| Letter of Dedication | TO THE VERY SAGE AND ILLUSTRIOUS THE DEAN
AND
DOCTORS
OF THE SACRED FACULTY OF THEOLOGY
OF PARIS. |
GENTLEMEN,
1. The motive which impels me to present
this Treatise to you is so reasonable,
and
when you shall learn its design, I
am confident
that you also will consider that there
is
ground so valid for your taking it
under
your protection, that I can in no way
better
recommend it to you than by briefly
stating
the end which I proposed to myself
in it
2. I have always been of the opinion
that
the two questions respecting God and
the
Soul were the chief of those that ought
to
be determined by help of Philosophy
rather
than of Theology; for although to us,
the
faithful, it be sufficient to hold
as matters
of faith, that the human soul does
not perish
with the body, and that God exists,
it yet
assuredly seems impossible ever to
persuade
infidels of the reality of any religion,
or almost even any moral virtue, unless,
first of all, those two things be proved
to them by natural reason. And since
in this
life there are frequently greater rewards
held out to vice than to virtue, few
would
prefer the right to the useful, if
they were
restrained neither by the fear of God
nor
the expectation of another life; and
although
it is quite true that the existence
of God
is to be believed since it is taught
in the
sacred Scriptures, and that, on the
other
hand, the sacred Scriptures are to
be believed
because they come from God (for since
faith
is a gift of God, the same Being who
bestows
grace to enable us to believe other
things,
can likewise impart of it to enable
us to
believe his own existence), nevertheless,
this cannot be submitted to infidels,
who
would consider that the reasoning proceeded
in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed
that you, with all the other theologians,
not only affirmed the sufficiency of
natural
reason for the proof of the existence
of
God, but also, that it may be inferred
from
sacred Scripture, that the knowledge
of God
is much clearer than of many created
things,
and that it is really so easy of acquisition
as to leave those who do not possess
it blameworthy.
This is manifest from these words of
the
Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where
it is
said, Howbeit they are not to be excused;
for if their understanding was so great
that
they could discern the world and the
creatures,
why did they not rather find out the
Lord
thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it
is said
that they are without excuse; and again,
in the same place, by these words,
That which
may be known of God is manifest in
them--we
seem to be admonished that all which
can
be known of God may be made manifest
by reasons
obtained from no other source than
the inspection
of our own minds. I have, therefore,
thought
that it would not be unbecoming in
me to
inquire how and by what way, without
going
out of ourselves, God may be more easily
and certainly known than the things
of the
world.[
3. And as regards the Soul, although
many
have judged that its nature could not
be
easily discovered, and some have even
ventured
to say that human reason led to the
conclusion
that it perished with the body, and
that
the contrary opinion could be held
through
faith alone; nevertheless, since the
Lateran
Council, held under Leo X. (in session
viii.),
condemns these, and expressly enjoins
Christian
philosophers to refute their arguments,
and
establish the truth according to their
ability,
I have ventured to attempt it in this
work.
4. Moreover, I am aware that most of
the
irreligious deny the existence of God,
and
the distinctness of the human soul
from the
body, for no other reason than because
these
points, as they allege, have never
as yet
been demonstrated. Now, although I
am by
no means of their opinion, but, on
the contrary,
hold that almost all the proofs which
have
been adduced on these questions by
great
men, possess, when rightly understood,
the
force of demonstrations, and that it
is next
to impossible to discover new, yet
there
is, I apprehend, no more useful service
to
be performed in Philosophy, than if
some
one were, once for all, carefully to
seek
out the best of these reasons, and
expound
them so accurately and clearly that,
for
the future, it might be manifest to
all that
they are real demonstrations. And finally,
since many persons were greatly desirous
of this, who knew that I had cultivated
a
certain Method of resolving all kinds
of
difficulties in the sciences, which
is not
indeed new (there being nothing older
than
truth), but of which they were aware
I had
made successful use in other instances,
I
judged it to be my duty to make trial
of
it also on the present matter.
5. Now the sum of what I have been
able
to accomplish on the subject is contained
in this Treatise. Not that I here essayed
to collect all the diverse reasons
which
might be adduced as proofs on this
subject,
for this does not seem to be necessary,
unless
on matters where no one proof of adequate
certainty is to be had; but I treated
the
first and chief alone in such a manner
that
I should venture now to propose them
as demonstrations
of the highest certainty and evidence.
