FREE WILL AND DECISION-MAKING

JON NEIVENS:
Hi Jud, You asked:

JUD EVANS:
*Whilst these thoughts about determinism
and freewill are swirling around,
I wonder
if any of you guys can come up
with any incident
in your own personal lives, the
life of your
country, or indeed the known
history of the
cosmos which was not predetermined
by prior
events? I ask, because in the
seminars which
followed our lectures on determinism
not
one of the students [including
myself] could
come up with one? Now obviously
there are
some things that are predetermined
genetically,
the fact that you are black,
white or yellow,
the fact that you can or cannot
have a baby
because of your sex, the fact
that you have
no wings and cannot fly without
the aid of
technology. I am not referring
to those types
of determinism though indeed
those sort of
things are determined - I am
referring to
choices which you have made in
the past which
in your opinion were COMPLETELY
unaffected
by anything which had gone on
before, either
in your own personal lives, the
life of your
country, or indeed the known
history of the
cosmos?* |

JON NEIVENS:
I certainly
couldn’t come up with an example of
that.
But the question itself interests me.
My immediate thought is
that
this would be a very wide definition
of determinism.

JUD EVANS:
You are right that there are various forms
of determinism John. The type of determinism
I am using here is the so-called *hard determinism* as opposed to the other most well known form
*compatibilism* [there is an *anti-compatibilist version too.] *Hard determinism* is what the title suggests - a *take no hostages - everything that happens
is determined* approach, whilst the compatibilist model
claims that free will is congruous with determinism,
thus providing a *get out clause* for society, in the sense that because for
them free will is taken to be a necessary
condition of moral responsibility [for example]
criminals can be justifiably prosecuted for
their crimes and not plead the hard determinists
defence that it was not their fault but *history is to blame.*

JON NEIVENS:
Though I guess when it comes to the notion
of ‘free will’ the point is that we
usually
go straight to a discussion of ‘will’
and
tend to leave ‘free’ unexamined. In
this
case it seems that there would be no
possible
example of a completely free will,
but I
guess for that to lead to the notion
that
there’s no such thing as free will
at all,
one would have to accept that one could
no
more be partially free than partially
pregnant.

JUD EVANS:
From my own point of view, as is well know,
the abstraction *will* doesn't exist at all
whether it be free or constrained. In my
book only the willing willer exists. Well
I realise that is easy enough for me to say,
but [I must ask myself] where does it get
me? In my view of determinism - the totally
eliminativist view - only object exist in
the world. I call them *causal objects* because things that don't exist cannot cause
[have an effect] on either themselves or
other causal objects. For me *cause* is always
a two-sided affair. In fact the only thing
that I ever agreed with to come out of existentialism
was Sartre's assertion that The person who
is mugged is just as much responsible for
the mugging as the mugger that knocks him
down and robs his wallet.
Of course in order to accept
this and not view it as *a moral outrage* is to eliminate the human dimension of morality,
and just view the incident objectively as
the impingement of two objects upon each
other. They meet. They both cause intrinsic
changes to themselves and each other. They
part. In terms of *blame* it is as much the
*fault* of the mugged for walking down that
street at this as the mugger. Now you know
how antagonistic I have always been to existentialism
- and when I first read that -on a Sartre
list many years ago] I was appalled - and
wrote back and said *Absolutely ridiculous!*
It was only when I really though about it
DISPASSIONATELY that I realised that Sartre
was absolutely correct. If determinism is
correct the mugger and the mugged are not
much different to two asteroids on a collision
course - neither of them are responsible
for any impact damage. In other words the
*collision course* of mugger and the mugged
was something completely out of their hands.
I guess [to wallow in abstraction for
a moment]
that for human causal objects one could
say
that each individual object's concatenational
antecedal history has programmed him/her
to desire/act/respond in certain ways
in
relation to other causal objects both
human
and non-human - and this way of behaving
IS WHAT *WILL* REALLY IS. Think for
example
of Hitler's early history the way that
he
felt that his country had been dragged
into
WW1 by Jewish cosmopolitanism and blamed
the horror of post-war economic chaos
on
the same people. This experience determined
his attitude towards them later with
disastrous
results for Germans, German Jews and
Germany
itself not to mention the horrors that
happened
to the peoples of practically every
other
European nation. What I am trying to
say
is that there is absolutely no *ontological difference* between the way that Hitler existed as a *causal object* and his *WILL* - he and his *WILL* are absolutely
synonymous and substitutable.
This means that
intentionality
or deliberation or existing in an existential
modality of a fixed and persistent
intent
or purpose is as much an outcome of
antecedal
cause and effect as the unfortunate
Magee
deliberately walking down La Rue de la Chance Mauvaise in order to reach Au revoir Rue du Portefeuille and running into the Mugger. Similarly -
This means that intentionality or existing
in an existential modality of a fixed
and
persistent intent or purpose to rob
somebody
else is an outcome of antecedal cause
and
effect too. This means [if one accepts
what
determinism claims] that one has to
accept
that one could no more be partially
free
than partially pregnant.

JON NEIVENS:
Rather than going into a discussion of such
things as political freedom which are
notoriously
hard to quantify, I think it’s better
to
use some notion like ‘freedom of movement’
in a more mechanical sense.

JUD EVANS:
This is the compatibilist view. What they
say is *It depends what you mean by
*freedom?*
For them freedom is not *being free
to do
what one wishes,* but being *free from
constraint
- as for the wheel in your example
below.

