The Consolation of Boethius
by Sanderson Beck
1 She had spoken and was turning the direction
of the speech toward handling and explaining
other subjects.
Then I said, "Your encouragement is
in fact correct and absolutely most worthy
of your responsibility, but what you just
now said about providence being a question
complicated by many other things I am experiencing
in reality. For I am asking whether you think
chance is anything at all and what it is."
Then she said, "I am in a hurry to pay
off the debt of the promise and open up for
you the way by which you may go back home.
But these things though very useful to have
acknowledged nevertheless for a little while
are averse from the trail of our purpose,
and there is a concern lest tired out by
side-trips you may not be capable of traversing
the straight journey."
"Have absolutely no concern for that,"
I said; "for instead it might be a rest
for me to understand that by which I am most
charmed. At the same time, when the flank
of your argument might be established by
every undoubted belief, none of the consequences
may be argued."
Then she said, "I will humor you,"
and at the same time the beginning was as
follows: "If in fact," she said,
"one may define chance to be some event
produced by accidental movement and by no
connection of causes, I would confirm chance
to be nothing at all and except for an indication
of the subject matter I would determine it
to be an absolutely empty word. For with
God confining all things in order can there
be any place left for randomness?
"For it is a true sentence that nothing
arises out of nothing, which none of the
ancients ever opposed, though they might
not lay it down as a working principle but
as a subject of the material as if this were
a kind of foundation of all reasonings about
nature.
"But if something should arise from
no causes at all, it will seem to be arisen
from nothing; but if this is unable to arise,
it is not possible for chance at any rate
to be like this which we defined a little
before."
"What then," I asked, "is
there nothing which can rightly be called
either chance or accidental? Or is there
something, even though the crowd may miss
it, for which such words may be appropriate?"
"My Aristotle," she said, "defined
it in his Physics both briefly and by reason
near the truth."
"In what way?" I asked.
"Whenever," she said, "something
is managed for the sake of some matter and
something other than what was intended from
the purposes happens it is called chance,
as if someone in digging the ground for the
purpose of cultivating a field should come
upon a mass of buried gold.
"Then this is believed to have happened
by accident, not from nothing it is true,
for it has its own causes, whose unforeseen
and unexpected coincidence seems a chance
occurrence. For if the cultivator was not
digging the field's ground, if the depositor
had not buried his money in that place, the
gold would not have been discovered.
"So these are the causes of the accidental
saving, which comes about from the causes
exposed to it and flowing together with it,
not from the intention of the one managing
it.
"For neither the one who buried the
gold nor the one who cultivated the field
intended that this money should be discovered,
but, as I said, it coincided that what the
former buried the latter dug up, and so it
concurred.
"So it is all right to define chance
to be an unexpected event from causes flowing
together in these which are managed for the
sake of something else. While that order
makes causes concur and so flow together
proceeding from the inevitable connection
which descending from the source of providence
arranges all things in their places and times.
I "In Persian rock cliffs, where turned
on one following a fugitive shoots aggressive
darts in their breasts, Tigris and Euphrates
release themselves from one source and soon
disunite into unjoined waters. If they should
combine course and return again into one,
each shoal's stream which draws may flow
together, ships and trunks plucked by the
river come together and the mixed stream
may entwine accidental ways; nevertheless
the very steepness of chance's earthy abyss
and the order of the falling flow guide these
wanderings. Thus luck which seems to float
with reins surrendered submits to bridles
and goes itself by law."
2 "I am paying attention," I said,
"and agree that it is just as you say.
But in this sequence of causes clinging to
itself is there any freedom for our judgment
or does the fatal chain constrain the very
movements of human souls too?"
"There is," she said; "nor
could there be any rational nature unless
freedom of judgment should support the same.
For whatever by reason can use it naturally
has the judgment by which it may discern
each one; by itself then it may distinguish
avoiding or choosing. Truly everyone seeks
what one judges one to be choosing, while
one shuns what one evaluates one is avoiding.
"Therefore reason belongs in the very
ones in which the freedom of willing and
of refusing also belong, but I am not establishing
that this is equal in all. For in celestial
and divine substances there is both sharp
judgment and uncorrupted will and the effective
power of the readily chosen.
"While human souls must in fact be more
free when they keep themselves in contemplation
of divine mind, while less when they fall
out toward bodies, and even less when they
may be compressed in earthly limbs; while
the last is slavery when addicted to vices
they have fallen from the possession of their
own reason.
