The Consolation of Boethius
by Sanderson Beck
When with dignity of expression and a serious
face Philosophy recited this service gently
and pleasantly, then I not yet having forgotten
the depth of sorrow inside broke off something
she was still intending to say and said,
"O foreseer of true light, which right
up to now your speech has shed the unconquered
have been evident not only by their divine
observation but by your arguments, and these
even if recently forgotten because of the
pain of the wrong to me nevertheless you
have not spoken of what was completely unknown
previously.
"But this itself is even the greatest
cause of our grief which, when a good guide
of things should emerge, either evils could
not exist at all or they may escape unpunished;
you should certainly consider with so much
surprise that it alone may be fitting.
"Yet to this another even greater is
attached; for by commanding and prospering
worthlessness virtue not only lacks rewards,
but is even subject to being trampled under
the feet of the wicked and pays the punishment
in place of the criminals. For it to happen
in the reign of God the all-knowing, the
all-powerful, but willing only good no one
can either wonder or complain enough."
Then she said, "And it would be of infinite
bewilderment and more terrible with all monstrous
things if, as you estimate, in such as in
the most arranged home of the master of an
estate the cheap dishes might be cherished,
the expensive trashed. But it is not so;
for if these which were concluded a little
before are preserved undestroyed, from the
very originator of whose reign we are now
speaking you understand in fact goods always
are powerful, while bads always are contemptible
and so helpless, neither is vice ever to
be without penalty nor virtues without reward;
to the good happiness always comes, to the
bad misfortune and many things of that kind,
which with your complaints calmed it may
corroborate in firm solidity.
"And since the form of true happiness
you have just now seen from my demonstrating,
you have also recognized where it may be
situated, from all the maneuvers which I
think necessary to precede the proven way
that brings you back to your home. Also I
may fasten wings to your mind by which it
could lift itself into heaven, so that with
confusion removed you may return safe into
your country by my guidance, my path, and
my vehicles.
I "In fact swift wings are mine which
climb the heights of the pole; which when
the quick mind has put on for itself it looks
down on detested lands, rises above the globe
of vast atmosphere and sees the clouds left
behind and which is warmed by the agile motion
of the sky, passes beyond the peak of fire,
until it may rise into the home of the stars
and join the ways of the sun or it follows
the route of the old in the cold, the soldier
of the shimmering constellation or wherever
sparkling night is pictured recurs the orbit
of stars and so when it might already be
exhausted enough it may leave the farthest
pole and press the ridges of the fast sky
in control of the respected light. Here the
master of kings holds the scepter and regulates
the reins of the orbit and steady it steers
the flying car, the shimmering arbiter of
things. If the way should bring you back
returned here which now forgetful you request,
'These I remember,' you will say, 'the country
is mine, from this source, here I stand firm.'
But if it should please you to visit the
night of earthly things left behind, you
will perceive grim dictators exiled whom
the wretched peoples fear."
2 Then I said, "Wow, what greatness
you promise! Not that I doubt you could accomplish
it, and don't delay what you have just excited."
"Then first," she said, "you
should recognize that power always supports
the good, the bad are devoid of all strengths;
in fact each of these is explained from the
other. For since good and bad should be opposites,
if power consisted of being good the helplessness
of the bad is evident, or if the fragility
of bad should be clear the firmness of good
is noted. But so that confidence in our opinion
may be more abundant, I may proceed by both
paths now from here then from there confirming
the propositions.
"There are two things, in which every
effect of human actions is established, will,
of course, and power, of which if one or
the other has been left off, there is nothing
which can be accomplished. For in lacking
will no one in fact undertakes what is not
picked, but if power be absent the will may
be in vain. Thus, if you should see that
one wishes to attain what may not be attained,
you cannot doubt one has been missing the
ability for obtaining this which one has
wanted."
"It is clear," I said, "and
in no way can it be doubted."
"While if you should see someone has
accomplished what one has wanted, surely
you will not actually doubt one to have been
able?"
"Not at all."
"Truly everyone is rated effective in
that which one can do, while one is helpless
in this which one cannot."
"I admit it," I said.
"Then do you remember," she asked,
"that it was inferred from the preceding
arguments that every intention of human will,
which is acted on by various pursuits, accelerates
toward happiness?"
"I remember," I said, "that
to be proven too."
"Surely you may recall that the good
is happiness itself and in this way, since
happiness is sought, the good is desired
by everyone?"
"I recall," I said, "since
I hold it fixed in memory."
"Then all humans, good and bad alike,
by indistinguishable intention are striving
to come to the good?"
"Accordingly," I said, "it
is logical."
"But it is certain they become good
by attainment of the good?"
"It is certain."
"Then do the good attain what they desire?"
"So it seems."
"While if the bad should attain what
they desire, the good, they could not be
bad."
"So it is."
"Then since both may seek the good,
but these in fact should attain it, while
those do not, surely it is not doubted that
the good are in fact powerful, while the
ones who are bad should be helpless?"
"Whoever doubts it," I said, "can
consider neither the nature of things nor
the logic of arguments."
"Again," she said, "if there
be two for whom the same purpose may be second
nature, and one of them by a natural function
should act and complete the thing itself,
while the other cannot manage that natural
function, but by another method which is
not suited to nature in fact should not fulfill
one's purpose but is imitating the fulfilling,
which of these do you determine is more capable?"