JON NEIVENS:
Suppose you come across a pulley wheel of
some kind that’s rusted to the extent
that
it’s immobile, and thus has no freedom
of
movement. Rather than trying to force
it,
and perhaps break it completely, you
put
some oil in the mechanism and go back
to
it after a couple of hours. You now
find
you can turn it with a degree of effort,
and you repeat the process a few times
until
it works normally. Now all this is
still
very vague, but one can say that at
each
stage the wheel has more freedom of
movement,
although of course it could never have
complete
freedom of movement. In the case of
‘free
will’ I guess one could also speak
of limited
choice, both in terms of a determinate
range
of options and also of prior influence,
but
I wouldn’t say that’s enough to rule
out
free will per se.

JUD EVANS:
In compatibilist terms they would say *Freedom
FROM constraint* - not *Freedom OF
movement.*
Is this merely *word-play?* It is a
tricky
subject that needs a lot of my concentration.
Most people shy away from the thought
that
they have no free will at all - it
seems
so monstrously counter-intuitive that
they
deflect the problem [like a smoker
will often
do if his little *dependence-sticks*
are
threatened.] People don't like to talk
or
think about it - it is something of
a taboo
subject in philosophy I think. I mean
the
implications for society are horrendous
to
contemplate?

JON NEIVENS:
Anyway, now that it occurs to me I have a
question of my own, on something you
said
recently to Gary:

JUD EVANS:
*For me the most overriding, overwhelming
evidence for the *Existential Imperative* is ourselves and the objects that surround
us. It is the biggest and largest body of
physical evidence imaginable for it is the
cosmos itself, for if there WAS NO *existential
imperative* there would be no existents and
no cosmos and we would not be around to view
the sensible evidence. Now to make such a
claim is not similar to making the claim
that: *God created everything* - for
if he didn't there would be nothing in the
cosmos*, for with my claim there is no prerequisite
claim for a creator - *The Existential Imperative*
simply means *this stuff exists because it
is impossible for it not to exist. * Change
is thus a corollary of *exist* because if
change was not, then objects would not exist
in the first place - that is if *the first
place* existed - which it did not. For me
there was always a place and always will
be and as *space* is a misnomer it must always
be filled with changing existents. *God*
had nothing to create and is no more than
an originative redundancy.*

JON NEIVENS:
What I don’t quite get here is the idea that
the fact that everything that exists does
exist is evidence for the idea that it is
impossible for everything that exists not
to exist?

JUD EVANS:
This is difficult for me to explain. I will
try. I have always believed that if a certain
thing happens it is then undoubtably a fait
accompli - an irreversible accomplishment
- an accomplished fact. For me the fact that
a thing happens in one way means that there
was never any likelihood of it ever happening
in any other way - for if there WAS any likelihood
of it ever happening in any other way then
THAT would be the way it happened and it
would not be the way it might of happened.
What this means in fact is that the word *might* is a complete redundancy and the notion
of *possible worlds* is also a redundancy. Nothing on earth is
*possible* *Possibility* is merely an anthropocentric
abstraction - only that which is real exists
and that which is real means OBJECTS - objects
have never been, never are, and never will
be *possible objects,* the are only ever
objects. Now this is something I have always
believed [I mean ever since I was a kid]
long before I had ever heard of the word
*determinism.*

JON NEIVENS:
Since the notion of change is important here,
I presume you’re talking about the
totality
of matter rather than the particular
forms
that that matter happens to take?

JUD EVANS:
The word *totality* here for me is itself
a redundancy and I will say why I think this.
[again a difficult one for me] Because I
believe that the notion of *nothing* is no
more than a primitive human folk-belief and
is a story employed in order to make sense
of the world in a pre-scientific age which
has stuck and is still believed by certain
people, mostly of a religious bent, because
it underpins the story of the *creation*
etc. Without *nothing* there is no *job*
for *God* to do - making *nothing* redundant
as an idea is to sack God as *surplus to
ontological requirements* at the same time.
That is why the Heidegger crowd suck on their
*Nothing Comforter* [dummy*) so noisily.
*Nothing* cannot exist [otherwise it would
be *something.* This means that only *that
which is material exists* If you remember
in the old days I was always on my hobby-horse
about *space* not existing - that it actually
comprised of a Minestrone Soup of material/energy?
Well now
*dark matter* is all the rage with
cosmologists.
If the universe is a *material universe*
as I have always believed, then that
fact
in itself makes the term *totality
of matter*
redundant too - for if *that which
is material*
is all there is, then the *totality
of that
which is material* has no contra *that
which
is not material* to distinguish or
to *mark
out* as being different from it, and
is therefore
of no further use or utility as a dualistically,
contrasting, differentiating nominatum.

JON NEIVENS:
What I’m unsure of is that this notion of
the existential imperative seems to
introduce
the question of necessity.

JUD EVANS:
Again for me the word and notion *necessity*
is an anthropocentrism. For me *that
which
is natural* doesn’t deal in human-centricities.
As I see it that which some people
call *nature*
ALWAYS takes the easiest option – and
the
*easiest option* exactly corresponds
to what
some people call *The Laws of Physics*. The fact that *that which is material*
is ubiquitous – not just in the known
universe,
but for *ever and ever* in all directions
means *necessity* is not involved -for
to
be considered necessary requires somebody
to consider it necessary, and if that
is
*God* then we have to propose another
*God
02* which considered *God 01* to be
a necessity*
and so on to infinity and
*infinity* itself is a redundancy because
like *totality* it has not finiteness*
to
distinguish or to *mark out* as being
different
from it, and is therefore of no further
use
or utility as a dualistically contrasting,
differentiating ontological nominatum.

JON NEIVENS:
Now, as I see it, the whole idea of
necessity
can make sense only in contrast with
that
of possibility, and the only way possibility
really arises for us is when we imagine
that
things could have happened otherwise;
i.
e., I might say ‘If I hadn’t crossed
the
road just now, that piano would have
fallen
on me’ etc.

