
- insert your own name for them - (which
inhabit a domain in which you are expert
Georges) of what exists, are timeless, consistent,
and ontologically unchanging - to which I
add - other than in accord with an inherent
innate inclination of inter-matergic re-constitutive
relationships which favour a continuance
to exist and enhance the existential modalities
of such entities.
Now as might be expected, after more than
two thousand years Parmenides' latter (cosmological)
claims are arguable and provide a subject
for another interesting discussion. What
is being argued about on these lists is the
ontological implications of Parmenides' claim
that "what is not" (to mae on"
- "that which is not") is unworthy
of mention in human discourse. I do NOT believe
(with Parmenides) that the occult is unworthy
of discussion. If modern philosophers or
scientists just ignored it simply hoping
such irrational faiths in the existence of
the non-existent would just "fade away"
- then they have got a nasty surprise coming
- particularly if the irrationalists get
their trembling hands on weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them.
Now on face value alone this appears to suggest
that human communication according to Parmenides
would be reduced to the guttural exchange
of nouns presumably accompanied by helpful
gesticulation. It means nothing of the sort.
It implies that all non-material behavioural
predicative referenda (action, events, cause,
perception, thinking, etc) can all be identified,
distinguished and mapped to material entities
if the signification employed in that mapping
indicates entity-types already proprietarily
equipped and accepted by the language community
involved as being entiatically known, with
a predicative data that (as the police say)
constitutes "previous form."
Actually the question of "what is and
what is not" the physically matergic
entity it is purported to be, is surely one
of the most fundamental and important features
of most progressive agendas, and particularly
for Einstein, who insisted that: "A
new manner of thinking is essential if mankind
is to survive."
Like Georges Metanomski, Antonio Rossin and
others, in my own modest way, humble in the
sense that I have no pretensions that I what
I think and write personally can have more
than but a minuscule effect upon the tragic
outcomes will ripple out into the sea of
humanity if the need for a new way of thinking
is ignored, am responding to Einstein's plea
for cognitive change and how outdated views
might be improved, in contradistinction to
outlooks based upon ancient misunderstandings,
which either deliberately or unintentionally
militate against any melioration or renaissance
in the neurological basis of human communication
and behaviour.
These critical differences, hinging as they
do on understandings and misinterpretations
of what actually exists in the world - rather
than what is imagined, or would be "preferred"
by some to exist in the world, has led to
behaviours in which non-matergic entities
are volitionally self-existentialised or
conjured or twizzled into the world (compare
Meinong's "to name is to existentialise,"
etc.)
In other words "doctrinally preferred"
pseudo-entities are "thought into existence"
in order to support certain doctrinal minutiae
or the needs of faith. Such primitive practices
are profoundly dangerous and of critical
importance, particularly in a nuclear world,
where unstable individuals, groups, communities
and whole nations infected with a cocktail
of ontological myopia and religious fanaticism
- but rich funds, manpower with a suicidally
dedicated criminal ability to kill, or in
situations where societies with certain desirable
assets can employ or trade such monetary
or black, liquid gold for nuclear weapons.
Predicate Logic.
In the same way that one cannot create "centaurs"
or boodlewangers" just by naming them
- one cannot create existential sets (empty
or otherwise) simply by placing a backwards
E - then hoping like hell that everyone accepts
twizzle-stick logical games in order to win
arguments by making up our own rules. The
notorious Russian mathematicians dreamed
up new sets and got away with we know, but
that is because the mathematical community
were up the river without a paddle and desperately
welcomed the newly created set-fodder provided
by the "Name Worshippers" in order
to deal with concepts of infinity hang on
to their jobs. The real names of Russian
Trio of religious fanatics (who also happened
to have been mathematicians) were: Egorov,
Luzin and Florensky.
"Naming Infinity - A True Story of Religious
Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity" Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor
The Belknap Press of Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
People only agree to play the syllogistic
OXO (tic-tac-toe to Brits) games of deductive
reasoning in which a conclusion is derived
from two premises "O" and "X"
must appear in a horizontal or vertical row
and render the winning word OXO, or the hangman
game, where the hanged stick-figure is made
to appear in a certain configuration of short
lines added sequentially in conformity with
rules which have been mutually agreed in
advance.
Let's pretend OXO "logic" (or Twizzle-Stick
Logic") if perfect for whiling away
the time on a long railway journey, but has
no place in serious grown-up, ontological
discussion. In other words the soundness
or unsoundness of twizzle-stick "logical"
premises which have been arbitrarily made
up by the twizzler are ABSOLUTELY the same
as filling in crossword puzzles in conformity
with the rules established by the crossword-setter
himself. Question: In what way can a "fact"
or "number" be claimed or implied
to exist other than as a matergic object?
Answer: There are only two ways to explain
and ontologically rectify the naive reificative
claim that a "fact" or "number"
or "is of isness" can be said to
exist.
(A) By a demonstrative restoration of the
referential association to the matergic nominatum,
in place of which the metaphysical reifico-factive
substitution has wrongfully been made. i.
e.