"Even if I infer," I said, "what
you want, nevertheless I long to hear it
more plainly."
"Surely you will not deny," she
said, "that the motion of walking is
second nature for humans?"
"Not at all," I said.
"And surely you do not doubt that feet
are the natural function of that?"
"Not in this case," I said.
"If someone then with feet is able to
advance walking and another, who lacking
this natural function of the feet, is attempting
to walk leaning on the hands, which of these
can be considered rightly more capable?"
"Devise other riddles," I said,
"for no one could argue but that the
one with the power of the natural functions
should be more capable than the same."
"But the highest good, which is equally
the purpose of the bad and good the good
in fact seek by the natural function of virtues,
while the bad through a different desire,
which is not the natural function for attaining
the good, are attempting to attain the very
same; or do you consider it otherwise?"
"No," I said, "for even what
is following is obvious. For out of this
which I should have conceded it is necessary
that the good in fact are powerful, while
the bad are helpless."
"You anticipate it correctly,"
she said, "and, as doctors are accustomed
to hope, the indication is now of a nature
uplifted and resistant. But since I am perceiving
you to be understanding most readily, I shall
accumulate crowded arguments; for look how
obvious the weakness of vicious humans may
be, who cannot even come to this to which
their nature leads and intention almost compels
them.
"And what if they were deprived of going
forward with so great and nearly invincible
assistance of nature? Truly consider how
much impotence the wicked humans should have.
For neither easy nor sporting are the rewards
they seek which it follows also they could
not obtain, but concerning the very highest
and top of things they fail and from that
in miseries success is not reached for which
alone the days and nights are working; in
which thing the strengths of goods excel.
"For if one who is advancing on foot
toward that place up to which one could have
arrived beyond which lay nothing accessible
to attack you would consider that one to
be most capable of walking, so the one who
takes hold of the goal of aiming beyond which
is nothing you must judge is most capable.
Thus, what is opposite to this, seeing that
it is the same for the wicked they seem to
be abandoned by all the strengths.
"For why having been left by virtue
do they chase vice? Is it ignorance of the
goods? But what is weaker than the blindness
of ignorance? Or have they known chasing,
but does lust throw them across? So too is
excess fragile, which cannot struggle against
vice.
"Or do the knowing and willing desert
the good and turn aside to vice? But in this
way they abandon not only being capable,
but being entirely; for they too equally
stop being who abandon what is the common
goal of all who are.
"It may in fact seem rather strange
to some that we should say the bad, who are
the majority of humans, that these same ones
do not exist; but the reality in themselves
has it so. Now I am not denying those who
are bad are the bad ones, but I do plainly
and simply deny that these exist.
"For though you might say a corpse is
a dead person, you simply could not really
call it a person, so I might concede that
the vicious are in fact bad, but I cannot
confess they exist completely. For it is
what retains order and preserves nature;
while what defects from this being, which
is situated in its nature, also abandons
it.
"But they are capable, you say, of bad;
I would not even deny it, but this power
of theirs comes not from strengths but from
helplessness. They can do bad things, which
they would not have been able to do if they
could have stayed in the effectiveness of
goods. Which capability shows more clearly
they can do nothing; for if, as we inferred
a little before, the bad is nothing, since
they could do only bad things, it is evident
the dishonest can do nothing."
"It is clear."
"And so that you may understand what
the strength of this power may be: we have
defined a little before nothing to be more
powerful than the highest good."
"So it is," I said.
"But the same," she said, "is
unable to do bad."
"No."
"Is there then," she asked, "anyone
who thinks that humans can do everything?"
"Unless someone may be insane, no one."
"And yet the same can do bad."
I said, "I wish in fact they couldn't!"
"Then since only one capable of goods
could do everything, while those capable
of evils still could not do everything, it
is obvious those who can do evils can do
less. Moreover we have indicated that all
power among aims being counted and all aims
are to be referred to the good as to a kind
of summit of their natures. But the possibility
of committing a crime cannot be referred
to the good; then it is not aiming. Yet all
power is aiming; then it is evident the capability
of evils is not power.
"Out of all these the power of goods
is fact, while the weakness of evils appears
not doubtful at all, and that true sentence
of Plato is evident that it is the wise alone
who can do what they may desire, truly the
dishonest in fact practice what may please,
while they cannot fulfill what they desire.
"For they do what pleases, as long as
they think through things in which they delight
they will attain for themselves the good
which they desire; but they are not attained,
because abuses do not come to happiness.
II "Those eminent kings you see sitting
on a lofty throne, bright in gleaming purple,
walled in with sad weapons, threatening from
a grim face, panting in the heart's fury,
if someone should take away from the arrogant
the vain's cultured covering, then one will
see inside masters bearing tight chains;
for here lust twists hearts with greedy poisons,
here troubled anger raising a flood whips
the mind, captured grief either tires or
slippery hope tortures. So when you may perceive
one head bear so many tyrants, it does not
do what it chooses itself, oppressed by unjust
masters.
3 "Do you see then in how much filth
abuses are maintained, by which light honesty
may shine? In this it is clear never are
rewards for the good missing, never for the
wicked their punishments. And as a matter
of fact of the things which are produced
that reward can not seem to be wrong on account
of which everyone of the same is produced,
as with running in the stadium the garland
is the reward for which one is running.
