Jean Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulations
If we were able to take as the finest
allegory
of simulation the Borges tale where
the cartographers
of the Empire draw up a map so detailed
that
it ends up exactly covering the territory
(but where, with the decline of the
Empire
this map becomes frayed and finally
ruined,
a few shreds still discernible in the
deserts
- the metaphysical beauty of this ruined
abstraction, bearing witness to an
imperial
pride and rotting like a carcass, returning
to the substance of the soil, rather
as an
aging double ends up being confused
with
the real thing), this fable would then
have
come full circle for us, and now has
nothing
but the discrete charm of second-order
simulacra.
l
Abstraction today is no longer that
of the
map, the double, the mirror or the
concept.
Simulation is no longer that of a territory,
a referential being or a substance.
It is
the generation by models of a real
without
origin or reality: a hyperreal. The
territory
no longer precedes the map, nor survives
it. Henceforth, it is the map that
precedes
the territory - precession of simulacra
-
it is the map that engenders the territory
and if we were to revive the fable
today,
it would be the territory whose shreds
are
slowly rotting across the map. It is
the
real, and not the map, whose vestiges
subsist
here and there, in the deserts which
are
no longer those of the Empire, but
our own.
The desert of the real itself.
In fact, even inverted, the fable is
useless.
Perhaps only the allegory of the Empire
remains.
For it is with the same imperialism
that
present-day simulators try to make
the real,
all the real, coincide with their simulation
models. But it is no longer a question
of
either maps or territory. Something
has disappeared:
the sovereign difference between them
that
was the abstraction's charm. For it
is the
difference which forms the poetry of
the
map and the charm of the territory,
the magic
of the concept and the charm of the
real.
This representational imaginary, which
both
culminates in and is engulfed by the
cartographer's
mad project of an ideal coextensivity
between
the map and the territory, disappears
with
simulation, whose operation is nuclear
and
genetic, and no longer specular and
discursive.
With it goes all of metaphysics. No
more
mirror of being and appearances, of
the real
and its concept; no more imaginary
coextensivity:
rather, genetic miniaturization is
the dimension
of simulation. The real is produced
from
miniaturized units, from matrices,
memory
banks and command models - and with
these
it can be reproduced an indefinite
number
of times. It no longer has to be rational,
since it is no longer measured against
some
ideal or negative instance. It is nothing
more than operational. In fact, since
it
is no longer enveloped by an imaginary,
it
is no longer real at all. It is a hyperreal:
the product of an irradiating synthesis
of
combinatory models in a hyperspace
without
atmosphere.
In this passage to a space whose curvature
is no longer that of the real, nor
of truth,
the age of simulation thus begins with
a
liquidation of all referentials - worse:
by their art)ficial resurrection in
systems
of signs, which are a more ductile
material
than meaning, in that they lend themselves
to all systems of equivalence, all
binary
oppositions and all combinatory algebra.
It is no longer a question of imitation,
nor of reduplication, nor even of parody.
It is rather a question of substituting
signs
of the real for the real itself; that
is,
an operation to deter every real process
by its operational double, a metastable,
programmatic, perfect descriptive machine
which provides all the signs of the
real
and short-circuits all its vicissitudes.
Never again will the real have to be
produced:
this is the vital function of the model
in
a system of death, or rather of anticipated
resurrection which no longer leaves
any chance
even in the event of death. A hyperreal
henceforth
sheltered from the imaginary, and from
any
distinction between the real and the
imaginary,
leaving room only for the orbital recurrence
of models and the simulated generation
of
difference.
The divine irreference of images
To dissimulate is to feign not to have
what
one has. To simulate is to feign to
have
what one hasn't. One implies a presence,
the other an absence. But the matter
is more
complicated, since to simulate is not
simply
to feign: "Someone who feigns
an illness
can simply go to bed and pretend he
is ill.
Someone who simulates an illness produces
in himself some of the symptoms"
(Littre).
Thus, feigning or dissimulating leaves
the
reality principle intact: the difference
is always clear, it is only masked;
whereas
simulation threatens the difference
between
"true" and "false",
between
"real" and "imaginary".
Since the simulator produces "true"
symptoms, is he or she ill or not?