JUD EVANS:
We all think and say things like: ‘If I hadn’t
crossed the road just now, that piano
would
have fallen on me,’ but I guess that
is more
a verbalisation of what we have learned
by
our *lucky escape* and is an open or
relieved
expression of our internalisation,
in the
sense that in future we will try to
be more
alert and careful when walking along
the
road – to be on the lookout for overhead
pianos. It is also a way of *congratulating
* ourselves for crossing like we did
and
when we did, and repeating it to ourselves
reinforces our belief that we are not
destined
to die just yet, and we have neatly
*cheated
death.* As I said above – for me *possibility*
does not exist as an ontological fact
– the
only thing that is *possible* is what
proves
to be possible, and that is what actually
happens. It was therefore IMPOSSIBLE
for
the piano to have fallen on you – for
if
it WERE possible it would have done
so, and
it would then have been impossible
for it
NOT to have fallen on you..

JON NEIVENS:
Generally I tend to have problems with assuming
that ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ are
descriptions
of the cosmos, as opposed to how we
view
the cosmos.

JUD EVANS:
Me too.

JON NEIVENS:
: I also have some similar problems with
the term ‘exists’ too, even without
adding
the term ‘existence.’ I’m not really
sure
I’m making myself clear here though,
or even
whether I’m making any sense at all.

JUD EVANS:
For me the word *exists* refers to those
causal objects that are present in
the cosmos
of whose existential modalities we
are aware,
as opposed to the rest of the causal
objects
in the cosmos of whose precise existential
modalities we are unaware but we know
exist
because they could not NOT EXIST [the
existential
imperative kicks in again.] So for
me Kant’s
unencountered *noumenal entities* fill
what
we call *space* for ever and ever in
all
directions. So it is not a question
of needing
*proof* that they exist – it is a question
of being unfamiliar with the WAY that
they
exist. As science progresses [I see
no reason
why human enquiry should grind to a
halt
– unless some transcendentalist maniac
blows
us all to Kingdom Come of course] it
won't
MATTER so much that we are ignorant
of secernate
noumenal actuality as long as we understand
how it all works.

JON NEIVENS:
This is a brief additional point. You said:
*The tutor pointed out that what we
chose
to do was not really a choice, although
it
is important to the ego to THINK it
is*.
I guess this raises the question of why
it is important for the ego to think
that?
Presumably we evolved in such a way
as to
have this illusion, so it must serve
a useful
role of some kind?

JUD EVANS:
Partly childhood brainwashing I think? We
are encouraged to be positive – to
not shilly-shally
around or dithering over what to do.
The
idea of self-management and individual
responsibility
etc is part of our language and its
constant
use reinforces the notion continuously.
Ditherers
are the butt of jokes on TV and in
literature:
*For God’s sake man MAKE YOUR BLOODY
mind
up!* shouts the parade ground sergeant
*Don’t
you know your bleedin’ left from your
right?*
Yes, Richard’s the man to give a view
on
this, but I think in this case he would
agree
that the ability to be positive and
make
decisions is a plus in the Darwinian
survivalist
stakes? Thanks for the usual mind-expanding
and thought-provoking observations
Jon.

JON NEIVENS:
Hi Jud!
Many thanks for the detailed reply. Rather
than replying point by point I’ll try
to
write a more general response.
I think I understand your notion of
the existential
imperative better now, so I won’t focus
on
that but rather on the determinism
issue.
It may well be the case that I’m a
compatiblist
of sorts. To be honest, till now determinism
isn’t really a subject I’ve given that
much
consideration to.
Really it’s the final question I asked
in
my previous mail that I’m still concerned
with.
For me, I’m uncomfortable with discussions
of ‘will’ and would rather trade that
in
for a different abstraction and speak
of
‘consciousness.’ Obviously I’m using
that
in the sense of an aspect of the brain,
but
the reason I prefer it is that it at
least
doesn’t carry implications of a homunculus.
It’s difficult to put this in a way
that
doesn’t involve abstract nouns, but
I’m talking
about those modes of existence that
seem
specific to humans. Another way of
putting
it would be to say that humans have
evolved
such as to have greater powers of reason
than other creatures. It may be that
this
simply means we are open to a far wider
range
of influences than other creatures.
But it
seems clear that whilst a hard determinist
believes that we don’t actually make
decisions
or choices, the fact that we believe
we do
means the hard determinist has to accept
that we do have at least have the illusion
that we make decisions and choices.
Anyway
I asked before:
Presumably we evolved in such a way
as to
have this illusion, so it must serve
a useful
role of some kind?

JUD EVANS:
Partly childhood brainwashing I think? We
are encouraged to be positive – to
not shilly-shally
around or dithering over what to do.
The
idea of self-management and individual
responsibility
etc is part of our language and its
constant
use reinforces the notion continuously.
Ditherers
are the butt of jokes on TV and in
literature:
*For God’s sake man MAKE YOUR BLOODY
mind
up!* shouts the parade ground sergeant
*Don’t
you know your bleedin’ left from your
right?*
Yes, Richard’s the man to give a view
on
this, but I think in this case he would
agree
that the ability to be positive and
make
decisions is a plus in the Darwinian
survivalist
stakes?

