Acknowledging the fact that subject- predicate sentences are not able to get along without a indicant copula of course reinforces my claim that BE and its conjugates/ is, am, was were/ etc., NEVER EVER address /pure existence/ bereft of any existential modality, despite of hundreds of years of abusive effort on behalf of the priestly and transcendental community to try and fit a square non-ontological semantic peg into a round ontological hole.

Nothing can be broader or more sensible than that which is there, being the material objects with which we are surrounded, and, as we are, forming as we do, an individuate cognitive cloister, are extant and present as a part of that existential environ. The source and employment of the language we use is an existential modalic feature of the: that which is there, which is characterised as human Ignorance philosophical or otherwise, no more exists than intelligence.

What exist are ignorant philosophers, who (with some outstanding exceptions) have been allowed to flourish and have been given precedence, attention and acclaim only if their ontologies do not conflict with the miasmic reifica of religion, which rises from the stinking houses of prayer in chants and incense smoke and spouts of narcoleptic obfuscation, to quieten, pacify, dominate, frighten, exploit and in many cases sexually abuse children rather than blast down the hoi polloi in the manner of the police power-water-hoses of the oppressive state.

The so-called is of unknown properties (pure existence) is a myth. Enough proprietary modality to correctly instantiate a subject is ALWAYS available as potential predication and is triggered by the subject name. If to the addressee the name does not map to any known existential modalities, then nothing further can be said for the subject is totally unknown, unidentified, meaningless. NO statement is capable of being generated other than:

I do not know what you are talking about, or what the word means, or what it refers to.

Although to be a named object is to be present in the world in an existential modality of being a named object - of being the attributant of an identificatory label - if that is the only mode and no other predicational information as to the existential nature of the object can be mapped to it, then the veil of ignorance remains in place, and it never starts, or if started, ceases to act as a topic of conversation for the person concerned.

A savage who has never heard of the term GOD is inevitably informed by a missionary attempting to convert the pagans of the many acts regarding what that which is called God does and why it is important to take heed when the claim: God is. is made in his own tiny tribal dialect, which the preacher has patiently mastered in order to instruct his dusky pupil.

In the view of the preacher, God has so many existential modalities that to enumerate them would be impossible an unnecessary - that is why so many snappy axioms like;

                                            God is Love or God is Good

are created as selected propositions that are not susceptible of proof or disproof; its truth is assumed to axiomatic and be self-evident. So the toothy savage smiles, nods, his head and makes his gold mines or oil wells available to God's intermediary in exchange for a necklace of beads and a bible printed in the local language, in order that they may rejoice in the Lord and dance excitedly up and down in the high river reeds.

Predicatationally truncated, sententially orphanic verbalisms are meaningless UNLESS the addressor is already in possession, and prior to a specified or implied time be aware of a compendium (however large or small) of biographic, experiential, existential modes which map to the statement I experience.

One DOES NOT employ such a term unless one is aware of its meaning and the fact that it can be successfully mapped to the state of existing and being alive. This is the ontological lynch-pin which, when withdrawn sends the whole of Descartes' curious assemblage crashing to the ground.

Would one say

                                      I do not experience - therefore I am not.

Embrangled logic forces us to believe that it would be a possible sentence for him to construct - for to form the utterance I experience, or I think presupposes that the negative version (or as Plato would say the heteron) of to experience or to think, or any other verb in the languages of all of the languages on earth. It is quite possible to be ignorant of the properties of that which is the topic of the conversation (indeed such is the experience of all humans as the grow up in the company of adults, such a veil of nescience follows us into society and into school, college and university. It is a life-long condition that we will experience until we die. But such a condition holds only insofar as we may be listeners to such conversational topics and not contributors.

As soon as we open our mouths and generate meaningful sentences it is assumed that we understand the semantic import of the words we employ. Thus, if Descartes claimed  he may be ignorant of the properties of that which is the topic of the conversation, and he initiated a topic by forming the sentence: 'I experience; therefore, I am,' or  I think therefore I am then it is assumed that he must be aware of the meaning of I, experience, therefore, am in that order, and I, think, therefore am, which presupposes that he isnaturally aware of the negative, other, or opposite of that condition or meaning.

If  he DENIED  that he is aware of the meaning of

                         I, experience, therefore, am  and I, think, therefore am.

the experience that he will undergo  will be the sound of the gales of laughter as audience  hurriedly vacates the room and rushes for the protection of the police, in the belief that he has gone mad.

I thought by now it is common knowledge  that Be is not the only so-called verb which conceals its purposes  covertly sometimes?

Would Descartes abusively ignore the meaning of the (this is a fictive one) verb brygrit for example in a sentence such as:

                                               I brygrit therefore I grerg.

And claim he grerged if he did no know the meaning of the words?

It would make no difference whatsoever as to which existential modality you or Descartes chose to use in order to confirm the fact that you exist.

I think, I experience, I have a painful blister on my bottom, I am thirsty therefore I am, I     think I am thinking therefore I am, or even the single first person pronoun I am!

Any words confirm and carry the same implicature - and what does that implicature delimit? What does the utterance of a human tongue imply? Could it for example be the utterance of a parrot? A computer? A tape recorder? Would a statement I think therefore I exist be made by a parrot? Parrots DON’T MAKE STATEMENTS. They imitate sounds - a parrot is incapable of stating a fact or making an assertion which is offered as evidence for any thing at all - never mind that something is true. So, to get back to my question, What does that implicature delimit?