"But we have indicated happiness is
the same good itself for which all things
are produced; then it is for human actions
the good itself just as if the proposed reward
is in common. And yet this cannot be separated
from the good ones--- for besides the one
who may be missing the good will not be rightly
called good---; therefore honest morals do
not forsake their rewards.
"Then however much the bad may rage,
nevertheless the garland of the wise does
not fall off, does not dry up; nor does dishonesty
by another pluck off personal honor from
honest souls.
"But if one is glad for credit from
outside, this could be taken away either
by someone else or even by the very one who
conferred it; but since honesty confers one's
own on each, then one will lack one's reward
only when one stops being honest.
"Finally, since every reward is desired
for the reason that it is believed to be
good, would someone judge the experienced
in control of a good reward? But of which
reward? The most beautiful and greatest of
all; remember that corollary I emphasized
a little before, and conclude as follows.
"Since happiness should be the good
itself, it is evident that all the good who
should be good become blessed by that itself.
But it is agreed that those who may be blessed
are gods. Then it is the reward of the good
to become gods, which no time may erase,
no power may lessen, no dishonesty may darken.
"Since this should be so, the wise cannot
doubt the inevitable punishment of the bad
too; for since good and bad, like the opposites
of punishment and reward should disagree
broadly, the reward which we see taken in
by the good must match the same penalty opposite
on the side of the bad.
"Then just as honesty itself becomes
a reward for the honest worthlessness itself
is a punishment for the dishonest. While
surely whoever is afflicted by bad does not
doubt oneself to be suffering a penalty.
If then they themselves may be willing to
judge themselves, could they seem to themselves
not free of punishment, which not only afflicts
them with the worst of all evils, worthlessness,
but also actually infects them violently?
"Now from the opposite side of the good
ones look at the penalty which accompanies
the dishonest; for example you learned a
little before that everything which may be
is one and that the one itself is good; from
which it is logical that everything which
may be also may be seen to be good.
"Then in this way whatever defects from
the good ceases to be. Thus the bad should
stop being what they had been. But the form
of the human body still left them proves
that they had been humans; therefore to be
turned into evil is to lose human nature
too.
"But since honesty alone could advance
someone beyond humans, it is necessary that
the ones whom dishonesty throws down from
the human condition it may deservedly push
down below humans; then it turns out that
you could not judge as human one whom you
may see is transformed by vices.
"A violent robber burns from greed of
others' wealth: you might say is like a wolf.
One insolent and so restless exercises the
tongue with quarrels: you will compare to
a dog.
"The hidden ambusher likes to steal
with frauds: and is equal to a little fox.
The intemperate roars with anger: and is
believed to carry about the spirit of a lion.
"The terrified and timid fears things
not to be feared: and may be held like deer.
The lazy and stupid is dumb: and lives as
an ass.
"The trivial and so fickle changes parties:
and is no different from birds. One is immersed
in foul and dirty lusts: and is held back
by the sordid pleasure of swine.
"Thus the one who deserts honesty ceases
to be a person, since one could not change
the condition into the divine, one may be
turned into a beast.
III "The sails of Ithaca's leader and
the wandering rafts on the open sea the east
wind drove to an island, where was residing
a beautiful goddess descended from the seed
of the sun; she mixes for her new guests
potions influenced by song.
"Whereby her herb-powerful hand turns
them into various shapes, the face of a boar
covers this one, that one appears as an African
lion with a fang and claws; here recently
added were wolves while intending to weep
one howls, that one like a tiger from India
gently prowls around the house.
"But although in various misfortunes
the divinity reared in Arcadia pitying the
covered leader released him from the plague
of the hostess, though the crew had already
drunk by the mouth the evil potions; by then
the pigs had turned from cereals to acorn
fodder, and nothing remains intact with voice,
body in ruins.
"The mind alone staying steady bewails
the monsters which suffer. O too slight the
hand and not potent the herbs, which though
they could turn the limbs, are not able to
turn the hearts!
"Inside is the energy of humans established
by a hidden fortress. More powerful are these
dreadful drugs which going deep inside withdraw
the human from oneself and not harmful to
the body they cruelly wound the mind."
4 Then I said, "I acknowledge and see
that it is not wrong to say that the vicious,
although they may preserve the form of the
human body, nevertheless in the quality of
their souls may be changed into beasts; but
that their fierce and wicked mind rages with
the ruin of the good I would have refused
to allow this itself for them."
"It is not allowed," she said,
"as will be shown with an appropriate
argument, but nevertheless, if this itself
should be taken away, which it is believed
is permitted to them, the punishment of wicked
humans would be to a great extent relieved.
In fact, what may seem to anyone as perhaps
incredible, it must be the bad are more unhappy
when they might carry through desires than
when they could not fulfill things which
they desire.
"For if it is wretched to have wanted
the perverse, it is more wretched to have
been able to get it, without which the wretched
will's effect would be weak. And so since
one's own misery may be single, they must
be urged as triply unfortunate whom you may
see willing, able, and performing crime."
"I agree," I said, "but so
that they may be freed soon from this misfortune
of suffering crime I desire strongly that
it to be removed from the ability."
"They will be free of it," she
said, "sooner than either you may wish
perhaps or those may guess themselves to
be freed; for there is nothing in such brief
lives apprehended so late that especially
the immortal soul should think it has to
wait a long time.