JON NEIVENS:
I’d agree with that last point, but
surely
if hard determinism is correct then
we don’t
actually have that ability, we merely
have
the illusion that we do? What I’m getting
at here is what possible advantage
being
under that illusion would provide us
with?
I can see what you mean about the idea
of
‘being positive,’ but it seems that
if decision
making is valued the is already in
place.
It think it only really pushes the
question
one stage back, since without the illusion
that we make decisions, decision could
not
be valued in the first place. I realise
I’m
banging on about this, but I’d tend
to regard
it as the weak point of the determinist’s
argument, or the least plausible at
any rate.
I presume the determinism expert at
the Uni
would have come across this objection
and
have some replies. I’d be interested
to hear
what he says, if this doesn’t get in
the
way of your own work of course.

JUD EVANS
Hi Again Jon! You make an excellent pivotal
point in your last paragraph. It does
open
another couple of important cans of
worms
- or cans of important worms actually.
There
is nothing better than two little bundles
of pink wriggly-things to get one's
mind
working first thing in the morning.
:-)
Looking back at my own last paragraph
I see
that I missed out a vitally important
word.
But it is not just the replacement
of the
missing word that I find interesting
- it
is the implications of the critically
important
point which you have put your finger
on in
your usual, sharp, perceptive way.
Before I reveal that word to you (you
may
have already guessed what it is?) I
want
to assure you that the omission was
a genuine
slip [one might even say: *a Freudian
slip*]
and is not an attempt by me to *retrieve
my position* by changing the wording.
A clue
to what this word is can be seen in
the second
introductory sentence of my paragraph
where
I say: *We are encouraged to be positive...*
because the missing word is of course
*considered.*
My last sentence should have read:
* The
ability to be positive and make decisions
is considered a plus in the Darwinian
survivalist
stakes?*
Now when I think about this more deeply,
it means that whatever the true case
concerning
the hard determinists' claim that *free
will*
does not exist, most people DO believe
that
it does, and furthermore claim to recognise
WHEN free will is being exercised and
employed
quickly, positively, confidently, convincingly
and to best advantage,' and also when
it
is being exercised hesitantly, indecisively,
diffidently and uncertainly.
Therefore in this case, you may be
tempted
to agree with me that most people's
perception
of the DEGREE and EFFECTIVENESS of
the free
will they believe they observe in others
is a question of them judging the adequacy
of the person exercising that free
will,
and is not a questioning of whether
in fact
free will really exists and can be
observed
in action in its various forms of trenchancy
or ineffectiveness?
OK! Now it is time to address your
vital
point head-on you ask: *What I'm getting
at here is what possible advantage
being
under that illusion would provide us
with?*
I will answer that in this way. First
to
set the scene on the various types
of *choice*
we believe we perceive in action. If
the
hard determinist is correct in claiming
that
EVERYTHING we do and say is determined
by
past events, then it follows that the
ability
to believe that making prompt and positive
choices is also a belief that is determined
by past events. Likewise, it may be
the case
that somebody whose occupation or lifestyle
is determinedly predicated upon NOT
making
hasty choices, but making slow, careful
assessments
of a given situation [lawyers, doctors
[if
they have the time] valuers of property,
insurance assessors, jewellery valuers,
would-be
employers, etc.], then the ability
to believe
that making measured, careful and unhurried
choices is also a positive expectation
that
is determined by past events?
Now when I re-read the above paragraph
I
have just written I can see that whilst
it
sets out the problem fairly plainly
it merely
[as you have pointed out] shunts everything
back into the past and re-asks the
question
again:
*What was it IN THE PAST that deemed
the
illusion that we make decisions to
be valuable
from a survivalist point of view in
the first
place?*
So finally I will get down to the deterministic
nitty-gritty.
The answer to the deterministically
and experientially
generated belief in the efficacy and
advantage
of positive CHOICE and decision-making
can
I believe can be found in the introduction
of the notion of *physical or instinctual
reaction.* Ever since I read Richard's
TWTWI
section in which he deals with the
most basic
awareness of early life-forms, I have
realised
that *choice* is really inherited instinct
passed on by a process of simple elimination.
Those that reacted to extrinsic situations
quicly and positivly tended to survive
and
those that reacted slowly or subjectively
were killed off and their DNA was eliminated
from the gene-pool.
I think that the whole doctrine of
*choice*
can be traced back to early life forms,
when
an instant reaction to a perceived
attack
was manifested in the celebrated *fight
or
flight* behaviour. Now *fight or flight*
to a large extent must be deterministically
hardwired, and determinist hardwiring
is
the result of the survival of those
members
of a given species who for the perfectly
understandable genealogically determined
reason that their parent lived rather
than
died, had quick reflexes, which did
not so
much depend upon evaluative cognitive
abilities
of the sort that modern humans are
equipped
with - but upon physical responses
inherited
from forbears who survived and had
offspring.
In this way we can now see that Darwinism
- absolutely brilliant and world changing
as it was - was really no more than
a deterministic
account of the way in which natural
selection
works.
If Darwinism were to be renamed *Darwinistic
Deterrminism* and his analysis called:
*The
Determination of the Species Through
Antecedal
Selection* it would I think better
describe
and give a title to the actual deterministic
process whereby *that which is naturally
and successfully ecologically niched*
at
any given time survives - and that
which
isn't - doesn't.
Do you think I would be safe to offer
the
following as a epigram?
*Choice is the juxtapositioning of
antecedantly
hardwired and currently-informed instinct.*
Do you think that this successfully
addresses
your point Jon?
In conclusion I must mention some remarks
made by one young lady - a quiet, unassuming
Lancashire Lass who was not in the
habit
of making many contributions to the
discussions
in our seminars and was somebody who
I previously
would not have guessed was a determinist.
I have a tiny digital recorder, so
her words
here below are perfectly preserved.
On this occassion there was no escape
for
her, as the tutor went round the class
asking
each student in turn his or her opinion
regarding
*Free Will* and whether it really existed
or not. Her answer was one upon which
I am
still puzzling over and I have since
converted
what she said at the time into print:
*I think we are all determined by past
events
to make what we THINK are *choices,*
because
if nature had not supplied us with
such wishful
thinking and we were NOT under that
illusion,
there would be no real reason to DO
anything.
We would just lie in bed all day or
stand
on a street-corner and do and say nothing
- for what would be the point if everything
had already been mapped out for us
thousands
or millions of years ago?
I thought that was the end of what
she had
to say, but then she added.
*On the other hand, in the light of
having
no such deterministically inspired
illusion,
we might respond absolutely oppositely
and
behave in the most outrageous and impulsive,
reckless way, endangering ourselves
to violence
and disease and our loved ones to all
kinds
of distress and humiliation in the
belief
that *whatever will be will be.* Therefore
I think most of us walk a deterministic
tight-rope
between being careful and taking chances
without realising that both of these
attitudes
come into play deterministically at
the appropriate
time, thankfully without our ever being
aware
of it.*
I think she is headed for a 1st on
the strength
of that! What she cleverly and convincingly
pin-points here with economy and aplomb
is
not the importance of decision-making
itself
to survival, but the importance of
the ILLUSION
of decision-making to survival.
ANTONIO:
Hi,I insert in the text some questions
for
explanation (plus a final comment).
Thanks for your kind replies.

