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The BE-Mechanism
The question of the BE-mechanism doesn't appear to have occurred to
that craven Nazi Martin Heidegger.
As for the supposition of the infinitive
"exist" with the word "am"
so beloved of the transcendentalists
[because it is so useful for obfuscation]
- this will get them nowhere fast.
"I think therefore I exist" implies or connotes and involves an ontological
redundancy, an unnecessary condition of consequence;
as in logic , for the very mention of the
subject "I" is in itself enough
to instantiate existential presence, without
any spurious modalic bolt-ons such as "thinking"
or "breathing" or any other
Cartesian existential modalic afterthoughts.
Heidegger failed to pick
up on the BE-mechanism, which he should have done, as Being and Time, the book he wrote purports to be an examination
of the question of "Being." I am perfectly aware of the intransitivity
and transitivity of the infinitive TO BE
in this discussion, my ontological point
is that the intransitivity of "To be" is a philosophical, ontological and semantic
absurdity because:
(A) When used intransitively there is a hidden
predicational transitive assumption. For
example let's examine the few occasions when
it is used [usually in religious tracts,
poetry or transcendentalist literature]
Take Shakespeare's famous line:
"To be or not to be." Here the underlying predication [which
every reader instinctively understands] is: "To be [alive] or not to be [alive.]" Take Disney's Popeye and his: "I am what I am." The cartoon sailorman's assertion also has
an implied predicate: "I am [the person]
I am." Descartes' "I think therefore I am" actually includes the tacit predicational
meaning: "I think therefore I am [me/Descartes]."
It is physically and
ontologically impossible for any entity to
exist in a pure propertyless state. The moment
one utters the words: "I am" the subject "I" is instantiated as a mirrored predicate
— it immediately exists as an entity which
exists in the state of being "I."
The imagined ontological existential 'purity"
is dissolved.
(B) The use of "To be," without
an apparent predicate is entirely contextual.
The public are aware of this with varying
degrees of consciousness. Try it for yourself.
Approach anyone you know and say to them:
"I am." and see what they say.
Inevitably they will respond; "You are
what Shaun?" In fact bearing in mind
my earlier remarks concerning ontological
redundancy, you might well approach you friends
and simply say: "I" — you don't
need the "am" to establish your
existential actuality. They will of course
respond: "You are what?" or some
similar acceptance of your reflexive acknowledgement
of yourself as an existential reality.
If ever, in reply to
a question, we answer: "I am" we are simply not bothering to repeat the
predication posed in the antecedal question.
"Who is going to the dance tonight?" has the predicate: "... going to the dance tonight?" If we answer: "I am," it is a similar instance of the predicate
being understood and dropped [for speed and
convenience] but the verb retaining its transitivity.
(1) "I am what I am" DOES have
a predicate and the predicate is: "...
what I am."
(2) "I think therefore I am," DOES
have a predicate and the predicate is..."think
therefore I am."
(3) "I am" DOES have a predicate,
and the predicate is: the omitted "I"
["I am I."]
Heidegger was always chunnering on about
language being this and language being that
— but in effect he had no real understanding
or respect for its workings. He claimed that
his philosophical purpose was to create,
or allow, recognition of the pre-predictive
ground of "Being," to recognise
the primacy of context, of relevance, of
subjective-in-objective, and of the mystery
of the matrix. BUT IN THE EVENT HE DIDN'T!
Heidegger wasn't rigorous enough
in his examination of BE/IS and it suited his bizarre notions of the
so called "ontological difference" to leave BE unexamined, for if he had done
a proper semantic and ontological examination
of the "Question of "Being"
his clumsy fantasies would have been apparent
to all [even to him.]
For years I have been challenging
the whole concept of BE being a "verb"
at all, for although if carries a temporal
cargo [was — is — will be etc.,] it does
not conform in any other way to the way all
the other English verbs do — it is not a
"Doing Word" there is no "Action"
involved - BE in its various conjugational
forms allows, introduces, attributes, indicates
the action or states of the subject by pointing
to OTHER verbs or adjectives, etc.
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Evans Experientialism 
