The Consolation of Boethius
by Sanderson Beck
1 She had already finished the song, while
the soothing of the poetry bewitched me eager
and amazed with the ears of listening still
roused. And so after a moment I said, "O
highest solace of tired spirits, how you
have revived me either by the weight of the
sentences or else by the delight of the singing,
so much that now after this I should not
think myself to be unequal to the blows of
fortune! And so not only am I not trembling
at the remedies which you were saying are
a little sharper, but quite eager of hearing
I urgently demand it."
Then she said, "I sensed it, when silent
and attentive you seized upon our words,
and either I was waiting for that condition
of your mind or, what is more true, I caused
it; such are certainly the ones which remain
though in fact biting to the taste, yet taken
inside they should become sweet. But because
you mention your desire of hearing, in how
much ardor would you be blazing if you recognized
where I am undertaking to lead you!"
"Where?" I asked.
"To true happiness," she said,
"about which your soul dreams too, but
in being busy near the images the sight cannot
look at that itself."
Then I said, "Do it, I implore, and
explain what that truth may be without delay."
"I'll do so," she said, "for
your sake gladly; but what is better known
to you, before that I'll try to sketch and
define in words, so that from this perspective
when you have turned your eyes on the opposite
side you may be able to recognize the form
of true happiness.
I "Whoever wants to plant the native
land first clears the fields from bushes,
cuts back with a sickle brambles and the
fern, so that Ceres may go heavy under new
fruit.
"The labor of the bees is all the more
sweeter if previously the mouth should eat
a bad taste. Stars shine with more grace
where the south wind has ceased to bring
rainy sounds. As soon as the lightbringer
has pushed away the shadows the beautiful
day drives the rosy horses.
"You too having looked on false good
previously begin to draw back your neck from
the yoke: truths next will come to the soul."
2 Then under concentrated sight for a short
moment and just as she got back into the
majestic seat of her mind she began as follows:
"Every care of mortals which the labor
of various studies exercises advances in
fact by a different path, but it is striving
to reach all the same toward the one end
of happiness.
"Now the good is that in which anyone
in having attained it should be able to desire
nothing further. Which in fact is the highest
of all goods and containing all goods within
itself; in which if anything is missing it
could not be the highest, since something
is left outside that could be wished for.
Then it is clear that happiness is a state
perfected by the union of all goods.
"This, as we said, by a different trail
all mortals are trying to attain; for there
is inserted in human minds by nature desire
of the true good, but devious error leads
them away to the false.
"Some of them in fact are believing
the highest good is to need nothing, so that
they work hard for abundant riches, while
others the good they depend on is what may
be most worthy of respecting judging by veneration
for their civic honors attained.
"There are some who decide that the
highest good is in the highest power; these
either wish to rule themselves or they try
to adhere to the ones ruling. And these for
whom a certain celebrity seems best hurry
to propagate a glorious name either by the
arts of war or peace.
"While most measure the fruit of the
good by enjoyment and delight; these think
it happiest to melt away in pleasure. There
are even some who exchange the aims and causes
of these one with the other, as those who
desire riches for the sake of power and pleasures
or who seek power whether for the purpose
of money or of publishing a name.
"In these then and others like them
human motives and the intention of prayers
are engaged such as nobility and popular
favor, which seem to provide some distinction,
wife and children, which are sought for the
charm of delight; while of friends the kind
which is in fact most sacred is not to be
counted in fortune but in virtue, while what
is left is taken either for the purpose of
power or of amusement.
"Then truly it is evident that the body's
goods may be ascribed to the ones above;
for strength and size seem to be better for
vigor, beauty and speed for celebrity, health
for pleasure.
"By all these happiness alone is clearly
desired; for what each aims at before the
rest one judges it to be the highest good.
But we have defined the highest good to be
happiness; therefore one judges to be a happy
state what everyone desires before the rest.
"Then you have before your eyes almost
the proposed form of human happiness: wealth,
honors, power, glory, pleasure. Considering
these in fact alone Epicurus accordingly
determined for himself the highest good to
be pleasure, because all others seemed to
bring enjoyment to the soul.
"But to return to human inclinations,
their soul even though memory is fading nevertheless
goes back to the highest good, but like a
drunk doesn't know on which trail to return
home.
"Surely these do not seem to err who
are striving to need nothing? Yet there is
nothing else which could complete happiness
as well as the plentiful situation of all
goods and not needing of another but providing
for oneself.
"While surely these are not wavering
who may think what is best may also be most
worthy of respect by the cultivated? Not
at all; nor is it something being disparaged
by the poor because the intention of almost
all mortals labors to attain it.
"Or is power not being counted among
the good? Why then, surely it is not valued
as weak and without force what of all things
is agreed to be pre-eminent? Or is distinction
being thought of as nothing? But it cannot
follow but that what may be most excellent
to all it also seems to be most distinguished.
"For what is important to say is that
happiness is not troubled and sad nor is
it subject to sorrows and annoyances, since
in the smallest things too is it not trying
to get what is a delight to have and enjoy?
"Yet these are what humans wish to attain
and for this reason they desire riches, positions,
domains, glory and pleasures because through
these they believe sufficiency, respect,
power, celebrity, joy may be coming to them.
"It is the good then that humans seek
by such different pursuits; it is easily
demonstrated how much strength of nature
may be in that, since in spite of various
and disagreeing opinions all the same they
agree on the goal in the choosing of the
good.
II "How many reins of things powerful
nature may turn, by which laws providence
serves the immeasurable world and may draw
together tying it tight by a single bond,
it is pleasing to produce melodious music
with lingering lyres.
"Although the Punic lions may wear beautiful
chains and may try to catch food given by
hands and may fear the savage master to bear
the lashes of custom, if blood soaks their
shaggy mouth, once idle spirits return and
by serious roaring to remember themselves,
they undo the knots freeing the neck and
first torn by their bloody teeth the tamer
wets the raving anger.
"The babbling bird which sings on high
branches is confined in a hollow cage; in
this it is allowed a bedaubed cup of honey
and ample meals with sweet affection the
playing care of humans supply; yet if leaping
from the restricted web it should see the
welcome shadows of forests, having scattered
it with its feet it tramples the food, it
misses the woods with so much sadness, it
murmurs for the woods in a sweet voice.