JUD EVANS:
Hi Antonio! Grazie per il Suo pensiero solito
che provoca domande e osservazioni.
Lots
of stimulating questions - thanks.
I will
snip most of Jon's and my own input,
except
where it illuminates your question
and just
concentrate on your observations.
Yes, Richard's the man to give a view
on
this, but I think in this case he would
agree
that the ability to be positive and
make
decisions is a plus in the Darwinian
survivalist
stakes?
ANTONIO:
I question: what is meant for "to
be
positive"? Who is it the final
judge
for one having or having not been "positive"?

JUD EVANS:
I think like any other abstraction [beauty,
success, happiness etc.,] *positivity*
is
very much in the eye of the beholder.
However
there are certain people who procrastinate
to such an extent that they become
irritating
to others who may be awaiting the outcome
of some awaited decision. A government
which
appears to the voters to be taking
so much
time to deliberate upon so much-needed
change
of policy may become intensely disliked
and
held in contempt. Assertiveness, self-confident
decision-making, and a positive rather
than
a negative approach are said to be
male traits
admired by women, and although there
are
other male characteristics that women
value
in men, loyalty, empathy, sensitivity,
love
of children etc.,] I think it must
be admitted
that positive assertiveness in decision-making
can be said to be considered by at
least
half the world's population to be a
valuable
attribute for sexual selection and
the deterministic
concatenational transmission of genetical
instructions to future offspring.
ANTONIO:
There is literature about the "Be
spontaneous!"
pragmatic paradox, as put in a hierarchic
communication relationship - see Paul
Watzlawick
Pragmatic of Human Communication, 6.42,
W.
W. Norton &Co, N. Y., 1967, on
this point.
I wonder whether the "Be positive"
brainwashing encouragement could be
considered
as a variant of the "be spontaneous"
paradoxical injunction, actually vanishing
any 'free will' chance of the target.

JUD EVANS:
Thanks for the important lead. Watzlawik
has set up the axiom that: *One cannot
not
communicate.* Even if the partner doesn't
say anything you will interpret this
as a
reaction to your utterance. Watzlawik
is
correct in this. In this way it must
be that
when somebody is indecisive and procrastinates
it communicates a sense of inadequacy.
BUT
we may be fooled [or fool ourselves]
by this
interpretation, for the apparent procrastination
maybe really a strategic ploy to buy
some
time in order that the REAL decision
[already
covertly decided] may be effected.
Jon: Snip What I'm getting at here
is what
possible advantage being under that
illusion
would provide us with? Snip
ANTONIO:
I question, isn't that illusion functional
to the group hierarchy being up, since
it
determines the aspirant decision-maker
to
be a quiet puppet under the (predetermined)
social hierarchy? I guess, in the absence
of any shared deciding rule, any individual
i. e. unruled, wild decision-making
would
be a danger to the group hierarchy,
thus
in opposition to Darwin's findings.

JUD EVANS:
I think that the whole question of the myth
of authoritative decision-making is
an important
part of your ideas and writings on
hierarchy,
in particular this from your excellent:
*The Fascist Side of the Golden Rule.*
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/rossin02.htm
ANTONIO:
*This concern brought me to become
a founding
member of the Worldwide Direct Democracy
Movement and to hold discussions about
Democracy
Founding Documents, General Rules and
Global
Ethic issues. Throughout these discussions,
I always criticised anyone's attitude
to
foisting top-down policies on a people
whose
right of self-expression in the form
of bottom-up
proposals and participatory initiatives
had
been oppressed by the "No-Contradiction
Principle"; a principle practiced
all
through their family education model
to the
point of becoming the common habit.
Education
towards aware, autonomous participation
since
the earliest family patterning was
a key
priority, I guessed, to building bottom-up
democratic communities.* Antonio Rossin.