"For when they have lowered their eyes
from the light of the highest truth to lower
and dark things, soon they become misty from
a cloud of ignorance, are disturbed by ruinous
moods, in which approaching and agreeing
they encourage slavery which has been brought
on themselves and are in a way captured by
their own freedom.
"Nevertheless that intuition discerns
from the eternal the whole of providence
which is watching and arranges everything
predestined by their merits.
II "'It oversees all and listens to
all,' sings Homer with the honey-flow of
the mouth about the bright sun with its clear
light; nevertheless the weakness of its rays
is not able to break through with light the
innermost bowels of the earth or of the sea.
"Not so the creator of this great world:
for this one watching all from heaven none
blocks it with a pile of earth, nor does
night obstruct it with black clouds; what
may be, what might have been and may come
in one stroke of the mind it discerns; because
it alone looks back at everything you could
call it the true sun."
3 Then I said, "Look, again I am confused
by more difficult ambiguity."
"What is that?" she asked. "Of
course I am already guessing by which things
you may be upset."
"It seems,' I said, "to oppose
and so disagree too much for God to foreknow
the universe and for freedom's judgment to
exist for anyone. For if God foresees all
and cannot in any way be mistaken, what providence
has foreseen to be the future must result.
"Therefore if from eternity it foreknows
not only the actions of humans but also the
deliberations and wishes, there will be no
freedom of judgment; for neither any other
action nor any will whatever could exist
except what an infallible divine providence
might have preconceived.
"For if things were able to be turned
aside differently from how they are foreseen,
the foreknowledge of the future will not
already be sure, but opinion rather is uncertain;
which to believe about God I judge is wrong.
"For I do not approve of that argument
by which some believe themselves able to
unloose this question's knot. For they say
the reason why the future of events exists
is not because providence has foreseen it
to be, but on the contrary rather because
what the future is cannot escape the notice
of divine providence and by that method this
must fall back on the opposite side.
"For they say it is not necessary for
that which is foreseen to happen, but it
is necessary that future things are to be
foreseen--- as if truly which may be the
cause of which thing, whether foreknowledge
is the work of necessity's futures or necessity
the work of providence's futures, and so
should we not press on to demonstrate that,
howsoever the order of the causes may hold
itself the result of the foreknown matters
is necessary even if foreknowledge of the
resulting does not seem to impose necessity
on future matters.
"And in fact if someone should sit,
the opinion which infers that one is sitting
must be true; and so again from the converse,
if concerning someone the opinion be true
because one sits, one must be sitting.
"Then it is necessary in both cases,
in this fact of the sitting, but certainly
in the other of its truth. But not for this
reason is someone sitting because the opinion
is true, but rather this is true because
someone sitting has preceded. So though the
cause of the truth may proceed from another
side, nevertheless a common necessity belongs
to both.
"It is similarly evident to argue this
about providence and future matters. For
even if for this reason they are foreseen
because they are future things, truly the
reason they result is not because they are
foreseen, nonetheless either the things coming
must be foreseen by God or the things foreseen
must result as foreseen, which alone is adequate
for destroying freedom of judgment.
"Now really how absurd it is that the
result of temporal matters is said to be
the cause of eternal foreknowledge! What
other reason is there to think that God foresees
future things because they are about to result
than to suppose that what has happened only
once is the cause of that highest providence?
"Besides, just as when I know what is
it itself must be so when I have learned
what the future is it itself must be the
future; so it arises then that the result
of the foreknown matter could not be avoided.
"Finally if someone should think that
something is different from the reality it
has itself, it is not only not knowledge,
but it is a false opinion very much different
from true knowledge.
"Therefore if what is such a future
that its result may not be certain and so
necessary, how could it be foreknown that
it is to result? For just as knowledge itself
is impervious to falsity so that which is
conceived by it also cannot be conceived
otherwise.
"For indeed the reason why knowledge
should be free from deception is because
it must have such a reality as this by itself
so that the knowledge comprehends that it
has it by itself.
"What then, in what way does God foreknow
these uncertain future things? For if it
thinks coming things inevitable which it
is actually possible may not result, it is
mistaken; which it is not only wrong to feel
but even to mention aloud.
"But if accordingly it determines future
things to be just as they are such that it
may recognize equally whether they are to
arise or possibly not arise, what foreknowledge
is this, which comprehends nothing certain,
nothing stable? Or does this refer to that
ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias
'Whatever I may say either will be or not'?