1. The fact exists that the Eiffel Tower
exists. -- restored as --
2. The Eiffel Tower exists. In the absence
of such a semantic restoration, or if the
restorative process is too semantico-syntactically
complicated to communicate in a manner which
can be understood by the average reader -
then a simple acceptance that the reification
is actually a useful fiction is the only
alternative.
(B) By revealing the erroneous claim that:
"the fact exists that the Eiffel Tower
exists," rather than, or in addition
to, the existing Eiffel Tower as being a
neuro-existential modality of the utterer
of such a occult claim, rather than being
an existential modality the Eiffel Tower
itself, or of the word "fact."
It might be also helpful if the claimant
be compelled (perhaps with the assistance
of Harry Potter or The Wizard of Oz) to transport
his factive existent - "fact that the
Eiffel Tower exists." and erect his
"fact" next to the Eiffel Tower
in the Champs of Mars and publicly ascend
to the top in its lift. Such a public demonstration
of the metaphysical constructional possibilities
of transcendentalistic facts, rather than
caste iron and steel beams and nuts and bolts
are sure to be taken up by governments all
over the world with a proliferation of metaphysical
Eiffel Towers as tourist attractions from
Kalamazoo to the Kalahari Desert.
Joe Polanik:
in any case, what's at issue is not the definition
of existence, but my claim that there is
a pattern of speech, in use for thousands
of years, by which the user may assert that
the subject "is" without asserting
statements about that subject by means of
a predicate.
Jud Evans:
You have obviously thrown in the towel and
apparently rejected the whole basis of the
metaphysical study of the nature of being
and existence as seeking a definition of
existence, but are in "fact" merely
instances of patterns of speech which means
that your claims concerning what has been
discussed on this list and others (including
all that ontological bunkum about the cogito)
have not been arguments and claims about
the existence of non-existents - but rather
claims about the historical speech patterns
of others that you have unquestioningly adopted
and, to judge by your persist ant presentation
of these claims completely swallowed.
Joe Polanik:
this speech pattern is documented by the
scholars who have composed the OED. it is
signification 1 under 'be' in the OED. they
call it the 'absolute' signification of be.
I call it the is of isness.
are you denying that there is such a speech
pattern? if so, what is the basis that claim?
Jud Evans:
I will give you credit Joe for being the
most slippery fish I have ever encountered
on the Internet. Sadly your efforts at substituting
the topic of the speech-patterns of others
and the lexicographical compilations of examples
of those speech-patterns in the OED as the
subject under analysis just will not work
on a list with such canny membership as this.
The speech-patterns of others, whether they
be the speech-patterns of the Amazonian Indians,
the world's Catholic population of 1,121,516,000,
or the Muslim population of 1,387,454,500
are not an issue. What is the issue is and
what the issue HAS BEEN concerning this long-term
thread has been what Heidegger called: "The
ontological difference."
That the OED publishes signification 1 under 'be' and it appears in the OED. and
that they call it the 'absolute' signification of be. and that your version is to call
it the is of isness does NOT mean that merely because such a
book exists, that the claims that it contains
also exist is nonsensical - one has only
to look at the Bible as a further example.
I suggest that you proceed with you erection
of "the fact that the Eiffel Tower exists"
in Paris, while I made provisional approaches
to representatives of the Nobel Prize Committee to invite them to the French Capital to
witness your erection. ;-)
Georges Metanomski:
1. The operator "is" is merely
an "equals symbol," which computer
experts like much more likely to recognise
that conformance- philosophers steeped in
ancient ideas and challenged in the lateral
thinking department. ========== Just to keep
the record straight. The symbol "="
of programming say in C++ does not mean "equality"
but "transfer".
Explaining: Symbols "a" and "b"
are "addresses", i. e. pointers
to main store memory elements. Symbols "2"
and "5" define these numeric values.
after executing: a=2; b=5; the values 2 and
5 are stored respectively in memories "a"
and "b".
Now, the statement a=b; transfers the contents
of b to a and executing it we get: a contains
5 and b contains 5.
But, if we executed in stead "b=a",
both memories would contain 2.
"=" is not equality, but transfer.
"a=b" and "b=a" are not
equivalent, but opposed.
It's valid only for some programming languages
and using it as analogies for natural languages
should be done - if at all - very carefully.
Cheers Georges.
Jud Evans:
I appreciate you helpful comments here Georges
on computational - as a physicist engaged
with computers and such things obviously
you know more that I will ever know about
the function of such operators. My (humble) = sign /is/ is meant to convey that what follows
the sign /is/ ("=") describes an
aspect or aspects of the way (modality) an
object is judged to exist by the author of
the statement. I suppose it does "convey"
the information by deixis which in linguistics,
refers to the phenomenon wherein understanding
the meaning of certain words ( such as the
subject name) in an utterance requires contextual
information in that what follows (the predicate)
describes the way the subject can be found
in the world.