What does the utterance of a human tongue imply? Well it goes much further than implicature or entailment IT GUARANTEES that whatever makes a existential statement is a human being. We may not know in other words the name of that human being - we may not know WHO that human being is - but we can say with absolute surety and without ANY fear of contradiction that the entity - that English, Latin or French speaking entity is a HUMAN BEING speaking a complicated human language that took millennia to develop and which sets humans apart from parrot and other imitative creature as well as it separates us from mechanical technology which repeats recorded messages. Souls don't have tongues, mouths or brains wherewith to generated language - unless that is YOU HAVE CONVINCING PROOF THAT THERE ARE SUCH THINGS - AND THEY DO?

We have to assume that Descartes was not moronic and that when he made his ridiculous statement I think therefore I am, that not only was he aware of the (quite complicated intricacies of Latin grammar, that he was educated to a sufficiently informative standard to be able to select the correct first person pronoun I which presupposes a knowledge of the other pronouns which he deselected in favour of the first person version, that he understood the significance of the word think, together with a general, or at least a sufficient seventeenth century knowledge of the fact that thinking went on in people's heads, and that peoples heads were normally perched atop a pair of human shoulders, and these shoulders were part of a human body that had two arms and hands, that he would have already used those hands to hold the books that he had studied whilst he was learning French and Latin in order that one day he might learn sufficient of human biology to know what thinking was and where in the soma it took place, so that eventually he would be able to mouth the infamous sentence:

                                                     I think therefore I am.

And make a laughing stock of the cognitively challenged – possibly as an act of revenge against his Jesuit tormentors.

The seemingly obvious, undoubtably concise and (considering the palsied hand of the church on thinking at the time) pertinent statement: I think therefore I am reveals it, on closer examination to be posited on such an unacceptable counterfactual craziness as to render it in many way similar to Wittgenstein’s Colourless green ideas sleep furiously which, though it makes grammatical sense, is utterly meaningless and admits of no sense.

Any human demonstrating such linguistic capabilities, would, like any other have in train a host of intellectual connections, references, relationships both private and personal, not to mention the wealth of emotional a la recherche du temps perdu etc. The whole thing is such a mess of transcendentalist triviality that I am in a state of absolute awe that nobody amongst the trannie hordes has ever figured this spurious ontological obviousness out before.

Is possible to know that I am without knowing enough about the properties of the referent of 'I' to say what I am. hence, it must be possible to assert that I am without also asserting what I am.

ABSOLUTELY AND DEFINITELY NOT! Even if you were the unknown victim of an alpine climbing accident with dreadful head injuries and had been lying in a coma in a Zurich hospital for thirty years and had suddenly changed to a conscious rather than an unconscious patient. The first question asked of you would probably be: Who are you? (not by the way WHAT are you?) As soon as you opened you lips and answered - (or if you simply lay there and thought out your reply) I am Pierre Blancot or, I do not know, then you would have made it obvious to yourself and every body else concerned that you were the possessor of a sufficient knowledge of Swiss French, or English, or Latin to blow your ontological cover.

Such a revelation would usher in all the other multitudinous properties (existential modalities) which are part and parcel of, concomitant with, and form the essential pre-conditional neurological and physiological structural modes necessary, either to merely think such a complicated thought, or even more so to be capable of physically initialising the existential modes of lung compression, lip, tongue and jaw movement necessary for understanding and communicating such an advanced understanding of the grammar, semantic import and syntax of ANY human language - whatever that language happened to be.

It might be said that someone taking the via negativa may eventually conclude that nothing can be predicated of god (or tao or self or whatever); but, at the end of the road, some will conclude 'and, yet, god is'.

The fact that Descartes speaks excellent English, French, Latin (whatever)  and because of all the physio-neurological underpinning that goes with such an extraordinary intellectual feat it, is impossible for you NOT to be aware of the properties,which provide the key to who and what your are, for the employment of the term and yet as a qualifier obviously refers to additional covert information, knowledge about God, Tao or Self or whatever, which satisfies him that indeed in spite of the fact that nothing is known about what are virtually just meaningless names he still believes they exist? C’mon!

If such a person concluded that nothing can be predicated of God in addition to the his/her awareness of the term GOD then he would not (even if he/she were a cretin) be in a position to acknowledge the existence of some thing (a flower, an insect, a drain cover, a sexual disease, a dumpling etc.) for in his ignorance of any modality being attributed to such a unknown term he would be bereft of any existential or instantiational modes to map to any meaningless putative noun.

If such statements are said  not to be  claims and that there is a property free state of some entity; but, are claims that I, this experiencer, can be unaware of those properties --- at least until I acquire more knowledge (which, of course, may or may not happen anytime soon, if at all). are they valid claims?

C’mon this is outrageous sophistry. What kind of  claim is that, that there are people around who, though they admit complete ignorance of some unknown, of which they have only been given a name, and are bereft of any further information, description, category, form, location, or whether it (if it is an it) be animal, vegetable or mineral, is animate or inanimately dead, red, green, or decorated like a barber’s pole, sweet, sour or tasting of Cadbury’s? chocolate.