"Their great hope and eminent scheme
of crimes often are destroyed by a sudden
and unexpected end, which in fact imposes
a limit on their misery; for if worthlessness
makes them wretched, the longer one is worthless
the more wretched one must be.
"I would judge them to be most unhappy
if final death at least should not finish
their malice; and in fact if we have concluded
truly about the misfortune of depravity,
it is evident that infinite is the misery
which is agreed to be eternal."
Then I said, "At any rate it is a strange
inference and hard concession, but I know
it fits too well with these which previously
were conceded."
"You evaluate it correctly," she
said, "but one who thinks it is reasonable
that it is hard to come to a conclusion either
should point out that something false has
preceded it or show the arrangement of propositions
of the necessary conclusion not to be effective;
otherwise with the preceding concessions
there is absolutely nothing which may excuse
one from the inference.
"For this too which I am going to say
may not seem any less strange, but from these
which are assumed it is equally necessary."
"What?" I asked.
"That the dishonest are happier paying
the punishments than if no penalty of justice
should stick to them. Now I am not devising
what may come into anyone's mind, that perverted
morals be corrected by revenge and be led
away toward the right by fear of punishment,
to be an example to others also fleeing blaming;
but in another way I think the unpunished
dishonest are unhappier, even if no method
of correction is being considered, nor the
respect for example."
"And what other way would it be besides
these?" I asked.
And she said, "Did we not concede that
the good are happy, while the bad are wretched?"
"So it is," I said.
"If then," she said, "something
good may be added to the misery of someone,
is not one happier than the one whose pure
and solitary misery is without any admixture
of good?"
"So it seems," I said.
"But if with the same misery, the one
who may be free from all goods, besides this
by which one is wretched should have something
bad connected to them, is it not agreed that
this one is much more unhappy than the one
whose misfortune is relieved by the participation
of good?"
"Why not?" I asked.
"But for the dishonest to be punished
is just, while to get off unpunished is obviously
unfair."
"Who would deny it?"
"But no one at any rate," she said;
"will deny that what is just is good
and the contrary that what is unjust is bad."
I answered that it is clear.
"Then the dishonest have when they are
punished in fact some connection of the good,
the punishment itself of course, which is
good by reason of the justice, and the same
when they are free of punishment something
extra of the bad belongs to them, the impunity
itself, which in being deserving of adversity
you have confessed is bad."
"I cannot deny it."
"Then of the dishonest presented the
ones unjust by impunity are much more unhappy
than the just ones punished by revenge."
Then I said, "Your consequences from
these are in fact what was concluded a little
before; but I ask you, don't you allow for
any punishments of souls after the body is
discharged by death?"
"Yes, great ones in fact," she
said, "of which some are to be carried
out by severe penalty, while others I think
by purgatorial mercy; but it is not my purpose
to discuss these now.
"While so far we have managed it so
that what will seem to you the most unworthy
power of evils might be understood to be
nothing, and dishonesty's unpunished about
whom you seem to complain never are free
of their punishment, the licentiousness which
you were asking to be soon ended you might
learn is not long and if longer will be more
unhappy, while most unhappy if it should
be eternal; after this more wretched are
the dishonest let go by unjust impunity than
the ones punished by just revenge. With this
sentence it is logical that not till then
may they be oppressed by heavy punishments
when they are believed to be unpunished."
Then I said, "When I consider your arguments,
I think nothing could be said more truly;
but if I should turn back to the judgment
of humans, is there anyone to whom these
things would seem not only believable but
even understandable?"
"So it is," she said. "For
they are unable to lift up eyes accustomed
to the dark to the light of clear truth and
like birds whose sight night illuminates,
day blinds; for as long as they are looking
not at the order of things but at their feelings,
they may think either the license or the
impunity of the wicked is happy.
"But see what eternal law sanctifies.
You might have shaped the soul with better
things: there is no need for a reward from
a conferring judge, you have added yourself
to the more excellent; you might have perverted
study to worse things: you should not look
for an avenger outside, you have thrust yourself
into the inferior--- just as if you should
look back by turns at the sordid earth and
heaven, in discerning by reason all the loiterings
outside yourself you seem to be between now
the mud then the stars.
"But the crowd does not look back at
yours. What then, should we agree with these
whom we have shown are like beasts? What
if someone who utterly lost vision itself
also has forgotten ever having had sight
oneself and thought oneself lacking nothing
for human perfection, surely we the seeing
should not think the same as the blind? For
they do not even acquiesce to that which
equally rests on valid supports of arguments;
unhappier are those who do than those who
suffer injury."
"I should like to hear these very reasons,"
I said.
"Surely you do not deny," she asked,
"that everyone dishonest is deserving
of punishment?"
"Not at all."
"While it is abundantly evident that
those who may be dishonest are unhappy."
"Yes," I said.
"Then you do not doubt that those who
are deserving of punishment are wretched?"
"It is agreed," I said.
"Then if you might be the idle attorney,"
she said, "upon which would you think
of putting the punishment, on the one who
did it or on the one who endured the injury?"
"I would not waver," I said, "but
in making amends to the one who suffered
from the trouble."
"Then to you the bringer of the injury
seems to be more wretched than the receiver."
"It follows," I said.
