The meta-ethical question Ruse raises imparts a new vitality and energy to the ethical discourse and introduces exciting possibilities of a socio-biological nature that may underlie Mary Midgley's version of the origin of ethics. Midgley identifies morality as a group response to the conflict-ridden primal clashes and natural disasters associated by the traditional religious myths describing the origin of the universe and the early days of humankind. The chaos can only be overcome if human beings live by moral rules which curb and frustrate some of their desires. [2] (Midgely. 1993. p. 3.) So what is the nature of these rules? People look at the rules, compare them, and eventually question the point of morality itself.

Doris Schroeder has characterised evolutionary ethics as arguing that natural selection has instilled human beings with a moral sense and a disposition to be good. On this basis morality could be understood as a phenomenon that arises automatically during the evolution of sociable, intelligent beings and not, as theologians or philosophers might argue, as the result of divine revelation or the application of our rational faculties. [3] (Schroeder)

Combining Ruse's question and Schroeder's outline I have structured my essay in the following way:

I. GENES  AS  A  TELEOLOGICAL  AGENCY?

II. GENETICAL TELEOLOGY OR TELEONOMY?

III. THE DYNAMIC OF APPOSITIVE TENDENCIES .

IV. WHY DOES NATURE FAVOUR GOODNESS?

I. GENES AS A TELEOLOGICAL AGENCY?

Is humanity's moral nature manifested as a mere practical result or consequence of some species specific inherent disposition towards morality, as posited by Midgley's traditionalist approach, or does mankind's ethical nature operate as a feature of a hidden telic agenda with our genes acting as covert agential enforcers which further the cosmic program of some deity or unknown force?

Is the personification of DNA fragments known as *The Selfish Gene* a viable theory? The abstraction "selfish", certainly sounds scientifically louche when applied to uncomprehending cellular material wherein no psychic activity takes place. But as Andrew Brown writes in "The Science of Selfishness" for Dawkins the word means: 'The quality of being copied by a Darwinian selection process.' 'Evolutionary preferentiality' perhaps No, 'The Selfish Gene' is a brilliant title for a best seller. The title is a marketing device which instantiates the core idea. Dawkins is aware of the implicature. It is very doubtful if a book with the title: *The Genetic Quality Of Being Copied By A Darwinian Selection Process." would have sold half so many copies. 'You don't see something until you have the right metaphor to let you perceive it.'
(Shaw, 'echoing Thomas S. Kuhn' in Gleick, 1988.) [4] (Brown. 1998 )

Can it be that what we refer to as *morality* is really a feature of an evolutionary stabilising stratagem based upon opinion-forming genes? Do the articulations of our selfish replicators contain the DNA scripts of more just the obvious physical characteristics of our forebears, and encode the scripts for our behavioural relations with our fellow men too?

I believe they do, but not in the crude format of animal instinct-bearing genes with hard-wired scripts for nest-building, web-spinning, dam construction. Human genetic scripts provide subtle behavioural guidelines rather than strict directions which can be thought of as pre-dispositional inclinations to interpret situations in a particular, whilst allowing scope for a perceived freedom of action. For my part I hold that this apparent free will is also deterministically moderated - but that is the subject for another paper. For the purposes of this essay a combination of genetically derived behavioural orientation and both volitional extempore and planned behavioural performance will be taken as a given.

GENETICAL TELEOLOGY OR TELEONOMY?

Descriptions of the phenomena of teleology use of ultimate purpose or design as a means of explaining phenomena. Belief in the perception of purposeful development toward an end. Theologically it is the doctrine that all things are designed by God. Biologically it is the theory or study of organic development as caused by the 'purposes' which things serve. And what are these 'purposes' we may ask? Surely, to rely on some unspecified concept like 'purposes' is not to answer the question at all, but to leave it open-ended? If God is excluded teleologically it applies to ends that are planned by some natural agent which can preview with intention, purpose and foresight possible evolutionary improvable models of various human biological and ethical futures? Surely this abstract representation of a quality or idea as a person is not what genetical bioethics had in mind?