If you have any suggestions as to ways in
which my simple symbol might be improved
in such a way that ordinary folk will still
understand the economic simplicity of my
theories without complicating the gist of
what I am trying to convince people - I would
be deeply grateful
How could the is = symbol indicate any predication
of that which is un-predicative? The ontological
scrabble-word "isness" cannot be
of deictic interest to dear old /is/ for
it is predicatively empty container - it
is no more than a substitute word for the
subject itself.
Or if one considers (using your hoary old
lingo) the "isness" of the subject
in a sentence, then one is referring to the
sum or 'Gesamtsumme' of its " properties"
(existential modalities.) 'That which
exists and its so-called 'essence,' or "isness"
= the total existential modality or way that
such an entity exists, and maps precisely
the same thing as the denotatum of the subject
name "the cow" - in "The cow
is in the Garden." is the total sum
of all its properties - like the total isness
of a car is the collection of nuts and bolts
and wheels and fenders and windscreen wipers
and seats and ash-trays that we call "The
car."
The linguistic signifier can change of course
(from "calf" to "cow,"
etc) or from "egg" to "chicken"
in order for the human categorisor to keep
nominative pace with the concurrently ever-changing,
existential conglomerate of substances and
their combinatory modes, which impinge upon
the totality of the physical nexus and supervenery
Gesamtsumme which is its autogenic collaboratorist
isness.
There has been much philosophical discussion
concerning which came first - the chicken
or the egg? The answer is neither - they
are but earlier and later existential modalities
of the same thing. The real or sentential
(ideative) extantal subject is that which
equates or corresponds with the subject (the
nominatum) named by the signifier - the name
or noun by which it is identified. (see Walter
on this) The real or sentential entity that
corresponds to the definite article and signifier:
" the man" or "the Rhode Island
red which is the assemblage, or conglomerate
of human or chicken existential components
in their ever- changing states and modalities.
That which the philosophical tradition extrinsically
calls "essence" is intrinsically
a seething similitude of physical, event-based
somatic equivalences that occur to the quantum-based,
component mini-entities of which the entity
consists. The ongoing internal and external
interactions and the totality of their dynamic
somatic events and processes inhere to that
physical entireness - the named existent
subject entity - the man.
So your use of the word "isness"
will only send you down another rabbit-hole
to join the ontological Mad hatter's Tea
Party which you believed you had escaped.
Oh! Well - away you go.
I will look out for you as I stroll past
the next rabbit-warren I come to on my morning
walk.
(And watch out for the Queen of Hearts -
she can suddenly turn nasty.
Joe Polanik:
One difference between the two phrases is
that the is of isness does not indicate or assert the mode of
isness of the subject; except, for instantiating
the subject as an object of thought, the
topic of conversation. the crucial case is
the claim: there is an even prime number.
Asserting this claim instantiates the concept
of an even prime number as the topic of conversation;
but, the is of isness does not otherwise define the mode of isness
of '2'. thus, there is no assumption either
that the Plato/Godel/Penrose theory concerning
mathematical objects is true or that it is
false.
Jud Evans:
The Romans invented this ontologically pragmatic
term for exactly this clarification purpose,
presumably hoping that such an ontological
semantic improvement for discourse would
free them from the dreaded "being-word"
(which was screamed all over the forum by
those pesky lip-frothed Christians with its
implication of a soul, which acted as an
oppressive encumbrance on more worldly Roman
imperial and intellectual endeavor) and nail
the occult guff about spooky spiritual doppelgängers
following us around like permanent lodgers
all through are lives, only to desert the
sinking corporeal hulk for habitations in
hell or heaven when we die.
Though not half so bad as the primitive BE-
word which is traceable to the Ur-Language
of the great Indo-European language family
long before the great Indian linguist Panini
(experts give dates in the 4th, 5th, 6th
and 7th century BC) was but a gleam in his
father's eye, the exist word carries a similar payload of ontological
restrictive weight much like a racehorse
is loaded with thin metal weights to equal
the odds in a race.
Jon Neivens Neivens:
To substitute "God exists" which
is an intransitive verb not being followed
by an object does not solve the problem or
pure or bare existence for just like the
inferior transitive Be-word it suffers from
a predication problem. The way this is achieved
is much the same as the orphanic "is"
is circumlocutiously regularised and provided
with a ready-made, covert, experientially
crafted predicate:
Thus:
1. "God is..."God is great."
2. "God exists... God exists as... our
loving father."
Jud Evans:
What a great birthday present hearing from
you Jon Neivens! (actually, I was 75 yesterday.)
Great to hear from you! Hope you and your
dear wife are well? One person in the Neivens'
household most obviously is thriving and
that is Vinnie of course - when Clare saw
his photo - the first thing she (after what
a lovely little boy) was: "He looks
bursting with health."
It is nice to see you back again. I learnt
so much from you when we first started off
the AIT thing and judging from what you have
written below a new supply of cognitive goodies
has suddenly become available.
Jon Neivens:
So what better opportunity to rehearse some
of my own arguments again. I'll take it a
bit at a time, and see of anyone wants to
bite.
I'm going to take things a bit at a time.