The simulator
cannot be treated objectively either
as ill,
or as not ill. Psychology and medicine
stop
at this point, before a thereafter
undiscoverable
truth of the illness. For if any symptom
can be "produced," and can
no longer
be accepted as a fact of nature, then
every
illness may be considered as simulatable
and simulated, and medicine loses its
meaning
since it only knows how to treat "true"
illnesses by their objective causes.
Psychosomatics
evolves in a dubious way on the edge
of the
illness principle. As for psychoanalysis,
it transfers the symptom from the organic
to the unconscious order: once again,
the
latter is held to be real, more real
than
the former; but why should simulation
stop
at the portals of the unconscious?
Why couldn't
the "work" of the unconscious
be
"produced" in the same way
as any
other symptom in classical medicine?
Dreams
already are.
The alienist, of course, claims that
"for
each form of the mental alienation
there
is a particular order in the succession
of
symptoms, of which the simulator is
unaware
and in the absence of which the alienist
is unlikely to be deceived." This
(which
dates from 1865) in order to save at
all
cost the truth principle, and to escape
the
specter raised by simulation: namely
that
truth, reference and objective caues
have
ceased to exist. What can medicine
do with
something which floats on either side
of
illness, on either side of health,
or with
the reduplication of illness in a discourse
that is no longer true or false? What
can
psychoanalysis do with the reduplication
of the discourse of the unconscious
in a
discourse of simulation that can never
be
unmasked, since it isn't false either?
2
What can the army do with simulators?
Traditionally,
following a direct principle of identification,
it unmasks and punishes them. Today,
it can
reform an excellent simulator as though
he
were equivalent to a "real"
homosexual,
heart-case or lunatic. Even military
psychology
retreats from the Cartesian clarifies
and
hesitates to draw the distinction between
true and false, between the "produced"
symptom and the authentic symptom.
"If
he acts crazy so well, then he must
be mad."
Nor is it mistaken: in the sense that
all
lunatics are simulators, and this lack
of
distinction is the worst form of subversion.
Against it, classical reason armed
itself
with all its categories. But it is
this today
which again outflanks them, submerging
the
truth principle.
Outside of medicine and the army, favored
terrains of simulation, the affair
goes back
to religion and the simulacrum of divinity:
"l forbade any simulacrum in the
temples
because the divinity that breathes
life into
nature cannot be represented."
Indeed
it can. But what becomes of the divinity
when it reveals itself in icons, when
it
is multiplied in simulacra? Does it
remain
the supreme authority, simply incarnated
in images as a visible theology? Or
is it
volatilized into simulacra which alone
deploy
their pomp and power of fascination
- the
visible machinery of icons being substituted
for the pure and intelligible Idea
of God?
This is precisely what was feared by
the
Iconoclasts, whose millennial quarrel
is
still with us today. 3 Their rage to
destroy
images rose precisely because they
sensed
this omnipotence of simulacra, this
facility
they have of erasing God from the consciousnesses
of people, and the overwhelming, destructive
truth which they suggest: that ultimately
there has never been any God; that
only simulacra
exist; indeed that God himself has
only ever
been his own simulacrum. Had they been
able
to believe that images only occulted
or masked
the Platonic idea of God, there would
have
been no reason to destroy them. One
can live
with the idea of a distorted truth.
But their
metaphysical despair came from the
idea that
the images concealed nothing at all,
and
that in fact they were not images,
such as
the original model would have made
them,
but actually perfect simulacra forever
radiant
with their own fascination. But this
death
of the divine referential has to be
exorcised
at all cost.
It can be seen that the iconoclasts,
who
are often accused of despising and
denying
images, were in fact the ones who accorded
them their actual worth, unlike the
iconolaters,
who saw in them only reflections and
were
content to venerate God at one remove.
But
the converse can also be said, namely
that
the iconolaters possesed the most modern
and adventurous minds, since, underneath
the idea of the apparition of God in
the
mirror of images, they already enacted
his
death and his disappearance in the
epiphany
of his representations (which they
perhaps
knew no longer represented anything,
and
that they were purely a game, but that
this
was precisely the greatest game - knowing
also that it is dangerous to unmask
images,
since they dissimulate the fact that
there
is nothing behind them).
