he thrower does not exist as a 'cause' - he exists as a 'object.'
A 'cause' could never exist - it is an abstract noun - an orphanic grammatical term without a parent nominatum. The 'object' on the other hand is an entity which exists in the same manner as any other object in the cosmos - that of a 'changing object.'

In other words - what we call 'cause' and 'change' are abstractions (reifications) which do not exist - objects are effective entities at the same time that they impinge upon each other and the way that they exist is always intrinsically rather than extrinsically effected. As for the word 'thrower,' that is merely an alternative identitive name for a causal object. We may equally refer to him or her as:

               The man in the blue suit, or  the girl with the pony tail, or Fred Blogs.

     Non-existent abstractions are errors in thinking but they are  USEFUL non-existent reifications and comparatively unimportant errors in thinking for the average man in the street using natural language.

   It is only in terms of academic, scientific, ontological or philosophical discussion that they take on a ominous endangerment to clear exposition and logical conclusion. I use the term 'the physical laws of nature' purely as a shortcut.  I have created my own term: 'the existential imperative,' but I must confess that it does not wholly encompass my meaning, for it leaves the hint that there just might be an imperious and mysterious 'higher power' lurking up there with a teleological agenda - and that is the very last impression I wish to create.

I realise that as a reader coming to these ideas for the first time you will find them difficult to grasp.There are reasons for this. Over the centuries there has been an increasing reification and instantiation of abstract concepts, which to a large degree has been historically advantageous to humankind, but are becoming increasingly detrimental and dangerous in the modern world. To reify abstractions which are fundamentally separated from embodiment into quasi-entities, by treating them semantically, syntactically and in various degrees as if they were objects, is considered progressively prejudicial to the rational philosophical investigation of the truths and principles of human experience, knowledge and conduct.

I have written elsewhere questioning the historical origins of reification and in particular the influence of ancient Greece in the development of abstraction. I discuss the necessity and essential role of abstraction in a communicative context where the two-fold benign-malign implications and influences of reification are considered and deemed as an important phenomenon worthy of further serious philosophical investigation.

     It is my belief that if the nature and play between the lexical and the syntactico-grammatical elements and mechanics of reificational processes were better known and more deeply understood by users of natural language in general and the philosophical community in particular, then the rift between the transcendentalist and materialist, the idealist philosopher and the analytical thinker would, to a large extent, be repaired. I consider the main duty of philosophical research for the latter sort of materialist thinker, a fraternity of which I count myself a member, to be that of discriminating between what actually exists, from what is no more than the fleeting objectified neurological ephemera of the human brain or the vagaries of language

     I reject the notion of 'physical laws' out of hand really for what they ACTUALLY represent are the compendium of humanly observed events which mankind has usually witnessed over a long period and noted that given the same set of circumstances WITHOUT EXCEPTION a certain conjunction of object (A) with object (B) will lead to a certain effect.

    If this is so then humankind enter that into their Bumper Book of Scientific Facts and call it a physical law or a Law of Nature. So the 'law' remains there in the vade mecum and is accepted by the public and constitutes the major premise of an empirical proposition or argument such as : 'If you heat water to a temperature of  212 degrees Fahrenheit it will boil.' Note however that it is always liable to refutation or modification by subsequent experience. Science then is the constant quest for the discovery of more uniformities in relation to the impingement of objects one upon another.

     This does not mean that it is a 'necessary truth' - for I do not believe that the abstraction 'truth' exists, but only [until proved differently] it has no exceptions - if it isn't exceptionless it isn't a 'law.' So for me, what others think of as a 'law' I regard as 'an exceptionless existential modality' of a object in circumstances where it is impinged upon by another object or objects.

     Why go to all this trouble of definition? Because the concept of 'exceptionless existential modality' to a large extent removes any vestigial notions of folk ontology that there is an element of 'compulsion' or 'necessitation' involved in the existential transactions that occur twixt causal objects [I am of course referring to inanimate objects here.]

     Now whilst the word 'compulsion' certainly includes elements of 'intervention' of 'will' the word  'necessitation' whilst initially seeming innocent enough, also suggests a cause to be a concomitant, and I do not accept that 'cause' exists as an ontological difference which is somehow to be differentiated from the object itself.
     My claim is that unless we purge the residual primitive semantico-linguistic animality of the type that haunts Heideggerianism from our ontological and philosophical terminological language philosophy will be stuck in a time warp.