"Then it appears from this and other
causes resting on this foundation that baseness
makes one wretched by its own nature, the
misery put on anyone injured being not the
recipient's but the perpetrator's."
"It appears so," I said.
"And yet now," she said, "the
speakers do the opposite; for they try to
arouse the pity of the jurors for these who
suffered severely and who are bitter, when
more justly the pity should be for those
committing it; whom should be led to trial
not by the angry but rather by gracious and
pitying accusers as the sick are to the doctor
so that the fault's diseases may be cut short
by treatment.
"By this contract the works of the defenders
either would completely fall flat or if one
would rather be useful to humans it could
be turned into the practice of prosecution.
"The very dishonest too, if it were
possible for them by some crack to catch
sight of abandoned virtue and they could
see themselves laying down the dirt of vices
by the tortures of penalties, from the compensation
of acquiring honesty they would not consider
these to be torture and they would refuse
the work of the defenders and entrust themselves
completely to the prosecutors.
"Thus among the wise absolutely no place
would be left for hatred. For who but the
most foolish would hate the good? While one
does not have any reason to hate the bad.
"For just like the feebleness of bodies
so vice is like a certain disease of souls,
since we should not judge the sick in body
as deserving hatred but rather pity, much
more deserving not being persecuted but being
pitied are the minds whose dishonesty oppresses
by a more dreadful disease than any feebleness.
IV "Why is one glad to excite so much
emotion and to disturb fate with one's own
hand? If you seek death, it is near itself
of its own accord nor does it delay swift
horses. Those a snake, lion, tiger, bear
and boar by a fang attack nevertheless they
themselves attack the same with a sword.
Or is it because morals are diverse and different,
that they provoke unjust battles and cruel
wars and want to perish by one weapon after
another? It is not a just enough reason for
fury. You want to give back merits suitable
in turn: esteem rightly the good and feel
pity for the bad."
5 At this point I said, "I see that
either happiness or misery may be established
in the very merits of the honest and dishonest.
But in this way I find fortune itself to
be in some good people and in some bad; for
no one wise would be an exile, destitute
and degraded rather than strong in business,
respected in honor, effective in power to
prosper permanently in one's city.
"For thus the duty of wisdom is handled
more clearly and publicly, when the happiness
of the ruling is in a way transfused into
the contacting people, especially when prison,
murder, and the other tortures of legal penalties
should be rather for the ruinous citizens
for whom they are actually established.
"Then why these should be turned in
reverse and crimes' punishments should press
on the good, while the bad should snatch
the rewards of virtues, I am very much amazed,
and I long to know from you what reason may
be seen for such confusions of the unjust.
"And in fact I would be less amazed
if I could believe everything to be mixed
up with chance accidents. Now the divine
guide heightens my bewilderment. Since one
may concede that the one who often may assign
delights to the good, the bitter to the bad
and on the contrary the hard to the good,
wishes to the bad, unless the cause is detected,
what is it that seems to differ from chance
accidents?"
"It is no wonder," she said, "if
what is unknown of the order by reason may
be believed accidental and confused; but
although you may be ignorant of the cause
of so great an arrangement, nevertheless,
since a good guide regulates the universe,
you should not doubt that all things happen
correctly.
V "If someone is ignorant of Arcturus
the star sinking near the highest pole, why
the slow Bootes should steer the Great Bear
and sink its late flames into the horizon,
although very quickly it unfolds its rising,
one will marvel at the law of high heaven.
"The unfinished horns of the full moon
become pale by the dark of fearful night,
and the moon uncovers the diffused stars,
which she had covered with her shining face:
public error agitates the nations and they
tire from repeatedly striking cymbals.
"No one wonders at the northwest winds
beating the coast with roaring waves nor
the mass hardened by the snow's cold being
dissolved by the burning heat of the sun.
For here it is easy to discern the causes,
there hidden things disturb the feelings.
"Age promotes all things which are rare,
and the fickle crowd is stunned by sudden
things, but should the cloudy error of ignorance
depart, with progress they cease to seem
strange!"
6 "So it is," I said; "but
since it should be in your duties to unfold
the causes of things hiding and to explain
the reasons veiled by mist, I ask that you
may determine what is here; since this marvel
especially upsets me, you should explain
it in detail."
Then smiling for a moment she said, "By
a question you call me to the greatest matter
of all, on which hardly anything would be
enough to exhaust it. For the matter is such
that one head having been cut off by doubt
countless others like the hydra's grow back;
nor would there be any limit unless someone
should enclose them with the most lasting
fire of the mind.
"For in this one is accustomed to inquiring
about the singleness of providence, about
the sequence of fate, about the chances of
a sudden event, about divine cognition and
predestination, about freedom of decision,
which you weigh yourself how much of a load
they may be.
"But since it is part of your medicine
for you to know some of these too, although
fenced in by a narrow limit of time nevertheless
I'll try to determine some of them. But if
the musical amusements of song delight you,
you should delay this pleasure for a while
until I weave in their order the entwining
arguments."
"As you please," I said.
Then as though starting from another beginning
she examined it as follows: "The generation
of all things and the whole progress of mutable
natures and whatever is moved in any way
draw causes, order and forms out of the stability
of the divine mind.
"This in the regular arc of its singleness
established a manifold method for producing
things. Which method when it is observed
in itself by the purity of divine intelligence,
is named providence; while when it refers
to what moves and so arranges, it is called
by tradition fate.