This was the approach of the Jesuits,
who
based their politics on the virtual
disappearance
of God and on the worldly and spectacular
manipulation of consciences - the evanescence
of God in the epiphany of power - the
end
of transcendence, which no longer serves
as alibi for a strategy completely
free of
influences and signs. Behind the baroque
of images hides the grey eminence of
politics.
Thus perhaps at stake has always been
the
murderous capacity of images: murderers
of
the real; murderers of their own model
as
the Byzantine icons could murder the
divine
identity. To this murderous capacity
is opposed
the dialectical capacity of representations
as a visible and intelligible mediation
of
the real. All of Western faith and
good faith
was engaged in this wager on representation:
that a sign could refer to the depth
of meaning,
that a sign could exchange for meamng
and
that something could guarantee this
exchangeGod,
of course. But what if God himself
can be
simulated, that is to say, reduced
to the
signs which attest his existence? Then
the
whole system becomes weightless; it
is no
longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum:
not unreal, but a simulacrum, never
again
exchanging for what is real, but exchanging
in itself, in an umnterrupted circuit
without
reference or circumference
So it is with simulation, insofar as
it is
opposed to representation. Representation
starts from the principle that the
sign and
the real are equivalent (even if this
equivalence
is Utopian, it is a fundamental ax~om).
Conversely,
simulation starts from the Utopia of
this
principle of equivalence, from the
radical
negation of the sign as value, from
the sign
as reversion and death sentence of
every
reference. Whereas representation tries
to
absorb simulation by interpreting it
as false
representation, simulation envelops
the whole
edifice of representation as itself
a simulacrum.
These would be the successive phases
of the
image:
1 It is the reflection of a basic reality.
2 It masks and perverts a basic reality.
3 It masks the absence of a basic reality.
4 It bears no relation to any reality
whatever:
it is its own pure simulacrum.
In the first case, the image is a good
appearance:
the representation is of the order
of sacrament.
In the second, it is an evil appearance:
of the order of malefice. In the third,
it
plays at being an appearance: it is
of the
order of sorcery. In the fourth, it
is no
longer in the order of appearance at
all,
but of simulation.
The transition from signs which dissimulate
something to signs which dissimulate
that
there is nothing, marks the decisive
turning
pomt. The first implies a theology
of truth
and secrecy (to which the notmn of
ideology
still belongs). The second inaugurates
an
age of simulacra and simulation, in
which
there is no longer any God to recognize
his
own, nor any last judgement to separate
truth
from false, the real from its art)ficial
resurrection, since everything is already
dead and risen in advance.
When the real is no longer what it
used to
be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning.
There
is a proliferation of myths of origin
and
signs of reality; of second-hand truth,
objectivity
and authenticity. There is an escalation
of the true, of the lived experience;
a resurrection
of the figurative where the object
and substance
have disappeared. And there is a panic-stricken
production of the real and the referential,
above and parallel to the panic of
material
production. This is how simulation
appears
in the phase that concerns us: a strategy
of the real, neo-real and hyperreal,
whose
universal double is a strategy of deterrence.
Hyperreal and imaginary
Disneyland is a perfect model of all
the
entangled orders of simulation. To
begin
with it is a play of illusions and
phantasms:
pirates, the frontier, future world,
etc.
This imaginary world is supposed to
be what
makes the operation successful. But,
what
draws the crowds is undoubtedly much
more
the social microcosm, the miniaturized
and
religious revelling in real America,
in its
delights and drawbacks. You park outside,
queue up inside, and are totally abandoned
at the exit. In this imaginary world
the
only phantasmagoria is in the inherent
warmth
and affection of the crowd, and in
that aufficiently
excessive number of gadgets used there
to
specifically maintain the multitudinous
affect.
The contrast with the absolute solitude
of
the parking lot - a veritable concentration
camp - is total. Or rather: inside,
a whole
range of gadgets magnetize the crowd
into
direct flows; outside, solitude is
directed
onto a single gadget: the automobile.
By
an extraordinary coincidence (one that
undoubtedly
belongs to the peculiar enchantment
of this
universe), this deep-frozen infantile
world
happens to have been conceived and
realized
by a man who is himself now cryogenized;
Walt Disney, who awaits his resurrection
at minus 180 degrees centigrade.