JUD EVANS:
My last sentence should have read: * The
ability to be positive and make decisions
is considered a plus in the Darwinian
survivalist
stakes?*
ANTONIO:
I would rewrite the question as follows:
* One's ability to be considered "positive"
and a decision-maker is a plus in the
Darwinian
survivalist stakes?*

JUD EVANS:
Yes - that is much better.
[previously] Therefore in this case,
you
may be tempted to agree with me that
most
people's perception of the DEGREE and
EFFECTIVENESS
of the free will they believe they
observe
in others is a question of them judging
the
adequacy of the person exercising that
free
will, and is not a questioning of whether
in fact free will really exists and
can be
observed in action in its various forms
of
trenchancy or ineffectiveness?
ANTONIO:
I question: doesn't the fact that free
will
does not exist -- as so many people,
especially
the determinist, claim as -- mean that
it
does not still, at the current stage
of the
human evolution? I guess, even if free
will
does not exist up to now, because the
humans
are lacking of any shared rule making
it
compatible with the Darwinian survivalist
requirements, does not mean that it
is a
goal to go, that can be reached as
soon as
such a rule is set up. If so, the deterministic
claim that free will cannot exist even
does
not admit any further Darwinian evolutionary
step towards a better degree of survival
-- if only such a step would be the
case,
today.

JUD EVANS:
I find this to be one of the most thought-provoking
questions on this list for a long time
Antonio!
Nested within the question are a number
of
other questions - I will attempt to
mention
a few - but there are undoubtedly many
more
than I can come up with.
I will first approach the question
from a
hard determinist point of view and
then from
a hard free will point of view.
THE HARD DETERMINIST VIEW. ASPECT (A)
To
call oneself a determinist presupposes
that
*free will* does not still, at this
current
stage of the human evolution exist.
I would
add that from my own eliminative determinist
point of view it COULD never exist
- for
only a human causal object capable
of *free
will* could exist and the abstraction
*free
will* itself could not. To state this
part
of the question in a way which avoids
as
far as possible the introduction of
abstraction
and say:
*Could any past, present or future
human
being, robot or artificial intelligence
[or
even imagined alien intelligence] EVER
be
capable of making any choice which
was absolutely
unaffected and uninfluenced by any
antecedal,
deterministically governed cause?*
For me it is profoundly obvious that
for
such a fantasy step *forward* in human
evolution
to be conceivable there would have
to be
a change in the laws of physics - to
the
very manner in which objects exist
in the
cosmos.
ASPECT (B) The thought that humans
are lacking
of some shared *rule* making *free
will*
compatible with the Darwinian survivalist
requirements is an interesting one,
[though
it clashes with my conclusions arrive
at
in ASPECT (A) But assuming that such
a rule
empowering *free will* were to be drawn
up
- what would it consist of, how would
it
be enforced, and what would be the
benefits
of employing it? Would such a rule
enable
the very abuses of dictatorship that
you
rightly oppose in so many of your writings?
Would it not lead to chaos - which
is probably
the reason why *nature* has made sure
that
it will be for ever impossible? The
only
*free will* that I could ever conceive
of
as being of any value is the determination
on behalf of mankind NOT to exercise
their
*free will,* for I believe that the
tragedies
in the history of mankind can be largely
laid at the door of those that attempted
to, or successfully individually dominate
society were the bad guys, rather than
those
who were aware and able to identify
the benign
historic flows in the direction of
human
nature, economic, political, religious
and
scientific progress and sought to go
with
rather than against the flow. There
was a
scene in the classic film *All Quiet
on the
Western front* when German soldiers
take
a brief rest in a trench surrounded
by the
crumpled piles of the dead bodies of
their
comrades.
*They should put the Kaiser, Lloyd
George,
Marshal Petain and the rest of the
leaders
in a ring with swords and let them
fight
it out - there would soon be an end
to wars
like this,* says the bearded sergeant
to
his weary men.
THE HARD FREE WILLER'S VIEW. ASPECT
(A) Free
Willer's as is well known harbour the
delusion
that human beings ALREADY have *free
will.*
So the suggestion that the development
of
*free will* would manifest a further
Darwinian
evolutionary advanced step towards
a better
degree of survival can in my opinion
be disposed
of easily. If we accept that the free
willer's
are correct and *free will* is currently
a goal which has been achieved, and
that
such a rule is already set up, then
in this
case it is only necessary to mention
even
a few *evolutionary achievements* which
*free
will* has brought about - such as the
New
York Tower block destruction, the carnage
in Iraq, not to mention the two world
wars,
the holocaust, the dropping of the
H Bombs
on Japan blah, blah, blah. The claim
that
free will exists is to deny the laws
of matter
- it basically rejects the laws of
cause
and effect and claims that things can
happen
without cause. If we examine the process
which leads to a choice or a decision
we
can see that any decision is based
upon or
evaluated in the light of antecedal
experience.
Now it matters not whether this antecedal
experience was the causal experience
of reading
about it, being told about it, or seeing
it on TV or elsewhere or actually experiencing
it in the flesh - without some sort
of previous
experince of the elements involved
in the
choice of decision - no choice of decision
could ever be made. If the decision
includes
words - then the words and their meaning
constitute cause, if the choice involves
colour then the antecedal knowledge
of colour
effects choice - if the choice concerns
choosing
which of two lemons to buy - then they
fact
that they are known to be lemons affects
the operation of choosing between them
in
the first place. If the choice is based
on
shape, then the foreknowledge of shape
is
a causal factor. IMO no matter which
way
the free willer twists and squirms
he or
she can never escape from the reality
and
ubiquity of previous events impinging
upon
and influencing any action, even if
that
action is the involuntary rising and
falling
of their own breast as they breath
in and
breath out.
ANTONIO:
Does Nature perform free will?

