CHRISTIAN DETERMINISM
AN ESSAY
Jud Evans December 2008
INTRODUCTION
There are some works of philosophy or theology,
that may be researched, written (and
sometimes
read) as an austere pursuit of the
pleasure
of participating as the thought burgeons
and develops in this direction and
that.
Such has been my experience during
the research
and the writing of this paper.
* * * * *
The essay comprises of five parts.
1
FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM – DEFINITION
2
FATALISM, PREDICTION AND DETERMINISM
3
GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL
4
SOME MAINSTREAM CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES
5
A CONCLUSION WITH A PERSONAL VIEW
* * * * *
FREE WILL & DETERMINISM – AN INTRODUCTORY
OVERVIEW
Some Definitions of a Religious Understanding
of Determinism:
SUFFICIENT CAUSE
Sufficient cause consists
of an event or
events that provide the
generative force
that is the origin of something
which suffices
to ensure that the event
in question will
take place.
| THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSE |
A ‘snapshot’ of the cosmos obtained at a
given time, together with
a detailed understanding
of the laws of nature,
allied to sufficient
computational power could
enable someone
in possession of such knowledge
to predict
the state of the universe
and its contents
at any later time.
OMNISCIENT KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge in the possession
of some infallible
being responsible for originating
the laws
of nature, could enable
such an all-knowing
being (incapable of failure
or error) to
predict the state of the
universe and its
contents at any past, present
or future time.
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Determinists are divided between the so-called
hard determinists, who hold that free will is incompatible
with determinism, and compatibilists, also known as soft determinists who hold that determinism is compatible with
free will. People who hold
that
determinism is false are called libertarians.
PART TWO
FATALISM, PREDICTION AND DETERMINISM
Many people wonder if there is a difference
between determinism, fatalism and prediction
(prognostication.) One can easily differentiate the idea of
fatalism from determinism by considering
on the one hand:
FATALISM, PREDICTION AND DETERMINISM
Many people wonder if there is
a difference
between determinism, fatalism
and prediction
(prognostication.) One can easily
differentiate
the idea of fatalism from determinism
by
considering on the one hand:
FATALISTICALLY
ENGENDERED SPIRITUAL FORCES
God’s determined will – bestowed
benignly
through the implementation of
his detailed
providential, pre-determined
foreknowledge
of his own omniscient intervention,
and the
intricate minutia of his divine
design for
the ultimate outcome of that
which he created,
irrespective of any individual human choice,
or conversely
NATURAL CAUSALITY OR DETERMINISTIC
LAW
The cause - driven events and
catenulate
consequences antecedally engendered
by an
indifferent materialistic macrocosm
of coincidence
and unplanned happenstance.
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The references regarding foreknowledge and
providence have antecedents in the written biblical
scripture, even though they are sometimes
provided in the slightly ambiguous
or metaphorical forms of language characteristic of spiritual
writings, which flows from the difficulties of expression
in such matters.
The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole
disposing thereof is of the LORD. (Proverbs. 16:33)
For many religious people, biblical quotations
such as the above, when taken literally, provide sufficient evidence to confirm that
there are spiritually engendered forces
at
play. To such folk even the most trivial experiential
outcomes of our daily lives are engendered
by God and are not the results of deterministic
natural laws alone, or indeed simple
chance.
Hence events at the gaming table are seen
to be fated to happen, because it is
seen
to be in accordance with the will,
mysterious
providential schemata or preordained
plans
of Almighty God.
Fatalism then is a perception of God as dispensing
his Holy Will by (metaphorically speaking)
writing a script or an existential scenario for all his children, by setting in train
a planned program of inevitable mechanistic concatenation.
By that I mean the deity not simply
winding-up and setting in motion the universal
clock in the manner of a primum mobile, and letting it slowly unwind, ungoverned
and unmonitored, in a random indeterministic
manner – but by coiling the springs
of countless
‘tailor-made’ individually programmed clocks for every
life-form and inanimate entity in the
cosmos.
NATURAL CAUSALITY OR DETERMINISTIC LAW
Conversely, there are many who imagine the
world being influenced by materialistic,
deterministic concatenational laws,
without
anything at all being fated or destined to come about as a result of God’s design or any other spiritual intervention
or influence.