The first conclusion I've come to concerns
metaphysics, and its relation to the subject-predicate
distinction (or whatever else you want to
call it). So statement one, if you like runs
as follows:
METAPHYSICS IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU MISTAKE
THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE (or, more specifically,
the subject-predicate structure) FOR THE
STRUCTURE OF THE COSMOS.
Jud Evans:
I would agree with that and add that metaphysics
is also what happens when you find yourself
in the pilot's seat of an American Airline
aircraft full of screaming passengers heading
straight for a skyscraper in New York, which
is full of screaming office-workers of which
2,973 became the incinerated or crushed victims
of some metaphysical mistake. The overwhelming
majority of casualties were civilians, including
nationals of over 90 countries.
Jon Neivens:
I should add that NOT ALL metaphysical ideas
issue from this source -- but I tend to agree
with old Wittgenstein when he said that metaphysics
has its basis in the misunderstanding of
language. Abstract notions like causation
are another rich source of metaphysics.
Jud Evans:
Too true Jon Neivens: I'm with David Hume
on this one, for I believe the same as you
(and Wittgenstein on this point) that it
is the structure of language (including gerunds
morphing into [helpful and unhelpful] reification)
that give us the mistaken impression that
the descriptions of behavioural objects (matergy)
exists in addition to or together with the
objects themselves. For me ontology means
attempting to convince people of these linguistic
al semantic mistakes, for without any progression
in this area the rest of philosophy is mostly
a load of hot air. Along with Georges Metanomski
I believe that a second evolutionary enlightenment
is desperately needed to kick-in soon or
as James Cagney said " The show's over
- Its 'curtains baby!"
Jon Neivens:
But, to get back to my own statement, what
exactly does it mean? Well, it's the expectation
that the distinction between subject and
predicate corresponds to some kind of actual
distinction in the cosmos.
Jud Evans:
Strangely enough only yesterday I was contemplating
the critical difference between the textually
named subject and what is predicatively claimed
about the existential modes of that entity
and the extra- linguistic psychological versions
which may differ. I find people often map
meaning to the lexical chart itself, rather
than what Korzybski called the "territory"
and assume that it is the lexical items (the
words) that reflect or represent the reality
of the cosmos, rather than the interiorised
ontological determinations and judgements
instantiated by the human brain. There is
a persistent primitive belief that the human
brain and the cosmos are two different domains
just, because the brain is separated from
"outside" by a thin carapace of
bone no thicker than the binding of the average
hardcover book.
Jon Neivens:
Aristotle is a prime example of this-- his
genius in a way is that he exemplifies it
so clearly.
More generally, we can see what the subject
of a sentence refers to, and this is reasonably
(though not of course wholly) unproblematic.
In other words, subjects are generally (but
not always, viz. reifications) the kind of
things, objects, we can see and interact
with.
Jud Evans:
To me the terminology of philosophical discourse
has become corrupted. I believe that the
word "subject" and "object"
should be strictly reserved to map to matergic
entities for it confuses descriptions of
the behaviour of behavioural matergies (rocks,
humans, stars, quanta, army tanks, etc) with
that which is being described. Thus, "The
Friday meeting of the Womens' Guild"
is often elevated to a existential pseudo-status.
Such lexical constructions should rightly
continue to be referred to as rhema (as Aristotle
would have referred it) meaning "utterance"
and (by implication matters concerning the
REAL subject" or "topic of a narration,
a claim, a command or of human disputation
- and the REAL subject of ANYTHING that man
does, refers to, reports or claims is man
himself. So the real, actual, ontological
subject of ANY sentence ever uttered or written
in the whole of human history from his first
meaningful grunts to the latest sophisticated
output of our writers, poets, philosophers
and scientists is unfailingly a human or
humans.
Jon Neivens:
The problem is the assumption that predicates
refer in pretty much the same way as subjects
do. For then we have the problem of what
exactly predicates refer _to_. The problem
usually arises from the assumption that predicates
refer _in the same way_ that subjects do,
and so the fact that we generally (though
not of course always) find something tangible
that the subject refers to leads us to look
for the same kind of thing in respect of
predicates.
Jud Evans:
Consider the statement:
Dear Editor,
"The condition of the pavements in Bond
Street, which are disfigured by half-chewed
and ejected chewing-gum is a disgrace to
the city of London." |
In keeping with my view of "the subject
matter of any subject" above, I also
hold that what is predicated about the condition
of the pavements in Bond Street, which are
disfigured by half-chewed and ejected chewing-gum,
is "rhema or a "topic" or
"something said about" the human
beings who live in or visit London (although
the statement would be parse the "subject"
as being: the condition of the pavements
in Bond Street, "which is ultimately
(the nominatum) to which any sentential subject
in any human language anywhere can be retraced,
Jon Neivens:
One argument is that predicates refer to
properties, or universals, which is a simple
and obvious version of metaphysics. Some
people have no problem with this, others
find it problematic to the point of offensiveness.
I certainly fall into the latter category.
Jud Evans:
I agree with you completely Jon Neivens.