"Once driven downward by strong forces
the tree-top twig bends; if arching the right
hand releases this, as an upright pole it
faces the sky.
"The sun falls into the western waves,
but by a secret trail back it turns the car
toward the usual risings.
"All go back to their own recourse and
are pleased by their individual return, nor
does the entrusted order stay with any unless
that has joined the rising with the end and
has made its orbit steady.
3 "You too, o terrestrial creatures,
although poor imagine nevertheless your beginning
in dreams and you perceive that true goal
of happiness though in the least sharp awareness
all the same, and by it natural intention
leads you both to true good and manifold
error leads away from the same.
"Consider for example whether through
these by which humans think they may attain
happiness they will be able to arrive at
the determined goal. For if either money
or honors and the rest of such bring that
to someone who seems to lack none of the
goods, let us also acknowledge that some
do become happy by the attainment of these.
But if they are not able to accomplish what
they promise and are missing many goods,
clearly is not a false pretense of happiness
caught in them?
"First then you yourself, who a little
before was abundant with riches I ask: during
that most abundant wealth did anxiety never
confuse your spirit out of any concept of
injustice?"
"Yes," I said, "I cannot remember
in my spirit ever to have been free but that
there was some distress."
"Was it not because either what you
were not wishing to be missing was missing
or what you did not wish to be present was
present?"
"It is so," I said.
"Then were you desiring the presence
of the former and the absence of the latter?"
"I admit it," I said.
"Is everyone really," she asked,
"in want of what one desires?"
"Everyone is in want," I said.
"While the one who is in want of something
at every moment is not providing for oneself."
"Not at all," I said.
"And so you full of this insufficiency,"
she asked, "were you supported by wealth?"
"Of course not," I said.
"Then wealth could do nothing for need
and sufficiency, and this was what it seemed
to promise. Yet this too I am especially
thinking of considering that money may have
nothing in its own nature so that from these
by whom it is possessed it could not be carried
off against their will."
"I acknowledge it," I said.
"Why not acknowledge it, since any day
someone stronger may rob it against one's
will? From where are public complaints, unless
moneys which were stolen either by force
or by fraud are being reclaimed from the
unwilling ?"
"It is so," I said.
"Then everyone will be in want,"
she said, "from the outside in asking
for protection from one who will guard their
money."
"Who would deny it?" I said.
"Yet one would not be in want from it
unless one were possessing money, which one
could lose."
"I cannot doubt it," I said.
"Then the matter is fallen back into
the opposite; for wealth which was thought
to make one self-sufficient rather makes
a need for the protection of another. But
what is the method by which need may be expelled
by riches? For surely the rich are not unable
to be hungry, or unable to be thirsty, or
don't the limbs of the moneyed feel the cold
of winter?
"But there is support, you may say,
for the wealthy by which they may satisfy
hunger, by which they may remove thirst and
cold. Though need in fact can be consoled
in this way by riches, they cannot take it
away entirely; for though this is ever gaping
and requiring that something be filled up
by wealth, there must be remaining what could
be filled up.
"I do not mention that the least is
enough for nature, that nothing is enough
for greed. Therefore if wealth cannot remove
need and makes its own for itself, why is
it that you should believe it is responsible
for sufficiency?
III "Although rich from an affluent
flood of gold the greedy may not compel wealth
to be filled up and may load necks with pearls
from the Red Sea's shores and may plow a
hundred fat estates by the ox, nor will biting
care abandon the surviving and at death easy
wealth will not be accompanying.
4 "But positions give back honor and
respect to the one whom they might have prospered.
Surely this power is not with the offices
so that into the minds of the employed they
should insert virtues or expel vices?
"Yet they are accustomed not to banish
them, but rather to make famous the worthless.
Thus it is that we are indignant that these
often came to the worst people; so although
Nonius was sitting as a magistrate Catullus
nevertheless calls him a tumor.
"Don't you see how much disgrace positions
may add to the bad? Yet their unworthiness
will be less exposed if they are not made
famous by any honors.
"You too surely could not finally have
been led into so many dangers while you were
thinking to manage the office with Decoratus,
since you were looking back so long into
the mind of the worst jester and informer?
For we cannot on account of honors judge
worthy of respect those whom we judge unworthy
of honors themselves. But if you see someone
endowed with wisdom, surely you cannot but
consider them worthy of either respect or
at least the wisdom with which one is endowed?"
"At least."
"For then the position is appropriate
to the virtue, which it transmits directly
into those in whom the connection is made.
Because popular honors cannot create that,
it is clear they don't have the position's
proper excellence.
"On which that is paying more attention:
for if one is more degraded from it by which
everyone is more despised by more people,
since it cannot make respected those whom
it shows to more, position makes the dishonest
more despicable. True not with impunity;
for indeed the dishonest give back an equal
recompense to the positions, which they stain
by their contamination.
"And so that you may recognize that
true respect cannot be reached through these
shadowy positions: if one who functioned
as consul many times came by chance into
foreign nations, would honor make him venerated
by foreigners? Yet if this service were natural
in positions, they would in no way be remiss
from their duty anywhere in the world, just
as the fire of lands everywhere never stops
being hot.
"But since it is not a proper power
for them but the false opinion of humans
connects it, they disappear instantly when
they might have come to those who do not
value these as positions.
"But this is among outside nations:
while between these among whom they are born
surely they do not endure forever? Though
the great praetor was once powerful, now
it is an empty name and a heavy burden on
a senator's property; whoever might be administering
the people's grain market was once held great;
now why is this superintendence more degraded?
"For as we said a little before, what
has no elegance of its own, by the opinion
of those employing it sometimes receives
luster, sometimes loses it.
"If then positions cannot cause respect,
if besides they become dirty by the contamination
of the dishonest, if by the change of times
they stop shining, if they are cheap in the
estimation of nations, why is it that they
should have covetings of excellence in themselves,
much less may they be better than others?