Upon reflection, it seems fairly obvious
that the sundry agnostics and atheists
of
history, or the present-day promoters
of
the current materialistic or non-deistic
explanations which threaten the religious
institutions may be judged guilty of simply appropriating or plagiarising ontological aspects of the
religious version (for it was the religious model which all
of the disparate societies of mankind
first
adopted) and converting it for the
benefit
of their own worldly-minded agenda,
by overtly
substituting ‘God’ with a de-spiritualised ‘Nature’ in the manner of Richard Dawkins, and passing it off as their own idea, or replacing
it covertly by supervening ‘Nature’ upon ‘God’ in the surreptitious manner of the ingenious Spinoza?
FATALISTICALLY ENGENDERED SPIRITUAL FORCES
There is another ‘in-house’ threat to monotheistic
theology, which warns of a regression
to
fatalism. It concerns a possible conflict between God’s
divine providence and his equally infallible
sacred foreknowledge. It can be summed
up
as a conflict between certain interpretations
of the Christian perception of God's
intellect
and various ideas concerning the nature
of
God’s will. The problem can be highlighted up in this
manner:
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As God has an infallible awareness of everyone’s future in a way that
cannot be misguided, then no
events
can ever happen differently.
Therefore
if human freedom depends
on the power to act in a
different manner, then
we are
not free.
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But that is not all, for free will is also threatened by Divine Providence, for if all events are controlled by God’s
providential and paternalistic benign
will,
then the Almighty decides how everything
turns out best for us in His given circumstances, so once again we lack
the freedom to act in the way we wish
and
so once again – we are not free. But it is not only to us humans that God’s
Divine providential concern extends.
God’s
stewardship of the elements of his
creation
is hyper-extensional and encompasses
his
earthly instaurations beyond the human
family. As the biblical hermenuetician Dr. Paul Marston
points out in his: ‘Understanding Biblical Creation Passages:’
‘When Job was puzzled at the issue of apparently
unwarranted suffering, part of God's
response
was to ask:
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"Can you hunt the prey for the lion,
or satisfy the appetite of the young lions, When they crouch in their dens,
Or lurk in their lairs to lie in wait? Who provides food for the
raven, when its young ones cry to God, and wander about for lack
of food?” (Job 38:39-41)
Thus concludes Marston:
‘The God of Jesus Christ feeds
the lions
(that hunt prey) and the ravens
that consume carrion and will
even prey upon
sick and injured animals.’
[1] Marston 2007 p. 17)
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But if there is a causal chain - who or what
set this series of linked events in
train? Was it an all-knowing God’s beneficent will,
or Richard Dawkins’ scientistic version
of an creatio ex nihlio genetical jack-in-the box of unlikely lucky chances, which sprang forth Pandora-like and gave
birth to his robotic humans or ‘survival machines,’ which have been ‘blindly programmed’ in the absence of any cosmic programmer
blind or sighted? [2] (Dawkins 1989)
PROGNOSTICATION AND DETERMINISM
It is not difficult to differentiate prognostication from determinism. There is a well-known description of cosmic
determinism by the French philosopher
and
mathematician Count Pierre-Simon Laplace. The ‘intelligence’ that the atheist Laplace cites in the passage
below, might well be God, for the count’s
description of a cosmic creativeness
fits
him perfectly, which was surely not
the Frenchman’s
intention, but for some the two notions
of
‘a Creative Intelligence’ and ‘a Creative God’ are easy both to confuse, conflate as well as to separate.
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‘We may regard the present state of the universe
as the effect of its past and
the cause of
its future. An intellect which
at any given
moment knew all of the forces
that animate
nature and the mutual positions
of the beings
that compose it, if this intellect
were vast
enough to submit the data to
analysis, could
condense into a single formula
the movement
of the greatest bodies of the
universe and
that of the lightest atom; for
such an intellect
nothing could be uncertain and
the future
just like the past would be present
before
its eyes.’ [3] (Laplace. 1820)
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It appears then that counterfactual demons
prove a very popular transcendental
tool
for French philosophers, for just as
Descartes
introduced his 'malicious demon,' the potentially evil beguiler of the 'Meditations on First Philosophy,' whose conjectural existence as a genius malignus, was a necessary requirement of his rigorous
exercise to satisfy himself that he
really
existed, so too is Laplace credited
with
the above famous quotation which is
often
referred to as: 'Laplace's Demon.'
And now in part three I turn to a consideration
of whether human behaviour is the result
of heavenly foreordination, or whether
we
are free to act as we wish?