As is well known I have referred to it for
years as "useful fiction, " to
which BTW I would add "number (math)
as a super-dooper form of vitally important
useful fiction. It is the other category
of reificative , ontological nonsense that
I identity as malo-reification which contains
a real, actual threat to the very survival
of mankind.
Jon Neivens:
Another argument is that predicates refer
to nothing at all, that predicates are simply
_flatus vocis_, an emission of sound by the
mouth. The problem here is, if predicates
refer to nothing at all, how can they be
true or false of a subject?
Jud Evans:
It depends what is meant by "nothing
at all?" If I think what I think you
do, I agree. For whilst I believe that often
what is said about a human/humans subject
can be vital, important, useless, interesting,
boring, etc. ontologically speaking, like
you I believe that it IS no more than flatus
vocis because what is spoken about does not
exist unless the subject is a human or some
other matergic entity.
Jon Neivens:
How can I agree with "Grass is green"
and disagree with "Grass is red"
if both "green" and "red"
refer to nothing?
Jud Evans:
Absolutely! But most educated people understand
that red and green refers to the cones or
sensors of the human eye (an exterior part
of the brain) which translates certain wavelengths
of lights in configurations that effect the
brain that are interpreted and referred to
by the names we have invented for such a
purpose.
Jon Neivens:
The response generally leads to various forms
of conceptualism, i. e., the notion that
whereas subjects (for the most part) refer
to physical objects, predicates refer to
our own shared intellectual concepts.
Jud Evans:
I see that as the main thrust of my analysis
too.
Jon Neivens: I
t's interesting though that this latter argument
also ends up arguing, in effect, that the
subject-predicate distinction refers to a
distinction in the cosmos, although here
it's a distinction between physical objects
on the one hand and vibrations in the brain
(or some such thing) on the other.
Jud Evans:
As in my opinion us enbrained humans are
part of the cosmos it is possible on a certain
mereological level to distinguish neurologically
active humans from insentient beings. Mind
you it is possible to have two views of the
cosmos - a holistic one where we stare upwards
at the whole glittering array of the milky
way, or to pull back the focus and concentrate
on one individuate star or planet.. It is
the second observational mode that explains
many peoples' misunderstand of Parmenides
and his "ONE" immobile cosmos,
when in fact his intention (in spite of lacking
the word exist as he did) was to draw our
attention to the two ways of considering
the whole and its parts.
Jon Neivens:
But again, the basic notion here is that
predicates have to refer in the same way
that subjects do.
It's interesting too when you consider this
in relation to the so-called copula. This
is supposed to "join" the subject
and the predicate and, presumably, also join
their references. This just perpetuates the
erroneous picture outlined above.
Jud Evans:
I could not agree more Jon Neivens.
Jon Neivens:
Now my idea, is that rather than the subjects
and predicates referring to two different
things in the same way (i. e., the predicate
refers in the same way the subject does),
subjects and predicates refer to the same
thing (i. e., what the subject refers to)
but in different ways.
As soon as one asks as an isolated question
what predicates refer to one is already in
trouble. The answer will be something like
'it refers to an "aspect" of what
the subject refers to,' and you're already
in the mire.
Jud Evans:
This is easily explained by responding that
it is only humanly possible to generate a
limited amount of subject-predicatiana in
one utterance - and that it would be physically
and ontologically impossible to spew out
all that one could possible say about a subject-predicatiana
(a neologism straight out of the oven) (a)
because you don't know it all and never will
and (b) because human language is incapable
of conveying such information even if we
knew it.
The fatal flaw for you Joe lies in
your central argument and the sub-lines of
unreasoning you offer as reason, which you
usher forward in order to support your false
central Grundlage or basic principle upon
which the whole edifice of your metaphysical
mysterium is founded - "the existence
of existence, the being of being, or the
isness of isness" of that which exists.
There exist no existential "ontological
differences, " nor can any such abstractives
created by humans be found in the world for
use in discourse to describe the facts that
they believe exist in the world and particularise
such entitative behaviors. There exist only
the entiative corporeal discussive matergies
themselves.
The introduction of the metaphysical terms
"existence, being, isness, presence,
actuality, reality," or your instantiation
or pseudo-representation of an idea in the
form of an non-instance of it - isness without
predication, is to throw wide your doctrinal
doors and admit an infinite or vicious regress
of clamorous devils the like of which would
have caused old Descartes to leap from his
armchair before the fire and run for his
life - a life which he had already instantiated
the moment he uttered the pronominal "I"....
the rest of the cogito left unfinished and
the honeycomb abandoned to melt upon the
carpet.
To employ a recent perceptively laconic observation
of Georges Metanomski, which I have long
used myself in other forms of words in various
posts over the years - you initiate a mad
metaphysical melange of "isnessness
of isness" and if that does not bring
the bacon of "being" home - the
"isnessnessness of isnessness"
and so on to kingdom come.
You catch yourself in a conceptual cleft
stick, for you can only deny "the existence
of existence" (or isness) by denying
existence or isness - yet if you insist upon
claiming that such a thing exists, then you
are swept up in a recidivate regress of reificative
reflection worthy of the "Coney Island
Hall of Mirrors."