IV "However much the arrogant Nero might
dress himself in the proud purple of Tyre
and in snowy gems, hated nevertheless by
all he was thriving in the cruelties of luxury;
but once the dishonest was giving to venerable
senators indecent offices. Who then would
consider those honors blessed which the wretched
bestow?
5 "Perhaps sovereignties and familiarity
with royalty can really bring about power?
Why not, when their happiness endures forever?
Yet antiquity is full of examples, full also
is the present age, with monarchs who changed
happiness to calamity. O brilliant power,
which is not found capable enough even for
its own preservation!
"But if this power of rulers is the
author of happiness, may it not, if it has
failed in any part, be reducing happiness,
bringing in misery? But however widely human
empires may be spread, there must remain
more nations over whom not any monarch may
command. While in whatever part power stops
making them blessed there comes in by this
impotence what makes them wretched; in this
way then there must belong to monarchs a
greater portion of misery.
"A tyrant having experienced the fear
of the dangers of one's royal fate represented
it by the terror of hanging a sword above
the head. What then is this power, which
cannot expel the bite of anxieties, nor avoid
the stings of horrors? Yet they themselves
might wish to have lived in security, but
they cannot; then immediately they boast
about power.
"Perhaps you rate powerful one whom
you may see might wish for what one could
not bring about, or do you rate powerful
one who walks abroad with an attendant who
oneself is more afraid of those one terrifies,
who so that one may seem to be powerful is
lying in the hand of those serving?
"For why should I discuss the intimates
of royalty, when monarchies themselves are
proven full of so much weakness? These in
fact the royal power ruins often while unharmed,
often on the other hand when fallen.
"Nero forced his intimate and mentor
Seneca toward picking the decision of death;
Papinianus long a power among the courtiers
Antoninus threw to the soldiers' swords.
Yet both were willing to renounce their powers,
of whom Seneca even tried to transfer his
wealth to Nero and go into retirement; but
as long as the bulk itself draws things to
be ruined, neither accomplished what he wanted.
"What then is your power, which alarms
those having it, which when you may wish
to have it you are not safe and when you
may desire to lay it down you may not be
able to get rid of it?
"Or are friends for protection whom
not virtue but fortune reconciles? But a
friend whom happiness made misfortune makes
hostile. While what plague is more effective
in harming than an intimate enemy?
V "Whoever wishes oneself to be powerful,
should tame the insolent spirits nor collared
by lust should one submit to vile reins;
and although in far off India the country
may be afraid of your laws and most remote
Thule may serve, nevertheless it is not power
not to be able to drive out black cares and
banish wretched complaints.
6 "Truly how deceptive glory often is,
how ugly! Thus not wrongly the tragedian
exclaims:
'O glory, glory, thousands of mortals of
no live substance have you puffed up great.'
For many often obtained a great name from
the false opinions of the public. What can
be contrived uglier than that? For those
who are praised falsely must themselves blush
at their praises.
"Even if they may be collected by merit,
what could they add to the conscience of
the wise, who measures one's good not by
popular rumor but by the truth of conscience?
But if this seems beautiful to have spread
a name, it is logical that not to have extended
it is judged vile.
"But since, as I explained a little
before, it may be necessary for there to
be many nations to whom the fame of a single
person cannot come, it arises that the one
whom you estimate to be glorious seems inglorious
in the next part of the world. While between
these I think popular favor is not even worth
mentioning, which neither comes by judgment
nor ever remains stable.
"Now really who could not see how empty
it may be, how futile a name of nobility?
Which if it is ascribed to distinction, it
is another's; for nobility seems to be a
kind of praise coming from the merits of
parents.
"But if commendation causes distinction,
those must be distinguished who are commended;
therefore if you don't have your own brilliance,
the distinction of others doesn't cause it.
"But if there is anything good in nobility,
I think it is this alone, that the necessity
imposed on the noble ones seems not to degenerate
from the virtue of the ancestors.
VI "The birth of every person on earth
arises from a similar origin. For there is
one father of things; one serves all. That
gives to the sun rays, and gives horns to
the moon; that also gives humans to lands
as stars to the sky; this imprisoned in members
fallen souls from a high abode: then it produced
all mortals from a noble germ. Why should
you rattle on about birth and ancestors?
If you should look at your beginning and
author, God, no one is degenerate unless
cherishing worse faults one should desert
one's proper source.
7 "Now what should I speak about the
body's pleasures, of which the craving is
in fact full of anxiety, while the satiety
is full of remorse? How many diseases, how
much unbearable sorrow as if those are accustomed
to return to bodies some fruit of the enjoying
evils! Of these I am ignorant what impulse
of delight it might have; the outcome of
pleasures being truly sad, whoever is willing
to remember their passions understands.
"If these can open up blessings, there
is no reason why sheep too may not be called
blessed, whose every intention hurries toward
filling up a bodily pit.
"The enjoyment of marriage and children
may in fact be most honored; but too much
from nature is the proverb for the ignorant
who have found their sons to be tormentors.
However bitter the condition of those may
be it is not necessary to advise you since
you neither experienced it at one time nor
is it a worry now. In that I prove the sentence
of my Euripides, who said being unfortunate
in lacking children is lucky.
VII "Every pleasure has this: the stimulus
drives the ones enjoying and like the bee
flying where it scattered pleasing honey
it fled and with too much grip it hit the
struck hearts with a sting.
8 "Then there is no doubt but that these
roads to happiness may be kind of devious,
nor are they able to lead anyone through
it to what they may be promising to lead
them through themselves. I'll show very briefly
with how many evils they may really be entangled.
"Well? Will you not try to collect money?
But you rip it off from the one having it.
Do you wish to be illustrious in positions?
You will entreat with the one granting them,
and if you desire to precede others in honor
you are cheapened by the humility of asking.
"Are you not longing for power? In ambushes
of neighbors you are liable to be connected
to dangers. Do you aim at glory? But having
been distracted through all the violent things
you cease to be secure. Would you live a
pleasurable life? But who would not spurn
and abandon slavery to the most cheap and
fragile thing, the body?
"While already those who display the
goods of the body, how brief, how fragile
the possession they depend on! For surely
you will not be able to surpass elephants
in bulk, bulls in strength, nor will you
outstrip tigers in speed?
