Eliminative determinism claims that the repetitional impingement  of Hume's:  *Regularity Theory* in *Causation,* is only partly correct - and it is wrong to curtail the definition of causality to exclusively regularly repetitional impinging causal objects (billiard balls and the like.)  The reifications  *process* cause and change do not exist anyway - only processing, causal, changing matergic (materially energised) objects exist.

Each monad, indeed, must be different from every other monad. For there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a difference either internal or based on an intrinsic property.
G.W. Leibniz. Monadology. [9] 1714.

 In order to clarify the idea we could say that *cause* and *object* are *consubstantial.* or exists materically as a energetic-material unity.  I use this terminological fictions only as an ideational rundle which can be  stepped upon then kicked away when a person has risen to an understanding of  the concept, for I do not wish it to be thought that *cause* or *change* REALLY exist - even consubstantially.

   Hume was on the cusp of understanding the fact of this existential unity when he noted that: "we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second." (1) (Hume. p. 869.) What he fell short of  grasping was that causal objects are not just restricted to a similitude of objects - but rather that ALL objects are causal and the nature of their matergic  impingement on other causal objects and the nature of the impingent of other objects upon them is not confined to some morpho-physical similarity but upon the nature of their individual existential matergic modalities. An elephant and a mouse are morpho-physiologically disimilar, but they can act upon each other as impinging objects just as morphologically similar colliding causal objects such as biliard balls are mutually  impingemental and to a certain extent predictively effected.

       Hume was correct of course that we can quickly recognise the cognitive link by the observation of the repetitional effects of two random objects such a billiard balls coming together. I noticed it first when I used to take my kids to nursery and watch them as they added to their a posteriori knowledge of causal objects by manipulating coadundate, interlocking, coloured building blocks. If they persevered pushing two together they clicked and *caused * the ensuant bi-partite object to *become* (say) the arch over a doorway in a toy house etc. It is far less easy to anticipate  or to  initiate a cognitve link when a mouse and an elephant confront each other as can be witnessed by viewing the famous Mythbusters video here with surprising results:

http://www.xenvideo.com/2007/11/30/are-elephants-scared-of-mice-mythbusters/

     Learning to predict the causal-effectional outcomes of ergodic - or stochastic random impingements, (I call it identifying  the *catenulate accountability*) where no previous, impingemental or antecedal interactive model has been formerly experienced to predict values is an instinctual  feature of the way we are born and   develop as humans - apparently the same thing goes for elephants too!

     We utter a cry of discomfort and food is felt in our mouths - we learn that such an expellation of air from the voice-box CAUSES milk to be available via a maternal nipple or a rubber teat. Soon, following regular feeding, we learn that the teat in the mouth *causes* milk to run down our throats. Thus, incrementally we become acquainted with Hume's *Regularity Theory* of * causation,* which for the eliminativist has become the *regularity theory of causal objects.*

     The only way to grasp my eliminative determinist position [or to understand the material eliminativism of the Churchlands for that matter] is to understand that the old subject-predicative formalisation of the past does not hold in the case of what has hitherto been labelled *cause* or *causality.* Change/cause is somatogenetic and sui generistic - being the only example of its kind applicable to ALL OBJECTS constituting an ontological class on its own; unique to ALL - not just to certain members of the entiatic cosmic community. In other words if we say that *all objects are causal,* we must consider the term syncategorematical, in that it imports, conveys or transmits the nature of the predicate to the object. Subject and predicate are reflectant mirror images of each other.

Thus to compare and contrast and extrapolate from St. Thomas Aquinas:

"Whether there is only one being in Christ?"  [2] (Scanlon Quodlibetal Questions, IX, q. 2, a. 2 )

*Quia ergo in Christo ponimus unam rem subsistentem tantum, ad cuius integritatem concurrit etiam humanitas, quia unum suppositum est utriusque naturae; ideo oportet dicere quod esse substantiale, quod proprie attribuitur supposito, in Christo est unum tantum; habet autem unitatem ex ipso supposito, et non ex naturis.*

I assume it as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each.
G.W. Leibniz. Monadology. [10] 1714.

Translation: (with an extrapolation added in brackets by J. E.) Therefore, since we only posit one (causal object) subsisting thing [res] in Christ, [a causal object] to whose completeness his humanity [the causal object's changeability) accompanies, since there is one suppositum of both natures (of both causal object and its action), thus we must say that the substantial being [the way the causal object exists) which is properly attributed to the suppositum, (the causal object) is only one in Christ, (AS the causal object) but it has unity from its suppositum, ( existing AS a causal object) not from the natures.{ not from the abstraction; *causality* inhering within it.)

