Dear Dr. Bakker or anyone else, How does one know mineness is 'mine' or 'I am the same I'. And if the distiction between authenticity is so trival, as it seems to be, why use them at at? What do they actually distinguish if they really do distinguish anything?

Gary

R. B. M. de Bakker: First, i found the important place on Eigentlichkeit .

'Authenticity' as translation remains insufficient, that might be the whole problem. It has to do with a self (authos) but not with a *real* self. Somewhere he writes that Eigentlichkeit does not fly (schweben) over everyday world, but is a modification amidst it. When i used the word transformation (from subject to Da-sein), i meant this: modification towards Dasein as possibility. Daily dealing with things is just the modification of Dasein, it finds itself factically, thrown, in.

And the wordliness of the world is a free gift, though the pay-off won't stay out, we know that uneigentlich, by keeping it away, all too well! So we are always already, from the beginning befindlich, gestimmt, tuned, and not just there, like the pencil is in the pocket.

But that means, that we are 'essentially' possibility, and all ideas that imply a perfection, like a remaining subject 'i', false. False, insofar used in order to understand our way of being, not false in themselves (there is no measure, and therefore truth as correspondence fails).

True, insofar my 'i' is ontically the nearest, always familiar, but ontologically the remotest. What can be witnessed in the guilt analysis, a casting of Eigentlichkeit: as factically thrown Dasein remains 'behad' by Nichtigkeit.

What says 'one', when 'one' is behad by Angst, by one's own nullity: EIGENTLICH war es nichts. It was really nothing. "And true, Heidegger adds, "Es war nichts, das Nichts war da." It was nothing, the nothing was there.

The way we are hinged between Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit is, i would almost say, beautiful.

They are "gleichurspruenglich" [GCM: originally, equiprimordially]

But now the quote, it's at the start of the task to establish an original existential interpretation of Dasein, par. 45, SuZ, p. 232:

"Als je MEINES ist das SEINKOENNEN frei fuer Eigentlichkeit oder Uneigentlichkeit oder die modale Indifferenz beider. "

"As each time MINE, potential-being is free towards Eigentlichkeit or Uneigentlichkeit or the modal indifference of both." (M&R: But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated. iv” p. 275, “cf. section 9, H. 41 ff.” “The whole of the structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.”p. 65 – This translation seems preferable to Stambaugh.)

GARY C MOORE: Would this not indicate that “profound indifference” that I quoted about 12 times from FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS is either a third mode, or even a ‘transcendent’ mode superceding both like Kant’s “transcendental faculty of the imagination” over “understanding: and “intuition”? [For those who ‘Care’, this would necessarily be like Advaita Vedanta’s ‘Jivanmukta’, becoming one with ‘Atman’ while still alive, and losing one’s ‘self’, either ‘authentic’ or inauthentic.] Would not this “profound indifference’ be the same thing Meister Eckhart desired in which one can be either theist or atheist or . . . indifferent . . . to desire? Such a state, not altogether ‘blessed’ at all, would cause anxiety and the desire to start ‘Time’ all over again? Or could one be . . . reserved . . . and merely dally from time to time in human affairs, viciously or benevolently – any real distinction, of course, really ‘always already’ lost in profound indifference? Would this negate any sense of being ‘in between’? Would it not be always choosing potentially over actuality even when one does arbitrarily act? Is not calling it an ‘abyss’ prejudicial, presupposing a ‘moral’ point of view? Could it not just as well be heaven? As Mark Twain

(Samuel Clemens) once said, “I would rather go to Hell than heaven because all the interesting people are in Hell whereas heaven would be unbearably boring with all that praising of an incompetent deity?” Does that not negate the difference between heaven and Hell? And does not that negation of ‘abyss ’ versus ‘height’ become profound indifference? Is indifference really a ‘bad’ thing if there is no moral standard adequate to judge it by?

R. B. M. de Bakker: The question is indeed not: the one OR the other, we are always IN BETWEEN, therefore always potentiality. And 'i' to myself an abyss, not dramatically, but, formally understood, nichtiger Grund, a ground that seems a ground.

GARY C MOORE: Would not such ‘profound indifference do away with any ‘seems’ ? Would it not leave you with, “What you see is what you get?” Could one distinguish between ‘anxiety’ and mere whimsical ‘restlessness’ in ‘profound boredom’ whereby one can work such ‘restlessness’ off in action but still disavow commitment? Why must we be committed if there is nothing inherently worth committing FOR? What is wrong with playing around with the universe like Heraclitus’ child? What CAN be wrong with it? Why be sad or unhappy or regretful at all if one has to be committed to things one really does not like in the first place? A commitment that does nothing for you and, in reality, nothing for anyone else whatsoever either?

‘sincerely’ Gary C. More

Dear Michael, Your request is simple enough for my distorted mind to understand it . . . I think. But I could be wrong. But if I know that I am wrong now, am I right? Or am I right that I am wrong? Anyway . . .

The passage refers really to Heidegger's THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONS, the very last pages of the actual lecture series, lecture thirteen as a whole that needs to be read as a whole, specifically pages 112-113 [German 186-188]. Heraclitus Fragment 52 supposedly, but I'm too stupid to understand ANYTHING Heraclitus says.

michaelP

Dear Gary, I have the feeling that you surmised I might be about to jump wrt my abiding interest in Heraclitus for the express purpose of putting you down in some way, i. e., you sound a mite defensive here [all that stuff about right/wrong, simple/difficult, stupidity, etc], but I was/am simply and naively curious about the fragment, in ignorance, not having heard it before. I tracked down a transliteration and translation for this Fragment

52, which reads:

<aiòn paîs esti paízwn, pesseúon: paidòs he basileíe

<Time is a child at play, moving pieces in a board game; the kingly power is a child's.