And
I will also add that they are such
as to
lead me to think that there is no way
open
to the mind of man by which proofs
superior
to them can ever be discovered for
the importance
of the subject, and the glory of God,
to
which all this relates, constrain me
to speak
here somewhat more freely of myself
than
I have been accustomed to do. Nevertheless,
whatever certitude and evidence I may
find
in these demonstrations, I cannot therefore
persuade myself that they are level
to the
comprehension of all. But just as in
geometry
there are many of the demonstrations
of Archimedes,
Apollonius, Pappus, and others, which,
though
received by all as evident even and
certain
(because indeed they manifestly contain
nothing
which, considered by itself, it is
not very
easy to understand, and no consequents
that
are inaccurately related to their antecedents),
are nevertheless understood by a very
limited
number, because they are somewhat long,
and
demand the whole attention of the reader:
so in the same way, although I consider
the
demonstrations of which I here make
use,
to be equal or even superior to the
geometrical
in certitude and evidence, I am afraid,
nevertheless,
that they will not be adequately understood
by many, as well because they also
are somewhat
long and involved, as chiefly because
they
require the mind to be entirely free
from
prejudice, and able with ease to detach
itself
from the commerce of the senses. And,
to
speak the truth, the ability for metaphysical
studies is less general than for those
of
geometry. And, besides, there is still
this
difference that, as in geometry, all
are
persuaded that nothing is usually advanced
of which there is not a certain demonstration,
those but partially versed in it err
more
frequently in assenting to what is
false,
from a desire of seeming to understand
it,
than in denying what is true. In philosophy,
on the other hand, where it is believed
that
all is doubtful, few sincerely give
themselves
to the search after truth, and by far
the
greater number seek the reputation
of bold
thinkers by audaciously impugning such
truths
as are of the greatest moment.
6. Hence it is that, whatever force
my reasonings
may possess, yet because they belong
to philosophy,
I do not expect they will have much
effect
on the minds of men, unless you extend
to
them your patronage and approval. But
since
your Faculty is held in so great esteem
by
all, and since the name of SORBONNE
is of
such authority, that not only in matters
of faith, but even also in what regards
human
philosophy, has the judgment of no
other
society, after the Sacred Councils,
received
so great deference, it being the universal
conviction that it is impossible elsewhere
to find greater perspicacity and solidity,
or greater wisdom and integrity in
giving
judgment, I doubt not, if you but condescend
to pay so much regard to this Treatise
as
to be willing, in the first place,
to correct
it (for mindful not only of my humanity,
but chiefly also of my ignorance, I
do not
affirm that it is free from errors);
in the
second place, to supply what is wanting
in
it, to perfect what is incomplete,
and to
give more ample illustration where
it is
demanded, or at least to indicate these
defects
to myself that I may endeavour to remedy
them; and, finally, when the reasonings
contained
in it, by which the existence of God
and
the distinction of the human soul from
the
body are established, shall have been
brought
to such degree of perspicuity as to
be esteemed
exact demonstrations, of which I am
assured
they admit, if you condescend to accord
them
the authority of your approbation,
and render
a public testimony of their truth and
certainty,
I doubt not, I say, but that henceforward
all the errors which have ever been
entertained
on these questions will very soon be
effaced
from the minds of men. For truth itself
will
readily lead the remainder of the ingenious
and the learned to subscribe to your
judgment;
and your authority will cause the atheists,
who are in general sciolists rather
than
ingenious or learned, to lay aside
the spirit
of contradiction, and lead them, perhaps,
to do battle in their own persons for
reasonings
which they find considered demonstrations
by all men of genius, lest they should
seem
not to understand them; and, finally,
the
rest of mankind will readily trust
to so
many testimonies, and there will no
longer
be any one who will venture to doubt
either
the existence of God or the real distinction
of mind and body. It is for you, in
your
singular wisdom, to judge of the importance
of the establishment of such beliefs,
[who
are cognisant of the disorders which
doubt
of these truths produces].* But it
would
not here become me to commend at greater
length the cause of God and of religion
to
you, who have always proved the strongest
support of the Catholic Church.
Preface to the Reader.
1. I have already slightly touched
upon
the questions respecting the existence
of
God and the nature of the human soul,
in
the "Discourse on the Method of
rightly
conducting the Reason, and seeking
Truth
in the Sciences," published in
French
in the year 1637; not however, with
the design
of there treating of them fully, but
only,
as it were, in passing, that I might
learn
from the judgment of my readers in
what way
I should afterward handle them; for
these
questions appeared to me to be of such
moment
as to be worthy of being considered
more
than once, and the path which I follow
in
discussing them is so little trodden,
and
so remote from the ordinary route that
I
thought it would not be expedient to
illustrate
it at greater length in French, and
in a
discourse that might be read by all,
lest
even the more feeble minds should believe
that this path might be entered upon
by them.