PART THREE
GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL
The thesis of Fatalism is that the
necessity
of human behaviour emerges as the result
of heavenly foreordination and therefore
is unfree action. The form of theological
teaching that insists that our fate
is determined
in advance is usually associated with
Calvin,
for whom God has foreordained every
event
throughout time without end. Strangely
mirroring
the atheist Laplace’s identification
of a
non-specific super-human ‘intelligence,’
theological fatalism holds that God’s
inerrant
awareness of every human act and every
event
before it happens renders the act necessary
and our experiential biography is therefore
unfree. Many, if not all Christians
would
insist that indeed there is a being
who infallibly
knows everything that will happen in
the
future – and that being is God. And
yes,
as Laplace rightly claimed – logically
no
human act is free if there is a being
who
is infallibly aware in advance of everything
that will happen in the future, for
no human
being has any control over the future.
Christians
would say that the Frenchman’s fault
lay
not in his dianoetic reasoning, but
in his
dismissal of God as the divine volition
and
his interpolation of an unspecified
anonymous
noesis in his place.
The fatalist argument creates a theological
dilemma, for many historical and modern
religious
leaders have perceived it vital to
assert
on the one hand that mankind has the
free
will to accept or reject the love that
God
offers (together with the responsibilities
that acceptance entails, or the obligations
that rejection obviates) and the fact
that
God infallibly knows the entire future.
Thus
the theological anomaly appears to
suggest
that human free will and God’s infallibly
are incompatible, for to accept free
will
is to deny God’s infallibilty.
RELIGIOUS
COMPATIBILISTS
Christians who maintain it possible
to reconcile
both conflicting beliefs are labelled
‘religious
compatibilists’ in the sense of their
personal
satisfactory reconciliation of God’s
infallible
foreknowledge and human free will.
These
religious thinkers who wish to prescind
and
accept both free will and infallible
foreknowledge
must either discover a false assumption
in
the theological juxtaposition of free
will
and infallible foreknowledge or demonstrate
the hermeneutical error of those who
wrongly
interpret the scriptures and propose
such
a counter-intuitive duality. Religious
incompatibilists
proclaim the mutual exclusiveness of
foreknowledge
and human free will and deny both the
characterisation
of infallible foreknowledge and free
will
as signified in the argument. Their
method
of rapprochement is to question the
propositional
manner or language in which the problem
is
couched
Crick, Marston and Forster
Sometimes people say or write things
that
are so apodeictically obvious that
one wonders
what all the academic and Christian
determinist
disputation is all about in the first
place?
Such an astute observation can be found
in
the book by polymaths Marston and Forster.
A review of ‘Reason, Science and Faith’
(2001)
by Dr. Rodney Holder
(Oxford D. Phil in Astrophysics) describes
it as one in which the authors:
‘Robustly expose the intellectual and
moral
poverty of the scientistic atheism,’
[4]
(Holder 2001)
The authors of ‘Reason, Science and Faith,
who like many other scientists and highly
qualified academics both historical and contemporary
are practising Christians, were anxious both
to dispel some hermeneutical misunderstandings
to be found in the bible and establish the
actuality of libertarian free will and to
make it plain that human beings are
responsible to make moral choices.’
They were able to make this point regarding
a reference to something written by
the famous
biologist Frances Crick. Although the
great
biologist was a highly educated man
having
a B. Sc. in physics and another in
biology,
he was, like many, at the same time
under
the erroneous impression that all Christians
believe in an immortal soul. For him
the
very idea of a non-material soul that
could
enter a body and then persist after
death
is just that - an imagined idea. In
fact
Crick, referred to himself in his autobiography
‘What Mad Pursuit’ as:
‘A sceptic
and an agnostic with strong inclination towards
atheism'
[5]
(Crick. 1990 p. 146)
In order to make the points both that
the
Bible does not imply that man has an
immortal
soul and that humankind is quite capable
of making moral choices, the authors
quote
John Foster - a dualist interactionist
of
some renown who points out that:
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‘The Hebrew or the Greek psyche does not
imply that ‘the soul’ is some
kind of substance
distinct from the body. Thus,
eg, Genesis
2:7 says that man ‘became a living
soul’,
not that he got one. Verses traditionally
taken as implying some kind of
separate ‘soul’
are based on dubious translations.
In the
Bible, humans definitely do not
‘have an
immortal soul’. Only God is immortal
(1 Tim
6:16) and humans ‘seek for glory
and honour
and immortality’ (Rom 2:7) receiving
eternal
life as a gift (Romans 3.21).
