Speech developed to run simultaneously in the higher nervous centres within the skull with an antecedently evolved, delineatively transacted, representational mock-up model of a perceived reality of the experienced outer domain. The combination of these two phenomena – the representational and the linguistic create the illusion of an unverifiable sequential knowingness.

The semantic rendition of words acts upon human behaviour, which in its turn modifies the mammalian simulation of the perceived environment. There is a ceaseless refereeing taking place within the mind between the older dominant representational model and the more recent medium of language.

These constant adjudications explain many facets of cognisance and there is a constant conflict between the two.   Language, operating in an ordered, logical, syntactical pattern endeavours to override the more emotionally burdened mammalian perception as it too seeks to explain the incoming phenomena and reconcile it with the memory patterns stored in the consciousness. This parallel processing by the cerebral cortex and associative memory of the two competing cognitive and informational systems implies concilience and supervenience, but there is a fundamental conflict that underlies this apparent symbiosis. The bipartite apprehension of the environment is hierarchical – the primordial representational system being the first to grasp and classify the environmental evidence flow as it arrives and is already aware of the existence of the data transacted – it is sensible to the extantal nature of the existential subject (extantal imbuant,) identified by language as the canvass of presence.  It is for this reason that the consciousness baulks at the introduction of the “is” word in statements as an apparent introductory actuator of existence – because it already acknowledges the existence of the extantal imbuant - and does not need to be told twice.  Hence we maintain that due to the a priori awareness of serial existentiality on the part of the consciousness, the role of the pseudo-verb of existence “to be” and all its cognates has another function and that role is to exhibit and allow a description of the modality of existential activity which language struggles to reconcile with the consciousness version of reality in a focussed but ultimately imperfect collaboration.  Ideations of  ‘being’ and are wrongfully choreographed, for they are no more than chimeras resulting from a mistaken classification of the “to be” cluster as verbs of existence by ancient Greek grammarians, and a laggard-language belatedly anxious to establish presence after it has already happened and been apprised by its representational partner.

The ensuing confusion sees language mistaking a syntactical device of the continuous present: ‘being’ as a rival description of existence – an existence earlier approbated by its representational associate in the consciousness. Hence the phenomena of Heidegger and the confabulations of Dasein.

Jud Evans.