"Look again at heaven's space, stability,
quickness and for a while stop admiring the
cheap. Because in fact heaven is not more
admired for these than for its reason by
which it is guided. While the form's sleekness
is as swift, as fast and more fleeting than
the changeability of spring flowers!
"But if, as Aristotle says, humans could
use the eyes of Lynceus, so that their sight
might penetrate obstructions, in having looked
into the organs might not that superficially
most beautiful body of Alcibiades seem most
ugly?
"Then you do not seem beautiful by your
nature, but the weakness of the eyes looking
represent it. But estimate how excessive
are the goods of the body's face, as long
as you know that however much you admire
this it can be destroyed by the fire of three
days' fever.
"Out of all these to reduce that into
a summary it is admitted that these cannot
perform the good which they promise nor are
they perfected by the union of all goods,
nor do they lead to happiness as if by a
sort of path nor do they make them blessed.
VIII "Alas, what ignorance leads away
on a trail the devious wretched! You do not
search for gold on a green tree nor from
the vine do you pick gems, nor do you hide
nets on high mountains so that you may feast
on a fish banquet, nor if it would please
you to follow goats do you catch them in
the Tyrrhenian Seas; rather they know also
places hidden by the waves in the recess
of the sea, which waters are more productive
with snowy gems or which of the red purple-fish
and which shores not with delicate fish or
with bitter ones provide sea-urchins. But
where it may escape notice that they desire
good the blind maintain they are ignorant,
and sunk in the ground they seek what goes
beyond the starry pole. What should I invoke
fitting for stupid minds? They may court
wealth and honors, and when they may have
procured the false in a heavy bulk then they
may recognize true goods.
9 "Thus far it has been enough to have
exposed the form of deceptive happiness;
which if you have observed clearly, next
in order is to demonstrate what may be the
true."
"Yes, I see," I said, "it
is not possible to reach sufficiency by wealth
nor power by monarchies nor respect by positions
nor celebrity by glory nor joy by pleasures."
"Perhaps also you detected the reason
why it may be so?"
"I grasped it in fact just as I seem
to observe a crack, but I would rather learn
it more clearly from you."
"Yet the reason is most obvious. For
what is simple and by nature indivisible,
human error separates and transforms from
the true and thus perfect to the false and
imperfect.
"Or do you think that what may need
nothing lacks power?"
"Not at all," I said.
"You are correct in fact; for whatever
may be weaker in anything though strong,
in this it must be lacking in support from
another."
"So it is," I said.
"Then the nature of sufficiency and
power is one and the same."
"It seems like it."
"Truly do you think that such should
be rejected or on the contrary be most worthy
of all things in respect?"
"But this," I said, "cannot
be doubted at any rate."
"Then let us add respect to sufficiency
and power, so that we may judge these three
to be one."
"Let us add it, if in fact we wish to
acknowledge the truth."
"What," she asked, "do you
really think this is dark and unknown or
most bright in every celebrity? Consider
truly, it is conceded that it needs nothing,
that it is most powerful, that in honor it
is most worthy, whether it is lacking in
brightness, which it could not provide for
itself, and so on account of it it should
seem somehow partly more contemptible."
"I cannot," I said, "but confess
this granted that it is even so most celebrated."
"Then it is logical that we should acknowledge
that brightness does not differ from the
previous three."
"It is logical," I said.
"Then what should be in need of nothing
from another, what could be whole in its
own powers, what should be bright and so
venerable, is it not also established this
is most joyful?"
"But I cannot in fact imagine from where,"
I said, "any sadness might creep into
such a thing; thus it is necessary to confess
that it is full of joy, if in fact the previous
qualities will remain."
"Yet that is also necessary by the same
reason, the names of sufficiency, power,
brightness, respect, enjoyment in fact being
different, that the substance does not really
disagree in any way."
"It is necessary," I said.
"This then which is one and single by
nature human depravity divides and while
one tries to acquire a part of a thing which
is lacking in parts, one does not attain
a portion, which does not exist, nor itself,
which it is not aspiring to at all."
"How is that?" I asked.
"The one who seeks riches," she
said, "by the avoidance of want, does
nothing for power, prefers to be cheap and
unknown, and deprives oneself of many natural
pleasures too, lest one lose the money which
one has procured. But in this way not even
sufficiency comes to one whom strength abandons,
whom trouble stings, whom cheapness degrades,
whom obscurity hides.
"While the one who desires ability alone
spends wealth, despises pleasures and honor
lacking power, also values glory as nothing.
But you see this too how much they may forsake;
for it happens that sometimes one may need
necessities, that one may be bit by anxieties,
may not be able to remove these at any time,
besides what one is aiming at most, to be
powerful, may stop.
"One may argue similarly about honors,
glory, pleasures; but since each one of these
should be the same as the others, anyone
aiming at one of these without the others
does not even take hold of that in fact which
one wants."
"Then what," I asked, "if
one should desire to acquire all at the same
time?"
"That one wants in fact the sum of happiness;
but surely one will not find it in these
which we have demonstrated cannot confer
what they promise?"
"Not at all," I said.
"Then in these which are believed to
provide individually certain of the things
being coveted in no way is happiness being
discovered."
"I admit it," I said, "and
nothing truer could be said."
"Then you have," she said, "both
the false form of happiness and the causes.
Now turn the mind's observation into the
opposite; for there you will see at once
the truth which we have promised."
"Yet this," I said, "is even
clear to the blind, and you showed it a little
before when you tried to explain the false
causes. For unless I am mistaken, true and
perfect happiness is that which may make
one sufficient, powerful, respected, celebrated,
and joyful. And so that you may learn that
I have paid attention inwardly, I know which
one of these, since they are all the same,
truthfully can prove this to be full happiness
without ambiguity.
"O you, pupil, by this opinion are happy,"
she said, "if in fact you may have added
this!"
"What?" I asked.
"Do you think there is anything in these
mortal and perishable things that could bring
about such a state as this?"
"Not at all," I said, "and
I think it is proved by you, so that nothing
more is desired."
"These then seem to give to mortals
either images of the true good or a kind
of incomplete good, but they cannot confer
the true and complete good."
