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What is Meant
by Saying that One Event is Caused by Another?
For this paper I will first address
the ontology
of Aristotle by way of interpolating
my comments
to Aristotelian claims in respect of
events
and cause. I will then turn to Hume's
rejection
of the main Aristotelian assumption
that
one event is caused by another and
identify
the precise moment in his writings
where
he came so near and yet so far from
an early
ontological break-through. The paper
will
conclude with a brief outline of my
own eliminativist
determinist understanding of events
and cause.
Aristotle.
What Aristotle meant by saying
that one event
is caused by another is that
everything that
changes is made to change by
something.
[Physics 7, 241b].25]
Aristotle's paradigm includes the
necessity of a cause of change
and the process
of eventuation is explained in
what follows.
The most sensible format is for
me to address
each Aristotelian proposal one
by one.
(1)
Aristotle: The cause of change must be assumed an absolute
necessity.
Comment:
He would have been better to
start by questioning
whether in fact the abstraction
‘change’
actually exists. Surely what
exists are modificational
objects or changing material
entities - not
‘change’ itself?
(2
) Aristotle: Everything that changes is made to change
by something.
[1] [Physics 7, 241b].25]
Comment:
This is true, but it all hinges
on what the
‘something’ is? For me entities
change the
way that they exist in response
to the impingement
of other causal objects – not
some ontological
ignis fatuus called ‘cause,’
or potential,’
or ‘capacity.’
(3)
Aristotle:
Motion is the process of the actualisation
of what is capable of being so
moved.
Comment:
The question of ‘capability’
does not enter
into it – if entities could not
move they
would not exist. No movement
= No existence.
(4) Aristotle: What undergoes change is what has a potency
or capacity to do so.
[2] [Physics 7, 251a, 12]
Comment:
I find this interesting in that
he suggests
that objects exist with an intrinsic
property
of ‘capability,’ Every object
in the cosmos
can move if a sufficiently powerful
causal
object impinges itself upon it
in an appropriate
way. Compare: the 'Archimedes'
Lever' quote
about being able to move the
world with a
long enough lever. Actually,
The OCD renders
the quote as: 'Give me a place
to stand and
I will move the earth.'
(5)Aristotle: The actualisation of this potency needs an
agent.
Comment:
There is no ‘potency’ to ‘actualise.’
What
exists are causal objects which
move or deform
if they are impinged upon by
certain other
causal objects. What he is saying
here is
in fact an ontological superfluity,
for if
objects lacked the existential
‘ability’
to change, then they would not
exist in the
first place. No change = No existence.
(6) Aristotle: Nothing which has a capacity to undergo change
can bring that change about by
itself.
[3] [Physics 257b .9]
Comment:
At first I was tempted to challenge
his claim
that nothing can bring change
about by itself,
and point to a rotting apple,
but I quickly
realised that he is right and
the process
of decay in biological material
is in fact
initiated by other causal objects (air, sunlight etc.)
in the environment. However human
cells degenerate
as they re-copy themselves over
time even
if they are not subjected to
injurious intrinsic
or extrinsic impingement.
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Surely all these Aristotelian abstractions
do not exist, and it is the potently
robust
entities [material objects] which are
really
extant in existential modalities which
we
sensorially judge as being relatively
powerful
in relation to weaker ones?
Whilst Aristotle: (3) is fine, both Aristotle (4) and (5)
are each contradictory. There is a conflict
of meaning between events and other things being described as existing and happening
or occurring.
Whilst to sensorially experience Aristotle
(3) is to encounter a real object, let us
say a wall. To experience an event or an
occurrence such as for example to witness
a man banging his head against the wall is
simply to see two objects (a) the man and (b) the wall impinging upon each other. The *impingement*
is merely one of many descriptions and points
of view we can employ to describe that which
is entirely dependent upon the attitude of
the onlooker or witness to what he or she
sees.
Possible
Descriptions
A detached account or overall version
of
the collision of (a) and (b) as an
event
or occurrence devoid of emotional involvement.
A judgemental description of the shocking
experience of witnessing a mentally deranged
man (a) deliberately banging his head against
a wall (b).
A laconic depiction, meant to amuse,
of an
innocent and inoffensive wall (b) being
attacked
by a madman (a) using his head as a
weapon,
who was rewarded for this outrageously
unprovoked
attack by having a large red and purple
bump
appear on his forehead.