2. But, as in the " Discourse
on Method,"
I had requested all who might find
aught
meriting censure in my writings, to
do me
the favor of pointing it out to me,
I may
state that no objections worthy of
remark
have been alleged against what I then
said
on these questions except two, to which
I
will here briefly reply, before undertaking
their more detailed discussion.
3. The first objection is that though,
while
the human mind reflects on itself,
it does
not perceive that it is any other than
a
thinking thing, it does not follow
that its
nature or essence consists only in
its being
a thing which thinks; so that the word
ONLY
shall exclude all other things which
might
also perhaps be said to pertain to
the nature
of the mind. To this objection I reply,
that
it was not my intention in that place
to
exclude these according to the order
of truth
in the matter (of which I did not then
treat),but
only according to the order of thought
(perception);
so that my meaning was, that I clearly
apprehended
nothing, so far as I was conscious,
as belonging
to my essence, except that I was a
thinking
thing, or a thing possessing in itself
the
faculty of thinking. But I will show
hereafter
how, from the consciousness that nothing
besides thinking belongs to the essence
of
the mind, it follows that nothing else
does
in truth belong to it.
4. The second objection is that it
does
not follow, from my possessing the
idea of
a thing more perfect than I am, that
the
idea itself is more perfect than myself,
and much less that what is represented
by
the idea exists. But I reply that in
the
term idea there is here something equivocal;
for it may be taken either materially
for
an act of the understanding, and in
this
sense it cannot be said to be more
perfect
than I, or objectively, for the thing
represented
by that act, which, although it be
not supposed
to exist out of my understanding, may,
nevertheless,
be more perfect than myself, by reason
of
its essence. But, in the sequel of
this treatise
I will show more amply how, from my
possessing
the idea of a thing more perfect than
myself,
it follows that this thing really exists.
5. Besides these two objections, I
have
seen, indeed, two treatises of sufficient
length relating to the present matter.
In
these, however, my conclusions, much
more
than my premises, were impugned, and
that
by arguments borrowed from the common
places
of the atheists. But, as arguments
of this
sort can make no impression on the
minds
of those who shall rightly understand
my
reasonings, and as the judgments of
many
are so irrational and weak that they
are
persuaded rather by the opinions on
a subject
that are first presented to them, however
false and opposed to reason they may
be,
than by a true and solid, but subsequently
received, refutation of them, I am
unwilling
here to reply to these strictures from
a
dread of being, in the first instance,
obliged
to state them. I will only say, in
general,
that all which the atheists commonly
allege
in favor of the non-existence of God,
arises
continually from one or other of these
two
things, namely, either the ascription
of
human affections to Deity, or the undue
attribution
to our minds of so much vigor and wisdom
that we may essay to determine and
comprehend
both what God can and ought to do;
hence
all that is alleged by them will occasion
us no difficulty, provided only we
keep in
remembrance that our minds must be
considered
finite, while Deity is incomprehensible
and
infinite.
6. Now that I have once, in some measure,
made proof of the opinions of men regarding
my work, I again undertake to treat
of God
and the human soul, and at the same
time
to discuss the principles of the entire
First
Philosophy, without, however, expecting
any
commendation from the crowd for my
endeavors,
or a wide circle of readers. On the
contrary,
I would advise none to read this work,
unless
such as are able and willing to meditate
with me in earnest, to detach their
minds
from commerce with the senses, and
likewise
to deliver themselves from all prejudice;
and individuals of this character are,
I
well know, remarkably rare. But with
regard
to those who, without caring to comprehend
the order and connection of the reasonings,
shall study only detached clauses for
the
purpose of small but noisy criticism,
as
is the custom with many, I may say
that such
persons will not profit greatly by
the reading
of this treatise; and although perhaps
they
may find opportunity for cavilling
in several
places, they will yet hardly start
any pressing
objections, or such as shall be deserving
of reply.
7. But since, indeed, I do not promise
to
satisfy others on all these subjects
at first
sight, nor arrogate so much to myself
as
to believe that I have been able to
forsee
all that may be the source of difficulty
to each ones I shall expound, first
of all,
in the Meditations, those considerations
by which I feel persuaded that I have
arrived
at a certain and evident knowledge
of truth,
in order that I may ascertain whether
the
reasonings which have prevailed with
myself
will also be effectual in convincing
others.
I will then reply to the objections
of some
men, illustrious for their genius and
learning,
to whom these Meditations were sent
for criticism
before they were committed to the press;
for these objections are so numerous
and
varied that I venture to anticipate
that
nothing, at least nothing of any moment,
will readily occur to any mind which
has
not been touched upon in them. Hence
it is
that I earnestly entreat my readers
not to
come to any judgment on the questions
raised
in the Meditations until they have
taken
care to read the whole of the Objections,
with the relative Replies.