"I agree," I said.
"Then since you have known that which
may be true, the ones which moreover imitate
happiness, now it remains that you recognize
from where you could aim at this true one."
"For that in fact," I said, "already
I have been waiting eagerly for a long time."
"But since, as in the Timaeus it pleased
our Plato," she said, "in the smallest
things too one should invoke divine assistance,
what now do you think we should be doing
so that we may deserve to find out the foundation
of that highest good?"
"Call upon," I said, "the
father of all things, so that in having neglected
nothing the beginning is properly secured."
"Correct," said she; and at once
the following was sung:
IX "O you who rule the universe by perpetual
reason, sower of earth and heaven, you who
from eternity order time to pass and remaining
stable permit all things to be moved, whom
no external causes pushed to form a true
work of flowing material by an innate form
of the highest good free of envy, by a celestial
example you lead all, the most beautiful
itself managing by mind a beautiful universe
and shaping it in a similar image; and ordering
the perfect to finish the perfect parts,
you bind the elements with numbers, as winters
with flames, the dry lands harmonize with
waters, purer fire may not fly off nor do
weights bring down sunken lands.
"You released an intermediary soul of
triple nature connecting together the moving
through concordant members; which when cut
gathered movement into two circles, in self
returning it passes and goes round the vast
mind and turns heaven in a similar image.
"From like causes you carry forward
souls and lesser lives and fitting the sublime
with the light vehicles you plant in heaven
and earth, which converted by benign law
you cause to be led back to you by fire returned.
"Permit, father, the mind to mount this
majestic throne, permit it to scan the source
of good, permit discoveries by light to concentrate
perceptive visions of the soul on you.
"Scatter the mists of earth and the
massive burdens and so sparkle in your splendor;
for you are fair, you are the tranquil rest
of the pious, to perceive you is the goal,
beginning, carrier, leader, way, likewise
the boundary.
10 "Then since you have seen what may
be the form of the imperfect, as well as
the form of the perfect good, now I am thinking
of explaining where the perfection of this
happiness may be established.
"In this I think first it must be inquired
whether any good of this kind as defined
a little before could exist in the nature
of things, lest an empty image of thought
deceive us about the truth of the subject
matter.
"But it cannot be denied but it should
exist and may be this as a kind of source
of all goods; for everything that is said
to be imperfect is held to be imperfect by
the impairment of the perfect.
"Thus, if in any class whatever something
may seem to be imperfect, it may be necessary
for something perfect to be in it too; unless
raised by perfection somehow or other that
which is held imperfect cannot even come
to be formed.
"For the nature of things does not take
initiative from the diminished and uncompleted,
but progressing from the whole and complete
it disintegrates into these extremes and
so is exhausted. But if, as we have shown
a little before, there is a kind of imperfect
happiness of a fragile good, it cannot be
doubted that something is solid and perfect."
"Most sure," I said, "and
most true is the conclusion."
"While as to where it lives," she
said, "consider this. The common conception
of the human spirit proves that God, the
principle of all things, is good; for since
nothing better than God can be thought of,
who may doubt that what nothing is better
than is good?
"So reason demonstrates that God is
really good so that one may be convinced
that the perfect is in it too. For if it
were not such, it could not be the principle
of all things; for there would be something
more outstanding in it possessing the perfect
good, which may seem to be before this and
so more ancient; for all the perfect ones
have become clear to be prior to the less
complete ones.
"Therefore lest the argument proceed
into infinity, it is being acknowledged that
the highest God is most full of the highest
and perfect good; but we established perfect
good to be true happiness: then it is necessary
for true happiness to be situated in the
highest God."
"I accept it," I said, "nor
is it what can be spoken against in any way."
"But," she said, "I ask you,
see that you approve it solemnly and so inviolably
what we said about the highest God being
most full of the highest good."
"In what way?" I asked.
"It is not asserted that this father
of all things either has received from outside
that highest good of which it is full nor
should you presume it keeps so naturally
as if you should think the substance of the
God having it and the condition of happiness
to be different.
"For if you should think it received
from outside, you could judge that which
gave it more outstanding than that which
received it; but we most properly acknowledge
this to be the most excellent of all things.
Because if in fact it belongs by nature but
is different by reason, when we speak of
God as the principle of things, one may imagine
what can have joined these differences.
"Finally, what is different from any
thing is not that from which it is understood
to be different; therefore what is different
from the highest good by its own nature,
that is not the highest good; because it
is wrong to think that about it, when it
is established that nothing is more outstanding.
"For surely the nature of any thing
could not be better than its principle; therefore
I would conclude by the truest reasoning
that what may be the principle of all is
actually by its essence the highest good."
"Most correct," I said.
"But the highest good is conceded to
be happiness."
"So it is," I said.
"Then," she said, "it must
be acknowledged that God is happiness itself."
"I cannot," I said, "oppose
the preceding with any propositions, and
from those I perceive this to be logically
inferred."
"Look again," she said, "whether
from this too the same is more strongly proven,
because there cannot be two highest goods
which may be different from each other. For
it is evident that goods which disagree with
each other are not what the other may be;
therefore neither could be perfect, since
each is lacking the other.
"But it is obvious that what may not
be perfect is not the highest; then in no
way can those which are the highest goods
be different. Yet we inferred both happiness
and God to be the highest good; therefore
it must be the highest happiness itself which
should be the highest divinity."
"Nothing," I said, "can actually
be concluded that is truer or stronger in
reasoning or more worthy of God."
"Beyond this," she said, "then
as geometricians are accustomed to infer
something from proven propositions, which
they themselves call deductions, so I too
shall give one to you as a corollary.
"Now since humans become blessed by
the attainment of happiness, while happiness
is divinity itself, it is obvious that they
become blessed by the attainment of divinity.
But just as by the attainment of justice
they become just, by wisdom they become wise,
so it is necessary by similar reasoning to
become gods by having attained divinity.
Then everyone blessed is a god. But God is
one in fact by nature; while nothing prevents
as many as possible from being it by participation."
"This is both beautiful and so valuable,"
I said, "whether it be called either
a deduction or a corollary."
