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A popular explanation for the success of
scientific theories is made by presupposing
scientific realism. The realist's thesis
maintains that typically the theories of
"mature" science are approximately
true and that observational terms and theoretical
terms do actually refer, i.e. they denote
entities.
Therefore, it is part and parcel of the realistic
claim that it is "reference" which
explains theory "success". But
if we or the realist are not able to clarify
what "reference" is and a fortiori
cannot specify the reference to theoretical
"objects", we, and especially the
realist, become entangled in a vicious circle,
without any further independent criterion
— apart from the success of the theory —
which shows that the term is indeed a referring
term.
It is therefore clearly necessary to
clarify the notion of reference.
Needless to say, "reference" is
a relational term; but immediately a problem
arises here namely, that we not only habitually
imagine the relata, but we are also convinced
that a relation can only be a relation between
entities in a strict (Quinean) sense.
There are various kinds of references resp.
relations described as referential. This
applies, e.g., to the referential relation
which is usually called "intentionality".
If we consider the traditional distinction
between reference and meaning and analyze
the meaning of a term we always find at least
one referential component (intentional or
intended object). This referential mapping
process is not an unimportant aspect of linguistic
reference, but in the present context we
are considering the kind of relation called
"denotation" or "extension".
The notion of meaning and the concept of
reference are nonsubstantial constructions
of interpretation; yet nevertheless I would
like to argue in favor of a reference-theoretical
approach.
Theoretical terms have often caused diverse
problems for theoretical scientists, depending
on their particular "metaphysical"
background. At first sight, an elegant solution
appears to be given by Rom Harré's approach
(1986): Harré understands the reference to
theoretical as well as to empirical entities
as a "material practice". He offers
two explications for "material practice":
Observers (materially embodied [Harré, 102])
are involved in a physical/physicalistic
relation to a material object; experimentators
produce parts of reality on a theoretical
basis.
Regarding the production of reference it
turns out to be indifferent whether the object
is an object in the world or just "in"
a theory, for it is trivial that no one is
able to think of objects without conceptual
mediation. However, the distinction between
physical and theoretical entities is theory-dependent
itself, as is also the idea that a speaker
might refer to something and how he would
do so.
Secondly, Harré advocates a so called referential
realism, i.e. he tries to develop his concept
of realism further than traditional truth
realism and metaphysical realism. Within
the range of his scientific program he distinguishes
three kinds of scientific theories dependent
on three different levels of being and their
respective associated cognitive or operational-experimental
practices: type 1 theories contain descriptions
and definitions of observable phenomena,
they reach therefore beyond the level R1
of the directly observable. In type 2 theories
"objects" are represented or postulated,
which are — in Harré's opinion — not presently
(not yet actually),but in principle, observable;
while the entities postulated in type 3 theories
(covariances, symmetries, hence mathematical
features) are principally beyond all observation
(Harré 70).Harrés conception aims at a transformation
of type 2 theories to type1 theories. It
is feasible to consider the method he suggests
for this explicitly within the scope of this
paper.
Let me only indicate here that Harré (referring
to L. Roberts) distinguishes two kinds of
reference production: the so-called DC- and
IP-references. ("DC" stands for
the demonstrative pronoun and complement:
it could be called deixis as well, in connection
with a general term.) DC-references achieve
the selection of an object out of an extension
set, determined by the general terminus,
by pointing at, referring to something by
similar procedures. They differ from the
IP-references in that in the DC-associations
the general termini indicate perceivables.
The IP-references are so-called after the
"I" for "indefinite pronouns"
and "P" for the "individuing
predicate". In a way, the IP-references
are also dependent on perceptions, the "I"
refers to a that; it's true that this perception is not explained
by some other perception, but the predicate
level is defined by mere theoretical constructs.
The type 2 theories deal mainly with IP-references
(e.g., "Whatever is the cause of this
phenomenon is an X") and Harré's "aim"
in science is to transform (or reduce) IP-references
to DC-references. Therefore, he introduces
the beautiful metaphor of referent hunting with which — in my opinion — he unnecessarily
imputes that one can speak about "reference"
only when there is a referent in quite a
specific sense — and, according to Harré,
that would be an observable existence.