Father Scanlon writes
*According to Aristotle (Metaphysics. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity (whatness) of a thing signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, which we may call essence (or nature). In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called the suppositum. It is also called by three names signifying a reality - that is, a thing of nature, subsistence, and hypostasis, according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called subsistence; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called hypostasis, or substance. What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances.*


      David Hume was on the way to it in Section IV. Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding part 1.- and made a tremendous leap of cognition - but he just fell short of it. I held my breath whilst reading the relevant passages from AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING waiting for the epiphanic moment of sudden understanding or revelation and the final explanation or critical exegesis which never came.

*Cause* is actually exactly the same as *change.* It is the only way that ANY object can exist. Because *cause* or *change* is NOT PREDICATABLE of the object - as it IS the object - the way that it EXISTS - and people have not grasped the fact yet, so I am forced to employ the adjectives *causal* or *changeable* before the noun *object.*

     An eventuation can be regarded as a collection of individually necessary and jointly sufficient causal objects [or changing objects if you prefer] for the event to have occurred. Of course no *event* or *eventuation DOES occur - only the occurring causal objects exist and to *occur* means the same as to *exist.* That they are individually necessary causal objects means that if any one of these causal objects had not pertained, the event would not have happened - the causal objects did not exist in that particular spatial position at the requisite time. Determining the identities of impingemental causal objects and observing the results of the copuletic impingements reveal the individual characteristics by which a causal object is recognized or known, and are the self same factors which, were they to be avoided or duplicated in the future, would avert entirely or initiate future events with similar outcomes.

     The [reluctant but necessary] use of adjectivalisation at this stage in the development of eliminative determinism is not a *trick* or *word-play* in order to ATTRIBUTE  *causality* to the object in a *round-about* way, but because the ontological actuality is difficult to grasp for most people, I am forced to write the message on the blackboard in large letters and spell it out in [what are for the cognoscenti] unnecessary words - and the adjective *causal* is such a word.

     There is no *contradictio in adject*: (contradiction between the adjective and the noun it qualifies.) The logos [adjectival description] is a redundancy - for *causality* is not a *property,* nor an *essence* of an object. ALL COSMIC OBJECTS EXIST THIS WAY - so an adjectival description is a redundancy - to say *All objects are changing objects* is tautologic, in that logically the statement is necessarily true - for there would be no object to speak of if it were not changeable or causal and change and object are *sine qua non* or essential conditions or elements and indispensable entiatic modalities of unity we call a causal object and its actual existing as an objects.


     I interpret the meaning of logos as meaning *an account* or explanation* rather than *order.* Additionally I am addressing cosmic objects as noumenal entities which have no need of *logos* or human accounts and explanations to exist. The earth existed for millions of years before human philosophers stood upright on two legs with explanations to account for its existence and our being here as sojourners upon its surface.


     I am not a Parmenidean who attempts to ACCOUNT for cause or causality - I dismiss it out of hand as mythic.

     Lord Bertrand Russell said the same thing about the cosmos * IT IS because It is * but that is not my position - I say the cosmos exists because it is impossible for it NOT TO EXIST. Thus I give a reason for it existing where Parmenides and Russell did not.

It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence on its inner being.
G.W. Leibniz. Monadology. [11] 1714.

If someone says: *Why is it impossible for the cosmos NOT to exist?* I answer: *Because if it were deterministically possible for the cosmos not to exist - then it would not exist - and it DOES exist, which means that it is not impossible for it to exist, and impossible for it not to exist, for it is not possible to exist in a state of not existing. If someone can prove that the *nothing* in your empty fridge exists, I will personally wire Walmart to fill it up free of charge and bill it to my account. There was no *prime mover* because there was never any *Prime Move.* Not to exist is not an option of the existential imperative.

     The archai or “principles” which were the common quest of Ionian inquiry might be historical “origins,” “units” composing the material world, or “axioms” of scientific theory.

While they are at it - perhaps that can  explain how *nothing* can either exist or not exist in their refrigerator or in the cosmos in general? As for *one* and *two* they are just useful fictions and do not exist any more than 1000,000 exists.

If I say to a person *Show me an example of *one* they wil try to cheat me and show me a single *orange* - which of course is not *one* at all,  but that entity which is the nominatum of the English word *orange.* If I say to him *Show me an example of two* he wil try to cheat me and show me two *oranges.*