"Yet too nothing is more beautiful than
this which reason persuades is to be connected
to these."
"What?" I asked.
"Since happiness," she said, "may
seem to contain much, should all these join
together as one like a body of happiness
from a kind of variety of parts or should
some of them which may complete the essence
of happiness, while others may be referred
to this?"
I said, "I would like you to make it
clear by recollection of the things themselves."
"Do we not," she said, "think
happiness is good?"
"And in fact the highest," I said.
"You may impart this," she said,
"to all of them. For the highest sufficiency
is the same, the highest power the same,
respect too, distinction and pleasure are
judged to be happiness. What then, are all
these, the good, sufficiency, power and the
others, are they like some kind of members
of happiness or are they all referred to
the good as to a head?"
"I understand," I said, "what
investigating you propose, but I long to
hear what you may decide."
"Take the discernment of that thing
as follows. If these all were members of
happiness, they would in turn disagree with
each other too; for this is the nature of
the parts that different ones may compose
one body. And yet all these are shown to
be the same. Then at least they are not members;
otherwise happiness would seem to be joined
together out of one member, which cannot
be."
"That in fact," I said, "is
not doubtful, "but I am waiting for
what remains."
"While it is well known the others refer
to the good. For that reason sufficiency
is sought, since it is judged to be good;
for that reason power, since it too is believed
to be good; one may infer the same for respect,
distinction, enjoyment. Then the sum and
so the cause of all the aiming is the good;
for that which does not retain in itself
any good whether by reality or imitation
can in no way be sought out.
"On the other hand those which are not
by nature good nevertheless they are desired
if they may seem to be as if they were from
a true good. Thus goodness is rightly believed
to be the sum, axis and so the cause of all
aiming.
"While the cause of that which is sought
out seems to be chosen most, just as if someone
who wishes to ride for reason of health,
desires the riding not so much for the movement
as much as for the effect of health. Then
since all those are sought for the sake of
the good, not those but rather the good itself
is desired by all.
"But on account of what we have conceded
happiness to be the others are chosen; thus
here too happiness alone is sought. From
which it is clearly apparent that the substance
of the good itself and of happiness is one
and so the same."
"I do not see how anyone could disagree."
"But we have shown that God and true
happiness are one and so the same."
"Yes," I said.
"Safely then one may conclude that the
essence of God too is situated in the good
itself and nowhere else.
"Come here equally all the caught, whom
the deceptive binds with dishonest chains
lust inhabiting earthly minds: this will
be for you the labors' rest, this harbor
remaining quietly calm, this single open
sanctuary for the wretched.
"Not even the Tagus with its golden
sands bestows nor the reddening Hermus shore
nor the Indus near the torrid zone mingling
green gems with the white may illuminate
the sight and all the more close blind souls
into their darkness.
"This, whatever pleases and excites
minds, earth has nourished in the lowest
caves; the splendor by which heaven is guided
and flourishes avoids the dark ruins of the
soul; whoever will be able to note this light
will decline the bright rays of the sun."
11 "I agree," I said, "for
it all is established tied by the strongest
arguments."
Then she asked, "How highly would you
value it, if you might have recognized what
the good itself may be?"
"Infinitely," I said, "if
in fact it brings me at the same time to
recognize God too, who is the good."
"And yet this," she said, "I
may make clear by the truest reasoning, should
what was concluded a little before remain."
"They will remain."
"Have we not shown," she asked,
"that these which are desired by most
for this reason are not true and perfect
goods since they disagree from each other
in turn, at any time one is missing from
the other not being able to bring about full
and complete good, but then to become true
good when they are gathered as into a single
form and operation, so that what sufficiency
is may be the same as power, respect, distinction
and enjoyment, unless they all may be really
one and so the same, does it not hold that
they are to be counted among the things sought
out?"
"It is proven," I said, "nor
can it in any way be doubted."
"Which then when they disagree are not
at all good, while when they may have begun
to be one become good, does this not happen
so that they may become good by the attainment
of unity?"
"It seems so," I said.
"But do you concede that every good
is good by participation of the good, or
not?"
"So it is."
"Then you may concede by a similar reason
that the one and so the good ought to be
the same; for the substance of those of which
naturally it is not a different effect is
the same."
"I cannot deny it," I said.
"Then did you not learn," she said,
"everything that is remains and so continues
for as long as it may be one, but perishes
and is dissolved at the same time as soon
as it may have ceased to be one?"
"In what way?"
"As in animals," she said, "while
the soul and body combine and persist as
one it is called an animal, while when this
unity is dissolved by separation of both
it is clear the animal perishes and no longer
exists; in the body itself too while it persists
in one form by the union of members the human
appearance is seen, but if divided and segregated
parts of the body tear apart the unity it
ceases to be what it had been; and in this
way going through the others beyond a doubt
it will be evident that each one continues
as long as it is one, while when it ceases
to be one it perishes."
"In having considered more," I
said, "it seems to me no other."
"Then is there anything," she asked,
"which, in as much as it may act naturally,
having abandoned the craving for continuing
may long to come to destruction and corruption?"
"If I may consider animals," I
said, "which have some nature of willing
and refusing, I find nothing that with no
outside forcings would throw away the intention
of remaining and spontaneously hurry toward
destruction. For every animal labors to protect
its welfare, while it avoids death and ruin.
But what about plants and trees, what about
inanimate things in general? In short I doubt
the agreement for things."
"And yet about this too it is not what
you could argue, since you may observe plants
and trees first grow in places convenient
to them, where, as much as their nature could,
they should not be able to dry up quickly
and die. For some in fact spring up in plains,
some in mountains, marshes produce some,
some cling to rocks, barren sands are fertile
for some, which would dry up if someone tried
to transfer them to another place.
"But nature gives to each what is appropriate,
and, as long as they can remain, labors so
they may not perish. Why do they all draw
nourishment by the roots as if from a mouth
submerged in the soils, and so through the
pith the wood and bark spreads out? Why is
everything which is most tender, as in fact
the pith is, always stored away in an interior
site, while by a kind of strength of the
wood outside, the most remote bark is set
against intemperate weather as if it were
a patient averter of wrong?
