by Jud Evans
"The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils,
waters, plants, and animals, or collectively:
the land.""A land ethic of course cannot prevent
the alteration, management, and use of these
'resources,' but it does affirm their right
to continued existence, and, at least in
spots, their continued existence in a natural
state." Leopold, Aldo: A Sand County Almanac, and
Sketches Here and There, 1948, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1987, pg. 204 |
ALDO LEOPOLD'S LAND ETHIC
The Land Ethic of Aldo Leopold is a beautifully crafted spiritually uplifting testimonial to nature-centred living. Although resonating with a poetic lyriscism it is also logical in its scientific analysis of the importance of changing humanity's attitude towards the land and provides for us a revealling explanation of the biotic mechanism that underlies nature. It is premised on the idea that the separation of humans and nature is not an irreconcilable state but that humans are as much part of and dependent upon the biotic community as the soil, the water and the flora and fauna. Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic is extentionalist in that it broadens the idea of a community to the land. The intention of this paper is to explore why he seeks to promote this community of ethical interests, and exactly what comprises the concept of 'community,' and whether it is as the question asks: a reasonable development of our ethical thinking.
Foreword.
The question of whether Leopold's notions
are reasonable referred hinges on who is
making the judgement regarding the meaning
of what the abstraction 'reasonable' entails
in relation to Leopold's views. The quality
of some theory or behaviour, which is considered
plausible or acceptable or reasonable to
one person - may seem entirely unreasonable
or even unacceptable to the next man or woman.
I will deal with this question of reasonableness
in the following manner.
(1.) An introduction to Aldo Leopold the
man.
(2.) An Outline of the ideas of Community
in the Land Ethic.
(3.) Questions of Reasonableness and Unreasonableness.
(4.) Conclusion.
An introduction to Aldo Leopold the Man.
Aldo Leopold was born in Burlington, Iowa,
on January 11 1887 by the banks of the Mississippi.
His intimate relationship with nature and
the wild began in his early childhood. From
an early age he went hunting and the blood
sport became a lifetime pleasure and interest
for him to which he devoted the greater part
of his life. He loved the wilderness and
his fascination with hunting initiated and
orientated his future career. In his youth
his outlook was almost exclusively anthropocentric.
In 1929 he enlisted in the Forestry Service
and spent month-long trips in the wilderness
of Wisconsin mapping new areas of the forest.
These experiences brought him to understand
the mechanism of the balance of nature and
that predators and their prey were an inherent
component of the balance of nature and in
1936 he wrote an article in 'American Forrest'
in which he said that all predators have
a value - not just those we want to shoot.
An outline of the ideas of community in
the Land Ethic.
The fundamental tenet of Leopold's Land
Ethic can be summed up in his own words:
'Land is a system of independent parts,
which should be regarded as a community not
a commodity.' [Leopold 1948] |
Why prefer to view the land as community rather than as a commodity? First of all we must define what the word 'community' meant for Leopold when he used the word to refer to the land.
An Outline of the ideas of Community in the
Land Ethic.
The Land Ethic calls for the land to be
viewed as a balanced pyramidical relationship
of predator and prey which comprises an interaction
of biological organisms that form a super-organism,
which exists in a symbiotic holistic relationship.
It calls for an 'earth-centred' activity
and thinking - whereby we should put an end
to our unrestricted encroachment upon and
development of wilderness areas with the
consequent despoliation. We should conceive
of humanity as being a member of the autopoietic
biotic community. This membership places
upon us certain obligations and responsibilities
to do all that we can to ensure the healthy
continuance of this inter-relational, symbiotic
system. For Leopold the health of the land
is summed up in his well-known maxim: 'A
thing is right when it tends to preserve
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community.'
His emotional, spiritualist relation to
the land have caused me to speculate that
his attitude might be pantheistic in nature
and his writing style certainly reminds me
of perhaps the greatest of all English nature
writers, who strangely is not well known
even it appears in much of academia. I refer
of course to the great Richard Jeffries.
