ELIMINATING REIFICATION FROM LOGICAL NOTATION
Jud Evans
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Copyright © Oct. 2008 Jud Evans. Permission
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The problem for me with this project of eliminating
reification from the language of logic or
the way of writing logical terms concerns
the fact that it is anti-theoretic rather
than inter-theoretic, so keeping a balance
between an explanation-type (an expository
method) which can be understood by my notional
readership (reasonably educated, intelligent
non-physicists with an interest in philosophy)
is essential in order for me to be understood.
I am unsympathetic to logical notation (particularly
predicational logic) due to its inability
to handle the finer (often critical) nuances
of ontological discourse and for its tendency
to treat processes, the interactions of objects,
fields, matergy, entities call them what
you will as if they themselves existed rather
than the processing, moving, interacting
material components (integrals) themselves,
which are the subjects of such scientific
descriptions of such interactive states of
affairs.
I would really like to translate my ontology
into a logical formulation, for I would find
it useful to have both versions - the Natural
Language version and the Logic version available
for study and further development side by
side. The trouble is that I neither have
the skill enough in the language of physics,
nor do I know if my physicalist eliminativism
can be expressed in a satisfactory manner
using the current logical symbols available.
In such a situation, dealing as I am with
ontology in a completely new, and as far
as I know philosophically unique anti-reificational
way, much of the ontological terminology
employed by the philosophical and scientific
tradition is inappropriate. Occam cannot
come to my help, because, at least as far
as the tradition is concerned there are no
historical *axioms* or *givens* scientific
or otherwise that are acceptable to the majority
of my audience, who remain dependently enwrapped
in the coils of many of the false axioms
of a dualistic philosophy which has its roots
in folk wisdom.
The belief that humans are more than bodies
and that there is something in or about the
human being that survives bodily death has
its origins in prehistory. It is encountered
in the mythology of Ancient Egypt, the Hittites
and Assyria and was formulated into a philosophical
doctrine in the Platonic writings of Ancient
Greece. From those primitive beginnings such
reality-disconnectedness has seeped into
the very fabric of human perception and metastasised
in the brain in the form of cancerous sub-concepts,
which attribute dualistic occultisms to many
aspects of modern life
The well known physicist George Metanomski
has helpfully suggested that as my terminology
Cosmos, Matergy, (energised matter) Space,
etc., indicates an endeavor to found my eliminativist
ontology in Physics, Occam would advise it
helpful to replace the long accountwith one
statement:
Cosmos is given by its two P-Equivalent(*)
continuous Aspects, "Field""
and "Space" and discrete "material"
bodies are their integrals. It would suffice
to replace "Matergy" with "Field"
and "Occupation" with "P-Equivalence"
to make the commented message entirely compatible
with Physics.
I could not adopt such axioms for the following
reasons
1. Mereologically, while *discrete* correctly
suggests separate entities or parts - it
does not make it clear enough that in my
ontology are no non-material forms (in folk
language what would be called
*interstices of empty space*) of separation
or insulation between the Koestlerian type
holeronic individuates that make up the matergic
whole.
2. I am very suspicious of the term *phenomena*
even in its cleaned-up and disinfected non-Husserlian
version. For the eliminativist states or
processes known through the senses rather
than by intuition or reasoning sounds good
- but closer consideration reveals that what
we are being invited to accept as quasi-objects
are the "actions or movements"
of the discrete "material" bodies
which, like the ontologically non-physical
*aspects* which are characterised as distinct
features or elements in such a description
(for the eliminativist) do not exist - only
the processed or processing discrete "material"
bodies exist and not the necessary abstractive
terms that form a part of the description
of such *processes.*

Putting it in extremely simple terms (not
for your benefit, but for others that may
be getting a little confused) a scientist
of a auto-mechanic observing a car engine
running on the work-bench may be tempted
to consider phenomenolising the operating
*system* as states or processes of compression
ignition - explosion - expansion and torque
known through the senses, as something that
exists in itself, when in fact it is not
the *system* that exists - but the systematised
collective of interacting metal engine-parts
and exploding petroleum/air vapour that actually
exists.
Is it possible to translate the above into
a form of language which replaces or describes
the behaving, aspectivally eventuating.,
structured physical objects of the engine
without giving the impression that it is
the compressional, explosive, expansion events
that exist rather than the fields, entities,
material, physical objects, substances, extended
solids, call it what you will.
Philosophy is a discourse in a theoretical
space that allows for the reification of
its own abstractions. Such primitive reificology
hides or avoids (either deliberately or naively)
the fuzzy, basic and problematic semantico-ontological
references to the particulars of systematic
states of affairs, which includes its own
reificative methodology. Such reifications
are useful fictions employed in an attempt
to `ground' the abstractions in real material
instances of physical, neurological, chemical
and biological systems.
I reject Heideggerian reificology as another
variant of a particularly odious type of
German idealism - a hyposto-romanticism where
*Being,* replaces *God* and is deified as
the ongoing, neurologically perceived human
biography, or facts of individuate life,
and is elevated to a position of greater
ontological importance than the objects or
entities of which *Being* is claimed to be
vaporous Doppelganger of its life-participating
existent.
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