A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION
1710 A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE by George Berkeley TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE,
&c., KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF
THE GARTER AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S
MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL
MY LORD, You will perhaps wonder that an
obscure person, who has not the honour to
be known to your lordship, should presume
to address you in this manner. But that a
man who has written something with a design
to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion
in the world should make choice of your lordship
for his patron, will not be thought strange
by any one that is not altogether unacquainted
with the present state of the church and
learning, and consequently ignorant how great
an ornament and support you are to both.
Yet, nothing could have induced me to make
you this present of my poor endeavours, were
I not encouraged by that candour and native
goodness which is so bright a part in your
lordship's character. I might add, my lord,
that the extraordinary favour and bounty
you have been pleased to show towards our
Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling
to countenance the studies of one of its
members. These considerations determined
me to lay this treatise at your lordship's
feet, and the rather because I was ambitious
to have it known that I am with the truest
and most profound respect, on account of
that learning and virtue which the world
so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD,
Your lordship's most humble and most devoted
servant,
GEORGE BERKELEY
PREFACE
WHAT I here make public has, after a long
and scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently
true and not unuseful to be known- particularly
to those who are tainted with Scepticism,
or want a demonstration of the existence
and immateriality of God, or the natural
immortality of the soul. Whether it be so
or no I am content the reader should impartially
examine; since I do not think myself any
farther concerned for the success of what
I have written than as it is agreeable to
truth. But, to the end this may not suffer,
I make it my request that the reader suspend
his judgment till he has once at least read
the whole through with that degree of attention
and thought which the subject-matter shall
seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages
that, taken by themselves, are very liable
(nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation,
and to be charged with most absurd consequences,
which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal
will appear not to follow from them; so likewise,
though the whole should be read over, yet,
if this be done transiently, it is very probable
my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking
reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout
clear and obvious. As for the characters
of novelty and singularity which some of
the following notions may seem to bear, it
is, I hope, needless to make any apology
on that account. He must surely be either
very weak, or very little acquainted with
the sciences, who shall reject a truth that
is capable of demonstration, for no other
reason but because it is newly known, and
contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus
much I thought fit to premise, in order to
prevent, if possible, the hasty censures
of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn
an opinion before they rightly comprehend
it.
1. Philosophy being nothing else but the
study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason
be expected that those who have spent most
time and pains in it should enjoy a greater
calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness
and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed
with doubts and difficulties than other men.
Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk
of mankind that walk the high-road of plain
common sense, and are governed by the dictates
of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed.
To them nothing that is familiar appears
unaccountable or difficult to comprehend.
They complain not of any want of evidence
in their senses, and are out of all danger
of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we
depart from sense and instinct to follow
the light of a superior principle, to reason,
meditate, and reflect on the nature of things,
but a thousand scruples spring up in our
minds concerning those things which before
we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices
and errors of sense do from all parts discover
themselves to our view; and, endeavouring
to correct these by reason, we are insensibly
drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties,
and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow
upon us as we advance in speculation, till
at length, having wandered through many intricate
mazes, we find ourselves just where we were,
or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn
Scepticism.
2. The cause of this is thought to be the
obscurity of things, or the natural weakness
and imperfection of our understandings. It
is said, the faculties we have are few, and
those designed by nature for the support
and comfort of life, and not to penetrate
into the inward essence and constitution
of things. Besides, the mind of man being
finite, when it treats of things which partake
of infinity, it is not to be wondered at
if it run into absurdities and contradictions,
out of which it is impossible it should ever
extricate itself, it being of the nature
of infinite not to be comprehended by that
which is finite.
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to
ourselves in placing the fault originally
in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong
use we make of them. It is a hard thing to
suppose that right deductions from true principles
should ever end in consequences which cannot
be maintained or made consistent. We should
believe that God has dealt more bountifully
with the sons of men than to give them a
strong desire for that knowledge which he
had placed quite out of their reach. This
were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent
methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites
it may have implanted in the creatures, doth
usually furnish them with such means as,
if rightly made use of, will not fail to
satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined
to think that the far greater part, if not
all, of those difficulties which have hitherto
amused philosophers, and blocked up the way
to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves-
that we have first raised a dust and then
complain we cannot see.