Some of the
expressions used by Cartesians
like ‘mind-stuff’
or ‘mental substance’ are not
particularly
biblical. What does seem essential
is that
human beings are responsible
to make moral
choices, and that their ‘selves’
are open
to reconstitution through a divine
act of
resurrection. [6] (Foster (1991)
p. 159)
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Crick tempered his strong beliefs later
on
in life, when he stated:
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'An honest man, armed with all the knowledge
available to us now, could only
state that
in some sense, the origin of
life appears
at the moment to be almost a
miracle, so
many are the conditions which
would have
had to have been satisfied to
get it going.'
[7] (Crick. 1966 pp. 53-55.)
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PART FOUR
SOME MAINSTREAM
CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES
Initially I sketched in my impressions of
Christian attitudes to determinism with very
light brushstrokes at that early stage, the
ostensibly simple traditionalist definition
of the aspect of Christian theology that
deals with salvation as the effect of a divine
agency as introduced out the outset of this
paper is starting to look a little oversimplified
now we have come thus far. Now is the time
to widen the frame of the question by examining
and appraising what particular deterministic
- fatalistic differences of interpretation
may obtain between the various Christian
groupings.
To generalise, the apparent straightforward
view of Christianity in fact conceals
a wide
spectrum of Christian opinion that
extends
from an extreme liberalism to an extreme
monergism, within which three broadly
different
interpretive systems can be distinguished.
The churches or denominations appear
to be
divided mainly by the contradictions
implied
in holding a totally monergistic or
hard
deterministic view of God's relationship
with mankind on the one hand, as opposed
to the softer theological implications
of
a synergistic or compatibilistic stance
on
the other, with yet another, almost
totally
liberalistic grouping who regard action
of
any kind, including moral choices,
as lying
purely within the scope of all individual
members of mankind. This of course
is a gross
generalisation, and there are many
gradations
and different shades of opinion nestled
within
the interstices of that belief-spectrum.
The early traditional Christian theological
attitude to free will and determinism
has
been (in spite of some minor early
differences
of opinion) quite straightforward.
Personal,
public and natural events in the world
have
been pre-ordained by the will of Almighty
God as proclaimed by the good news
embodied
in the eschatology of the biblical
accounts
of the word of Jesus.
Other than that, it is only through
leading
lives of moral excellence, or through
unusual
acts of personal sacrifice or faith
can the
laws of nature and the inevitable consequence
of antecedent sufficient causes and
the concatenational
events of nature be circumvented, changed
or avoided via the divine grace of
God that
(with apologies to Shakespeare) the
slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune, or
the
inexorable unfolding of concatenational
consequences
can ever be modified or mollified.
Certain serious theological disadvantages
accompany this assignment of the responsibility
for all that happens as being derived
from
or associated with the divine power.
It creates
the notion of blame and responsibility
and
with it the serious problem of explaining
away or providing apologist reasons,
causes
or justifications of the evil that
seems
to be ubiquitous in the world.
Because of that much of early Christian
theology
is concerned with the defence of Christian
doctrines. It is very instructive and
interesting
to study the manner in which some early
Christian
thinkers such as Saint Augustine and
others
responded so brilliantly to the challenge
of explaining how a being who controls
even
the smallest detail of every event
in the
cosmos - a supreme being whom theology
holds
out to be a manifestation of the utmost
power,
perfection and loving goodness, can
countenance
even a hint of evil in the world.
Monergism
St. Augustine of Hippo placed great
store
in the power and grace of God in the
salvation
of souls and ushered in the idea of
monergism
to Christianity. Monergism is the belief
that human agency or the state of being
in
action or exerting unique power is
entirely
passive and it is God's agency which
is all-determining
- all-pervasive YET WITHOUT DESTROYING
HUMAN
FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND ACTION. 'Monergism’
(as opposed to ‘synergism’) is the
doctrine
that the Holy Spirit alone can act
to bring
about the religious conversion of people.
Monergism, in its simplest form states
that
salvation is all the work of God. It
is usually
linked with Calvinism and its belief
in irresistible
grace, as opposed to synergism, which
constitutes
its main differences with Arminianism
and
Roman Catholicism. [8] (wikipedia)
Held in Orange, France in 529. The
Second
Council of Orange dealt more directly
with
ongoing theological issues surrounding
the
conflict between Augustine, Bishop
of Hippo
in North Africa (354-430) and Pelagius,
a
British monk (c. 354 - c. 420/440)
who challenged
some of the traditional views of the
Church.