MEDITATION ONE
OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY
DOUBT. |
MEDITATION I. OF THE THINGS OF WHICH WE MAY
DOUBT.
1. SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I
first became aware that I had accepted, even
from my youth, many false opinions for true,
and that consequently what I afterward based
on such principles was highly doubtful; and
from that time I was convinced of the necessity
of undertaking once in my life to rid myself
of all the opinions I had adopted, and of
commencing anew the work of building from
the foundation, if I desired to establish
a firm and abiding superstructure in the
sciences. But as this enterprise appeared
to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited
until I had attained an age so mature as
to leave me no hope that at any stage of
life more advanced I should be better able
to execute my design. On this account, I
have delayed so long that I should henceforth
consider I was doing wrong were I still to
consume in deliberation any of the time that
now remains for action. To-day, then, since
I have opportunely freed my mind from all
cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions],
and since I am in the secure possession of
leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will
at length apply myself earnestly and freely
to the general overthrow of all my former
opinions.
2. But, to this end, it will not be necessary
for me to show that the whole of these are
false--a point, perhaps, which I shall never
reach; but as even now my reason convinces
me that I ought not the less carefully to
withhold belief from what is not entirely
certain and indubitable, than from what is
manifestly false, it will be sufficient to
justify the rejection of the whole if I shall
find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for
this purpose will it be necessary even to
deal with each belief individually, which
would be truly an endless labor; but, as
the removal from below of the foundation
necessarily involves the downfall of the
whole edifice, I will at once approach the
criticism of the principles on which all
my former beliefs rested.
3. All that I have, up to this moment, accepted
as possessed of the highest truth and certainty,
I received either from or through the senses.
I observed, however, that these sometimes
misled us; and it is the part of prudence
not to place absolute confidence in that
by which we have even once been deceived.
4. But it may be said, perhaps, that, although
the senses occasionally mislead us respecting
minute objects, and such as are so far removed
from us as to be beyond the reach of close
observation, there are yet many other of
their informations (presentations), of the
truth of which it is manifestly impossible
to doubt; as for example, that I am in this
place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter
dressing gown, that I hold in my hands this
piece of paper, with other intimations of
the same nature. But how could I deny that
I possess these hands and this body, and
withal escape being classed with persons
in a state of insanity, whose brains are
so disordered and clouded by dark bilious
vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to
assert that they are monarchs when they are
in the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold]
and purple when destitute of any covering;
or that their head is made of clay, their
body of glass, or that they are gourds? I
should certainly be not less insane than
they, were I to regulate my procedure according
to examples so extravagant.
5. Though this be true, I must nevertheless
here consider that I am a man, and that,
consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping,
and representing to myself in dreams those
same things, or even sometimes others less
probable, which the insane think are presented
to them in their waking moments. How often
have I dreamt that I was in these familiar
circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied
this place by the fire, when I was lying
undressed in bed? At the present moment,
however, I certainly look upon this paper
with eyes wide awake; the head which I now
move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously
and with express purpose, and I perceive
it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct
as all this. But I cannot forget that, at
other times I have been deceived in sleep
by similar illusions; and, attentively considering
those cases, I perceive so clearly that there
exist no certain marks by which the state
of waking can ever be distinguished from
sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and
in amazement I almost persuade myself that
I am now dreaming.
6. Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming,
and that all these particulars--namely, the
opening of the eyes, the motion of the head,
the forth- putting of the hands--are merely
illusions; and even that we really possess
neither an entire body nor hands such as
we see. Nevertheless it must be admitted
at least that the objects which appear to
us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations
which could not have been formed unless in
the likeness of realities; and, therefore,
that those general objects, at all events,
namely, eyes, a head, hands, and an entire
body, are not simply imaginary, but really
existent. For, in truth, painters themselves,
even when they study to represent sirens
and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and
extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures
absolutely new, but can only make a certain
medley of the members of different animals;
or if they chance to imagine something so
novel that nothing at all similar has ever
been seen before, and such as is, therefore,
purely fictitious and absolutely false, it
is at least certain that the colors of which
this is composed are real. And on the same
principle, although these general objects,
viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the
like, be imaginary, we are nevertheless absolutely
necessitated to admit the reality at least
of some other objects still more simple and
universal than these, of which, just as of
certain real colors, all those images of
things, whether true and real, or false and
fantastic, that are found in our consciousness
(cogitatio),are formed.