The objective profile of the United
States,
then, may be traced throughout Disneyland,
even down to the morphology of individuals
and the crowd. All its values are exalted
here, in miniature and comic-strip
form.
Embalmed and pactfied. Whence the possibility
of an ideological analysis of Disneyland
(L. Marin does it well in Utopies,
jeux d'espaces):
digest of the American way of life,
panegyric
to American values, idealized transposition
of a contradictory reality. To be sure.
But
this conceals something else, and that
"ideological"
blanket exactly serves to cover over
a third-order
simulation: Disneyland is there to
conceal
the fact that it is the "real"
country, all of "real" America,
which is Disneyland (just as prisons
are
there to conceal the fact that it is
the
social in its entirety, in its banal
omnipresence,
which is carceral). Disneyland is presented
as imaginary in order to make us believe
that the rest is real, when in fact
all of
Los Angeles and the America surrounding
it
are no longer real, but of the order
of the
hyperreal and of simulation. It is
no longer
a question of a false representation
of reality
(ideology), but of concealing the fact
that
the real is no longer real, and thus
of saving
the reality principle.
The Disneyland imaginary is neither
true
nor false: it is a deterrence machine
set
up in order to rejuvenate in reverse
the
fiction of the real. Whence the debility,
the infantile degeneration of this
imaginary.
It ~s meant to be an infantile world,
in
order to make us believe that the adults
are elsewhere, in the "real"
world,
and to conceal the fact that real childishness
is everywhere, particularly among those
adults
who go there to act the child in order
to
foster illusions of their real childishness.
Moreover, Disneyland is not the only
one.
Enchanted Village, Magic Mountain,
Marine
World: Los Angeles is encircled by
these
"imaginary stations" which
feed
reality, reality-energy, to a town
whose
mystery is precisely that it is nothing
more
than a network of endless, unreal circulation:
a town of fabulous proportions, but
without
space or dimensions. As much as electrical
and nuclear power stations, as much
as film
studios, this town, which is nothing
more
than an immense script and a perpetual
motion
picture, needs this old imaginary made
up
of childhood signals and faked phantasms
for its sympathetic nervous system.
Political incantation
Watergate. Same scenario as Disneyland
(an
imaginary effect concealing that reality
no more exists outside than inside
the bounds
of the art)ficial perimeter): though
here
it is a scandal-effect concealing that
there
is no difference between the facts
and their
denunciation (identical methods are
employed
by the CIA and the Washington Post
journalists).
Same operation, though this time tending
towards scandal as a means to regenerate
a moral and political principle, towards
the imaginary as a means to regenerate
a
reality principle in distress.
The denunciation of scandal always
pays homage
to the law. And Watergate above all
succeeded
in imposing the idea that Watergate
was a
scandal - in this sense it was an extraordinary
operation of intoxication: the reinjection
of a large dose of political morality
on
a global scale. It could be said along
with
Bourdieu that: "The specific character
of every relation of force is to dissimulate
itself as such, and to acquire all
its force
only because it is so dissimulated";
understood as follows: capital, which
is
immoral and unscrupulous, can only
function
behind a moral superstructure, and
whoever
regenerates this public mocality (by
indignation,
denunciation, etc.) spontaneously furthers
the; order of capital, as did the Washington
Post journalists.
But this is still only the formula
of ideology,
and when Bourdieu enunciates it, he
takes
"relation of force" to mean
the
truth of capitalist domination, and
he denounces
this relation of force as itself a
scandal:
he therefore occupies the same deterministic
and moralistic position as the Washington
Post journalists. He does the same
job of
purging and revivihg moral order, an
order
of truth wherein the genuine symbolic
violence
of the social order is engendered,
well beyond
all relations of force, which are only
elements
of its indifferent and shifting configuration
in the moral and political consciousnesses
of people.
All that capital asks of us is to receive
it as rational or to combat it in the
name
of rationality, to receive it as moral
or
to combat it in the name of morality.
For
they are identical, meaning they can
be read
another way: before, the task was to
dissimulate
scandal; today, the task is to conceal
the
fact that there is none.