JUD EVANS:
No. because *nature* does not exist. What exists are the countless
causal objects which constitute the
real
entities that lie behind the abstraction
*nature.* No causal object in the cosmos
could possibly exist if it had *free
will*
for no cosmic object could exist as
the *last
link* in a concatenational chain of
causal
objects [causality] that went back
into the
black sack of eternity.
ANTONIO:
Surely, the condition of best survival
were
determined, at the time when, and in
the
territory where, a species makes an
evolutionary
change. Nevertheless the condition
that makes
the champion win the intra-specific
competition
for survival is not predetermined.
It looks
rather the product of a sudden and
random
genetic mutation. Evolutionists say,
for
one mutation to win the evolutionary
competition,
thousands and thousands of mutations
happen
and go lost. How does the determinist
hypothesis
explain the production of wasted mutations?

JUD EVANS:
More very important and stimulating questions!
I will reintroduce the notion of the
*existential
imperative* here. But first please
don't
forget that whenever I write ANYTHING
- to
stick a *In my opinion* at the head
of every
sentence. For me the idea of the existential
imperative is that:
1. It is IMPOSSIBLE for entities not
to exist,
just as it is IMPOSSIBLE for *nothing*
to
exist or not exist.
2. Everything that exists exists in
the way
that it exists, and there was, is and
never
will be any *possibility* of it either:
(a) not existing. or (b) existing as
something
else, for objects can only ever exist
as
different versions of themselves and
not
as other objects.
Because objects can only exist in the
way
they exist it means that there are
physical
reasons why they cannot exist in any
other
way. We may - if we wish- call these
physical
reasons *the laws of nature.* I prefer
to
call these *laws of nature* *the Existential
Imperative.*
There are many reasons for evolutionary
change.
Creatures may move to another terrain
either
for their own reasons or through compulsion.
Adaptation then takes place in accordance
with the individual characteristics
of the
particular species. Lizard X may have
a slightly
longer tongue than lizard Y and catch
more
protein [flies] - it may therefore
survive
- mate with lizard Z and pass on the
long-tongued
gene. Lizard A might be caught in a
rock-fall
and lose its tail. The tailess lizard
might
then have a survival advantage over
Lizard
B - but its tailessness will not be
passed
on genetically - though a fellow lizard
with
a slightly shorter tail might survive
better
than its normally tailed lizard fellows.
Mutations themselves happen as the
result
of glitches in the chemical copying
of genes.
These glitches may turn out to be advantageous
or disadvantageous - it all depends
on the
nature of the particular environment
the
animal or plant is born into. To address
your question more directly in the
light
of this talk of mutation - it boils
down
to this:
*Is it the changing condition of the
territory
[mountain, swamp, tundra, desert, etc.]
where
a species makes an evolutionary change
deterministically
responsible for the evolutionary changes
in the plant or animal, or is the *lucky*
mutant responsible for evolutionary
change?
Are we correct in attributing the determined
chemical happenstance of mutational
changes
in the animal or plant as the cause
of the
physical advantages that manifest themselves
in evolutionary favourableness?
I think both. I think that without
the gradual
drying up of the swamp or the moisturisation
of the desert then there would be no
need
for adaptation and the species would
continue
mostly unchanged in its habitational
niche
[see sharks.] On the other hand without
the
presence of certain individuals amongst
the
species being significantly different
from
their fellows no adaptation could take
place
and the species would either move or
die
out.
A guy driving a car hits a brick wall
and
he is killed. What is responsible for
determining
his death?
1. Him?
2. His car?
3. the wall?
4. All three?
ANTONIO:
Let me conclude, it is a true luck
that free
will is not performed so much, for
the time
being, by those people -- eg. dictators
--
who have been put in the social position
to perform it 'onto others'.

JUD EVANS:
I totally agree.
ANTONIO:
As regards the others (including myself),
their survival instinct -- according
with
the Darwinian (evolutionary) hypothesis
--
makes them behave, i. e., make "choices",
as closest as possible to all the antecedent
natural instances in what is called
"determinism".

JUD EVANS:
Again - agreed. tHough I would not say the
*make choices* but rather *react in
accordance
with all the antecedent natural instances
in what is called "determinism".*
ANTONIO:
Though determinism only is not yet
sufficient
-- according with the (Darwinian) evolutionary
hypothesis -- for or survival so late,
to
look with sensitive eyes at today's
reality
surrounding us. Is it just free will,
the
missing element that could bring us
up to
win the evolutionary struggle for survival?
If so, a new deal seems necessary,
a shared
rule not to perform it as... free wild.

JUD EVANS:
Free will is a physical and ontological impossibility
IMO. Could you supply even one imaginary
scenario were a decision or choice
could
be made without ant antecedally determined
input?
Che è la Sua opinione circa le opportunità
di Italia nella tazza del mondo?

RICHARD SANSOM:
I am still working on a short paper
on this
subject, but I decided to cut to the
chase
a bit. Here are some things to chew
on [I
love mixing metaphors!]:
One can say that either there is complete
free will, or complete determinism
or some
mix of the two – those are the only
logical
choices. In my opinion what is really
important
is how we feel about FW&D, versus
the
importance of arguing for any of the
three
choices. I previously claimed that
the whole
matter is irrelevant, mainly since
the vast
majority of us act as though we do
have FW
– only a scant few truly believe that
some
mechanistic demon controls their every
action
and thought. There is a bit of fatalism
involved
in the belief that whatever happens
is preordained,
and some extremists believe that whatever
they do they are compelled to do through
some managing agent -- either God,
Allah
or *nature.* It is my belief that if
one
feels that every thought and action
is preordained,
then they believe that they can be
morally
excused from any act – rather like
*the devil
made me do it.* [Instead of the insanity
defense, it is the Deterministic defense!]
Therefore, I maintain that the only
reasonable
position, from a moral perspective,
is to
assume that we do have FW -- any other
position
abrogates us from moral responsibility.
This
should go without saying, but for some
the
argument is important – for me it is
irrelevant,
as I have said. In fact, if we do not
have
FW, there is no way to make this determination
anyway, or we end up with the odd conundrums
that our belief one way or the other
is determined
in advance –or, we are compelled by
deterministic
forces to conclude that we have FW,
or because
we have FW, we decide that we do not
have
it!!