7. To this class of objects seem to belong
corporeal nature in general and its extension;
the figure of extended things, their quantity
or magnitude, and their number, as also the
place in, and the time during, which they
exist, and other things of the same sort.
8. We will not, therefore, perhaps reason
illegitimately if we conclude from this that
Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the
other sciences that have for their end the
consideration of composite objects, are indeed
of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic,
Geometry, and the other sciences of the same
class, which regard merely the simplest and
most general objects, and scarcely inquire
whether or not these are really existent,
contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable:
for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains
true that two and three make five, and that
a square has but four sides; nor does it
seem possible that truths so apparent can
ever fall under a suspicion of falsity [or
incertitude].
9. Nevertheless, the belief that there is
a God who is all powerful, and who created
me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained
steady possession of my mind. How, then,
do I know that he has not arranged that there
should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any
extended thing, nor figure, nor magnitude,
nor place, providing at the same time, however,
for [the rise in me of the perceptions of
all these objects, and] the persuasion that
these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive
them ? And further, as I sometimes think
that others are in error respecting matters
of which they believe themselves to possess
a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I
am not also deceived each time I add together
two and three, or number the sides of a square,
or form some judgment still more simple,
if more simple indeed can be imagined? But
perhaps Deity has not been willing that I
should be thus deceived, for he is said to
be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant
to the goodness of Deity to have created
me subject to constant deception, it would
seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness
to allow me to be occasionally deceived;
and yet it is clear that this is permitted.
10. Some, indeed, might perhaps be found
who would be disposed rather to deny the
existence of a Being so powerful than to
believe that there is nothing certain. But
let us for the present refrain from opposing
this opinion, and grant that all which is
here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless,
in whatever way it be supposed that I reach
the state in which I exist, whether by fate,
or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents
and consequents, or by any other means, it
is clear (since to be deceived and to err
is a certain defect ) that the probability
of my being so imperfect as to be the constant
victim of deception, will be increased exactly
in proportion as the power possessed by the
cause, to which they assign my origin, is
lessened. To these reasonings I have assuredly
nothing to reply, but am constrained at last
to avow that there is nothing of all that
I formerly believed to be true of which it
is impossible to doubt, and that not through
thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent
and maturely considered reasons; so that
henceforward, if I desire to discover anything
certain, I ought not the less carefully to
refrain from assenting to those same opinions
than to what might be shown to be manifestly
false.
11. But it is not sufficient to have made
these observations; care must be taken likewise
to keep them in remembrance. For those old
and customary opinions perpetually recur--
long and familiar usage giving them the right
of occupying my mind, even almost against
my will, and subduing my belief; nor will
I lose the habit of deferring to them and
confiding in them so long as I shall consider
them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions
to some extent doubtful, as I have already
shown, but still highly probable, and such
as it is much more reasonable to believe
than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded
that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking
an opposite judgment of deliberate design,
I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for
a time, that all those opinions are entirely
false and imaginary, until at length, having
thus balanced my old by my new prejudices,
my judgment shall no longer be turned aside
by perverted usage from the path that may
conduct to the perception of truth. For I
am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise
neither peril nor error from this course,
and that I cannot for the present yield too
much to distrust, since the end I now seek
is not action but knowledge.
12. I will suppose, then, not that
Deity,
who is sovereignly good and the fountain
of truth, but that some malignant demon,
who is at once exceedingly potent and
deceitful,
has employed all his artifice to deceive
me; I will suppose that the sky, the
air,
the earth, colors, figures, sounds,
and all
external things, are nothing better
than
the illusions of dreams, by means of
which
this being has laid snares for my credulity;
I will consider myself as without hands,
eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses,
and as falsely believing that I am
possessed
of these; I will continue resolutely
fixed
in this belief, and if indeed by this
means
it be not in my power to arrive at
the knowledge
of truth, I shall at least do what
is in
my power, viz, [ suspend my judgment
], and
guard with settled purpose against
giving
my assent to what is false, and being
imposed
upon by this deceiver, whatever be
his power
and artifice. But this undertaking
is arduous,
and a certain indolence insensibly
leads
me back to my ordinary course of life;
and
just as the captive, who, perchance,
was
enjoying in his dreams an imaginary
liberty,
when he begins to suspect that it is
but
a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires
with the agreeable illusions that the
deception
may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord,
fall back into the train of my former
beliefs,
and fear to arouse myself from my slumber,
lest the time of laborious wakefulness
that
would succeed this quiet rest, in place
of
bringing any light of day, should prove
inadequate
to dispel the darkness that will arise
from
the difficulties that have now been
raised.
|
Evans Experientialism 