Of course, Harré doesn't assume that one
could somehow see or taste neutrinos. Obviously,
these are merely indirectly perceivable through
specific technically produced effects or
phenomena. Secondhand reference, however,
is reference-theoretically "indecent",
since it is not direct reference. There is,
in principle, no direct acquaintance with
the "object" and, therefore, it
is difficult — to say the least — to find
a distinction (in this relation) between
Harré's "reference chase" and Carnap's
correspondence rules, except, perhaps, by
pointing to the fact that retransformating
R2-entities to R1-entities would in the long
run hinder the progress of cognition in the
case where the re- or transformation attempts
are made indiscriminatey, firstly, in all
theories of various disciplines and, secondly,
independently of the respective intended
function of the theory (explanation, prediction,
"production instruction").
When reference is seen functionally — and
I think this is the only way to view it —
we can attribute a functional status to the
"objects" of reference. That means
that certain "objects" of reference
"exist" only within the reference
act itself, and are therefore only dependent
on the respective intended function.For a
long time it has been generally accepted
that the distinction between observational
and theoretical terms is, if not questionable
in principle, nevertheless highly dependent
on aims, formulations of the question, conventions,
practices of speech and not least on levels
of technology, especially of measurement
technology.Our entire world access is conceptually
defined (dependent on our cognition equipment),
is so to speak interpretation-infused. Thus,
Pegasus, bald present French kings, unicorns
and wooden irons, nouns originating from
adjectives like redness and blueness, phlogiston,
neutrinos and their mass, Snow White, as
well as the objects of direct perception
themselves are — metaphorically spoken —
in the same boat. Nevertheless, it is necessary
and possible to make distinctions. There
remains particularly the (practically) necessary
distinction between observable and theoretical
terms, as well as the determination of a
demarcation criterion between theoretical
and other non-observable entities.
The thesis states that possible objects of
reference are generated on different levels
of interpretation, (2) become reference objects by speaking acts,
which means that on the one hand a succeeding
reference procedure presupposes its objects,
and on the other, that this "object"
is not given independently (from interpretation),
but necessarily drafted in the form of an
interpretation result, formed and structured
in processes of explanation, which partly
(IS1+2) cannot take place in any other way,
i.e. independently from interpretation "grasps",
which are at least partly influenced by a
given (already found) speech practice (IS3)
and partly quite consciously and purposefully
constructed for certain aims.Not only the
objects of terms which are traditionally
not understood as being of a referring type,
but also theoretical entities should be understood
as higher level interpretative constructs,
and thus as something rather linguistically
introduced, that "exists" only
by dependence on a certain language. On the
other hand, the referent is, partially because
of linguistically independent conceptions,
types of action, practices, etc., definitely
and correctly to be understood as not being
of just a linguistic type in the narrow sense.In
summary:
Theoretical terms are insofar referring terms
as they, occuring in hypotheses or laws,
are used to explain reality (i.e. real events
and objects), make predictions possible and
to develop technological procedures. Their
objects of reference ("referents")
are given only under a description: more
specifically, they are significantly (selected
and selectable) indepently of a description.
This is however — following Frege and Russell
— , a serious obstacle for at least direct
reference. Nota bene, the distinction between
direct and nondirect reference is difficult
to specify: Referring terms are characterized
by objects being imputed (hypostatized) or
projected outside of the mind; and this makes
reference basically indirect. There may be
reasons for distinguishing reference to perception-based
objects as a direct reference. But theoretical
terms can also be understood as directly
referring — therefore you need only to refer
to the definition that a term is only referring
in the case that the truth — and realization
conditions are understood as being singular;
and this is what they are — as is well-known
— when there is an x, that makes a sentence
exactly true, if x fulfils the predicate
F ( ): Whether this is a theoretical, empirical
or even mystical predicate, is unimportant
in this context.
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Evans Experientialism 