As a theory the teleonomical explanation is an improvement which goes halfway to answering the question of a supposed developmental anticipated outcome. Teleonomy is the quality of apparent purposefulness and of goal-directedness of structures and functions in living organisms that derive from their evolutionary history and adaptation for reproductive success. Well, at least this cuts out the personification of teleology but it too seems to be ducking the question by offering evolutionary functionalism to explain the evolutionary function?

Theoretical descriptions of the possible processes that initiated the teleonomical process have recently been advanced. An interesting one is: 'On the Chemical Nature and Origin of Teleonomy' by Addy Pross [5] Pross. 2005) .of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, in Israel. The paper addresses the nature the physico-chemical of teleonomic events and the processes by which teleonomic systems could emerge from non- teleonomic systems. He speculates that teleonomic (purposeful) chemical events are those whose primary directive is discerned to be non-thermodynamic, while regular (non-teleonomic - non-purposeful events) are those whose primary directive is the traditional thermodynamic one, involving the conversion of different forms of energy. For the archetypal teleonomic event which is cell multiplication, the non-thermodynamic directive can be identified as being a kinetic directive. It is concluded, therefore, that the process of emergence, whereby non-teleonomic replicating chemical systems were transformed into teleonomic ones, involves a switch in the primacy of thermodynamic and kinetic directives.

He proposes that the step where that transformation took place was the one in which some pre-metabolic replicating system acquired an energy-gathering capability, thereby becoming metabolic. The analysis builds on previous work that considers living systems to be a kinetic state of matter as opposed to the traditional thermodynamic states that dominate the inanimate world. Ontologically my own theory of non- teleological change can be explicated thus.

The cosmos is an unbounded infinite complexity of interacting matter. The total cosmos is indestructible matter. The idea of a vacuum is a myth. All matter is in constant change - No change equals - no existence. Material is self-regulatory. (many self-regulatory material processes involve huge time spans by human standards. The spontaneous interaction of matter is a existential factor of its presence.

A teleonomic process, such as evolution, produces complex products without guiding foresight. Evolution gradually accumulates hindsight, as variations unwittingly make "predictions" about structures and functions which could successfully cope with the future, and participate in an audition which culls the also-rans, leaving winners for the next generation. Information accumulates about functions and structures that are successful, exploiting feedback from the environment via the selection of fitter coalitions of structures and functions. Teleonomy is related to past effects instead of present purpose.

For (Lorenz, 1996) Life is characterised by ``a special structure which is moulded by evolution to make probable the gain of energy and to exploit highly specific sources of energy''. Information in common parlance means relevant, teleonomically organised information that has a meaning for the organism receiving or possessing it''.

WHY DOES NATURE FAVOUR GOODNESS?

I share the view that 'morality' incorporates a group's evolutionarily engendered strategic attitudes or pragmatic opinions selected or sanctioned by nature as being beneficial for stable species-specific biological development. On this basis 'ethics' belongs to the domain of science not philosophy. A feature of the diachronic nature of philosophy is the gradual reduction of its corpus, as various subjects of study, like mathematics, geography, chemistry, history, medicine, politics and sociology etc., have established and constituted themselves into independent domains of science and the humanities and hived off as independent disciplines.

As Schroeder points out, this is certainly the view of Edward O. Wilson, the 'father' of the new science of sociobiology, who believes that "scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and bio-logicised" (Wilson, 1975: 27). The challenge for evolutionary biologists such as is to define goodness with reference to evolutionary theory and then explain why human beings ought to be good.

Descriptively (rather than analytically) speaking, for the average human singleton who does not give much thought to these matters, the term 'ethics' characterises the individual's acceptance, rejection or acquiescence towards a group's prescriptive, ethically generalist opinions, regarding a set of accepted principles of right conduct. For the human individual, actions and attitudes considered 'moral' are those opinions or principles conforming to standards of what is right within the social group or society with which he identifies himself. Such a correlation of opinion also includes personal beliefs or judgments regarding how we should treat the environment within which the individual and the group exist.

THE DYNAMIC OF APPOSITIVE TENDENCIES

Inherent within such a 'one to many -many to one 'relationship are two dynamical appositive tendencies. Mankind's primitive instincts often militate against the good of the group. The ethical self is pulled in two diametrical directions the individual good as opposed to the *other* or 'group good.' If an equilibria of appositive precepts is experienced for any prolonged period angst and frustration may occur.