4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can
discover what those Principles are which
have introduced all that doubtfulness and
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions,
into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch
that the wisest men have thought our ignorance
incurable, conceiving it to arise from the
natural dulness and limitation of our faculties.
And surely it is a work well deserving our
pains to make a strict inquiry concerning
the First Principles of Human Knowledge,
to sift and examine them on all sides, especially
since there may be some grounds to suspect
that those lets and difficulties, which stay
and embarrass the mind in its search after
truth, do not spring from any darkness and
intricacy in the objects, or natural defect
in the understanding, so much as from false
Principles which have been insisted on, and
might have been avoided.
5. How difficult and discouraging soever
this attempt may seem, when I consider how
many great and extraordinary men have gone
before me in the like designs, yet I am not
without some hopes- upon the consideration
that the largest views are not always the
clearest, and that he who is short-sighted
will be obliged to draw the object nearer,
and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey,
discern that which had escaped far better
eyes.
6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader
for the easier conceiving what follows, it
is proper to premise somewhat, by way of
Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse
of Language. But the unravelling this matter
leads me in some measure to anticipate my
design, by taking notice of what seems to
have had a chief part in rendering speculation
intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned
innumerable errors and difficulties in almost
all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion
that the mind hath a power of framing abstract
ideas or notions of things. He who is not
a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes
of philosophers must needs acknowledge that
no small part of them are spent about abstract
ideas. These are in a more especial manner
thought to be the object of those sciences
which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics,
and of all that which passes under the notion
of the most abstracted and sublime learning,
in all which one shall scarce find any question
handled in such a manner as does not suppose
their existence in the mind, and that it
is well acquainted with them.
7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities
or modes of things do never really exist
each of them apart by itself, and separated
from all others, but are mixed, as it were,
and blended together, several in the same
object. But, we are told, the mind being
able to consider each quality singly, or
abstracted from those other qualities with
which it is united, does by that means frame
to itself abstract ideas. For example, there
is perceived by sight an object extended,
coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound
idea the mind resolving into its simple,
constituent parts, and viewing each by itself,
exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract
ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not
that it is possible for colour or motion
to exist without extension; but only that
the mind can frame to itself by abstraction
the idea of colour exclusive of extension,
and of motion exclusive of both colour and
extension.
8. Again, the mind having observed that in
the particular extensions perceived by sense
there is something common and alike in all,
and some other things peculiar, as this or
that figure or magnitude, which distinguish
them one from another; it considers apart
or singles out by itself that which is common,
making thereof a most abstract idea of extension,
which is neither line, surface, nor solid,
nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an
idea entirely prescinded from all these.
So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the
particular colours perceived by sense that
which distinguishes them one from another,
and retaining that only which is common to
all, makes an idea of colour in abstract
which is neither red, nor blue, nor white,
nor any other determinate colour. And, in
like manner, by considering motion abstractedly
not only from the body moved, but likewise
from the figure it describes, and all particular
directions and velocities, the abstract idea
of motion is framed; which equally corresponds
to all particular motions whatsoever that
may be perceived by sense.
9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract
ideas of qualities or modes, so does it,
by the same precision or mental separation,
attain abstract ideas of the more compounded
beings which include several coexistent qualities.
For example, the mind having observed that
Peter, James, and John resemble each other
in certain common agreements of shape and
other qualities, leaves out of the complex
or compounded idea it has of Peter, James,
and any other particular man, that which
is peculiar to each, retaining only what
is common to all, and so makes an abstract
idea wherein all the particulars equally
partake- abstracting entirely from and cutting
off all those circumstances and differences
which might determine it to any particular
existence. And after this manner it is said
we come by the abstract idea of man, or,
if you please, humanity, or human nature;
wherein it is true there is included colour,
because there is no man but has some colour,
but then it can be neither white, nor black,
nor any particular colour, because there
is no one particular colour wherein all men
partake. So likewise there is included stature,
but then it is neither tall stature, nor
low stature, nor yet middle stature, but
something abstracted from all these. And
so of the rest. Moreover, their being a great
variety of other creatures that partake in
some parts, but not all, of the complex idea
of man, the mind, leaving out those parts
which are peculiar to men, and retaining
those only which are common to all the living
creatures, frames the idea of animal, which
abstracts not only from all particular men,
but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects.