This is the relevant canon 23 that
was agreed
to by the council:
It can be seen in the canon 23 fragment
below,
that whilst free will in man was not
denied,
it cleverly characterises human volition
as that exercise of human will which
displeases
God. The didactic import is clear –
do as
God wills – not as you will.
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Concerning the will of God and of man. Men
do their own will and not the
will of God
when they do what displeases
him; but when
they follow their own will and
comply with
the will of God, however willingly
they do
so, yet it is his will by which
what they
will is both prepared and instructed.
[9]
(Bratcher. 2007)
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Calvinism
The more extreme version of Christian
theological
determinism is best characterised by
the
doctrine of John Calvin (1509-1564.)
Calvin
was a French Protestant disputant who
advocated
reform in the sixteenth century. Calvinism
holds that the inviolable sovereignty
of
God is paramount. God's omnipotence
is total
and he has omniscient perception of
everything
that has and will happen in the cosmos.
Pardon and salvation are forms of limited
atonement accomplishable by and to God's
favoured few, and because not everyone is
a Christian, God must have selected
only some for salvation. The nature of the
death of his son our Jesus Christ was also
only for those few elect, and not the many.
This seems rather out of keeping with God's
stated reason for the crucifixion, for one
of the most quoted verses from the Bible
informs us that Jesus died for all humanity:
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'For God so loved the world that he gave
his one and only Son, that whosoever
believes
in him shall not perish, but
have everlasting
life' (John 3:16)
God's grace is a fully determined
irresistible
grace, for because we are numbered
amongst
the chosen such heavenly grace
is an overwhelming
benison which none can resist.
Calvin's claim
that only predestined, elected
persons are
eligible for salvation are the
most provocative
elements of his theology. [10]
(Hunt. 2001)
'No man can come to Me unless
the Father
who hath sent Me draw him; and
I will raise
him up at the Last Day.' (John
6:44)
'Hath not the potter power over
the clay
to make from the same lump one
vessel unto
honour and another unto dishonour?'
(Romans
9:20-21.)
In fairness to Calvin there is
no doubt that
allusions to God's determinate
will abound
in the bible. in A single example
will suffice
in relation to the crime of crucifying
our
Lord:
'Him, being delivered by the
determinate
will and foreknowledge of God,
ye have taken
and by wicked hands have crucified
and slain.'
(Acts 2:23)
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One is entitled to wonder here if the
‘wicked
hands’ can be admonished for demonstrably
carrying out God’s will? Thankfully
the Christian
theologian Millard Erickson comes to
our
aid and makes a good observation in
this
respect, which for me supplies a satisfactory
explanation:
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'For the Old Testament writers, it was virtually
inconceivable that anything could
happen
independently of the will and
working of
God. As evidence of this, consider
that common
impersonal expressions like 'It
rained' are
not found in the Old Testament.
For the Hebrews,
rain did not simply happen; God
sent the
rain. They saw [God] as the all-powerful
determiner of everything that
occurs. Not
only is [God] active in everything
that occurs,
but [God] has planned it. What
is happening
now was planned long ago'. [11]
(Erickson
p. 348)
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Synergism
Synergism means that salvation is a
cooperative
activity. Salvation is not a God-only
process,
but a God-and process. This working
together
is termed Synergism. Such Synergism
was a
religious philosophy with humanistic
overtones
even in Old Testament times, and it
has been
in evidence in every generation. It
is man's
demand not to be considered impotent,
Man
admits his sickness, but he is unwilling
to admit his death.
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‘Theologically, Synergism is fatal to any
sound Christian soteriology,
for it is a
denial of man's total bondage
in sin and
a claim to some remaining will
to absolute
good. By and large, the Greek
Fathers were
always content to place the grace
of God
and the free will of man side
by side, and
as a consequence, the Greek Catholic
Church
early assumed a synergistic position.
The
Roman Catholic Church followed
suit--though
somewhat more slowly. Since the
Council of
Trent it has held dogmatically
that man prepares
himself and disposes his own
heart to receive
the grace of justification.’
(12) (Berkof.
1975. p. 146)
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Surely this in itself confirms that
man is
credited with the decision-making ability
to opt for performing the actions requisite
for initiating that which is required
to
achieve salvation, which in itself
is a tacit
acknowledgement of the existence of
free
will in mankind?