"Also how would divine providence be
better than opinion if like humans it judges
things uncertain whose result is uncertain?
But if with that most certain source of all
things nothing can be uncertain, certain
is the result of these which that might have
foreknown firmly as future things.
"Therefore there is no freedom in human
deliberations and actions, which the divine
mind foreseeing all things without the error
of falsity binds to the one and constrains
the result.
"Once this is accepted it is clear how
much the downfall of human matters follows.
For in vain are rewards or penalties set
before the good and bad, which no free or
voluntary movement of souls has earned, and
what now is judged most fair will seem most
unfair of all, either to punish the dishonest
or reward the honest, whose own will does
not emit one or the other but necessity compels
the certainties of the future.
"Then neither vices nor virtues would
be anything, but rather there would be a
mixed and so indiscriminate confusion of
all merits; also nothing more wicked can
be contrived, since every order of things
should be drawn from providence and nothing
should be permitted to human deliberations,
it arises that our vices too should be traced
back to the author of all goods.
"Then there is no reason in either hoping
for or praying to avert anything; for what
would anyone either hope for or even pray
to avert when an inflexible sequence connects
all the things being chosen?
"Taken away then is that unique commerce
between humans and God, evidently of hoping
for and praying to avert, if in fact for
the price of fair humility we deserve the
inestimable recompense of divine grace; which
is the only way by which humans seem able
to converse with God and join with that inaccessible
light before they too should obtain it themselves
by means of praying.
"If in having accepted the necessity
of future things these may be believed to
have none of the powers, what will there
be by which we could connect and so adhere
to that highest principle of things? Therefore
it will be necessary for the race of humans,
just as you were singing a little before,
to crack having been separated and so removed
from its source.
III "What discordant cause released
the agreements of things? What God established
such wars between two truths so that what
at different points may exist as single the
same mixed should refuse to be coupled?
"Or is there no discord between the
truths and do they always cohere with themselves
definitely, but is the mind covered over
by the blind body parts unable by the fire
of suppressed light to recognize the thin
grip of things?
"But why does it burn with such love
to discover the hidden signs of truth? Does
it know what troubles it is desiring to learn?
But why does it work to know the signs?
"Or if it is ignorant, why does it seek
blindly? For who unaware would wish for anything?
Or who could pursue the unknown or where
would one come upon it? Who ignorant could
recognize the discovered form?
"Or when it perceives the deep mind
does it know alike the highest and the single,
now built by the cloud of body parts has
it not on the whole forgotten itself and
losing the sum holds the individual?
"Then whoever searches for truths is
in neither condition; for one does not know
nor yet is one thoroughly ignorant of everything,
but retaining the highest which it remembers
one deliberates from above reconsidering
the visions, so that one could add the forgotten
parts to the ones preserved."
4 Then she said, "Old is this complaint
about providence Cicero when he distributed
'Divination' eagerly ridiculed, and the matter
was questioned absolutely by you yourself
long and often, but not by any means has
it been explained by any of you thus far
diligently and powerfully enough.
"The cause of such mist is that the
movement of human reasoning is not able to
apply to the singleness of divine foreknowledge,
which if in any way could be contemplated,
absolutely nothing would remain ambiguous.
So this at last I'll attempt to make clear
and so explain, if before that I deal with
what you set in motion.
"For I am wondering why you should think
that refuting argument less effective which
because it considers foreknowledge not to
be the cause of the necessity for future
matters thinks freedom of judgment not hindered
by foreknowledge.
"For surely you do not draw the argument
of the necessity of future things from anywhere
but from the fact that things which are foreknown
cannot not result?
"If then forethought does not add any
necessity to future matters, which you even
acknowledged a little before, why is it that
the outcome of voluntary matters should be
compelled toward a certain result?
"Now for the sake of argument, so that
you may turn to what should follow, let us
propose that no foreknowledge exists. Then
surely, as many things as pertain to this,
which come from judgment may not be compelled
toward necessity?
"Not at all."
"Let us propose secondly it does exist,
but it imposes nothing of necessity on things;
the same freedom of will, as I believe, will
remain whole and so complete.
"'But,' you may say, 'although foreknowledge
of events is not a necessity for future things,
nevertheless it is a sign they are of necessity
coming.'