"It will soon be evident how different
these are if someone might observe mentally
the force of both; for providence is that
very divine reason established in the highest
principle of all which arranges all things,
while fate is the arrangement inherent in
moveable things through which providence
ties everything in its order.
"For providence embraces all things
together however different however infinite,
while fate divides the individual things
distributed in motion with places, forms
and times, so that providence may be this
impotent unfolding of the temporal order
in the perspective of the divine mind, while
the same impotence divided and so unfolded
in times may be called fate.
"Although these may be different, nevertheless
one depends on the other; for the destined
order comes forth out of the singleness of
providence. For just as an artist perceiving
mentally the form of the thing being made
puts in motion the accomplishment of the
work and what one had foreseen simply and
immediately one constructs through the temporal
order, so God by providence in fact arranges
the things being done individually and reliably,
while fate manages variously and temporally
this itself which has been arranged.
"Then whether fate is carried out by
divine spirits in some kind of serving of
providence or by a soul or by all nature
submitting or by the motions of the stars
in the heavens or by angelic virtue or by
the varied skill of spirits whether by some
of these or by all the fatal sequence is
woven, it is certainly obvious that providence
is the unchanging and single form of the
things being produced, while fate is the
changing bond and temporal order of those
which the divine singleness producing them
has arranged.
"Thus all things which are under fate
should be subject to providence too, to which
fate itself is even subject, while some things
which are placed under providence may rise
above the sequence of fate; these truly are
the things which reliably fixed near the
primary divinity exceed the order of destined
mobility.
"For as in the case of circles turning
themselves around the same pole the one which
is innermost goes toward the singleness of
the center and it exists as a kind of pole
of the others placed outside around which
they are turned, while the outermost rotated
in a greater circuit by however much it is
away from the indivisible center point so
much is it extended in a larger space; while
whatever connects and unites itself to that
center is gathered into singleness and ceases
to be diffused and flow away: by a similar
argument whatever goes farther away from
the primary mind is entwined in greater bonds
of fate, and something is so much freer from
fate by however much closer it aims at that
pole of things; but if it should cling to
the firmness of the supernal mind, being
free of the motion of fate it too surpasses
necessity.
"Then as reasoning is to understanding,
that which is produced to that which is,
time to eternity, a circle to the centerpoint,
so is the mobile sequence of fate to the
stable singleness of providence.
"This sequence moves heaven and the
stars, regulates the elements mutually in
themselves and transforms them one after
another by change, the same renews all things
being born and dying through the similar
progress of breeding and procreation.
"This also constrains the actions and
fortunes of humans by the imperishable connection
of causes; which since it originates from
the immovable beginnings of providence, it
is necessary for these to be unchangeable
too.
"Accordingly things are guided best
if the singleness remaining in the divine
mind brings out the unavoidable order of
causes; while this order by its own unchangeableness
should control mutable things or else they
would float about at random.
"Thus, although to us not able to contemplate
this order all things may seem confused and
disordered, nonetheless however its method
may arrange the directing of all things toward
the good.
"For there is nothing which may happen
because of evil nor even from the dishonest
themselves; whom, as is most amply explained,
perverse error diverts the ones looking for
the good, much less would the order profiting
from the pole of the highest good turn aside
anywhere from its beginning.
"'What truly,' you may ask, 'can any
confusion be more unfair than that now set-backs
should affect the good then successes, while
now wishes should affect the bad then hates?'
"Surely then humans do not pass these
with such integrity of mind that those whom
they rate honest or dishonest must also be
as they judge? And yet on this human courts
fight hard, and those whom some think fit
for a reward others think fit for punishment.
"But let us concede that someone could
discern good and bad; surely then one will
not be able to look into that innermost temperature
of souls, just as temperature is usually
told in bodies?
"For it is no less a miracle to the
ignorant why sweet things for instance may
be suited to some healthy bodies while bitter
things may be suited to others, why certain
of the sick are likewise helped by mild things
while others are helped by sharp ones. But
a doctor, who distinguishes the method and
temperament of health itself and so of sickness,
is not surprised by this at all.
"While what else other than honesty
is seen to be the health of souls, what the
sickness other than vice? Who else other
than God the guide and healer of minds is
either preserver of the good or remover of
the bad? When this one who has looked back
out of the deep mirrors of providence, recognizes
what may be proper to each one and has learned
what to apply it accommodates.
"Here already arises that destined distinguishing
marvel of order, when from the knowing is
produced what may astound the ignorant.
"Now considering how few words human
reason is capable of, I'll touch lightly
on divine profundity; about this which you
think is most just and most protective of
equality to the omniscience of providence
it seems different.
"As our familiar Lucan suggested, the
conquering cause pleased the gods, while
the conquered pleased Cato. Then whatever
you may see here short of hope with things
to be produced the order is in fact correct,
while in your opinion it is perverse confusion.
"But someone may be so well mannered
that about him divine and human judgment
may agree together, but in the strengths
of soul he is weak, and if something adverse
should happen to him he might perhaps stop
cultivating the innocence through which he
could not retain fortune: and so a wise dispensation
spares the one whom adversity could make
worse, lest it not be fitting to work for
one who may suffer.