The three observer views of the man and the
wall (three out of possibly thousands of
varied descriptions) show that the varied
descriptions of the *eventuating objects*
are actually no more than a biography of
the state of the neurological network of
the observer/writer at the time he witnessed
the man’s head and the wall colliding as
expressed in his later account of the experience.
What it all boils down to is whether one
accepts that a *collision* occurs [or *exists*
at the moment of impact] or whether only
the two colliding objects occur or exist
at the moment ofimpingement? Clearly the
two objects (a) and (b) existed or occurred
in the world as objects long before they
became colliding objects.
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Regarding any folk-claim that *events exist, happen or occur.* Such
a notion entails a third entity (c) *a collision* being posited as spontaneously coming into
existence at the moment of impact and then,
just as mysteriously going out of
existence a moment later.
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 As regards to the bump on the madman’s head
I do not see it as being *caused* by the wall. In natural language we
would probably say either that the
man caused
the damage to his own head because
he had
the volition to do so and the wall
did not,
or that both entities - man and
wall
were equal causal objects.
Compare a billiard ball which is struck
by
another moving ball which vacates its
spatial
position in order that its existential
integrity
is maintained. In accordance with the
laws
of physics [the existential imperative]
it
changes its spatial location to escape
the
total disintegration that would happen
if
it did not passively allow change
and move. The same applies to the oncoming
ball which changes its direction and
speed
upon impact in order to avoid
total
destruction.
if it both balls were existentially
constituted
not to stop, or one ball was travelling
at
great speed they would both shatter
to bits.
From a human point of view the billiard balls'
behaviour might seem like personification,
but that is not so - the balls do not
sense
danger and move - the balls are merely
responding
to the physical exigenciesof the existential modality in which they
and the all other 'causal objects exist, (including humans themselves) which
we describe as 'the natural laws of physics, the laws of
nature, the existential imperative
or as
Hempel named it - The universal affirmative.
Turning to Hume we find that his genius
was
to challenge the assumption that one
event
is caused by another, though he did
not actually
say that ‘cause’ does not exist in
so many
words. What he did say was that what
makes
something a causal circumstance for
something
else is that the two things share an
instance
of a constant conjunction. EVERY thing
like
the first is followed or conjoined
with a
thing like the second.
Hume did not have a very high opinion of
this contempories' insistance that
one
eveny caused another event...
'And what stronger instance can be produced
of the surprising ignorance and weakness
of the understanding, than the present?'
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So, for Hume if we had never seen an
event
similar to a billiard ball striking
another,
we could not extrapolate (based on
either
the nature of the event or the nature
of
the billiard-ball-in-itself) that the
struck
ball would move off in a new direction.
There
is no rational necessity between a
ball being
struck and it moving off in a certain
direction
at a certain speed.
Nor did he deny that everything that
changes
is made to change by something else.
Hume
challenges Aristotle’s intuitive opinion
and says that causality, is not a 'necessary'
connection between two events in the
Aristotelian
manner. For Hume it is a habit of the
mind
--something we do within our mind to
connect
disparate events into a coherent whole.
He
uses the example of a billiard ball
striking
another in his account of causality.
For
Hume, there is no necessary Aristotelian
connection between the event of the
two balls
colliding and the ensuant ontologically
divergent
event of the jarred ball moving off
in a
new direction. These two things are
distinct
events, which occur entirely separately.
It is the human mind that connects
the two
events. So although Hume made a giant
leap
forward by rightly pointing out that
we do
not see any push or pull when the balls
collide,
he does not seem to propose any replacement
ontological or physical explanation.
We hold our breaths as we read chapter
seven
of AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
and will Hume to succeed as he hovers
on
the lip of a dramatic ontological revelation,
then we sigh regretfully as the moment
passes:
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'Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore,
every moment, employed about
this relation:
Yet so imperfect are the ideas
which we form
concerning it, that it is impossible
to give
any just definition of cause,
except what
is drawn from something extraneous
and foreign
to it.'
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But wait! We read on to the fourth
paragraph
- and behold! The causal objects are
introduced,
at first nonchalantly, casually and
almost
absent-mindedly, and then, as Hume's
focus
tightens, they appear even more sharply
delineated
in the blinding candescence of his
intelligence.
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Similar objects are always conjoined with
similar. Of this we have experience.