"Then in this case, even if there were
no forethought, the outcome of future things
would still be necessary; and in fact every
sign only shows what may be, while it does
not cause what it designates.
"Therefore the previous demonstration
is that nothing happens except out of necessity,
so that it may be apparent that forethought
is a sign of this necessity; otherwise if
the latter does not exist, the former in
fact could not be a sign of that thing which
does not exist.
"While already the proof is established
supported by a strong argument, not from
signs nor from evidence sought outside but
from agreeing and necessary causes being
drawn.
"But how could it arise that what are
foreseen to be future things may not come
about? Truly it is as if we should believe
that future events do not exist which providence
foreknows do exist, and so instead of that
rather we should think, although they may
result, yet they have had nothing of necessity
in their nature so that they should result.
"What here you may easily weigh will
be allowed: and in fact as long as more subjects
arise we observe them with the eyes, just
as those drivers who perform in chariots
in restraining and turning are watched, and
in this way others also. Surely then necessity
does not compel any of those things to so
occur?"
"Not at all; for the effect of skill
would be in vain if all things should be
moved by compulsion."
"Then since the same things which occur
are free of arising by necessity before they
may occur future things are without necessity.
Therefore there are some things about to
happen whose outcome may be unrestricted
by any necessity.
"For in fact I think there is no one
who will say that what occurs now might not
exist before coming events should occur.
Then even these forethoughts have free results.
"For just as knowledge of present things
brings in of necessity nothing for these
which occur so foreknowledge of future things
brings in of necessity nothing for these
which are coming.
"'But,' you may say, 'this is the very
thing to be doubted whether there could be
any forethought of those things which have
no necessary outcomes.' And as a matter of
fact they seem to disagree, and you think
if they may be foreseen necessity follows,
if necessity ceases very little is foreknown,
and nothing can be grasped by knowledge except
the certain.
"But if outcomes which are uncertain
are foreseen as if they were certain, it
is the mist of opinion, not the truth of
knowledge; for to think a thing should have
anything different from itself you believe
to be opposite from the integrity of knowledge.
"The cause of this error is because
all things which are known which anyone knows
one thinks to be understood so much from
the power and so the nature of themselves.
"But it is the complete opposite; for
everything which is understood is grasped
not according to its own power but rather
according to the ability of those understanding.
"For as may be made clear by this brief
example, in one way sight in another way
touch recognizes the same roundness of a
body; the former staying at a distance looks
at it all at once by the rays it has thrown,
while the latter clinging to the sphere the
connected movement around the circumference
itself also grasps the roundness in parts.
"Also in one way sensation, in another
imagination, in another reason, in another
intelligence observe the same person. For
sensation examines the shape constituted
in the subject matter, while imagination
examines the shape alone without matter;
while reason transcends this too and weighs
by universal consideration the appearance
itself which belongs to the individualities.
"While the eye of intelligence rises
higher; for having surpassed the circumference
of the universal it observes that single
form itself by the clear apprehension of
the mind. In which the greatest consideration
is this: for the higher power of grasping
encircles the lower, while the lower in no
way rises up to the higher.
"For sensation is not able to grasp
anything except matter nor does imagination
observe universal appearances nor does reason
catch the single form; but intelligence as
if looking from above by the conceived form
differentiates all which actually are underneath,
but by this method it grasps the form itself,
which could be known to no other.
"For it understands both the universal
of reason and the shape of the imagination
and sensible material nor is it by using
reason or imagination or the senses, but
by that one stroke of the mind formally,
as I may say it thus, watching all.
"Reason too when it looks back at some
universal using neither imagination nor the
senses grasps the imaginable or the sensible.
For this is what so defines by the universal
of its conception: a human is a rational
two-footed animal.
"This not only may be a universal idea,
but no one is ignorant that the imaginable
and sensible are a reality because that considers
it not in imagination or sense but in a rational
conception.
"Imagination too, even though it has
taken its beginning of seeing and forming
shapes from the senses, nevertheless in the
absence of sense it surveys every sensible
thing not by the sensible but judging by
imagined reason.
"Do you see then that in understanding
all things should use their own ability rather
than those of the things which are understood?
Nor is it wrong; for since every judgment
is an act of the one judging, it is necessary
that everyone should carry out their work
not from another but from one's own capability.
IV "Formerly the Stoics brought forth
old ones too hidden who could believe the
senses and images from bodies outside were
impressed on minds, just as formerly with
a swift pen the practice was to fix pressed
letters on a smooth page which should have
no marks.