Questions of Reasonableness and Unreasonableness.
Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value
At All? R. M. Hare [1919-2002] advocated
the 'prescriptivism' where judgments about
goodness and badness, are not descriptive
statements but represent a kind of command
or prescription as to how we are to act.
Notions regarding the intrinsic value of
organisations such as ecosystems accept the
intrinsic worth of life forms in general
and therefore extends to human embryos and
people in a coma.. If one believes in the
intrinsic value of entities that are part
of a holism [such as the body of a pregnant
woman] is necessarily an anti-abortionist
and anti-euthanasia in nature. The "noncognitivist
"Axel Hägerström [1868-1939], said that
ascriptions of value are neither true nor
false. Hägerström's nocognitivism is called
'emotivism.' Like David Hume he claimed that
ascriptions of value are in essence expressions
of emotion. An emotivist believes that to
say: 'That tree is good' is not to make a
statement about the tree, but to say something
like: 'Hooray for that tree!' A. J. Ayer
[1910-1989] and Charles L. Stevenson [1908-1979]
believed something similar. Hägerström characterized
his own view as a type of "value-nihilism,"
and many have followed suit in taking noncognitivism
of all kinds to constitute a rejection of
the very idea of intrinsic value. Most Cognitivists
claim that our attributions of worth or value
to objects constitute statements that are
either true or false. For Leopopld conservation
is a state of harmony between men and land.
Only those who know the most about it can
appreciate how little we know about it. The
last word in ignorance is the man who says
of an animal or plant: "What good is
it?" Leopold suggests the there should
be an ethical relationship to the land and
that this relationship should and must be
based on love, respect, and admiration for
the land. Furthermore this ethical relationship
should be not just because of economic value
but also based on value in the philosophical
sense. The land ethic makes sense because
of the close relationship and interdependence
of humans with land that provides food and
amenity and contributes to air and water
quality. Humans have tended to become disconnected
from the land because of technological developments
that give apparent but not actual independence
from the land. Substitutes for natural material,
for example polyester instead of cotton,
furthers the notion that land is not essential
for survival and that technology can provide
suitable substitutes. Farm mechanization
has also tended to separate the farmer from
the land, the result being less care and
attention for a critical resource.
What about the intentionally organized realm
of human activity?
As Warwick Fox points out - one could be
forgiven for thinking that non-sentient autopoietic
systems behave as if they wanted to maintain
their own integrity, that is simply a projection
of our own subjectivity, our own intentional
way of understanding the world, upon them.
Just as entities like stones, rivers, and
guided missiles have no feelings, no subjective
awareness, and so cannot literally be said
to "strive," "desire,"
or "intend" to fall to the ground,
flow to the sea, or hit their targets, so
autopoietic systems, pure and simple (i.
e., non-sentient autopoietic systems), cannot
literally be said to "strive,"
"desire," or "intend"
to maintain their own integrity. That is
simply what they do; they are physical systems-special
kinds of physical systems, to be sure, but
physical systems nonetheless-and nothing
more. It is a mistake to attribute intentionality
to entities that do not have affective capacities
that do not have some at least rudimentary
form of inner experience. But why shouldn't
environmental ethics place its primary focus
of concern on entities that are essentially
products of the self-organizing realm (previously
termed the "natural" realm)*! Isn't
that what environmental concern should be
about? And the answer to that, in four words,
is: No, not only that. The restriction of
this primary focus of concern to the self-organizing
realm (i. e., to animals, plants, and ecosystems)
is both arbitrary and extremely limiting
in terms of its wider applicability (e. g.,
to the built environment). For example, although
ecologically oriented enthusiasts can sometimes
make it sound as if the ecological world
is so delicately interwoven that the removal
of a single strand (e. g., a single species)
is enough to cause the entire fabric (e.
g., an entire ecosystem) to fall apart, this
is, of course, typically (although not always)
far from the truth. It is often possible
to remove a species-or introduce a new species
for that matter-without particularly compromising
the autopoietic functioning of an ecosystem
at all. In these cases it is not at all clear
that the holistic integrity approach offers
any firm basis on which to object to the
extinction of a species or the addition of
a new species, since the holistic integrity
(or autopoietic functioning) of the ecosystem
is not in question.