Suitably
to this experience, therefore,
we may define
a cause to be an object, followed
by another,
and where all the objects, similar
to the
first, are followed by objects
similar to
the second. Or, in other words,
where, if
the first object had not been,
the second
never had existed. The appearance
of a cause
always conveys the mind, by a
customary transition,
to the idea of the effect. Of
this also we
have experience. We may, therefore,
suitably
to this experience, form another
definition
of cause; and call it, an object
followed
by another, and whose appearance
always conveys
the thought to that other.'
[4] [Hume AECHU. Section 7, part 2. 3]
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There it is in black and white! WE
MAY DEFINE
A CAUSE TO BE AN OBJECT. It has been
muted,
and although he sought fit not to develop
the idea further - the idea has been
put
out in the world for future generations
of
philosophers to germinate the precious
seed
further. It is that moment in the text
when
the tumidity of Hume's ontological
interrogation
falls back as if drained with the effort
of mind. The moment has gone, for he
seems
unaware of the rich ideative seam he
has
exposed, and he does not develop the
idea
further but returns again to the arid
consideration
of the non-existent abstractions of
'cause'
and ' event' which have stymied philosophy
for two thousand years.
Thus does Hume substantially distance
himself
from the commonsensical view of the
human
mind and at the same time pass by the
chance
of revealing the answer to the most
ontologically
perplexing problem of all time.
We leave Hume with his wise words ringing
in our ears:
| 'No conclusions can be more agreeable to
scepticism than such as make discoveries
concerning the weakness and narrow limits
of human reason and capacity.'[5] [Hume AECHU. Section 7, part 2. 3] |
There it is in black and white! WE
MAY DEFINE
A CAUSE TO BE AN OBJECT. It has been
muted,
and although he sought fit not to develop
the idea further - the idea has been
put
out in the world for future generations
of
philosophers to germinate the precious
seed
further.
It is that moment in the text when
the tumidity
of Hume's ontological interrogation
falls
back as if drained with the effort
of mind.
The moment has gone, for he seems unaware
of the rich ideative seam he has exposed,
and he does not develop the idea futher
but
returns again to the arid consideration
of
the non-existent abstractions of 'cause'
and ' event' which have stymied philosphy
for two thousand years.
Thus does Hume substantially distance
himself
from the commonsensical view of the
human
mind and at the same time pass by the
chance
of revealing the answer to the most
ontologically
perplexing problem of all time.
We leave Hume with his wise words ringing
in our ears:
What is Meant by Saying that One Event is Caused by Another
for the Eliminative Determinist
View?
For me and my new ontology of eliminative
determinism 'events' do not exist to
'cause'
anything at all. I take up and run
with the
baton of causal objects which the good
Hume
picked up, examined briefly, then dropped
so long ago. What I perceive of as
existing
are eventuating causal objects because
in
my schema eventuating is a synonym
of existing.
All entities eventuate - that is changes
and an entity that could not change
equals
the 'nothing' which parmenides tells
us cannot
be spoken about.' . As all objects
change
– therefore all objects are 'causal
objects'.
If a causal object is incapable of
'causing'
then it would not exist in the first
place.
Ontologically speaking the word 'causing'
can be interchanged in the context
of 'causalogical
discussion' as being synonymous with
the
word 'existing' relative to that context
- for existentially 'to cause' is just
another
way of saying 'to exist.'
All objects exist as intrinsically
and extrinsically
causative objects.
‘Cause’ and ‘causality’ are reificational
abstractions which were created in
order
to try to describe or tell a story
about
the perceived interaction of 'Causal
Objects'
that exist in the world. Causal objects
change
internally in themselves and cause
other
objects to subjectively change. All
causal
objects change but they only change
if they
exist in such a manner or mode that
facilitates
change when impinged upon by another
causal
object which exists in a manner suitable
to a facilitation of such causal change.
'Causal Objects' change in order to
accommodate
and maintain their causal objectivity.
The
bodywork of a car which is hit by another
vehicle collapses in such a manner
that as
little as possible subjective structural
change is undergone to its causal integrity.
But if someone protests:
| ‘Surely the movement of B-Ball is utterly
dependent upon being struck by
A-Ball, for
if it were not struck it would
remain at
rest?’ |
But *movement* does not exist - only the moving ball exists.
The B-Ball just exists when it is NOT being
struck. The future *movement* of the ball does not exist to be dependant or independant upon or of anything.
The Existential
Integrity of Causal Objects.