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‘The crucial issue is the sovereignty of
God's grace in the most absolute
sense, a
pure unabashed Monergism. The
only defence
against Synergism is an unqualified
Calvinism
ascribing all the glory to God
by insisting
upon the total spiritual impotence
of man,
an Election based solely upon
the good pleasure
of God, an Atonement intended
only for the
elect though sufficient for all
men, a grace
that can neither be resisted
nor earned,
and a security for the believer
that is as
permanent as God Himself.’ [13]
(Custance.
1979. Ch. 21)
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Methodism
First some biblical quotations suggestive
of free will.
'They have built the high places...
to burn
their sons and daughters in the fire
- something
I did not command nor did it enter
my mind'
(Jeremiah 7:31)
With regard the Calvinistic interpretation
that God has only chosen some to be
saved
Peter writes:
'The Lord is not slow in keeping his
promise,
as some understand slowness. He is
patient
with you, not wanting anyone to perish,
but
everyone to come to repentance'
(2. Peter 3:9 and see Ezekiel 33:11/1
Timothy
2:3-4)
‘Furthermore, it is also taught that
God
gives us freedom to make a real choice
to
follow God., (Is. 55:1/Matthew 11:28)
Although Arminians retain the notion
that
we are elected to salvation, they do
so on
the basis that God has merely chosen
those
God already knows will accept salvation
(Romans
8:29). To some this point may be more
a technicality
in order to distinguish Arminianism
from
Calvinism rather than anything else.
Theologically, John Wesley the founder
of
Methodism was essentially a follower
of Jacobus
Arminius the Dutch theologian and founder
of Arminianism, which opposed the absolute
predestinarianism of Calvin and was
influential
throughout Europe. In 1744 the first
Annual
Methodist Conference was held and the
Articles
of Religion were drawn up. They were
based
to a considerable extent upon the Thirty-nine
Articles of the Church of England,
but great
emphasis was laid upon repentance,
faith,
sanctification, and the privilege of
full,
free salvation for everyone. By 1995
there
were about 388,000 Methodists in Great
Britain.
There are over 26 million Methodists
worldwide.
A recent (2000) document issued by
the General
Conference of the American United Methodist
Church ‘on new developments in genetic
science,’
included a statement in Section III.
A of
the conference report which appears
to leave
the deterministic door slightly ajar
with
regard to a possible revaluation or
recognition
of certain genetic determinations as
the
following brief paragraph makes clear:
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'Developments in genetic science compel our
revaluation of accepted theological/ethical
issues, including determinism
versus free
will, the nature of sin, just
distribution
of resources, the status of human
beings
in relation to other forms of
life, and the
meaning of personhood. [14] (Book
of Discipline.
2000.)
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After reiterating that creation has
its origin,
existence, value, and destiny in God
the
document defines human beings as 'stewards
of creation' with all the logical implications
for free will and decision-making that
such
a custodianship entails and further
explains:
'While human beings share with other
species
the limitations of finite creatures
who owe
their existence to God, their special
creation
'in the image of God' gives them the
freedom
and authority to exercise stewardship
responsibly.
[15] (Ibid.)
For the pragmatic Methodists at least
there
is no evangelical time wasted agonising
over
freedom of choice. The obviousness
of free
will remains unhindered by obfuscation
and
hermeneutical misunderstanding.
For Methodists at least the way is
clear:
‘Free will exists, so let us exercise
that
free will by getting on with the business
of telling others of the Good News
and spreading
Christ’s message.'
CONCLUSION
So after this fairly comprehensive review
of the differing attitudes of Christianity
towards determinism – where do I stand personally?
Theology aside I reject the middle of
the road compatibilist stance as ontologically too vague. Even though I do not submit to the belief
that I able to change my destiny, I confess
to being attracted in some ways to the fatalist
approach, but like most people I am happy
to put 'reality' on the back burner and to
pretend to myself that the 'decisions' I make are my own..
I sometimes ask myself: 'Well, what is wrong with fatalism anyway?'
Who is right indeed?
Marston and Forster help us again by formulating the important questions:
One thing is certain - fatalism delivers
us from uncertainty, for there is a comforting
assurance in putting one’s trust in God,
which anyone who has visited a mosque
in the east, or a clap-board country
church in the depths of the Russian countryside
as I have done, would readily appreciate
just by observing the faces and deportment
of the faithful.