"But the mind if thriving with its characteristics
explains nothing with its impulses, but lays
experiencing so much subdued by the marks
of bodies and empty like in a mirror it represents
the images of things, from where does this
idea so thrive in souls discerning all things?
"What power sees through the individuals
or what differentiates the things learned?
What recovers the things differentiated and
selecting one course after another now engages
its head in the highest things now departs
into the lowest, then bringing itself back
to itself refutes the false with the true?
"This is an efficient cause very much
more powerful than that which only experiences
the impressed marks of matter.
"Nevertheless it precedes rousing and
so moving the powers of the soul in the passive
living body when either light strikes the
eyes or the voice makes noise in the ears.
"Then the aroused energy of the mind
holds the appearances which are inside calling
similar ones into motion, attaches them to
marks from outside and inside mingles the
images with the stored away forms.
5 "But if in feeling bodies, however
much otherwise exposed qualities may affect
the instruments of the senses and the body's
experience may precede the energy of the
active soul, which in itself may provoke
the action of the mind and arouse meanwhile
on the inside the dormant forms, if in feeling
bodies, I say, the soul is not distinguished
by the experience, but out of its own power
judges the experience subjected to the body,
how much more do those who are unqualified
by all the moods of the body not follow external
objects in distinguishing, but extricate
the action of their own mind!
"And so by this argument various ideas
might yield to diverse and different means.
For sense alone went to all the other immobile
animals destitute of ideas, such as are the
sea's shellfish and others which are raised
clinging to the rocks; while imagination
is for mobile beasts, in whom some already
seem to be endowed with avoiding and desiring;
while the reason of the human race is so
important just as intelligence alone is of
the divine: thus this idea may be better
than others which by its own nature understands
not only its own but subjects of other ideas
too.
"What then, if sense and imagination
are opposed to reasoning saying that that
from the universal is nothing which reason
may think it contemplates by itself?
"For that which is sensible or imaginable
cannot be universal; then either the judgment
of reason is true and the sensible is not
anything or, since there may be known to
be more subjects in the senses and imagination,
the concept of reason is empty, because it
might consider what should be sensible and
so individual as if they were something from
the universal.
"To this if reason itself should answer
in reply in fact that it perceives both what
may be sensible and what imaginable in the
logic of the whole, while those cannot attain
the understanding of the whole since their
idea could not exceed corporeal shapes, while
concerning the understanding of things it
is rather trusting in stronger and more perfect
judgment: in a dispute like this then should
not we, in whom belongs the power of such
great reasoning as well as of imagining and
also of feeling, rather approve the position
of reason?
"It is similar to how human reason thinks
that divine intelligence does not contemplate
future things except as it understands them
itself. For so you discuss it: If in these
which don't seem to have certain or necessary
results their coming cannot be foreknown
for certain. Then there is no foreknowledge
of these things; if we actually may believe
that to be in these, there will be nothing
that does not happen out of necessity.
"If then just as we are reason's participants
so we could have the judgment of the divine
mind, just as we have judged imagination
and sense ought to yield to reason so we
shall assess it most just for human reason
to submit itself to the divine mind.
"Therefore, if we can, let us rise up
to the summit of that highest intelligence;
for there reason will see what it cannot
contemplate in itself: and that is, where
in a moment even what doesn't have a certain
outcome certain and definite forethought
nevertheless may see, and it would not be
opinion but rather the inclusive singleness
of the highest knowledge with no boundaries.
V "In how many varied shapes do animals
move on the lands! For some are in a stretched
body and sweep the dust and drag a continuous
furrow by the breast's roused force; some
are wanderers for whom the wings' lightness
beats winds and swims in fluid flight in
the vast space of the sky; and some like
to press these footprints only on steps either
to pass over green plains or to go under
forests.
"Though you may see all differ in various
forms, yet sense is able to weigh downward
the stupid faces; the unique race of humans
lifts the lofty summit higher and stands
in an easy upright body and looks down on
lands.
"This figure advises, unless earthly
you fool with evil: You who in an upright
look seek heaven and reveal the front, to
the sublime should bear the soul too, lest
weighed to the ground the mind should sink
lower than the higher lifted body.
6 "Then since, as was shown a little
before, everything which is known is understood
not from its own nature but from comprehending,
let us examine now as much as possible what
may be the condition of the divine substance,
so that we could also recognize what its
knowledge may be.