"Another is complete in all the virtues
and holy and so near God: providence judges
it would be so wrong for this one to be touched
by any adversity whatever that he is not
allowed to be agitated by bodily diseases
for instance. For as someone better than
I put it:
'So the ethers build the body of a sacred
man.'
"Moreover it often happens that the
highest guiding of things is conferred upon
the good so that abounding dishonesty may
be checked. To others a certain one distributes
a mixture according to the quality of the
souls: Some she torments lest they be luxuriant
in long happiness; others may be agitated
by hardships so that they may reinforce the
virtues of the soul by the use and exercise
of patience. Some are too afraid of what
they can bear; others look down too much
on what they cannot bear; these she leads
into proof with their sad things.
"Some revering the ages have earned
a name of glory at the price of death; the
impregnable by other sacrifices have held
out a certain example of virtue being unconquered
by evils; there is no doubt how correctly
these may happen and so to whom they seem
to come by arrangement and out of their good.
"For that too is induced out of the
same causes, because now sadness then wishes
come to the dishonest. As to the sad ones
in fact no one is surprised, because everyone
thinks them deserving of bad; whose punishments
in fact then deter others from crimes by
which then they are driven themselves to
improve. While the glad ones speak a great
argument to the good, about how they ought
to judge this kind of happiness which they
should discern often serves the dishonest.
"There is another thing also I believe
to be regulated which is someone's nature
being perhaps so headstrong and insolent
that domestic material poverty could rather
irritate one into crimes; for an illness
of this kind providence heals with the remedy
of collected money.
"Here one viewing the conscience fouled
by abuses and comparing it with one's fortune
perhaps is very alarmed lest the loss of
that of which the use is pleasing be sad;
then one will change morals and so as long
as one is afraid to lose a fortune one forsakes
wrong.
"Happiness shamefully spent has thrown
others into deserved ruin; for some the right
of punishing is permitted so that it might
be a cause of exercise for the good and of
punishment for the bad. For just as there
is no treaty between the honest and dishonest
so among themselves the dishonest are not
able to agree.
"Why not, since with vices tearing apart
the conscience by the selves themselves everyone
disagrees, and they often may do things which
when they may have managed them they may
decide they should not be managing them?
"Out of which that highest providence
often brought forth a distinguishing marvel,
so that the bad might make the bad good.
For while they seem to allow a certain inequality
to themselves from the worst, burning with
hatred of the guilty ones they return to
the fruit of virtue, until they apply themselves
to be unlike those whom they hate.
"For it is divine force alone for which
evils may be goods too; when using them competently
it elicits the effect of something good.
For a certain order embraces all things,
so that what has departed the place assigned
by reason of order this nevertheless falls
back into order, though another one, lest
anything in the realm of providence be left
to chance.
'But it is difficult for me to proclaim all
these things as a god.'
For it is not possible for a human either
with genius to comprehend all the engines
of the divine work or to explain them by
language.
"It may be sufficient to have observed
this enough that the same God, the producer
of all nature, directing all may arrange
them for the good, and while it hastens to
retain this which it has brought forth in
its likeness, it may eliminate through the
sequence of destined necessity all evil from
the boundaries of its republic. Thus what
is believed to abound on earth, if you should
look at the providential arrangement, you
would judge nothing at all to be evil.
"But I have seen for a long time that
you are both overloaded by the weight of
the question and exhausted by the length
of the argument waiting for some poetry's
sweetness; take then a drink by which refreshed
you may strive farther stronger.
VI "If you wish to discern the laws
of the high Thunderer with a clear and clever
mind, focus on the summit of the highest
heaven; there by a fair agreement of matters
the stars preserve the ancient peace.
"The sun roused by red fire does not
obstruct the cold axis of the moon nor does
the Bear which by the world's highest pole
turns its swift movements never washed in
the western deep perceiving other stars to
be sunk desire to dip its flames in the ocean;
always by equal intervals of time does the
evening star announce the late shadows, and
Venus brings back the nourishing day.
"Thus does mutual love restore the eternal
courses; thus discordant war is an exile
of the stellar face.
"This concord regulates the first principles
by equal measures, so that by fighting wet
may by successions yield to dry and cold
things may join faith with flames; a flickering
fire should rise into heaven, and heavy earthly
things by their weight should sink.
"Truly from these causes of warming
the flowery year breathes the odors, summer
heat dries the grain, autumn comes back heavy
with fruit, falling rain irrigates the winter.
"This temperature nourishes and brings
forth whatever breathes life in the world;
the same snatching conceals and takes them
away burying the born in a final death.
"Meanwhile the creator sits on high
and guiding turns the reins of things, king
and master, source and origin, law and wise
judge of the just, and what stirs by angry
emotion it may check drawing it back and
so strengthen the wavering; for unless the
movement recalling the corrected winding
again collected them in cycles, which now
a stable order contains the separated would
be split from their source.
"Here love is common to all, and they
go back to be held by the goal of the good,
because in no other way are they able to
endure unless turned back around by love
the causes which gave them being may flow
again.
7 "By now then do you see what all these
things are which follow from what we have
said?"
"What?" I asked.
"That all fortune," she said, "is
absolutely good."
"And how can that be?" I asked.
"Listen," she said. "Since
all fortune whether pleasant or difficult
is brought about for the sake of at one time
rewarding or disciplining the good at another
punishing or correcting the dishonest, everything
which consists of being either just or useful
is good."