The ability for human predictability is severely
limited by the deterministically engendered
behaviour of other inevitable consequences
of antecedent sufficient causes and their
variables. We can however conceive of a vaguely
reliable extension ( a weak or strong possibility)
of the eventive concatenational chain continuing
more or less predictably (into the so-called
*future*) as one event supplants another,
particularly if such a *prediction* is based
upon a past record of a regularity of events.
So, though it is possible to make informed
guesses as to the immediate future, one can
never be certain in the face of so many (equally
determined) polynomial existential functions
that are the sum or nexus of a large number
of converging event-variables.
Perhaps it can be explained because I am
now an old man, and in a like manner to Frances
Crick with his burgeoning agnosticism as
he grew older, my attitudes are mellowing
with time too? I no longer believe in God
in the way that I did as a young child, nor
that some supernatural being foreordains
by divine will or heavenly decree that such
things happen in the order they do. My determinism
is now of the atheistic kind and conceives
of 'nature' as an uncaring, material imperative of change
predicated upon the absence of
any agential connection of inclusion or containment.
Human decision-making is merely a feature
of our imagination. All our thoughts
and these words I write are entirely
deterministic as many scientists and others
claim.
‘Reason, Science and Faith’ poses the vital questions in this manner:
‘Is a completely deterministic view of the
brain either plausible or compatible
with
Christian belief?’
Eccles states strongly:
“If physical determinism is true, then that
is the end of all discussion or argument;
everything is finished. There is no
philosophy.
All human persons are caught up in
this inexorable
web of circumstances and cannot break
out
of it. Everything we think we are doing
is
an illusion...”
[17] (Eccles. 1980 p. 546)
‘MacKay, in contrast, argues that it would
be unproblematic for the Christian
if it
turned out that’:
“...
knowledge of our brain mechanisms and the
forces acting on and in them were sufficient
to allow our actions to be predicted (secretly) by a detached observer.”
[18] (MacKay 1980 p. 69)
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‘So who is right?’ …Marston and Forster continue…
‘Actually we can ask several
distinct questions
about this:
1. Would strict determinism mean
that our
“feeling” of making decisions
was in fact
illusory?
2. Would it mean that we were
right to be
'fatalistic' in the sense that
if someone
predicted our actions with certainty
and
told us, then we would 'have
no choice',
but to follow the predictions?
3. Would it make moral responsibility
void?'
[19] (Marston and Forster 1999
p. 90)
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Christians regard it as a given that
God exerts a divinely conferred dominion
over nature. To them it seems logical that
a necessary assumption of God’s administrative
and volitionary ascendancy is that free will
must exist for humans. They cannot see the
point for God to have 'wound up the mechanism
of the cosmos' and then to have absconded
and left it to run without further stewardship.
For the believer God is perfect and is the
solitary determinator of all creation. For
the Christian, if God controls the catenulate
unspooling of time and only lets us imagine
that we have a modicum of free will as frame
by frame our life is projected upon the screen
of our experience – then they would not be
in the least upset by that. For them God
is the cosmic projectionist, and they are
but a willing member of the captive audience.
They are content to enjoy the production
in which they are both an active participant
and a passive spectator. They say that a
God of that awe-inspiring, unimaginable stature
and magnitude is bound to move in ways which
seem to us mysterious. Their God is a fair,
loving, compassionate father whose mercy
extends comprehensively to all his flock
– not pre-selected individuals.
Finally I believe in a situation
of extreme determinism (or forthright
fatalism)
resulting from acceptance of the doctrine
that everything that happens is predetermined
and inevitable. Whilst
Christian
determinists believe that in addition
to the essential work of the evangelical
church, that God has created us with an inherent
awareness of the efficacy of behaving
morally,
which is experientially confirmed and
reinforced in practice in our relationship with society
I believe in a humanist doctrine of
treating
others as I would hope that they treated
me. My doctrine does not include
the
Christian one on 'turning the other
cheek'
- if somebody insults me the I insult
them
back in more than equal measure. Thus
my
outlook in the last degree does not
conflict
so much with the ethics of the religious.
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‘Do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.’ Is a command based
on Jesus' words
in the Sermon on the Mount which
is mirrored
in every ancient system of wisdom
about our
conduct to others, including
the Koran, the
Analects of Confucius and the
Talmud.
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Jesus. Matthew 7:12, Luke 6:31, Luke
10:27
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