The material universe exists and must exist in a fashion which complies with the physical realities of how of matter exists- that is kinetically. To be kinetic involves change - change presupposes modes of change - modes of change presuppose ordered rather than chaotic change. If chaotic change was materially possible we would not exist and the cosmos would be a chaotic mess. The cosmos is not a chaotic mess and we exist - therefore only ordered change is possible. Ordered change is what humans mean when the refer to *nature* or 'the laws of physics.' Therefore 'ordered change' or 'nature' is simply the way the universe exists

ANIMAL INSTINCT AND HUMAN PREDISPOSITIONAL WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

There is a conflictual tension produced between the individual's egoistical desires, and his/her perceived obligation to comply with the evolutionary stabilising strategies of his fellows which are designed to promote group equilibria. This tendency to impel the individual towards adopting strategies considered more beneficial to the person rather than the group operates via adaptive dynamics. Such responses often take the form of pretence or covert immoral behaviour. Lying (including self-deception and 'white lies'.) are quite common. In the extreme there is sometimes a complete and overt rejection of the particular moral constraints involved.

In order for a moral strategy to be considered sequentially sensible a belief is required, but the belief in a moral systematic plan of action is most often conditional. It is expected to maximize a reciprocatory engendered pay off in terms of personal, sexual, group or societal stability. In the absence of a constancy of benefits individuals and the state institute a tit-for-tat policy or an equivalent given in return agenda is often instituted, which in personal relationships can lead to displacement activity or the dissolution of the moral contract and an end of the relationship. In societal terms such a lack of a reciprocatory generated pay off often ends in society withdrawing from the moral contract and excluding the individual by imprisonment or taking other punitive action.

Societally the tit-for-tat moral code is by far the best strategy. Though contemporary societies have moved on from the biblical style 'eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth' models, our current administration of moral justice is based upon the idea that a moral agent who breaks the moral codes and courses suffering to others is made to suffer too via the moral agency of the justice system. Perhaps the close connection between morality and religion, the equilibrious effect of an authoritative control mechanism is thus revealed? Perhaps his explains inter-religious rivalries and hatreds to a large extent? If ethical hegemony is a function of natural selection, any other moral system perceived as an alternative or threat to that to group cohesion would be identified as an adversary.

Before going further it is important to qualify exactly what genetical encoding actually implies, and whether the implication present in the question of an deceiving genome bent upon foisting on to us a teleologically contrived biological agenda holds any water? Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, teaches us that a instinctual trait, which favours survival will be selected via competition. To be considered instinctual a behaviour must be: Automatic b) Irresistible c) Occurrent d) Unmodifiable e) Event-actuated

The absence of one or more of these criteria indicates that the behaviour is not fully instinctual.

If these criteria are used in a rigorous scientific manner, application of the term "instinct" cannot be used in reference to human behaviour. When terms, such as mothering, territoriality, eating, mating, and so on, are used to denote human behaviour they are seen to not meet the criteria listed above. In comparison to animal behaviour such as hibernation, migration, nest building, mating and so on that are clearly instinctual, no human behaviour meets the necessary criteria. In other words, under this definition, there are no human instincts.

That there exists an inborn hard-wired pattern of behaviour often responsive to specific stimuli resulting in predictable behaviour in animals is an accepted fact. Key stimuli initiate innate releasing mechanisms. Neurological imprinting causes geese to follow around the first moving object that they encounter, as it tends to be their mother. A firefly travels miles to home in on the female pheromones carried by the wind - you see a juicy veggie-burgher - your mouth waters etc. But that alone is not enough to say that there is any evidence that moral strategies are genetically encoded. It is arguable that we are born with predispositional traits which equip us to recognise, learn and inaugurate so-called 'moral' strategies considered to be biologically advantageous during the course of our lives. It is also true that instinctual behaviours which are in fact biologically self-serving behaviours calculated to realise biologically advantageous opportunities could be mistaken for 'moral behaviours.' The man who assists the blind person across the road and drops a five- pound note in the beggar's cap might act in such a way as to impress his female companion in order to insinuate himself into her bed. All organisms have constitutional dispositions towards particular behaviours. The obvious ones are courtship behaviour, nest building and protection strategies. Those who have been harried by gulls when walking near their nests will have personal experience of this, as will any game- warden who has approached a female elephant who has recently calved. Instincts are inherited patterned, fixed action responses to certain kinds of stimuli they are almost certainly reinforced by repetition. Human emotional responses form a basis for arousal to outside stimuli but they can be countervailed by cognitive processes based upon moral strategies based upon considerations of delayed satisfaction, fear or a desire to preserve a group or societal stability. I do hold that predispositional, instinctual behaviour such as the care and protection of one's young ( the couriers of one's patrimonial genetical endowment) is hard- wired into the human animal and that our genes have developed in the way that they have through naturally selected for the promotion of reproductive ends. In the limited sense that morality is an illusion of course I agree with Ruse's comments.

