ELIMINATING REIFICATION
FROM LOGICAL NOTATION

The problem for me with this project of eliminating reification from the language of logic or the way of writing logical terms concerns the fact that it is anti-theoretic rather than inter-theoretic, so keeping a balance between an explanation-type (an expository method) which can be understood by my notional readership (reasonably educated, intelligent non-physicists with an interest in philosophy) is essential in order for me to be understood.

I am unsympathetic to logical notation (particularly predicational logic) due to its inability to handle the finer (often critical) nuances of ontological discourse  and for its tendency to treat processes, the interactions of objects, fields, matergy, entities call them what you will as if they themselves existed rather than the processing, moving, interacting material components (integrals) themselves, which are the subjects of such scientific descriptions of such interactive states of affairs.

I would really like to translate my ontology into a logical formulation, for I would find it useful to have both versions - the Natural Language version and the Logic version available for study and further development side by side. The trouble is that I neither have the skill enough in the language of physics, nor do I know if my physicalist eliminativism can be expressed in a satisfactory manner using the current logical symbols available.

In such a situation, dealing as I am with ontology in a completely new, and as far as I know philosophically unique anti-reificational way, much of the ontological terminology employed by the philosophical and scientific tradition is inappropriate. Occam cannot come to my help, because, at least as far as the tradition is concerned there are no historical *axioms* or *givens* scientific or otherwise that are acceptable to the majority of my audience, who remain dependently enwrapped in the coils of many of the false axioms of a dualistic philosophy which has its roots in folk wisdom.

The belief that humans are more than bodies and that there is something in or about the  human being that survives bodily death has its origins in prehistory.  It is encountered in the mythology of Ancient Egypt, the Hittites and Assyria and was formulated into a philosophical doctrine in the Platonic writings of Ancient Greece. From those primitive beginnings such reality-disconnectedness has seeped into the very fabric of human perception and metastasised in the brain in the form of cancerous sub-concepts, which attribute dualistic occultisms to many aspects of modern life

The well known physicist George Metanomski has helpfully suggested  that as my terminology Cosmos, Matergy, (energised matter) Space,  etc., indicates an endeavor to found my eliminativist  ontology in Physics,  Occam would advise it helpful  to replace the long accountwith one statement:

I could not adopt such axioms for the following reasons

1. Mereologically, while *discrete* correctly suggests separate entities or parts - it does not make it clear enough  that in my ontology are no non-material forms (in folk language what would be called *interstices of empty space*) of separation or insulation between the Koestlerian type holeronic individuates that make up the matergic whole.

2. I am very suspicious of the term *phenomena* even in its cleaned-up and disinfected non-Husserlian version. For the eliminativist states or processes known through the senses rather than by intuition or reasoning sounds good - but closer consideration reveals that what we are being invited to accept as quasi-objects are the "actions or movements" of the discrete "material" bodies which, like the ontologically non-physical *aspects* which are characterised as distinct features or elements in such a description (for the eliminativist) do not exist - only the processed or processing discrete "material" bodies exist and not the necessary abstractive terms that form a part of the description of such *processes.*

Putting it in extremely simple terms (not for your benefit, but for others that may be getting a little confused) a scientist of a auto-mechanic observing a car engine running on the work-bench may be tempted to consider phenomenolising the operating *system* as states or processes of compression ignition - explosion - expansion and torque known through the senses, as something that exists in itself, when in fact it is not the *system* that exists - but the systematised collective of interacting metal engine-parts and exploding petroleum/air vapour that actually exists.

Is it possible to translate the above into a form of language which replaces or describes the behaving, aspectivally eventuating., structured physical objects of the engine  without giving the impression that it is the compressional, explosive, expansion events that exist rather than the fields, entities, material, physical objects, substances, extended solids, call it what you will.

Philosophy is a discourse in a theoretical space that allows for the reification of its own abstractions. Such primitive reificology hides or avoids (either deliberately or naively) the fuzzy, basic and problematic semantico-ontological references to the particulars of systematic states of affairs, which includes its own reificative methodology. Such reifications are useful fictions employed in an attempt to `ground' the abstractions in real material instances of physical, neurological, chemical and biological systems.

I reject Heideggerian reificology as another variant of a particularly odious type of German idealism - a hyposto-romanticism where *Being,* replaces *God* and is deified as the ongoing, neurologically perceived human biography, or facts of individuate life, and is elevated to a position of greater ontological importance than the objects or entities of which *Being* is claimed to be vaporous Doppelganger of its life-participating existent.