The constituent parts of the abstract idea
of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous
motion. By body is meant body without any
particular shape or figure, there being no
one shape or figure common to all animals,
without covering, either of hair, or feathers,
or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair,
feathers, scales, and nakedness being the
distinguishing properties of particular animals,
and for that reason left out of the abstract
idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous
motion must be neither walking, nor flying,
nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion,
but what that motion is it is not easy to
conceive.
10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty
of abstracting their ideas, they best can
tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a
faculty of imagining, or representing to
myself, the ideas of those particular things
I have perceived, and of variously compounding
and dividing them. I can imagine a man with
two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined
to the body of a horse. I can consider the
hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted
or separated from the rest of the body. But
then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must
have some particular shape and colour. Likewise
the idea of man that I frame to myself must
be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny,
a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low,
or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort
of thought conceive the abstract idea above
described. And it is equally impossible for
me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct
from the body moving, and which is neither
swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear;
and the like may be said of all other abstract
general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I
own myself able to abstract in one sense,
as when I consider some particular parts
or qualities separated from others, with
which, though they are united in some object,
yet it is possible they may really exist
without them. But I deny that I can abstract
from one another, or conceive separately,
those qualities which it is impossible should
exist so separated; or that I can frame a
general notion, by abstracting from particulars
in the manner aforesaid- which last are the
two proper acceptations of abstraction. And
there are grounds to think most men will
acknowledge themselves to be in my case.
The generality of men which are simple and
illiterate never pretend to abstract notions.
It is said they are difficult and not to
be attained without pains and study; we may
therefore reasonably conclude that, if such
there be, they are confined only to the learned.
11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged
in defence of the doctrine of abstraction,
and try if I can discover what it is that
inclines the men of speculation to embrace
an opinion so remote from common sense as
that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly
esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given
it very much countenance, by seeming to think
the having abstract general ideas is what
puts the widest difference in point of understanding
betwixt man and beast. "The having of
general ideas," saith he, "is that
which puts a perfect distinction betwixt
man and brutes, and is an excellency which
the faculties of brutes do by no means attain
unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps
in them of making use of general signs for
universal ideas; from which we have reason
to imagine that they have not the faculty
of abstracting, or making general ideas,
since they have no use of words or any other
general signs." And a little after:
"Therefore, I think, we may suppose
that it is in this that the species of brutes
are discriminated from men, and it is that
proper difference wherein they are wholly
separated, and which at last widens to so
wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas
at all, and are not bare machines (as some
would have them), we cannot deny them to
have some reason. It seems as evident to
me that they do, some of them, in certain
instances reason as that they have sense;
but it is only in particular ideas, just
as they receive them from their senses. They
are the best of them tied up within those
narrow bounds, and have not (as I think)
the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of
abstraction."- Essay on Human Understanding,
II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this
learned author, that the faculties of brutes
can by no means attain to abstraction. But
then if this be made the distinguishing property
of that sort of animals, I fear a great many
of those that pass for men must be reckoned
into their number. The reason that is here
assigned why we have no grounds to think
brutes have abstract general ideas is, that
we observe in them no use of words or any
other general signs; which is built on this
supposition- that the making use of words
implies the having general ideas. From which
it follows that men who use language are
able to abstract or generalize their ideas.