A billiard ball which is struck by
another
moving ball moves in order that its
existential
integrity is maintained, and to escape
the
total disintegration that would happen
if
it remained still. The same applies
to the
oncoming ball which changes its direction
and speed to escape the same fate.
From an
anthropological point of view these
escape
tactics might seem like personification,
but that is not so the balls are merely
responding
to the actuality of the modality in
which
they and the other 'Causal Objects'
in the
cosmos exist which humans describe
as 'the
natural laws of physics.'
Thus when two cars crash special investigators
are called in to seek a ‘cause,’ because
in a Humean sense our ideas concerning
cause
come from experience, and the investigators
are more experienced in identifying
the cause
of accidents.
It is interesting and instructional
that
when the investigators arrive on the
scene
they do not look for some abstraction
called
‘cause,’ they look at the actual 'causal
objects' – the cars, the road surface
and
the drivers. It is interesting also
that
when the experts assessing blame examine
'that which is changed' they do not
examine
some abstract 'potency or capacity'
within
the mangled remains of the damaged
cars,
nor do they seek some actualisation
of this
potency on the icy or grease smeared
highway,
nor do they check for 'potentiality'
in the
breathiliser bag of the drunken motorist.
They examine 'Causal Objects' - brakes,
tyres,
tarmac, traffic lights and signposts,
and
the breathalyser-count of the number
of grams
of alcohol per each 500 grams of the
human
causal object's blood.
Richard Sansom Comments
Speaking of change and cause the Americam poet and philosopher Richard
Sansom wrote:
This issue resonates with just
about everything
dealing with empirical philosophy,
and strikes
at the heart of the meaning of
time and space.
One ca nnot escape the concept of time when discussing
change, since change seemingly
occurs in
the dimension of time. But time
does not
really exist – it is manifested
only by motion.
We measure change by clocks,
and clocks are
merely change-mechanisms that
are consistent
in their motion. How do we know
when change
occurs? By observation and calculation.
How
do we know there is radioactive
decay, which
is apparently an example of unaided
change?
We measure the decay by counting
the electron
emissions from rocks and fossils,
etc. The
encyclopedia says this about
this process:
All living organisms absorb radiocarbon,
an unstable form of carbon that
has a half-life
of about 5,730 years. During
its lifetime,
an organism continually replenishes
its supply
of radiocarbon by breathing and
eating. After
the organism dies and becomes
a fossil, C-14
continues to decay without being
replaced.
To measure the amount of radiocarbon
left
in a fossil, scientists burn
a small piece
to convert it into carbon dioxide
gas. Radiation
counters are used to detect the
electrons
given off by decaying C-14 as
it turns into
nitrogen. The amount of C-14
is compared
to the amount of C-12, the stable
form of
carbon, to determine how much
radiocarbon
has decayed and to date the fossil.
Such decay is spontaneous, i.
e. uncaused
– it being merely a feature of
the element
that has no inputs for replenishment.
This
might be seen as negative causality!
But
it might be an example of change
in the absence
of a [positive] causal agent.
C-14 turns
into nitrogen all by itself and
we certainly
cannot blame time as the causal
agent!!
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From an eliminative
determinist
point of view Aristotle’s ‘potencies
and
’capacities’ are no more than
useful fictions
and form a part of what later
became absorbed
into the medieval priestly chatter
of ‘properties’
and ‘essences’ and other fictions
that go
bang in the night and do not
go bang on the
billiard table.
The eliminative
determinist
response is that 'Causal Objects'
simply
exist in the way they exist without
the benison
of human attribution of so called
‘properties’
and ‘capacities’ and potentials’
which have
everything to do with the way
that the human
brain needs to classify the 'Causal
Objects'
with which he is surrounded in
the world
and has nothing whatsoever to
do with the
manner in which billiard balls
exist.
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References:
[1] Aristotle's Physics. http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/aristotle_physics07.htm
[2] ibid. [Physics 7, 251a, 12]
[3] [ibid. Physics 257b .9]
[4]Heidegger, Martin. in the
section on 'Kant's
Manner of Asking About the Thing',
subsection
5, (e) The Essence of the Mathematical
Project
(Galileo's Experiment with Free
Fall)
[5] Hume, David. 'An Enquiry
into Human Understanding.'
[Section 7, part 2. 3]
http://eserver.org/18th/hume-enquiry.html |
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Evans Experientialism 