So many otherwise brilliant philosophers
fall at this ficto-factive fence. For some
reason, which I find utterly bizarre, many
otherwise brilliant men cannot get their
brain around the fact that "facts"
DO NOT EXIST.
For example - it is a fact (which our friend
Georges will confirm) that there stands in
Champ de Mars in Paris a remarkable structure
called The Eiffel Tower (Tour Eiffel) Indeed
it has become both a global icon of France
and one of the most recognizable structures
in the world. The fact that The Eiffel Tower
exists is incontrevertible, but the fact
that it exists does not exist and is not
true.- only The Eiffel Tower exists.
It is also true that because facts do not
exist, then the fact that there are facts
does not exist either, nor does the fact
that facts do NOT exist, exist. The same
is true of any of the transcendentalist reifications
that form the Grundlage of all metaphysical
doctrines ever espoused and which differ
only in their terminology and totems the
falsely existentialise - but share similar
world views in the sense of being based upon
naive faith rather than reason.
Aristotle argued that knowing doesn't necessitate
an infinite regress, because some knowledge
does not depend on demonstration: Aristotle,
Posterior Analytics (Book 1, Part 3)
But is silly and dangerous to take such an
opinion seriously - for Aristotle was himself
a man of God believed that there is a tripartite
human soul. and men of god who believe that
have a tripartite spiritual passenger aboard
cannot be trusted as far as one can physically
throw them as far as anything of ontological
seriousness is concerned, for he said:
" Yet there is God, though not perhaps
the simple and human god conceived by the
forgivable anthropomorphism of the adolescent
mind."
Now I do not think that philosophy and particularly
ontology should be based up knowledge completely
bereft of demonstration or forms analycity
accounted for in wholly immanent terms, or
of mental or reifico-revelatory acts or visitations
performed entirely within the mind devoid
any empirical evidence whatsoever and based
upon hypostasisation rather than that which
is real. quoting The Collected Works of John
Stuart Mill, Volume VII - A System of Logic
Ratiocinative and Inductive. Chapter IV Of
Propositions. [1843]
It is apt to be supposed that the copula
is something more than a mere sign of predication;
that it also signifies existence. In the
proposition, Socrates is just, it may seem
to be implied not only that the quality just
can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover
that Socrates is, that is to say, exists.
This, however, only shows that there is an
ambiguity in the word is; a word which not
only performs the function of the copula
in affirmations, but has also a meaning of
its own, in virtue of which it may itself
be made the predicate of a proposition. That
the employment of it as a copula does not
necessarily include the affirmation of existence,
appears from such a proposition as this,
A centaur is a fiction of the poets; where
it cannot possibly be implied that a centaur
exists, since the proposition itself expressly
asserts that the thing has no real existence.
Joe Polanik:
This is the type of thinking that results
in a derangement of the existential quantifier.
Jud Evans:
Please Note: my caps are for emphasis only.
There is no such thing as: "the existential
quantifier" to be "deranged"
in the first place. The existential quantifier
is at the same time an ontological, logical,
physical and commonsense impossibility which
needs exposing as an utter scam.
"Pure or bare existence" is a total
impossibility, for an entity can only exist
AS SOME KIND OF ENTITY which presupposes
PROPERTIES.
Entities cannot exist as NOTHING AT ALL -
just as a NAME at all. Nothing can exist
BY NAME ALONE. The so-called existential
quantifier is a logicians toy - and patently,
judging by the fact that they have never
challenged Frege's load of old crap and continue
to peddle the guff in universities and God
knows where else - the very LAST thing that
"logicians" understand is the be-mechanism
and the most basic fundamental of ontology
- i. e. that one cannot existentialise entities
merely by typing a backward E on a computer
screen. Predicate logic consists of no more
than satisfactorily completing syllogisms
that make sense according to rules which
have ABSOLUTELY NOTHING do with the real
world but simply comply with stupid rules
created by stupid men. Such games for grownups
is similar to filling in the X symbols and
the O symbols in the daily newspaper so that
they may be read as OXO like the kid's game.
What humans call "existence" or
"being" or "worldly presence"
is only possible for significata (nouns and
sentential subjects SUCESSFULLY MAP to denotata
WHICH ALREADY EXIST a priori to any putative
attempts by humans to metaphysically existentialise
them. No matter how many backward E-signs
they employ, no matter how many incantations
are chanted, no matter how many times they
wave their magic metaphysical twizzle-sticks
mankind cannot existentialise things simply
by NAMING THEM!
En passant the philosopher of Nazism Heidegger's
silly little metaphysical mannikin Dasein
( in German: "existence" or the
gerundial "being there" does not
exist either just because Ontology's clown
Heidegger attempted to map to such a nominational
non-entity.
There can only EVER be instantiative claims
concerning the existential modalities of
property-equipped existing entities, or descriptions
of such entities that existed in the past.