That this is the sense and arguing of the
author will further appear by his answering
the question he in another place puts: "Since
all things that exist are only particulars,
how come we by general terms?" His answer
is: "Words become general by being made
the signs of general ideas."- Essay
on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it
seems that a word becomes general by being
made the sign, not of an abstract general
idea, but of several particular ideas, any
one of which it indifferently suggests to
the mind. For example, when it is said "the
change of motion is proportional to the impressed
force," or that "whatever has extension
is divisible," these propositions are
to be understood of motion and extension
in general; and nevertheless it will not
follow that they suggest to my thoughts an
idea of motion without a body moved, or any
determinate direction and velocity, or that
I must conceive an abstract general idea
of extension, which is neither line, surface,
nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate
colour. It is only implied that whatever
particular motion I consider, whether it
be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal,
or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom
concerning it holds equally true. As does
the other of every particular extension,
it matters not whether line, surface, or
solid, whether of this or that magnitude
or figure.
12. By observing how ideas become general
we may the better judge how words are made
so. And here it is to be noted that I do
not deny absolutely there are general ideas,
but only that there are any abstract general
ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted
wherein there is mention of general ideas,
it is always supposed that they are formed
by abstraction, after the manner set forth
in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex
a meaning to our words, and speak only of
what we can conceive, I believe we shall
acknowledge that an idea which, considered
in itself, is particular, becomes general
by being made to represent or stand for all
other particular ideas of the same sort.
To make this plain by an example, suppose
a geometrician is demonstrating the method
of cutting a line in two equal parts. He
draws, for instance, a black line of an inch
in length: this, which in itself is a particular
line, is nevertheless with regard to its
signification general, since, as it is there
used, it represents all particular lines
whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated
of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in
other words, of a line in general. And, as
that particular line becomes general by being
made a sign, so the name "line,"
which taken absolutely is particular, by
being a sign is made general. And as the
former owes its generality not to its being
the sign of an abstract or general line,
but of all particular right lines that may
possibly exist, so the latter must be thought
to derive its generality from the same cause,
namely, the various particular lines which
it indifferently denotes.
13. To give the reader a yet clearer view
of the nature of abstract ideas, and the
uses they are thought necessary to, I shall
add one more passage out of the Essay on
Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is
as follows: "Abstract ideas are not
so obvious or easy to children or the yet
unexercised mind as particular ones. If they
seem so to grown men it is only because by
constant and familiar use they are made so.
For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we
shall find that general ideas are fictions
and contrivances of the mind, that carry
difficulty with them, and do not so easily
offer themselves as we are apt to imagine.
For example, does it not require some pains
and skill to form the general idea of a triangle
(which is yet none of the most abstract,
comprehensive, and difficult); for it must
be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but
all and none of these at once? In effect,
it is something imperfect that cannot exist,
an idea wherein some parts of several different
and inconsistent ideas are put together.
It is true the mind in this imperfect state
has need of such ideas, and makes all the
haste to them it can, for the conveniency
of communication and enlargement of knowledge,
to both which it is naturally very much inclined.
But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas
are marks of our imperfection. At least this
is enough to show that the most abstract
and general ideas are not those that the
mind is first and most easily acquainted
with, nor such as its earliest knowledge
is conversant about."- If any man has
the faculty of framing in his mind such an
idea of a triangle as is here described,
it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out
of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire
is that the reader would fully and certainly
inform himself whether he has such an idea
or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard
task for anyone to perform. What more easy
than for anyone to look a little into his
own thoughts, and there try whether he has,
or can attain to have, an idea that shall
correspond with the description that is here
given of the general idea of a triangle,
which is "neither oblique nor rectangle,
equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but
all and none of these at once?"
14. Much is here said of the difficulty that
abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains
and skill requisite to the forming them.
And it is on all hands agreed that there
is need of great toil and labour of the mind,
to emancipate our thoughts from particular
objects, and raise them to those sublime
speculations that are conversant about abstract
ideas. From all which the natural consequence
should seem to be, that so difficult a thing
as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary
for communication, which is so easy and familiar
to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if
they seem obvious and easy to grown men,
it is only because by constant and familiar
use they are made so. Now, I would fain know
at what time it is men are employed in surmounting
that difficulty, and furnishing themselves
with those necessary helps for discourse.