JUD EVANS:
A few comments and then a brief reiteration
in defence of my own position.
(1) For me there is either complete
free
will, or complete determinism. If called
upon to do so I could easily supply
a thousand
examples of events which were/are the
direct
and obvious results of prior events.
My writing
of this brief message is one tiny example
of an event caused by a prior event
amongst
the uncountable billions upon billions
that
have taken place throughout human history
and before, and yet nobody on any internet
list or in any private conversation
or university
discussion and in any book I have ever
read
can supply one single example of any
event
which was not caused by some prior
event.
(2) I my opinion how people feel about
FW&D,
versus the importance of arguing for
any
of the two choices is unimportant to
me because
99.9% of the human race do not even
think
about determinism, or if they do dismiss
it as unimportant. In effect it is
not a
problem.
(3) I think the employment of terms
like
*mechanistic demon* is perhaps a little
unhelpful,
for it introduces an element of demonology
or religion or perhaps the supernatural
into
a subject which is a million miles
removed
from any hint of *spirituality* or
the metaphysical.
I do not personally regard the natural,
scientifically
described effect of one event being
the cause
of another as *mechanistic,* anyway,
but
rather the reverse - as machines and
things
mechanical being the result of deterministic
events. One cog turns as the direct
scientifically
observable result of the prior turning
of
another, etc. Such deterministic events
can
be monitored and recorded. If I lift
the
bonnet of my car and ask my wife to
turn
the ignition-key I can observe the
engine
fire and run as the direct effect of
the
action of the my wife turning ignition-key
that caused the electric current to
operate
the starter-motor that caused the cylinders
to turn, the carburettor to inject
a mix
of petrol vapour and air and the pistons
to move up and down as an effect of
the explosions
taking place.
(4) The fact that some religious nuts
or
*nature-worshipers* believe that whatever
they do they are compelled to do through
some managing agent -- either God,
Allah
or fantasised *nature* has nothing
at all
to do with scientific determinism [like
such
activity as reporting the effects of
the
turning ignition key and the rest]
and for
many religions the *sinner* or *non-believer*
is free to wreak what damage he likes,
just
as long as he or she is prepared to
pay the
price of having pitchforks stuck up
their
ass for the rest of eternity after
death.
Without this *get-out clause* God would
be
deterministically blamed for every
single
accident, war, famine, flood, tsunami,
war
and every child's death that ever was.
Sinner's
are the prerequisitorial patsies of
religion
- without sinners [or foolish non-Godfearing
idiots] to take the rap, religion would
fold
overnight and priests would be toasted
to
death on their own confessional iron-gratings.
(5) I agree that if the world population
suddenly became determinist it might
cause
problems for the justice system. A
simple
decalaration that *determinism would
not
be entertained as a court-plea for
certain
offences* would solve that problem.
Any moral
protest would be blanked out by a fear
of
the alternative chaos which would result
if such pleas were to be admitted.
I say
*certain offences* because SOME deterministically
engendered conditions and events ARE
already
entertained in our courts as excuses
for
crimes. Insanity for example. Also
some conditions
of women after child-birth, and crimes
of
passion, stealing food to ward-off
starvation,
or actions committed,
*whilst of unsound mind.* The ending
of some
loved one's pain by killing them painlessly
is now accepted as a deterministically
engendered
excuse in most European courts and
in the
USA [but not in Britain] for killing
some
intruder that enters your home without
permission.
Other deterministically engendered
pleas
may become acceptable in the fullness
of
time - who knows?
(6) Regarding the fact that we are
compelled
by deterministic forces to conclude
that
we have FW. This is a point I have
been making
in recent posts and is precisely the
point
driven home by *The Lancashire Lass.*
This
is a forceful argument that could be
used
to back up any legislation and declaration
that determinism should not and would
not
be entertained as a court-plea accept
in
special cases.
My own position for what it is worth
regarding
the uncovering of philosophical *truths,*
is that I couldn't give a monkey's
about
how many people feel about FW&D.
All
I am interested in is how *I* feel
about
the matter of FW&D. The fact that
a billion
Catholics or a billion Muslims or a
billion
Hindus feel a certain way about their
version
of what exists does not influence me
in my
search for *truth* at all. If this
*truth*
happens to be *awkward* or *inconvienient*
or raises unsettling moral questions
about
our judicial systems then so what?
It is
not the job of the ontologist to stifle
research
into questions that raise ethical and
moral
questions which disturb the equanimity
of
any accepted view. That is what. happened
to Galileo Galilei.
Now please don't think that I am in any way
comparing myself to Galileo Galilei or any
other man of the past who has introduced
or sought to popularise or remind people
of inconvenient realities which challenge
accepted beliefs or question the basis of
our very own conceptions of the *freedom* of the *self.*
I am I know just an irritating and persistent
small-fry midge [mosquito] compared to them,
or perhaps an old [but not toothless] dog
endlessly worrying a bone. I just don't like
the idea of going to my death [*comporting
myself towards death* as Heidegger would
say] in the knowledge that I have not made
every effort that I possible can have done
to understand this strange old thing called *my life* without satisfying myself that I have not
poked my nose into as many aspects of it
as possible, and have NOT under any circumstances
accepted the agendas of others, either because
it it *easier* to do so, or because it is
considered a *waste of time* to do so, or that it is easier to go along
with how others *feel* about it. ;-)
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