Superficially, and without venturing an alternative interpretation, this sounds like a celebration of playfulness, the world as play (superficially, again, like Nietzsche's "the world is nothing but will-to-power" [approx]). Compared to the Greek, the translation seems overly dense, crowded, overdetermined... might be worth looking into. This is a good case for "interesting quotes".

regards

michaelP R. B. M. de Bakker: First, i found the important place on Eigentlichkeit .

'Authenticity' as translation remains insufficient, that might be the whole problem. It has to do with a self (authos) but not with a *real* self. Somewhere he writes that Eigentlichkeit does not fly (schweben) over everyday world, but is a modification amidst it. When i used the word transformation (from subject to Da-sein), i meant this: modification towards Dasein as possibility. Daily dealing with things is just the modification of Dasein, it finds itself factically, thrown, in.

And the wordliness of the world is a free gift, though the pay-off won't stay out, we know that uneigentlich, by keeping it away, all too well! So we are always already, from the beginning befindlich, gestimmt, tuned, and not just there, like the pencil is in the pocket.

But that means, that we are 'essentially' possibility, and all ideas that imply a perfection, like a remaining subject 'i', false. False, insofar used in order to understand our way of being, not false in themselves (there is no measure, and therefore truth as correspondence fails).

True, insofar my 'i' is ontically the nearest, always familiar, but ontologically the remotest. What can be witnessed in the guilt analysis, a casting of Eigentlichkeit: as factically thrown Dasein remains 'behad' by Nichtigkeit.

What says 'one', when 'one' is behad by Angst, by one's own nullity: EIGENTLICH war es nichts. It was really nothing. "And true, Heidegger adds, "Es war nichts, das Nichts war da." It was nothing, the nothing was there.

The way we are hinged between Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit is, i would almost say, beautiful.

They are "gleichurspruenglich" [GCM: originally, equiprimordially]

But now the quote, it's at the start of the task to establish an original existential interpretation of Dasein, par. 45, SuZ, p. 232:

"Als je MEINES ist das SEINKOENNEN frei fuer Eigentlichkeit oder Uneigentlichkeit oder die modale Indifferenz beider. "

"As each time MINE, potential-being is free towards Eigentlichkeit or Uneigentlichkeit or the modal indifference of both." (M&R: But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated. iv” p. 275, “cf. section 9, H. 41 ff.” “The whole of the structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.”p. 65 – This translation seems preferable to Stambaugh.)

GARY C MOORE: Would this not indicate that “profound indifference” that I quoted about 12 times from FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS is either a third mode, or even a ‘transcendent’ mode superceding both like Kant’s “transcendental faculty of the imagination” over “understanding: and “intuition”? [For those who ‘Care’, this would necessarily be like Advaita Vedanta’s ‘Jivanmukta’, becoming one with ‘Atman’ while still alive, and losing one’s ‘self’, either ‘authentic’ or inauthentic.] Would not this “profound indifference’ be the same thing Meister Eckhart desired in which one can be either theist or atheist or . . . indifferent . . . to desire? Such a state, not altogether ‘blessed’ at all, would cause anxiety and the desire to start ‘Time’ all over again? Or could one be . . . reserved . . . and merely dally from time to time in human affairs, viciously or benevolently – any real distinction, of course, really ‘always already’ lost in profound indifference? Would this negate any sense of being ‘in between’? Would it not be always choosing potentially over actuality even when one does arbitrarily act? Is not calling it an ‘abyss’ prejudicial, presupposing a ‘moral’ point of view? Could it not just as well be heaven? As Mark Twain

(Samuel Clemens) once said, “I would rather go to Hell than heaven because all the interesting people are in Hell whereas heaven would be unbearably boring with all that praising of an incompetent deity?” Does that not negate the difference between heaven and Hell? And does not that negation of ‘abyss ’ versus ‘height’ become profound indifference? Is indifference really a ‘bad’ thing if there is no moral standard adequate to judge it by?

R. B. M. de Bakker: The question is indeed not: the one OR the other, we are always IN BETWEEN, therefore always potentiality. And 'i' to myself an abyss, not dramatically, but, formally understood, nichtiger Grund, a ground that seems a ground.

GARY C MOORE: Would not such ‘profound indifference do away with any ‘seems’ ? Would it not leave you with, “What you see is what you get?” Could one distinguish between ‘anxiety’ and mere whimsical ‘restlessness’ in ‘profound boredom’ whereby one can work such ‘restlessness’ off in action but still disavow commitment? Why must we be committed if there is nothing inherently worth committing FOR? What is wrong with playing around with the universe like Heraclitus’ child? What CAN be wrong with it? Why be sad or unhappy or regretful at all if one has to be committed to things one really does not like in the first place? A commitment that does nothing for you and, in reality, nothing for anyone else whatsoever either?

‘sincerely’ Gary C. More

Gary, this may be 'sincere', but i cannot but consider it a forlorn position. Accusing someone of subjectivism makes no sense, so i won't go into that, i just mention your 'personal body', subjectivist fiction i would say. But when one's in a fiction, it's hard to accept, to 'like' the phenomenal, that's right. The mere thought that one 'should', the idea of a call, seems to raise irresistable repulsion. And the preference for cannibalism over any (lying) authority a natural consequence. But i cannot see how one escapes to being the victim of what one opposes. Apart from the *possibility* to acknowledge it. You seem honest enough for it.

best regards rene