"While now how great is the diligence
of nature that they should all be propagated
by seed multiplication! Who does not know
of them all remaining not only for a time,
actually by species too as it were lasting
forever as if to be some kind of machines?
"Even these which are believed to be
inanimate does not each long for what is
theirs by a similar reason? For why does
lightness convey flames in fact upwards,
while weight presses down the lands, unless
it is because these places and motions are
appropriate to each one?
"Moreover, the individual preserves
what is in keeping with itself, just as they
ruin things which are unfriendly. While now
things which are hard like stones stick most
persistently with their parts and resist
being easily dissolved; while fluids which
are like air and water yield easily in fact
to being divided, but quickly glide back
again into that from which they are cut off;
while fire flees every section.
"Now we are not dealing with the voluntary
movements of an understanding soul, but with
natural intention, just as it is accepted
that we digest food without thought, that
unknowing we draw breath in sleep. For not
even in animals does the love of remaining
come out of the will of the soul, but truly
out of the principles of nature.
"For often the will embraces death,
which nature dreads, for compelling reasons,
and on the other hand that by which alone
the long life of mortal things endures, the
work of procreating, which nature always
desires, the will occasionally represses.
"So this love of oneself comes not out
of animal motion, but out of natural intention;
for providence has given to creatures from
things themselves this very greatest cause
of remaining so that naturally they should
long to remain as long as they can.
"Therefore there is no way that you
can doubt that all things which are naturally
desire constancy of persisting, to avoid
ruin."
"I confess," I said, "to discerning
now without my doubt what a moment ago seemed
uncertain."
"Moreover," she said, "what
seeks to hold out and persist longs to be
one; for if this is removed in fact, nothing
will persist."
"It is true," I said.
"Then all," she said, "long
for the one."
"Agreed."
"But we have shown this one itself to
be what is good."
"So it is in fact."
"Then all things seek the good, which
you may in fact describe as being the good
itself which should be longed for by all."
"Nothing," I said, "can be
thought out more truthfully; for either all
things are brought back to no one thing and
will flow abandoned as if without one guiding
head, or if there is something universal
toward which they accelerate it will be the
highest of all goods."
And she said, "I am very glad, o pupil;
for you have fixed mentally the note of the
central truth. But in this it has opened
to you what you were saying you didn't know
a little before."
"What?" I asked.
"What might be," she said, "the
end of all things. For it is certainly what
is longed for by all; because we have inferred
that to be good, we should acknowledge the
end of all things to be the good.
XI "Whoever with a deep mind investigates
the truth and desires to be deceived by no
deviations should turn back into oneself
the light of the inner sight and bending
should force the long movements into a circle
and should teach the soul that whatever is
built outside it possesses withdrawn in its
treasures; what a while ago the gloomy cloud
of error covered will shine more clearly
than the sun itself.
"For the body carrying a forgetful bulk
did not expel light from every mind; there
certainly lingers inside the seed of truth
which is awakened by instruction fanning
it; for why when asked do you spontaneously
answer correctly unless sunk in a deep heart
a spark might live? But if the Muse of Plato
rings true, what everyone learns is recalled
from the forgotten."
12 Then I said, "I agree very much with
Plato; for this is already the second time
you have reminded me of these, the first
time I lost the memory by bodily contact,
the next when pressed by a mass of grief."
Then she said, "If you should look back
at previous admissions, that in fact might
no longer be absent but rather you might
recall what you just now confessed not knowing."
"What?" I asked.
"By which governments," she replied,
"the universe may be guided."
"I remember," I said, "that
I had confessed my ignorance, but what you
bring up, may already be foreseen, nevertheless
I long to hear it from you more plainly."
"That this universe," she said,
"is guided by God a little before you
were not even thinking of doubting."
"Not even now am I thinking it,"
I said, "nor was I ever thinking of
doubting it, and let me briefly explain by
which reasons I came to this. This universe
would not have come together into one form
out of such diverse and opposite parts unless
there were one who might join together such
differences.
"While the very diversity of natures
in turn discordant might dissociate and so
tear apart the joined unless there were one
who should hold together what it tied. While
so definite an order of nature might not
go on, nor might such arrangements of motion
unfold in places, times, efficiency, spaces,
qualities unless there were one who should
arrange these varieties of changes while
remaining itself. This, whatever it is, by
which created things remain and so are motivated
with the designation usual to all I name
God."
Then she said, "Since you may feel this
is so, I think there is little work left
for me so that safely in control of happiness
you may revisit your homeland. But let us
look into what we have proposed. Have we
not included sufficiency in happiness, and
have we not agreed that God is happiness
itself?"
"Yes in fact."
"And then," she said, "for
guiding the universe it will not need any
supports from outside; if it should be in
need of anything else by which to do so,
it would not have full sufficiency."
I said, "It is so of necessity."
"Through itself then alone does it arrange
all things?"
"I cannot deny it," I said.
"And yet God is shown to be the good
itself."
"I remember," I said.
"Through the good then it arranges all
things, if in fact it guides all through
itself which we have agreed to be the good,
and this is like a kind of rudder and so
a helm by which the universal machine is
preserved stable and uncorrupted."
"I very much agree," I said, "and
a little before though I was restrained by
suspicion I foresaw it would be said by you."
"I believe it," she said; "for
already, as I think, you focus your eyes
more carefully on discerning truths. But
what I may say is no less open to being observed."
"What?" I asked.
"Since God," she said, "is
rightly believed to steer all by the rudder
of goodness, and all these, just as I have
taught, by natural intention accelerate toward
the good, surely it cannot be doubted but
that they may be guided voluntarily and by
themselves toward the will of the one arranging
as if harmony and the moderate should turn
round unaided by the guide?"
"It must be so," I said; "nor
would the guidance seem to be blessed, if
in fact it was a yoke of the resisting, not
the welfare of the complying."
"Is there nothing then, which serving
nature attempts to go against God?"
"Nothing," I said.
"But if one attempts it," she went
on, "surely at last it does not profit
against that which we rightly conceded to
be the greatest power of happiness?"
"Absolutely nothing could," I said.