What do I mean by: 'inherited semantico-linguistic animality?' Well I am trying to express the idea of the sort of impression that the primitive brain (that of our early homo sapienic ancesters) would have had of natural events such as 'lightening striking a tree' or 'a river bursting its banks,' or 'a large rock suddenly falling from a great height and crushing a member of the group'.  They were bound to have attributed 'intentionality' to the happening and 'blamed' the lightening or the river-water or the rock for 'deliberately causing' the effect.  Don't you agree?


I think that this has been passed down to us for even us moderns 'feel' that way sometimes. I refer you to this hilarious video clip from an episode of Fawlty Towers, the best loved bad hotel in the world, 'the definitive volume of sit-com perfection' and required viewing. We see Basil Fawlty thrashing his car with a large branch. Like our primitive forbears, he blames the inanimate car for not starting. Basil's thrashing of his recalcitrant 1100 in the Gourmet Night episode once topped a poll of memorable motoring moments, beating the Italian Job's car chase.
Why was it so popular with the public? Because we ALL still retain that primitive attitude of blame towards inanimate objects who we still feel CAUSE the unpleasant events which annoy or hurt us.

http://www.metacafe.com/watch/518139/faulty_towers_thrasing_the_car/


We impute resistance to the strong pub-door spring that holds the door closed because if we were in the position of the door we would feel resistance. "Resistance," "force," "energy" and other animistically tinged words are constantly used in traditional philosophy AND the physical sciences - the ontological disease runs through our culture like a vein of fool's gold.  

     You cue a billiard ball and [from a human point of view] start it on its way toward the place where you want it to roll. You see it strike the another target  ball, apparently imparting motion to it.   When you see the cue-ball seemingly inducing a similar effect on the second ball,  like your cue  'pushed' the cue-ball, you are inclined to say that  the moving cue-ball pushed, forced or even 'compelled' the second ball to move. 

     The language is misleading. If these expressions refer simply to what you observe, namely that one ball makes contact with another and then other starts moving in a certain direction, then you have not gone beyond the empirically observable facts. But if you were asked to describe what you had witnessed,  then the  words you use to depict the situation seem to import into the situation something that is not there at all.  They seem to imply that the first ball underwent a 'feeling of effort' or 'strain' (which the verb "pushing" imparts)  when it collided with the second one and that the second felt "resistance" to the motion of the first.

     Do we do really believe this?  Our form of  language certainly  leaves the impression that we do. The same is true even when we say that the first ball makes the second or move. If this means merely that when the first ball hits the second the second moves, and that this regularly occurs, then we are merely describing what we observe - but we are NOT - we are doing more than that - we are attributing a anthropocentric notion of *making* - assigning the modality of devising or causing something to be or to become. We are personifying or imputing human qualities to an inert, insentient billiard ball.

     There is an animistic ring about the word "makes," which resonates of  spirits; we do not believe that the tree feels pain when it is cut down or that the stone is animated or compelled by gravity  by a desire to get to the centre of the earth; we do not believe that water is compelled to do anything when it finds its own level, because we believe only animate beings can have compulsion exerted upon them and water is inanimate. Nevertheless, we often talk as if we believed these things. We "read our feelings into nature." We personify the clouds and speak of the sky as gloomy, though it is we who feel gloom and not the sky; we speak of the chasm as yawning, of the earth as smiling, of the train as "steaming away impatiently." Poetry is filled with animistic language, and the poetic quality is often enhanced by it. But in philosophy, it is important that we be careful about this way of using language.

I seek a term which encompasses the notion of 'exceptionless, unpersonified existential modality'

The term then that I seek to coin - though it is something of a tall order - is a term which encompasses the notion of 'exceptionless existential modality' or 'the way objects are' as the objective contents of the universe. Until such a term occurs to me I shall have to content myself with theontologically  inferior: 'Laws of Nature' or the slightly less inferior, but equally difficult to define:  'Existential Imperative.'

     There is no 'cause of the throw,' for neither 'cause' nor 'throw' [nor throwing] exist. What exists is the man in the baseball cap and  blue suit who is either throwing or waving AND the object [if observer (A) is correct and the man in the blue suit IS INDEED throwing something rather than waving to somebody. Observer (A) exists in a mode of perceiving the man in the blue suit to be existing this way, whilst observer (B) observes the man in the blue suit to be existing in another way - as waving to somebody. BOTH cannot be right. But even if they were BOTH mistaken it would have no effect upon the man in the blue suit, for he would continue existing in the way he exists as the man in the blue suit doing whatever he was actually doing.