J. Baird Callicott has promoted a communitarian
environmental system inspired by the “land
ethic” writings of Aldo Leopold. One subject
of concern is a dilemma. Either: the position
is open to a charge of “eco–fascism” because
it holds that only one maximal community
fundamentally matters and interests of smaller
communities and individuals can be swamped
by a fundamental concern with the whole.
There are those who strenuously reject the
ideas which Leopold promoted. The science
fiction writer Robert Heinlein wrote the
following:
"There are hidden contradictions in the minds of people who "love Nature" while deploring the "artificialities" with which "Man has spoiled 'Nature.'" The obvious contradiction lies in their choice of words, which imply that Man and his artifacts are not part of "Nature"-- but beavers and their dams are. But the contradictions go deeper than this prima-facie absurdity. In declaring his love for a beaver dam (erected by beavers for beavers' purposes) and his hatred for dams erected by man (for the purposes of men) the "Naturist" reveals his hatred for his own race--i. e., his own self-hatred."
Robert Heinlein - (1973) |
Conclusion.
In my opinion it is an error to impute existential
motivation to insentient beings on the basis
of having a teleology. Ends or purposes do
not exist for them. I believe that it will
not be long before for most people the notions
of anthropocentricism and biocentrism coincide
and that it's vital to retain whatever ecological
integrity we can between now and then. Having
said that I disagree with the philosophical
route by which Leopold was motivated to promulgate
his Land Ethic I thoroughly agree with this
outlook - so any strictures that I have are
in a way valueless. There is no doubt and
it would be foolish to argue differently,
that the spiritualistic approach which includes
notions of intrinsicality is very popular
with huge sections of the public and that
we owe Leopold a huge debt for the part he
has played in the popularisation of ideas
of responsibility and good husbandry and
care and even love for the land which was
so dear to him. We need to stop industrial
logging, stop industrial fishing, stop global
warming, and stop industrial agriculture.
We have developed in such a way that we characterise
'civilisation' as a way of life characterised
by the expansion of cities. A city is a collection
of people living in numbers large enough
to require the importation of resources.
As cities expand we have to denude larger
areas of the land to cater for that expansion.
At first it bothered me intellectually that
Leopold dealt in so much abstraction - that
like most transcendentalists he talked in
terms of sentient and insentient entities
as having 'inherent value.'
His pre-occupation with shooting and thereby
killing animals is difficult to swallow,
but he was a renowned scientist and scholar,
a sincere and exceptional teacher, philosopher,
and gifted writer who did much to initiate
the environmental movement and promote a
widespread interest in ecology as a science.
His plusses by far compensate for his ontological
minuses. If the intrinsic approach engages
and awakens and persuadis the masses to change
- then evironmental ends justify the philosophical
means - certainly as far as I am concerned.
It is for his book, A Sand County Almanac, that Leopold is best known to millions
of people around the globe. The Almanac,
is often acclaimed as the century's literary
landmark in conservation, On the basis of
my critical analysis of Leopold's work, which
I have 'read with charity,' I have brought
forward in my paper what I believe to be
both Leopold's reasons for extending the
idea of a community to the land and the fact
that his efforts were reasonable, and that
his Land Ethic was a landmark development
of our ethical thinking.
References:
Leopold, Aldo: A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There, 1948, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, pg. 204
Fox, Warwick. A Critical Overview of Environmental
Ethics. Chadwick & Schroeder eds. Applied Ethics.
Critical Concepts in Philosophy 2002.
Heinlein, Robert -Time Enough For Love. (Putnam 1973) )
Heffernan. James.D. The Land Ethic: A Critical Appraisal. Environmental Ethics (1982) |