To be is to be the value of a variable [1]
Quine's obfuscative definition is only definitive in that it defines
Quine as being in this instance - mistaken.
(though the general standard of his
oeuvre
is exemplary.)
My explanation here is that To be is NOT to be the value of a variable. And I offer this account as something which,
as far as I know, is the first de-construction
of Quine's famous axiom.
Professor Quine's definition is actually
an ontologically committed claim which simply
shift's the logico-ontological implication
or existential significational burden of TO BE from (the possibility) of being
some unstated object or a state of some unstated
object, to that of BEING an unstated existential
modality of a non-object.
Some Definitions of the term Variable
| * |
something that is likely to vary; something
that is subject to variation
"the weather is one variable to be considered
" |
| * |
a quantity that can assume any of a set of
values
|
| * |
liable to or capable of change; "rainfall in the tropics is notoriously variable" "variable winds"variable expenses."
|
| * |
variable star: a star that varies noticeably
in brightness
|
| * |
varying: marked by diversity or difference;
"the varying angles of roof slope";
"nature is infinitely variable" |
| * |
a symbol (like x or y) that is used in mathematical
or logical expressions to represent
a variable
quantity.
[2] |
| The usefully definitive fictions which lack
material denotata like the orphanic
word-tokens
in the definition of variables above do just like like values not exist |
possibilities, somethings, variables, quantities,
capabilities, changeabilities,
diversities,
differences, symbols, mathematical
or logical
expressions,etc.
Only the various or variegated
concrete,
material types of objects themselves
that
can be said to be objects exist
and the term to be can only be said to refer to a modality
of their existence. The terms
value and variable do not stand forth or cause to stand,etc. but are already modalities which are
attributed to objects in order to qualify
such concrete nouns and as such cannot have
further modalic layers assigned to them
as Quine attempts to do so. Such an bizarre
ontological practice leads to infinite regression.
1384, from O.Fr. existence, from L.L. existentem "existent," prp. of L. existere "stand forth, appear," and, as
a secondary meaning, "exist;"
from ex- "forth" + sistere "cause to stand." |
All that Quine achieves is to characterise,
to be as something that is not a
descriptive modalic variability
of an
object, but something
that acts
as a descriptive variable of
the modality
of a logically useful non-object.
In addition Quine assumes the layman's
error that to be is the uninflected form of the
stem be (used in the sense of be as an unspecified state of being something or other not mentioned) when in fact the to adds an inflectionality which can bestow
to be with intentionality, futurity, locativity and a host of other psychological, occupational, biological
abstractive possibilities in its sentential
employment, as in:
Bill is a father to be. Phyllis is going
to be a mother. John is studying to be a doctor. Jane is
said to be suffering from cancer. I think
its going to be raining by nightfall. Eric
is aid to be living in Tangiers.etc.
References:
[1] Quine. Willard Van Orman. "On What There Is," first published in the Review of Metaphysics. 1948.The article is included in Quine's
book, From a Logical Point of View
(Harper
& Row, New York: 1953).
[2] wordnetweb. princeton. edu/perl/webwn.
|
Quine 
Evans 