The literary and linguistic references to
centaurs, unicorns, Moby Dicks and the rest
of the fiction of the poets and children's
books are ACKNOWLEDGED not to map to matergic
objects and nobody with any sense expects
a matergic "hit" when reading Snow
White and the Seven Dwarves" so why
do predicate logicians and other sundry transcendentalists
expect to map to the rest of the propertyless
lexicals and expect to get correlative hits
with names bereft of any properties whatsoever?
Is your fall-back excuse-position still totally
reliant on false speech patterns alone?
Anyway - you are due in the Champs of Mars
soon, so then we will see if your occult
claims have any basis.
Joe Polanik:
The centaur is indeed a fiction of poets
and an object of the imagination; hence,
it is a phenomenological reality and exists
as such.
Jud Evans:
And please explain in the bowels of our Lord
Jesus Christ what
"phenomenological realities" are
and the precise manner in which they exist
and where I may find one and evaluate it?
Joe Polanik:
To imply, as Mill does, that because centaurs
do not have real existence
(no metaphenomenal existence as matergic
objects) they have no existence of any mode
of existence is to misunderstand the is as
copula. by itself it makes no claims as to
metaphenomenal modes of isness (or the lack
thereof).
Jud Evans: We all know that already Joe -
it was me that told you so - remember? Centaurs
either exist - or they do NOT exist - which
is it? My position quite is clear on the
point - they do NOT exist and the ideational
instantiation of such non-existents and questions
of whether they exist or do not exist does
not exist either, and the ancient tales about
them and the imaginative pictorial representations
of them - are neuro-existential modalities
of the humans who are engaged in such info-entertainment
and historical research into ancient beliefs
and mythology, etc.
Joe Polanik:
this results in the derangement of the existential
quantifier because the mathematically true
statement, an even prime number exists, becomes
false when existence is limited to real (physical)
existence; and, it becomes questionable when
existence is taken to mean real (Platonic)
existence.
Jud Evans:
What kind of an answer is that Joe? What
on earth is "existential quantifier"
- what does THAT do - I will answer that
- bugger-all! The
"mathematically true" statement
is UTTERLY different from an "ontologically
true" statement (which correctly denies
the existence of number altogether) for it
is a humanly created useful fiction for establishing
a mutually agreed system of providing a mathematical
description of the world in which we find
ourselves. As for Platonic existence it is
no more than a discredited farce.
The Platonically ideal pork pie? You gotta
be jokin!'
A good epitaph on my gravestone? It needs
remembering that abstractionism and reificationalism
is not the exclusive preserve of transcendentalists
and the religious - the little piglets of
scientism can be seen vigorously tail-wiggling
and squealing at the same strip of sow-teats
of spuriousness."
That would make a good epitaph on my gravestone?
Yes? Is it too long to scan onto the stone?
Could it be compressed or compacted? Too
expensive to chip? What's that? You agree?
Well, old friend, make sure that Clare goes
ahead with ordering the stonemason to execute
the inscription should you outlive me. You
know my address - you are "persona grata"
in our home - put the pressure on when the
time comes, and insist that it was my wish..
Produce this text as evidence. Premonitions
of death? No. Just laying down a post-mortemnal
marker.
Walter writes:
X is 23.
Therefore, named 'X' = 23.
I'm not sure you've actually responded to
that. I mean, obviously, sometimes, these
types of arguments are valid. But they don't
seem to be at other times, and it's not because
there are lots of Jon Neivenseses. Even if
there were only one, the above would be fallacious.
W
Jud:
Dear Walter,
PROLOGUE BEFOR ARRIVING AT THE GOODIES!
I believe that we humans, because of our
(fit for purpose) but inadequate sensorium,
which in some cases is incapable of an extended
examinational treatment of certain of the
particulars we find around us in the world,
come nearest to understanding and perceiving
objects (matergy) when what we are dealing
with becomes the subject of a logical tautology.
I am very partial to tautologies, which seem
to me to be constructions which are perceptions
that allow us to see the glimmerings of what
"reality" is really like.
The statement x is named x is such a tautology
unless someone asks:
"What, if anything other than a logical
symbol, does x stand for? If the answer is:
"X stands for Jon Neivenses" or
"X stands for all the ice cream cones
in the world"
then it spoils the logical symmetry and allows
the real cruel world to intrude on such beautiful
abstraction and spoil the party, for there
are not only millions of Jon Neivenseses
in the world, some of which, because their
surname is unknown to another person, is
perhaps known as "Jack" or "the
guy standing at the bar."
As far as Cynthia Jon Neivenses is concerned
she becomes Cynthia Wilkinson when she marries,
and many people might have no idea that she
has surrendered her "Jon Neivensesness."
"X is 23 therefore, named 'X' = 23"
contains similar extraneous implicature,
which can set the cognitive cat amongst the
ontological pigeons, for if the reader lacks
the knowledge that 23 refers to the age of
X and the meaning does not relate to his
age, but to the number on his prison cell
door and he has just been moved next door
to cell 22 - then the statement is false,
for in that situation, as far as x, his fellow
prisoners and the warders are concerned "x
was (not is) 23." There are many other
examples I will not mention here. The trouble
with predicate logic is that it relies upon
assumptions which in the real world can be
a very dangerous thing to do. In that sense
I rate symbolic logic of this type to be
merely slightly better than cross-word puzzles.