"Is there not then anything which either
would or could resist this highest good?"
"I don't think so," I said.
"Then it is the highest good,"
she said, "which bravely guides and
pleasantly arranges all things."
Then I said, "How not only these which
are the highest conclusions of arguments,
truly much more these very words which you
used please me, so that now at last one should
be greatly ashamed of one's foolish abusing!"
"You have heard," she said, "in
fables about Giants challenging heaven; but
it had arranged those too, as it was appropriate,
by a kind courage. But do you want us to
bring these very arguments into conflict
with each other? Perhaps out of a conflict
of this kind some beautiful spark of truth
may fly off."
"By your decision," I said.
She said, "No one would doubt God to
be the power of all."
"At any rate," I said, "no
one who depends on a mind would argue."
"While for the one who is all-powerful,"
she said, "there is nothing which that
one could not do."
"Nothing," I said.
"Then surely God cannot do evil?"
"Not at all," I said.
"Then evil," she said, "is
nothing, since that one could not do it for
whom nothing is impossible."
"Are you playing with me," I asked,
"weaving an inextricable labyrinth with
arguments, which at one time where you may
come out you may go in, while at another
where you may have gone in you may come out,
or are you complicating some wonderful circle
of divine simplicity?
"For a little before beginning from
happiness you were saying it is the highest
good, speaking how it is situated in the
highest God. You were explaining that God
itself too is the highest good and full happiness,
out of which you were granting a small present
that no one is to be blessed except one who
might equally be God.
"Again you were saying that the very
form of the good is the essence of God and
of happiness, and you were teaching that
the one itself is the good itself which is
sought by all from the nature of things.
You were arguing that God also guides the
universe by the helms of goodness and that
all willing things obey nor does any nature
of evil exist. And you were explaining these
with no outside assumptions, but from one
to the other getting credence with innate
and internal approvals."
Then she said, "We were not playing
at all, and we have examined the greatest
matter of all by the grace of God, to whom
we were just now praying. For the form of
the divine substance is such that it is not
dissolved in externals nor would it itself
take into itself anything external, but,
as Parmenides puts it,
'well-rounded on all sides like a sphere's
mass'
it rotates the mobile circle of things while
it preserves itself immobile. But if you
should seek reasons too not outside but inside
of the matter which we were tossing around
we have deliberated on things established,
there is no reason to be surprised, since
you have learned from Platonic ordaining
that the relations about the matters which
are spoken ought to be the discourses.
XII "Happy, the one who can see the
clear source of good, happy, the one who
can release the chains of heavy earth. Once
the prophet of Thrace mourning his dead wife
when with tearful music he compelled nimble
forests to run, the rivers to stand and deer
joined unafraid beside the fierce lions and
the rabbit did not fear the sight of the
dog already calm from the song, when hotter
inside the fervor of feeling burned and the
measures of the one who had subdued all could
not soothe the master, lamenting the inexorable
gods above he went to the lower worlds.
"There by sounding strings moderating
charming tunes whichever he drew from the
special source of the mother goddess, which
powerless lamentation was giving, which love
bewailing lamentation the lower world moving
weeps and by a sweet prayer asks the lords
of the ghosts for indulgence.
"The threefold porter is astonished
captured by the new song; the avenging goddesses
of crimes who drive the guilty by fear next
are drenched by tears of grief; the head
of Ixion is not thrown down by the fast wheel,
and ruined by long thirst Tantalus spurns
the streams; now the vulture is sated by
the music and does not pull at the liver
of Tityos.
"Finally 'We are conquered' the pitying
witness of the ghosts declares. 'We bestow
on the man the accompanying wife bought by
a song; but a law controls the gift, until
she has left the underworld to turn the eyes
would not be allowed.'
"Who would give a law to lovers? A greater
law is love to itself. Alas, near the boundary
of night Orpheus upon his Eurydice looked,
lost, fell.
"This fable looks back to you whoever
of you into the day above seeks to lead the
mind; for the one who in the chasm of the
underworld having been conquered has turned
the eyes, whatever special one carries off
one loses when one sees the lower worlds."
Notes to Book 3: I: Ceres, the goddess of
agriculture, was known to the Greeks as Demeter.
4: The poem of Catullus referring to Nonius
was published about 60 BC.
4: Decoratus was quaestor in 508 CE.
5: In the 4th century BC the tyrant Dionysius
the Elder of Syracuse invited Damocles, who
envied royal happiness, to a banquet and
seated him beneath a sword hanging by a thread.
5: The philosopher and tragedian Seneca was
the tutor and advisor of Nero, but after
retiring he was ordered to commit suicide
by the emperor in 65 CE.
5: Papinianus (140-212) wrote influential
books on Roman law and held office under
the emperor Severus, but he was ordered killed
by the next emperor Caracalla for refusing
to justify Caracalla's fratricidal murder
of his brother Geta.
V: To the Romans Thule represented the most
remote island in the north or west, possibly
Iceland.
6: The tragedy quoted is Andromache (l. 319)
by Euripides.
7: The statement of Euripides on children
is also found in Andromache (l. 420).
8: Lynceus was an Argonaut famous for his
sharp vision.
8: The great philosopher Aristotle lived
from 384 to 322 BC.
8: Alcibiades (450-404 BC) was considered
quite handsome. (See Alcibiades by Plato.)
XI: How knowledge comes from remembering
is discussed in Plato's Meno 82-86 and Phaedo
17-21.
12: Parmenides of Elea lived about 500 BC;
his philosophy emphasized the unity of being.
He was considered the first to declare that
the earth is a sphere.
12: Plato discusses the relation between
discourse and subject matter in Timaeus 29b.
XII: The legendary Thracian musician Orpheus
descended to the underworld in an attempt
to reclaim his dead wife Eurydice, where
he charmed the three-headed dog Cerberus
by the door, and the avenging goddesses,
the Furies, were so moved that they let up
on their punishments of Ixion, Tantalus,
and Tityos. Because Orpheus violated the
condition laid down by the placated Pluto,
the god of the underworld, by looking back
at Eurydice at the last moment of their departure,
she was lost to him.
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Evans Experientialism 