It cannot be when they are grown up, for
then it seems they are not conscious of any
such painstaking; it remains therefore to
be the business of their childhood. And surely
the great and multiplied labour of framing
abstract notions will be found a hard task
for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing
to imagine that a couple of children cannot
prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles
and the rest of their little trinkets, till
they have first tacked together numberless
inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds
abstract general ideas, and annexed them
to every common name they make use of?
15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful
for the enlargement of knowledge than for
communication. It is, I know, a point much
insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration
are about universal notions, to which I fully
agree: but then it doth not appear to me
that those notions are formed by abstraction
in the manner premised- universality, so
far as I can comprehend, not consisting in
the absolute, positive nature or conception
of anything, but in the relation it bears
to the particulars signified or represented
by it; by virtue whereof it is that things,
names, or notions, being in their own nature
particular, are rendered universal. Thus,
when I demonstrate any proposition concerning
triangles, it is to be supposed that I have
in view the universal idea of a triangle;
which ought not to be understood as if I
could frame an idea of a triangle which was
neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural;
but only that the particular triangle I consider,
whether of this or that sort it matters not,
doth equally stand for and represent all
rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is
in that sense universal. All which seems
very plain and not to include any difficulty
in it.
16. But here it will be demanded, how we
can know any proposition to be true of all
particular triangles, except we have first
seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea
of a triangle which equally agrees to all?
For, because a property may be demonstrated
to agree to some one particular triangle,
it will not thence follow that it equally
belongs to any other triangle, which in all
respects is not the same with it. For example,
having demonstrated that the three angles
of an isosceles rectangular triangle are
equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore
conclude this affection agrees to all other
triangles which have neither a right angle
nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that,
to be certain this proposition is universally
true, we must either make a particular demonstration
for every particular triangle, which is impossible,
or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract
idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars
do indifferently partake and by which they
are all equally represented. To which I answer,
that, though the idea I have in view whilst
I make the demonstration be, for instance,
that of an isosceles rectangular triangle
whose sides are of a determinate length,
I may nevertheless be certain it extends
to all other rectilinear triangles, of what
sort or bigness soever. And that because
neither the right angle, nor the equality,
nor determinate length of the sides are at
all concerned in the demonstration. It is
true the diagram I have in view includes
all these particulars, but then there is
not the least mention made of them in the
proof of the proposition. It is not said
the three angles are equal to two right ones,
because one of them is a right angle, or
because the sides comprehending it are of
the same length. Which sufficiently shows
that the right angle might have been oblique,
and the sides unequal, and for all that the
demonstration have held good. And for this
reason it is that I conclude that to be true
of any obliquangular or scalenon which I
had demonstrated of a particular right-angled
equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated
the proposition of the abstract idea of a
triangle And here it must be acknowledged
that a man may consider a figure merely as
triangular, without attending to the particular
qualities of the angles, or relations of
the sides. So far he may abstract; but this
will never prove that he can frame an abstract,
general, inconsistent idea of a triangle.
In like manner we may consider Peter so far
forth as man, or so far forth as animal without
framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea,
either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all
that is perceived is not considered.
17. It were an endless as well as an useless
thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great
masters of abstraction, through all the manifold
inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute
which their doctrine of abstract natures
and notions seems to have led them into.
What bickerings and controversies, and what
a learned dust have been raised about those
matters, and what mighty advantage has been
from thence derived to mankind, are things
at this day too clearly known to need being
insisted on. And it had been well if the
ill effects of that doctrine were confined
to those only who make the most avowed profession
of it. When men consider the great pains,
industry, and parts that have for so many
ages been laid out on the cultivation and
advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding
all this the far greater part of them remains
full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes
that are like never to have an end, and even
those that are thought to be supported by
the most clear and cogent demonstrations
contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly
irreconcilable to the understandings of men,
and that, taking all together, a very small
portion of them does supply any real benefit
to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent
diversion and amusement- I say the consideration
of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency
and perfect contempt of all study. But this
may perhaps cease upon a view of the false
principles that have obtained in the world,
amongst all which there is none, methinks,
hath a more wide and extended sway over the
thoughts of speculative men than this of
abstract general ideas.
