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I find it difficult to take human reifications
in seriously. The practice makes a farce
of philosophy. In my opinion the ontological
fallacy of misplaced concreteness, e. g.,
the mistake of confusing and reifying a human
or non-human activity into a construct such
as a verbal noun or gerund is a modern form
of semantic yobism left over from the Greeks.
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To me the transmutation of verbs into abstract
nouns and gerunds and Platonistically inspired
existential sentential templates are so patently
ludicrous when viewed from a semantic, ontological
or philosophical point of view, that I experience
great difficulty in summoning up the mental
energy even to discuss them in a serious
manner. The emergence of some whimpering
transcendentalist taking a short break from
comporting himself along the yellow-brick
road towards death to claim that there entiatic
nominata which correspond to these abstract
referenda just makes me yawn.
If it weren't for the
philosophical damage that they do, one might
even welcome these illogicalities as
heaven-sent, comedic routines, pantomime-parts-of-speech
sent as a knockabout intermezzi in the
Heideggerian opéra bouffe, to brighten up
the boredom of interminably meaningless
transcendentalist tracts and pseudo-psychological
drivel
My critique is the general
one of an increasing number of philosophers
and scientists, but that is not
to say that I don't recognise the usefulness
of many hypostatisations in natural language
and in ordinary communication at street level.
Away from the university or
philosophical discussion I use them myself
in this way all the time, and you will find
my writings peppered with metaphor, for they
are so damn difficult and handy as communicative
short-cuts to avoid in natural language.
And yes, once in a while its good to relax.
It's good fun to let one's analytical
hair down and visit the philosophical theme park -
THE Land of Let's Pretend, which is engendered by such crude reificationwherein the metaphysical Munchkins abide,
and its fun to go along for the ride
on the
transcendentalist roller-coaster with
the
screaming Heideggerians in their kiss-me-quick
hats, holding tight to some candy-floss
of
metaphysical nonsense and be a kid
again.
But now such cheap and cheerful
ontological
yobish fun has invaded philosophy
itself
like some metastasising cancer, surely
it
is time to take stock of the situation?
For
philosophers to engage with these nonsenses
gravely and employ them with a straight
face
when addressing psychology, ontology,
sociology
or matters scientific or philosophical
importance
I find utterly incomprehensible.
To reify is to 'thingify': to treat an abstraction as a material thing.
I find such behaviour most unscholarly
and
unprofessional – the equivalent of
skinhead-culture
spilling over into the domain of academia.
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