'Only in the modality of throwing is the thrower a thrower.  . Or only in the modality of fishing is the man a fisherman - BUT NOTE when a actor carries out some act or function on a REGULAR basis he is often addressed with that title permanently. Thus Fred's father is a bus driver - though he doesn't drive the bus continuously 24/7 he occasionally goes for a drink and he goes to bed and sleeps every night.

For the eliminativist  the abstract nouns 'cause' = change, do not exist and do not point to any entity that can be found in the universe. All objects in the cosmos exist as 'changing and changeable' objects. There exists no other 'higher level,' or 'separate hidden realm' or in any way ontologically different category, set, or construct whereby objects or individuals can be distinguished from the FACT of their existential actuality of  being  'changing, changeable objects.'
 
     'Action' or 'Being' does not exist - so why grace it with some obscure existential importance? Only the acting actor REALLY exists - it is convenient and necessary to have linguistic terms to IDENTIFY his changing existential modalities - but such ephemeral, fleeting, 'existential film-clips' or ontological out-takes, should not be elevated into a fantasy realm of ontological difference, either as individual modalities nor as sequentialities spliced together into a major reel and titled 'Being.'in the manner of the Heideggerians.

     We humans can address inanimate objects as the subject targets of our existential inquisitorial modes. Living in a situation surrounded by trees I am plagued by the lawn becoming leaf-bespattered every day. A few days ago I purchased an electrical device which is in effect an outside hoover with a collection bag attachment. Right now I am thinking about that object which is a thing in itself. It is hanging in the garage in complete ignorance of the fact that it exists in a form described by humans as: ' an outside hoover.' It has no idea that it is hanging on a hook at the back of my garage. It doesn't 'do the job of tidying the leaves' - it is insentient and doesn't know what itself is - never mind being aware of a leaf. I AM THE ONE who 'does the job of tidying the leaves' object labelled by (English -speaking] humans as: 'an outside hoover.' It is important to note however that: *tidying the leaves* does not exist.  Only the leaves, the outside hoover and the human leaf-tidier exists.

There is no universality of beings. As that which exists is ubiquitous in the cosmos - the term 'universal' and the one I have just employed 'ubiquitousness' is a redundancy. The term 'The universality of universals' is a tautology.' Every single objects, every molecule, atom, tree, human, star, stoat, women's handbags, toilet roll, razor comb and lather-brush is different from another WITHOUT EXCEPTION. If object (a) was exactly the same as object (b) then either (a) or (b) or both of them wouldn't exist.

The existence of the man identified correctly or incorrectly as a thrower is not affected at all by the subjective opinion of someone observing the throwing thrower. The observed human subject simply exists in the way that he exists. The way you think, imagine, speculate, consider and cognise rightly or wrongly as to the existential modalities of your sensorial target object has NO EFFECT WHATSOEVER on the observed object. 'Both ways - ontological or otherwise' don't exist for the eliminativist - objects only exist in one way - and that is the way they exist at the time.

If observing an apple I announce: 'That apple is green,' I am in fact only announcing that I myself exist in a modality of  observing the apple in such a way that it corresponds to my personal classification of the reflected  light waves from the surface of the fruit correspond with the colour I know as green.

      The apple itself just exists noumenally in the way that it [ex-homo-sapiensically] exists. Viewed strictly ontologically rather than commonsensically, it is NOT A GREEN APPLE! It is a noumenal existent which in the sight of humans appears to exist in modes which are contingent upon the sensorial equipment of that species. To the sensorial equipment of a dog, and elephant, a flea, a bear or an inhabitant of Ursa Minor it may appear to exist quite differently.

As a rider to the above I would add that sometimes the eye of the beholder is correct in its modalic evaluation/classification of the causal object observed and sometimes it is incorrect. In the case of the man in the blue suit he may or may not be throwing or waving - but if whatever he IS DOING corresponds to the perception of observer (A) then observer (A) was correct in his modalic evaluation/classification of the blue suited causal object observed, but if whatever he IS DOING corresponds to the perception of observer (B) then observer (B) was correct in his modalic evaluation/classification of the blue suited causal object observed

It is not the elimination of 'beings' [existents] because one cannot eliminate that which does no exist to be eliminated. Ideation or thinking is an existential modality of he who ideates or thinks. The eliminativist seeks not to remove these words from our language but to remove the behavioural description of causal objects [known grammatically by the technical terms 'verbs' or 'gerunds' and 'adverbs'] and descriptive words that express an attribute of something [known grammatically as 'adjectives' and 'adjectival nouns' or 'words exhibiting the gerundial suffix '-ing' ] from the pantheon of 'beings' [existents.] from the philo-ontological terminology of academic debate.

