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ALDO LEOPOLD'S LAND ETHIC![]() ALDO LEOPOLD ![]() |
UCLAN The question of whether Leopold's notions
are reasonable referred hinges on who is
making the judgement regarding the meaning
of what the abstraction 'reasonable' entails
in relation to Leopold's views. The quality
of some theory or behaviour, which is considered
plausible or acceptable or reasonable to
one person - may seem entirely unreasonable
or even unacceptable to the next man or woman. [2] (Leopold 1948] The Land Ethic calls for the land to be viewed
as a balanced pyramidical relationship of
predator and prey which comprises an interaction
of biological organisms that form a super-organism,
which exists in a symbiotic holistic relationship.
It calls for an 'earth-centred' activity
and thinking - whereby we should put an end
to our unrestricted encroachment upon and
development of wilderness areas with the
consequent despoliation. We should conceive
of humanity as being a member of the autopoietic
biotic community. This membership places
upon us certain obligations and responsibilities
to do all that we can to ensure the healthy
continuance of this inter-relational, symbiotic
system. For Leopold the health of the land
is summed up in his well-known maxim: 'A
thing is right when it tends to preserve
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community.' Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All? R. M. Hare [1919-2002] advocated the 'prescriptivism' [4] where judgments about goodness and badness, are not descriptive statements but represent a kind of command or prescription as to how we are to act. Notions regarding the intrinsic value of organisations such as ecosystems accept the intrinsic worth of life forms in general and therefore extends to human embryos and people in a coma.. If one believes in the intrinsic value of entities that are part of a holism [such as the body of a pregnant woman] is necessarily an anti-abortionist and anti-euthanasia in nature. The "noncognitivist "Axel Hägerström [1868-1939], [5] said that ascriptions of value are neither true nor false. Hägerström's nocognitivism is called 'emotivism.' Like David Hume he claimed that ascriptions of value are in essence expressions of emotion. An emotivist believes that to say: 'That tree is good' is not to make a statement about the tree, but to say something like: 'Hooray for that tree!' A. J. Ayer [6] [1910-1989] and Charles L. Stevenson [1908-1979] [7] believed something similar. Hägerström characterized his own view as a type of "value-nihilism," and many have followed suit in taking noncognitivism of all kinds to constitute a rejection of the very idea of intrinsic value. Most Cognitivists claim that our attributions of worth or value to objects constitute statements that are either true or false. For Leopopld conservation is a state of harmony between men and land. Only those who know the most about it can appreciate how little we know about it. The last word in ignorance is the man who says of an animal or plant: "What good is it?" Leopold suggests the there should be an ethical relationship to the land and that this relationship should and must be based on love, respect, and admiration for the land. Furthermore this ethical relationship should
be not just because of economic value but
also based on value in the philosophical
sense. The land ethic makes sense because
of the close relationship and interdependence
of humans with land that provides food and
amenity and contributes to air and water
quality. Humans have tended to become disconnected
from the land because of technological developments
that give apparent but not actual independence
from the land. Substitutes for natural material,
for example polyester instead of cotton,
furthers the notion that land is not essential
for survival and that technology can provide
suitable substitutes. Farm mechanization
has also tended to separate the farmer from
the land, the result being less care and
attention for a critical resource.
That is simply what they do; they are physical systems-special kinds of physical systems, to be sure, but physical systems nonetheless-and nothing more. It is a mistake to attribute intentionality to entities that do not have affective capacities that do not have some at least rudimentary form of inner experience. But why shouldn't environmental ethics place its primary focus of concern on entities that are essentially products of the self-organizing realm (previously termed the "natural" realm)*! Isn't that what environmental concern should be about? And the answer to that, in four words, is:
No, not only that. The restriction of this
primary focus of concern to the self-organizing
realm (i. e., to animals, plants, and ecosystems)
is both arbitrary and extremely limiting
in terms of its wider applicability (e. g.,
to the built environment). For example, although
ecologically oriented enthusiasts can sometimes
make it sound as if the ecological world
is so delicately interwoven that the removal
of a single strand (e. g., a single species)
is enough to cause the entire fabric (e.
g., an entire ecosystem) to fall apart, this
is, of course, typically (although not always)
far from the truth. It is often possible
to remove a species-or introduce a new species
for that matter-without particularly compromising
the autopoietic functioning of an ecosystem
at all. In these cases it is not at all clear
that the holistic integrity approach offers
any firm basis on which to object to the
extinction of a species or the addition of
a new species, since the holistic integrity
(or autopoietic functioning) of the ecosystem
is not in question.
In my opinion it is an error to impute existential motivation to insentient beings on the basis of having a teleology. Ends or purposes do not exist for them. I believe that it will not be long before for most people the notions of anthropocentricism and biocentrism coincide and that it's vital to retain whatever ecological integrity we can between now and then. Having said that I disagree with the philosophical route by which Leopold was motivated to promulgate his Land Ethic I thoroughly agree with this green outlook - so any strictures that I have are in a way valueless. There is no doubt and it would be foolish to argue differently, that the spiritualistic approach which includes notions of intrinsicality is very popular with huge sections of the public and that we owe Leopold a huge debt for the part he has played in the popularisation of ideas of responsibility and good husbandry and care and even love for the land which was so dear to him. We need to curtail industrial logging, stop
industrial over-fishing, stop global
warming, and control industrial agriculture.
We have developed in such a way that we characterise
'civilisation' as a way of life characterised
by the expansion of cities. A city is a collection
of people living in numbers large enough
to require the importation of resources.
As cities expand we have to denude larger
areas of the land to cater for that expansion.
At first it bothered me intellectually that
Leopold dealt in so much abstraction - that
like most transcendentalists he talked in
terms of sentient and insentient entities
as having 'inherent value.' [3] Jefferies. Richard. evans-experientialism. freewebspace. com/jefferies_bio. htmi [4] Hare. Richard Mervyn. The Language of Morals. 1952. Oxford University Press [5] Hägerström Axel. Filosofiskt lexikon, ed Alfred Ahlberg, Natur och Kultur, Third edition, 1951 [6] Ayre. A. J. Language, Truth and Logic 1936, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd [7] C. L. Stevenson . Emotivism. Yale University Press Publication.1944 d. [8] Fox, Warwick. A Critical Overview of Environmental Ethics. Chadwick & Schroeder eds. Applied Ethics. Critical Concepts in Philosophy 2002. [9] Heinlein, Robert -Time Enough For Love. (Putnam 1973) ) |