"Then that God is eternal is the judgment
by the common reason of all peoples. Then
let us consider what eternity may be; for
this will make clear to us at once divine
nature and knowledge. Then eternity is at
once the total and perfect possession of
interminable life. This is more clearly evident
from comparison of the temporal.
"For whatever lives in time that present
proceeds from the past into the future and
nothing is established in time which could
embrace at once the entire space of its life,
but in fact it does not yet apprehend tomorrow
while it has already lost yesterday; in life
today too you do not live more fully than
in that passing and transitory moment.
"Then what submits to the condition
of time, that may, just as Aristotle supposed
about the universe, never begin to be nor
does it cease and its life is extended in
the infinity of time, nevertheless it is
not yet such that it rightly may be believed
to be eternal. For not all at once is it
permitted to comprehend and so grasp the
space of infinite life, but the future not
yet, it does not have the past already.
"So what comprehends and so possesses
at once the entire fullness of interminable
life, to whom nothing of the future may be
absent nor has anything of the past vanished,
it is rightly asserted to be eternal and
it must be both present in control of itself
to always stand by itself and have present
the infinity of passing time.
"Thus not correctly do some, who when
they hear this universe viewed by Plato,
neither to have had a beginning of time nor
is there to be a failure of conditions, in
this way they think the created universe
is co-eternal with the creator.
"For it is one thing to be led through
interminable life, which Plato attributed
to the universe, another for the presence
of the interminable life to be embraced all
at once, which it is obvious is a characteristic
of the divine mind. Nor should God be seen
as older than the created things in the amount
of time but rather in the property of a single
nature.
"For that infinite movement of temporal
things imitates this state of the present
immobile life, and since it could not represent
and so equal it, from immobility it falls
into movement, from singleness of the present
it degenerates into the infinite quantity
of the future and so the past, and since
it is unable to possess all at once the fullness
of its life, this by itself which in some
way never ceases to be that to some it seems
to emulate what it cannot fulfill and so
express binding itself to whatever presence
of this brief and fleeting moment, which
since it carries a certain image of that
remaining presence, with whatever it has
touched it stands out so that they seem to
be.
"While since it could not remain, the
infinite march of time took hold of it and
the action from that method is that it might
continue the same life the fullness of which
it has not been able to embrace by enduring.
And so if we wish to apply worthy names to
things, following Plato let us say that God
is in fact eternal, while the universe is
perpetual.
"Since then every judgment comprehends
according to its nature things which are
subject to it, it is moreover with God always
an eternal and so an immediate state; knowledge
too having surpassed every motion of that
time remains in the singleness of its present
and embracing the infinite spaces of the
past and future it contemplates all things
as if they were already produced in its single
cognition.
"And so if you wish to consider the
foreseeing by which it distinguishes all,
you will more correctly evaluate it not to
be foreknowledge as if of the future but
knowledge of a never failing presence. Thus
it is called not foreseeing but rather providence,
because established far from things below
it may watch all as if from the eminent summit
of things.
"Why then do you claim that necessary
things should arise which are illuminated
by divine light, since humans in fact may
not cause necessary things to be which they
may see? For your having observed the present
which you perceive surely does not add any
necessity to them, does it?"
"Not at all."
"Yet if the worthy comparison is of
the divine and the human present, as you
see certain things in this your temporary
present so that perceives all things in its
eternal one. Therefore this divine forethought
does not change the nature and property of
things and looks at the presence of such
things with itself even as future things
one day come about.
"Nor does it confuse the judgments of
things and with one observation of its mind
it distinguishes coming things whether by
necessity or not by necessity, just as when
you see at once a person walk on land and
the sun rise in the sky, even though both
are observed at the same time nevertheless
you distinguish them and decide the former
is voluntary and the latter necessary.
"So then divine observation looking
through all does not at all disturb the quality
of things which are present in fact with
itself while future in regard to the arrangement
of time. Thus this may not be opinion but
rather an idea based on truth, since it understands
what is to exist which the same is not unaware
of existing free of necessity.
"At this point if you should say that
what God sees is about to happen cannot not
result, and that what cannot not result occurs
out of necessity, and should bind me to this
name of necessity, I'll admit in fact the
matter is of the most solid truth, but it
is one which hardly any explorer has approached
except by the divine.