Human beings exist as sensing, thinking objects [entities.] They sense themselves as objects and the objects that make up their environment with the aid of sensors. You live within the sensorial envelope which is the organ we call our 'skin.' it is COVERED with sensors and the only parts of our exterior body that lacks a sensorial capability is the dead keratin of our bodily hair and fingernails. That is not to mention the more obvious sensors of sight, hearing, taste and smell. There is no 'separation' possible of the human entity [unity] unless we cut off a limb, an ear, fingers or toes etc. The intact body is an holism.

The fact that I refer to a man as a 'object' and you refer to him as Prince Charles' and a priest refers to him as a former adulterous sinner' makes not one jot of difference to the object generally referred to as 'Dad' sometimes as 'Charles' - sometimes as 'Darling' and sometimes as 'Your Royal Highness. As the old but very true saying goes: 'A rose by any other names smells just as sweet.'

Objects exist in the way that they exist IN SPITE of what anyone calls them or says about them.

    Named and unnamed objects exist pure and simply as existing in the unique way in which they exist. The 'subjective attribution' of names' to 'objects' such as John Jones' or 'a pint of Guinness' has ABSOLUTELY NO EFFECT on the 'object, 'John Jones' [whose birth certificate name might be 'Sidney Green'] or  on the 'pint of Guinness' [which might actually be a pint of some other brewer's stout.]

     In fact the truth of the matter is that when an object is named it is NOT the object that begins to exist in that identitive existential modality - it is YOU - ME and anybody else that agrees that it be called by such a name.  Just like the outside vacuum-cleaner hanging in my garage,  it DOESN'T exist in itself as an outside vacuum-cleaner - it is ME who exists in the mode of referring to it as 'the outside vacuum cleaner in the garage.'

Prince Charles exists where he exists right at this moment in spite of anything that is going on inside your head or mine..

     They do not for ONE MOMENT exist only 'as cast in the light of certain ideas.' Prince Charles exists where he exists right at this moment in spite of anything that is going on inside your head or mine. We have NOTHING AT ALL to do with his existential modality and he does not have anything to do with yours or mine. As for 'Being' and 'Thinking' they are just meaningless representations of an out of date folk psychology.

     'Being' is an  intangible, ontological psychic outsider - a forever indescribable, indefinable, ineffable will o’ the wisp? We certainly think of external causal objects. At this precise moment I am thinking about the external vacuum-cleaner for sucking-up  leaves which is  hanging upon a hook in my garage. Both the external vacuum-cleaner and leaves exist as objects with no names - it is WE who exist in modalities of identifying them with labels. It is not the 'animistically projected 'intention' of the external vacuum-cleaner that 'causes' the leaves to be sucked up - from the eliminativist point of view [and Sartre's by the way] it is as much the leaves' fault' for lying on the grass in the first place.

      I would certainly never be so careless as to fall into some Cartesian reptile-pit of dualism. Regarding a 'mass of atoms' [I prefer a community of atoms actually] a 'mass' is suggestive of disorganisation, which is the complete opposite of the usually quite stable entity we call Prince Charles or an apple compared to many other more unstable entities [gas for example] However an apple and Prince Charles do not exist cast  'as beings in the light of ideas - they just exist in the way they exist, walking under the elms at Sandringham or lying in a basket on the table in the conservatory. [the latter refers to the apple - not Prince Charles.]

The trap that all transcendentalists fall into is to separate the causal object from the existential modality in which it exists. When this is done on a serial basis rather than an episodic one - the monster of 'Being' is instantiated - the enemy and perverter of philosophy for over two thousand years.

The perception of the way that beings as such exist  is a feature of the perceiver's existence. Sometimes this perception is in error [a man perceived to be throwing when in fact he was waving his hand in order to attract the attention of a friend [or whatever]  which was wrongly perceived as him  throwing something.   No matter how many different people perceive a 'thing in itself* differently, the thing in itself ALWAYS continues to exist in the way it actually exists.