So in my book in order for a for a tautological
expression to be as trustworthy as is possible,
the relationship must be a very old established
one, tried and trusted for a long time (where
everybody knows exactly what is meant by
23) in order that any implicature like numbers
on cell doors etc. that might disturb its
truth value have been ironed out.
NOW FOR THE GOODIES. I like the inference
in what you have written that all predication
might at bottom be about identity very much
indeed, and it is a cool idea (as my 13 year
old ontologically street-wise son Cameron
has just remarked about it whilst I drove
him to school) for if can be empirically
proved - it will be a cutting edge ontological
breakthrough (which I think is what we are
jointly acheiving) which will leave poor
old Frege and Lord Bertie floundering in
our wakes.
The idea makes sense to me, for as no object
in the cosmos is EXACTLY the same as any
other and uniquely the same in EVERY way
(otherwise it would BE that other object)
the only thing, as far as humans are concerned,
that allows it to be thought of as existing
and identified as such, is that which is
said of it (its predication.) IOW what instantiates
it and sets it apart from other objects is
the nature of the predication that describes
and identifies it. That is not to say that
such predico-identitive instantiation is
"singleton-specific" and that it
will not work for identifying "set membership"
too.
It also bangs yet another satisfying nail
into the curious coffin lid of the so-called
"pure existence" primitive ontological
burlesque - Joe's madcap belief that the
= operator /is/ can magically instantiate
entities bereft of any previous predication
whatsoever, relying entirely upon the name
(or number) alone like some nineteenth century
mathematician.
In Joe's Dodgsonesue or Carrollian world:
(unless he has now accepted my theory of
covert predication) the name "cat"
alone is supposed to be existentialised by
the = sign when it is deemed by Joe to be
in its creative-wizard mode (maybe "God"
is actually the //IS OPERATOR// in disguise?
- A theological breakthrough?) as his sorcerous
existentialising stick touches on the word
"cat" and ...
"Lo and Behold Our Lord IS created Felix
and a sudden meowing is heard throughout
the land, and all the lowly mice run like
hell.
I hold, as you know, that onto-predicative
orphanic expressions of this type can never
be instantiated without the addressee providing
predication (which satisfies him as being
a meaningful "hit") via a quick
search of his predicative neurological compendium
for a suitable subject -predicate match.
This jives with your brilliantly perceptive
suggestion, that goes further than my suggestion
(which is revolutionary enough with its claims
that the is-operator is wholly concerned
with existential modality rather than existentialisation)
that not only is /is/ (speaking illeistically)
devoted to Jud's version where descriptive
predication alone rules - but there is a
further universal function underlying such
descriptive predication which is that of
an identifier of the subject either as a
singleton and/or as member of a certain classificatory
group.
Preliminary sample sentences reveal that
1. "The cow is in the garden" as
embodying an identity function as well as
useful information distinguishes the cow
from all other cows which are not in the
garden AND initiates a neuro-ransack which
provides the back-up confirmative predicational
info regarding what a member of such a group
entails that can be mapped to the cow, (reproductive
organism, animal, four legs, large udder,
provides milk, makes a mooing sound, shits
on petunias until it is eaten by humans.
etc.)
2. There is a cow in the garden" Brilliant!
The same indentico-predication applies. The
fact that it is introduced with an indefinite
determiner "a" cow - rather than
the definite "the cow" which implies
a greater amount of antecedally stored predicative
familiarity - but does not seem to make any
difference as far as identification of the
cow.
So far so good, for once the predication
is added it does the job of a determiner
too! For in answer to the question. "Which
is the cow to which you refer? Answer - "The
cow in the garden of course." Ha hah!
Super!
Nouns (communicative symbols) do not instantiate
or instance themselves in the actual world
or in heaven - they are instantiated (the
idea of what is named initiates a attestative
core-predicate search) conceptually by the
human in the neurological network of the
human thinker. Humankind cannot think things into existence or life whether those things are Meinong's Crystal
Mountain, God, thinking Jesus back into life,
or conceptually instantiating a kitten into
existence for my kids. If the supportive
core-predicate search encounters "a
match" and that maps to a real-world
object then all well and good - but if the
supportive core-predicate search encounters
an archival nominational "hit"
for the word "god" (caps or lower
case don't bother the brain) ;-) but hits
a nominatum archival brick wall as far as
"god" existing as anything other
than a tokenish item of faith in the mental
"Uncorroborated Beliefs Folder" then no denotatum dice.
Sadly, many folk do not appear to have an
"Uncorroborated Beliefs Folder."
but instead have a "Believe Any Rubbish
Folder" which is mostly stuffed with
mouldy old ideas of the religious or the
"ontological differantia" kind
of the particular occult definiendum to be defined and definitionally
digested.
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