18. I come now to consider the source of
this prevailing notion, and that seems to
me to be language. And surely nothing of
less extent than reason itself could have
been the source of an opinion so universally
received. The truth of this appears as from
other reasons so also from the plain confession
of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas,
who acknowledge that they are made in order
to naming; from which it is a clear consequence
that if there had been no such things as
speech or universal signs there never had
been any thought of abstraction. See III.
vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human
Understanding. Let us examine the manner
wherein words have contributed to the origin
of that mistake.- First then, it is thought
that every name has, or ought to have, one
only precise and settled signification, which
inclines men to think there are certain abstract,
determinate ideas that constitute the true
and only immediate signification of each
general name; and that it is by the mediation
of these abstract ideas that a general name
comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas,
in truth, there is no such thing as one precise
and definite signification annexed to any
general name, they all signifying indifferently
a great number of particular ideas. All which
doth evidently follow from what has been
already said, and will clearly appear to
anyone by a little reflexion. To this it
will be objected that every name that has
a definition is thereby restrained to one
certain signification. For example, a triangle
is defined to be "a plain surface comprehended
by three right lines," by which that
name is limited to denote one certain idea
and no other. To which I answer, that in
the definition it is not said whether the
surface be great or small, black or white,
nor whether the sides are long or short,
equal or unequal, nor with what angles they
are inclined to each other; in all which
there may be great variety, and consequently
there is no one settled idea which limits
the signification of the word triangle. It
is one thing for to keep a name constantly
to the same definition, and another to make
it stand everywhere for the same idea; the
one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.
19. But, to give a farther account how words
came to produce the doctrine of abstract
ideas, it must be observed that it is a received
opinion that language has no other end but
the communicating our ideas, and that every
significant name stands for an idea. This
being so, and it being withal certain that
names which yet are not thought altogether
insignificant do not always mark out particular
conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded
that they stand for abstract notions. That
there are many names in use amongst speculative
men which do not always suggest to others
determinate, particular ideas, or in truth
anything at all, is what nobody will deny.
And a little attention will discover that
it is not necessary
(even in the strictest reasonings) significant
names which stand for ideas should, every
time they are used, excite in the understanding
the ideas they are made to stand for- in
reading and discoursing, names being for
the most part used as letters are in Algebra,
in which, though a particular quantity be
marked by each letter, yet to proceed right
it is not requisite that in every step each
letter suggest to your thoughts that particular
quantity it was appointed to stand for.
20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked
by words is not the chief and only end of
language, as is commonly supposed. There
are other ends, as the raising of some passion,
the exciting to or deterring from an action,
the putting the mind in some particular disposition-
to which the former is in many cases barely
subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted,
when these can be obtained without it, as
I think does not unfrequently happen in the
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader
to reflect with himself, and see if it doth
not often happen, either in hearing or reading
a discourse, that the passions of fear, love,
hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like,
arise immediately in his mind upon the perception
of certain words, without any ideas coming
between. At first, indeed, the words might
have occasioned ideas that were fitting to
produce those emotions; but, if I mistake
not, it will be found that, when language
is once grown familiar, the hearing of the
sounds or sight of the characters is oft
immediately attended with those passions
which at first were wont to be produced by
the intervention of ideas that are now quite
omitted. May we not, for example, be affected
with the promise of a good thing, though
we have not an idea of what it is? Or is
not the being threatened with danger sufficient
to excite a dread, though we think not of
any particular evil likely to befal us, nor
yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger
in abstract? If any one shall join ever so
little reflexion of his own to what has been
said, I believe that it will evidently appear
to him that general names are often used
in the propriety of language without the
speaker's designing them for marks of ideas
in his own, which he would have them raise
in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names
themselves do not seem always spoken with
a design to bring into our view the ideas
of those individuals that are supposed to
be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman
tells me "Aristotle hath said it,"
all I conceive he means by it is to dispose
me to embrace his opinion with the deference
and submission which custom has annexed to
that name. And this effect is often so instantly
produced in the minds of those who are accustomed
to resign their judgment to authority of
that philosopher, as it is impossible any
idea either of his person, writings, or reputation
should go before. Innumerable examples of
this kind may be given, but why should I
insist on those things which every one's
experience will, I doubt not, plentifully
suggest unto him?