Where I disagree strongly with Ruse regards his suggestion that our genes fob us off with our concept of 'morality' in order to conceal an underlying carnal agenda or sexual dimension of good behaviour. I do not believe that our genes have developed stratagems designed to falsely present human reproduction as morals. Evolution is an unconscious, incognisant, uncaring, unplanned process. If it were true, that genes used morals as a cloak for sex then ironically it would position the very advocates and organisations which urge decent moral behaviour upon us as the very ones promoting strategies leading to sexual behaviour - that such sexual intercourse should remain within the parameters of couplings sanctioned by the church makes little difference to the incongruity of such a situation for the Rusean message: 'Be nice to others and you will get more nookie,' has the same message whichever way you look at it.

Instinctual behaviour in humans beyond infancy is conjectural. Obviously we are born with the instinct to breath and show a normal desire to communicate, whilst we are infants at our mother's breast, etc. Human history certainly demonstrates a will to acquire knowledge and to be organise. Our inborn patterns of survival-behaviour and compulsion to have children, along with the conduct such instincts promote are no doubt reflected in our societal, political and cultural patterns.

A phenotype describes any observed quality of an organism, such as its morphology, development, or behaviour. In my view ethical particularism is a form of punctuated equilibria or human phenotypic plasticity. I believe that all humans are phenotypically plastic. By this I mean that just as an organism has the ability to adjust to its physical environment during the course of its lifetime, this ability also includes the aptitude to learn to modify its behaviour towards other individuals and the group. So what if any is the difference between phenotypic plasticity and moral self-education? What account can I as a particularist give of our propensity to learn from our 'moral' experience? Tact rather than rudeness and crude sexual innuendo is a behaviour that can be rewarded greater compliance and by the delivery more benefits. My reply is that such a learning curve and change of behaviour is not morality triumphing over morally objectionable behaviour in any way, but rather egoistically engendered behavioural modification. There may be apparent extrinsic change, but inwardly the 'immoral agent' mat continue to be as contemptuous of the addressee as he was prior to the pretended respect. 'Moral self-education' is a myth. The ego learns what behaviour is likely to deliver acceptance and the desired benefits, as opposed to behaviour which is likely to invite chastisement or rejection. It is purposeful behavioural opinion-response compliance - not 'moral concurrence.' Michael Ruse is correct regarding subjectivist Darwinian metaethics, and the non objectivist requirement of moral theory, but wrong in relation to his so-called genetical illusional ploys. If he is (as I believe) correct in his non objectivism and the hoi polloi of humankind were to become convinced of the truth of what he claims regarding covert genetical re-productionism then the motivation on the part of humanity to continue following such moral obligations would evaporate. Nobody wishes to be conned - particularly by their own genes. In view of that, my advice to Ruse is to raise a finger to my lips and murmur 'Shhhhush!'

References.

[1] Ruse Michael. Taking Darwin Seriously. Oxford: Blackwell; 1986.

[2] Midgley. Mary. 'The origin of ethics' 1993. p. 3. A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy.

[3] Schroeder. Doris. Evolutionary Ethics.2006. http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/evol-eth.htm

[4] Brown,. Andrew. 1998. "The Science of Selfishness." Salon 21st.

[5] Addy Pross. 'On the Chemical Nature and Origin of Teleonomy. The Journal of Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, 84105, Israel Springer Netherlands ISSN 0169-6149. Volume 35, pp. 383-394 Number 4 / August, 2005 .