"For I'll answer that the same future
when it is referred to the divine idea seems
necessary, while when it is weighed in its
own nature it seems absolutely free and so
released.
"As a matter of fact there are two necessities,
one single, for instance that all humans
must be mortal, the other conditional, as
when you may know someone is walking he must
be walking. For what everyone has learned
is unable to be otherwise than what is known,
but the latter condition does not imply that
the other former one is simple.
"For it does not cause this necessity
by its own nature but by the addition of
a condition; for no necessity compels the
one stepping by will to march, although whenever
one is stepping it may be necessary at that
time to march.
"Then in the same way, if providence
sees what is present, it must be even though
it may have no necessity in nature. Yet God
observes these future things as present which
come out of the freedom of judgment; then
these necessary results arise according to
divine observation through the arrangement
of the divine idea, while considered through
themselves they do not abandon the absolute
freedom of their nature.
"Then beyond doubt all things which
God foreknows to be the future will arise,
but some of them do originate from free judgment,
which although they may come out by existing
nevertheless they do not lose their own nature
in which before they arose they could not
even come out.
"To what then does it refer that things
are not necessary, since on account of the
arrangement of divine knowledge by all the
means of necessity the appearance comes out?
This of course is why that which I proposed
a little before, the sun rising and the stepping
person, which while arising cannot not arise,
nevertheless one of them was existing by
necessity even before it has arisen, while
the other not at all; so too what God has
present beyond doubt exists, but some of
those things in fact result from necessity
while others result from the power of doing.
"Then this we said was not wrong if
they be referred to the divine idea they
are necessary, if they be considered through
themselves they are released from the bonds
of necessity, just as everything which is
exposed to the senses if you should refer
to reason is universal, if to itself you
may regard them as individual.
"'But if it is in my power,' you may
ask, 'to change the planned situation, I'll
avoid providence, since what that foreknows
I shall have bravely changed.'
"I'll answer that you can in fact turn
aside your plan, but since the present truth
of providence observes both that you can
and whether or not you may do it or change
it you cannot evade divine foreknowledge,
just as you could not escape observation
of a present eye although by free will you
might turn to various actions.
"'What then,' you may ask, 'will divine
knowledge be changed from my arrangement,
so that when I may want now this now that
that too may seem to alter the changing conditions
of knowing?'
"Not at all. For divine observation
anticipates every future, and it turns them
back and so recalls them to the presence
of its own knowledge; it does not alter,
as you think, now this now the other by the
alternating of foreknowing, but remaining
in one glance it comes before and so embraces
your changes.
"God is assigned this omnipresence of
comprehending and seeing not from the result
of future things but from its own singleness.
From this that too is resolved which you
proposed a little before, that it is unworthy
if our future is said to provide a cause
of God's knowledge.
"For this power of knowledge by an immediate
idea embracing all has itself established
the method for all things, while it owes
nothing to posterior things. Which since
they may be so, the freedom of judgment for
mortals remains undefiled, nor do the laws
set forth rewards and penalties unfairly
for wills freed from every necessity.
"Also God remains a foreknowing observer
of all from above and the ever present eternity
of its vision concurs with the future quality
of our actions dispensing rewards to the
good and punishments to the bad. Neither
are the hopes nor prayers placed in God in
vain, which when they are right cannot be
ineffective.
"Then reject vices, cultivate virtues,
lift up your soul to right hopes, offer to
the heights humble prayers. Great is the
necessity of honesty indicated for you, if
you are not to deceive with appearances,
since you do all before the eyes of a discerning
judge.
THE END
Notes to Book 5:
1: Aristotle, in his Physics II, 3, defines
the material, formal, efficient, and final
causes of things.
II: The Homer quote is said of the sun in
the Iliad III, 277 and in the Odyssey XI,
109.
3: Horace (65-8 BC) makes fun of the legendary
soothsayer Tiresias in his Satires II, 5.
4: The Roman statesman and prolific writer
Cicero (106-43 BC) discussed providence in
his Divination II, 8.
IV: The Stoics, named after the porch in
Athens where Zeno of Citium taught in the
early third century BC, recognized the impressions
of the senses and imagination and attempted
to rise above them.
6: Aristotle discusses whether the heavens
and the universe are eternal in book I of
On the Heavens, concluding that only the
ungenerated can be eternal.
6: Plato's ideas on the eternity of the universe
can be found in the Timaeus 28 and 37.
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Evans Experientialism 