21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility
of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what
has been said for them by their ablest patrons;
and endeavored to show they are of no use
for those ends to which they are thought
necessary. And lastly, we have traced them
to the source from whence they flow, which
appears evidently to be language.- It cannot
be denied that words are of excellent use,
in that by their means all that stock of
knowledge which has been purchased by the
joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages
and nations may be drawn into the view and
made the possession of one single person.
But at the same time it must be owned that
most parts of knowledge have been strangely
perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words,
and general ways of speech wherein they are
delivered. Since therefore words are so apt
to impose on the understanding, whatever
ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take
them bare and naked into my view, keeping
out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those
names which long and constant use hath so
strictly united with them; from which I may
expect to derive the following advantages:
22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of
all controversies purely verbal- the springing
up of which weeds in almost all the sciences
has been a main hindrance to the growth of
true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this
seems to be a sure way to extricate myself
out of that fine and subtle net of abstract
ideas which has so miserably perplexed and
entangled the minds of men; and that with
this peculiar circumstance, that by how much
the finer and more curious was the wit of
any man, by so much the deeper was he likely
to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly,
so long as I confine my thoughts to my own
ideas divested of words, I do not see how
I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider,
I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be
deceived in thinking I have an idea which
I have not. It is not possible for me to
imagine that any of my own ideas are alike
or unlike that are not truly so. To discern
the agreements or disagreements there are
between my ideas, to see what ideas are included
in any compound idea and what not, there
is nothing more requisite than an attentive
perception of what passes in my own understanding.
23. But the attainment of all these advantages
doth presuppose an entire deliverance from
the deception of words, which I dare hardly
promise myself; so difficult a thing it is
to dissolve an union so early begun, and
confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt
words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to
have been very much increased by the doctrine
of abstraction. For, so long as men thought
abstract ideas were annexed to their words,
it doth not seem strange that they should
use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable
thing to lay aside the word, and retain the
abstract idea in the mind, which in itself
was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to
me the principal cause why those men who
have so emphatically recommended to others
the laying aside all use of words in their
meditations, and contemplating their bare
ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves.
Of late many have been very sensible of the
absurd opinions and insignificant disputes
which grow out of the abuse of words. And,
in order to remedy these evils, they advise
well, that we attend to the ideas signified,
and draw off our attention from the words
which signify them. But, how good soever
this advice may be they have given others,
it is plain they could not have a due regard
to it themselves, so long as they thought
the only immediate use of words was to signify
ideas, and that the immediate signification
of every general name was a determinate abstract
idea.
24. But, these being known to be mistakes,
a man may with greater ease prevent his being
imposed on by words. He that knows he has
no other than particular ideas, will not
puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive
the abstract idea annexed to any name. And
he that knows names do not always stand for
ideas will spare himself the labour of looking
for ideas where there are none to be had.
It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone
would use his utmost endeavours to obtain
a clear view of the ideas he would consider,
separating from them all that dress and incumbrance
of words which so much contribute to blind
the judgment and divide the attention. In
vain do we extend our view into the heavens
and pry into the entrails of the earth, in
vain do we consult the writings of learned
men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity-
we need only draw the curtain of words, to
hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose
fruit is excellent, and within the reach
of our hand.
25. Unless we take care to clear the First
Principles of Knowledge from the embarras
and delusion of words, we may make infinite
reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may
draw consequences from consequences, and
be never the wiser. The farther we go, we
shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably,
and be the deeper entangled in difficulties
and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to
read the following sheets, I entreat him
to make my words the occasion of his own
thinking, and endeavour to attain the same
train of thoughts in reading that I had in
writing them. By this means it will be easy
for him to discover the truth or falsity
of what I say. He will be out of all danger
of being deceived by my words, and I do not
see how he can be led into an error by considering
his own naked, undisguised ideas.
|
Evans Experientialism 
