Peter Durigon’s thesis is truly excellent. On the whole issue of abstractions (the Ideas, the Forms, the real independent existence of abstractions) versus nominalistic pointing and saying “This” or “This” or “This” . . . . , he has very clearly delineated in Plato’s Sophist through Heidegger’s commentary PLATO’S SOPHIST, while saying he is not making a judgment of how valid Heidegger’s commentary is as a true reflection of Plato’s actual thought – which I think is dodging the issue because so far he has shown that Heidegger has thoroughly grasped the problematic Plato, as an honest person, has found himself within, in the conflict between the “earth born,” the practical, at-hand people, that its only real if you can see and handle it (however, time steps in as constant change so what is an identity now is and cannot be the same identity later) – and the “friends of the Forms” who say only the unchanging Forms can make knowledge valid and meaningful since an identity remains itself through time. Durigon shows that Plato “like a child” seeing the obvious absurdity of either position by itself cries out that BOTH must be correct somehow because that is the only way our experience literally works. This is how things actually are dealt with (phenomenological description of actual passive and active experience/intellection) and cannot be got around through either extreme position which, to exist, must ignore a facet of actual human activity.


I must admit when I read the Sophist itself and then Heidegger’s PLATO’S SOPHIST I completely and utterly did not get the point. I have still much work to do. But Durigon’s thesis relates not only directly to our discussion about abstractions, and the middle compromise position we both seem to think is necessary, but relates that directly to Plato’s And Heidegger’s concept of “being.” I have always had a high regard for Heidegger’s 1924 lecture series but concentrated far too much on the first part dealing with Aristotle because 1) it was so clear about fundamental problems and approaches to Aristotle, but 2) Heidegger seemed to emphasize the importance of Aristotle far over Plato, and other scholars have said exactly the same thing. Now I know this is completely wrong. Heidegger may disagree with Plato on the precise process of deriving an abstraction from an individual (and I think he analyses this very carefully somewhere in the Nietzsche lectures?), but I think Heidegger’s secret appropriation of the entire Neoplatonic tradition and translation of it into his own terms that no one recognizes as coming from Plato and the Neoplatonics because A) he supposedly rejected Plato, and B) no one really has read the Neoplatonic texts in relation to Heidegger. Supposedly Durigon does that. The teacher he wrote his thesis for John M. Dillon is a great expert on the Neoplatonic tradition. It is his translation of Proclus’ commentary on the PARMENIDES I am reading now and he has written a great book on Iamblichus also. But he he seems to know NOTHING of Heidegger!