"In fact," I said, "the argument
is very true, and, if I should consider the
providence or fate which was taught a little
before, the sentence rests upon firm strength.
But if it seems good, let us count it among
those which a little before were set down
as inconceivable."
"Why?" she asked.
"Because the common talk of people says
of it, and in fact frequently, that the fortune
of some is bad."
"Do you wish then," she asked,
"that for a little while we should not
go too far from the talk of the crowd as
we would seem to have departed from the experience
of humanity?"
"As it pleases," I said.
"Then don't you consider what is productive
to be good?"
"So it is," I said.
"While what either disciplines or corrects,
is it productive?"
"I admit it," I said.
"Then is it good?"
"Why not?"
"But this is theirs who either set in
virtue wage war against difficulties or turning
aside from vices take the way of virtue."
"I am unable to deny it," I said.
"What about the truly pleasant, which
as a reward is bestowed upon the good, surely
the crowd does not consider it to be bad?"
"Not at all, as it is true so too one
rates it to be the best."
"What about the rest, which since it
may be difficult curbs the bad by just punishment,
surely the people do not think it good?"
"No," I said, "of all which
can be imagined one judges it to be most
wretched."
"Watch out then lest following the opinion
of the people we might formulate something
quite inconceivable."
"What?" I asked.
"For out of these," she said, "which
are conceded it turns out that all the fortune
of those who either are or are in possession
of or are advanced in or are in the attainment
of virtue may be entirely good, while for
those staying in dishonesty all fortune is
the worst."
"This is true," I said, "although
no one would dare confess it."
"Accordingly," she said, "a
wise hero should not become annoyed whenever
struggle is drawn into fortune, just as it
is not proper for a brave hero to be indignant
whenever the tumult of war is noisy.
"For both the difficulty itself is an
opportunity for the latter in fact in extending
glory while for the former in shaping wisdom.
From which even virtue is named, which thriving
on its strengths is not overcome by adversities;
nor have you positioned in the advancement
of virtue come to melting away in delights
and wasting away in pleasure.
"You are engaged in a battle for passions
with every sharp fortune lest either the
sad should oppress you or the pleasant should
corrupt you. Occupy the middle with firm
strengths; whatever either stops lower or
advances beyond has the contempt of happiness,
does not have the reward of labor.
"For in your hands is situated the kind
of fortune you prefer to form for yourself;
for everything which seems difficult, unless
it either disciplines or corrects, punishes.
VII "Wars for twice five years occupied
the avenging son of Atreus in the ruins of
Phrygia where he expiated his brother's lost
marriage-beds; when that one wished to set
sail with a Greek army and in bloodshed ransomed
the winds, he put off paternal pity and as
a sad priest marred the throat of his daughter.
"The Ithacan mourned for his lost companions,
whom the savage Polyphemus reclining in a
vast cave plunged into his monstrous stomach;
but nevertheless frenzied by a blind face
delight compensated for the sad tears.
"Hard labors glorify Hercules: that
one tamed the arrogant Centaurs, carried
away the spoils from the fierce lion, pierced
with unerring arrows the birds, snatched
fruits from the perceiving dragon in a left
hand heavier with golden quarry, dragged
Cerberus with a triple chain; the victor
is said to have set the inexorable master
as fodder for the fierce team of four; Hydra
perished in burned up poison; the river Achelous
disfigured in appearance submerged its modest
face under the banks; he threw down Antaeus
on the Libyan sands; Cacus appeased the anger
of Evander, the shoulders which the deep
world was to press the bristly one marked
with foams; the last labor lifted heaven
with an unbent neck and earned again the
heavenly prize of the last labor.
"Go now, brave ones, where the lofty
way of the great leads by example. Why do
you lazy ones expose your backs? The earth
surpassed, the stars are bestowed."
Notes to Book 4: III: Ithaca's leader was
Odysseus (Ulysses). His visit to the island
of the magical Circe and his rescue by the
Arcadian god Hermes is described in Homer's
Odyssey book X.
V: Arcturus is the brightest star in the
northern constellation Bootes and is in direct
line with the tail of the Great Bear (Ursa
Major); Arcturus in Greek means "bear
guard."
6: The poet Lucan (39-65 CE.) in Pharsalia
i, 128 refers to Caesar's victory at Thapsus
in 46 BC which led to Cato's suicide.
VII: Agamemnon, the son of Atreus, fought
the Trojans for ten years in Phrygia because
the wife of his brother Menelaus was taken
by them; to gain favorable winds for sailing
he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia.
VII: Odysseus (Ulysses) of Ithaca had some
of his crew eaten by the Cyclops Polyphemus,
but getting him drunk Odysseus blinded the
one-eyed giant.
VII: Hercules is credited with accomplishing
twelve great labors for which he won a heavenly
reward. These included overcoming the half-human
half-horse Centaurs, killing the Nemean lion,
destroying the many-headed Hydra by fire
and the Stymphalian birds with arrows, picking
the golden apples of the Hesperides that
were guarded by a dragon, capturing the triple-headed
dog Cerberus, overcoming the river god Achelous,
outwrestling Antaeus the king of Libya, helping
king Evander and punishing Cacus for stealing
cattle, and for a while taking the weight
of heaven off the shoulders of Atlas.
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Evans Experientialism 
