One of the Largest and Most Visited Sources of Philosophical Texts on the Internet.

Evans Experientialism             Evans Experientialism
SEARCH THE WHOLE SITE? SEARCH CLICK THE SEARCH BUTTON

The Academy Library

The Athenaeum Library

The Nominalist Library
Athenaeum Reading Room

<DESCARTES
AND
THE INCOGNISANT COGITO


  Feb 2009

Copyright © 2009 Jud Evans. Permission granted to distribute in any medium, commercial or non-commercial, provided author attribution and copyright notices remain intact.

We do not need the formulaic self-referential confirmatory subsumptions Descartes considered necessary for the recognition and incorporation of one's humanness under a more general category of "human."


THE INCOGNISANT COGITO

We do not need the formulaic self-referential confirmatory subsumptions Descartes considered necessary for the recognition and incorporation of one's humanness under a more general category of "human."

It is not the utterance of abstract nouns, verbal frequentatives (like "I think") and reificative lexical shells which confirm our existence as homo-sapiens.

We are aware that we exist as human beings at a much deeper non-lexical neurological level without the need to articulate the obvious. We need no verbal formulaic mantras like: "I think therefore I am" nor the mouthing of the usefully encoded first-person personal pronouns: "I" and "me" to corroborate our manhood or womanhood.

Our brains are self-registering survivency organs, evolved to provide continuous feedback of its own indications at the maxima and minima of experiential variations. Our brains provide a ceaseless biologic systems-analysis backed up by an informative biographic arcanum of stored stratagems for survival. A brief consideration of these facts leads us to reject the motivation, the requirement and the saneness of any ill-considered ritual of existential self-confirmation of the type represented by the spurious Cartesian cogito pantomime. The exposited content of a pronoun like "I" makes available an enshelled or memory-packed abundance of potentially useful interfacial experiential layers. Such experiential templates enable the human entity to interact with the environmental system in which it finds itself.

Whenever the personal pronouns" I " or " me " is neurologically and/or conversationally generated and introduced the memorising brain makes available a huge empiric digest, a complete (if somewhat fractured) personal autobiography and a constantly updated compendium of one's current , moods, actions, interests and preoccupations with, particular reference to the current  concerns of the conscious brain.

I claim that even prior to the use of the word "I" (or any other word) the brain relates the first-person pronoun to the sub-lingual existential language-possessing-entity itself, which is the utterer of the identity symbol in the first place.

Therefore human entities do not need to make an existential claim - for there is no alternative to existing. To exist is a done deal which is seen to be done by the resultant existent. The very fact of existing is psychosomatically tantamount to confirming the lack of any non-existential alternative.

The whole Cartesian project is rendered a grossly nonsensical dualistic redundancy - the historically spurious slow-witted slapstick claim that a linguistically equipped verifier who refers to his self  needs verification that he that exists as a  verifier - exists.



What could be more ontologically ridiculous in the annals of metaphysical vaudeville than a French and Latin-speaking existent self-referentially asking a French and Latin-speaking existent to prove that it exists?

What kind of a metaphysicalist muggins does it take to even suggest that the subjectival denominatum of such a sentential denotation having the power of explicitly denoting or designating (by pronominally naming itself:  "I" and further  predicating of the "I"  that it: "thinks - therefore [it] exists")  requires confirmation that "that which is denoted as "I"  exists,  when, if he was not the denotatum -  then he could not have made the such an ontologically stupid  statement in the first place?


NEXT
Philosophy and the Reification of the Unreal