Watergate is not a scandal: this is-
what
must be said at all cost, for this
is what
everyone is concerned to conceal, this
dissimulation
masking a strengthening of morality,
a moral
panic as we approach the primal (mise-en-)scene
of capital: its instantaneous cruelty;
its
incomprehensible ferocity; its fundamental
immorality - these are what are scandalous,
unaccountable for in that system of
moral
and economic equivalence which remains
the
axiom of leftist thought, from Enlightenment
theory to communism. Capital doesn't
give
a damn about the idea of the contract
which
is imputed to it: it is a monstrous
unprincipled
undertaking, nothing more. Rather,
it is
"enlightened" thought which
seeks
to control capital by imposing rules
on it.
And all that recrimination which replaced
revolutionary thought today comes down
to
reproaching capital for not following
the
rules of the game. "Power is unjust;
its justice is a class justice; capital
exploits
us; etc." - as if capital were
linked
by a contract to the society it rules.
It
is the left which holds out the mirror
of
equivalence, hoping that capital will
fall
for this phantasmagoria of the social
contract
and furfill its obligation towards
the whole
of society (at the same time, no need
for
revolution: it is enough that capital
accept
the rational formula of exchange).
Capital in fact has never been linked
by
a contract to the society it dominates.
It
is a sorcery of the social relation,
it is
a challenge to society and should be
responded
to as such. It is not a scandal to
be denounced
according to moral and economic rationality,
but - challenge to take up according
to symbolic
law.
Moebius: spiralling negativity
Hence Watergate was only a trap set
by the
system to catch its adversaries - a
simulation
of scandal to regenerative ends. This
is
embodied by the character called "Deep
Throat," who was said to be a
Republican
grey eminence manipulating the leftist
journalists
in order to get rid of Nixon - and
why not?
All hypotheses are possible, although
this
one is superfluous: the work of the
Right
is done very well, and spontaneously,
by
the Left on its own. Besides, it would
be
naive to see an embittered good conscience
at work here. For the Right itself
also spontaneously
does the work of the Left. All the
hypotheses
of manipulation are reversible in an
endless
whirligig. For manipulation is a floating
causality where positivity and negativity
engender and overlap with one another;
where
there is no longer any active or passive.
It is by putting an arbitrary stop
to this
revolving causality that a principle
of political
reality can be saved. It is by the
simulation
of a conventional, restricted perspective
field, where the premises and consequences
of any act or event are calculable,
that
a political credibility can be maintained
(including, of course, "objective"
analysis, struggle, etc.) But if the
entire
cycle of any act or event is envisaged
in
a system where linear continuity and
dialectical
polarity no longer exist, in a field
unhinged
by simulation, then all determination
evaporates,
every act terminates at the end of
the cycle
having benefited everyone and been
scattered
in all directions.
Is any given bombing in Italy the work
of
leftist extremists; or of extreme right-wing
provocation; or staged by centrists
to bring
every terrorist extreme into disrepute
and
to shore up its own failing power;
or again,
is it a police-inspired scenario in
order
to appeal to calls for public security?
All
this is equally true, and the search
for
proof- indeed the objectivity of the
fact-
does not check this vertigo of interpretation.
We are in a logic of simulation which
has
nothing to do with a logic of facts
and an
order of reasons. Simulation is characterized
by a precession of the model, of all
models
around the merest fact- the models
come first,
and their orbital (like the bomb) circulation
constitutes the genuine magnetic field
of
events. Facts no longer have any trajectory
of their own, they arise at the intersection
of the models; a single fact may even
be
engendered by all the models at once.
This
anticipation, this precession, this
short-circuit,
this confusion of the fact with its
model
(no more divergence of meaning, no
more dialectical
polarity, no more negative electricity
or
implosion of poles) is what each time
allows
for all the possible interpretations,
even
the most contradictory - all are true,
in
the sense that their truth is exchangeable,
in the image of the models from which
they
proceed, in a generalized cycle.
The communists attack the socialist
party
as though they wanted to shatter the
union
of the Left. They sanction the idea
that
their reticence stems from a more radical
political exigency. In fact, it is
because
they don't want power. But do they
not want
it at this conjuncture because it is
unfavorable
for the Left in general, or because
it is
unfavorable for them within the union
of
the Left - or do they not want it by
definition?
When Berlinguer declares, "We
mustn't
be frightened of seeing the communists
seize
power in Italy," this means simultaneously:
1 That there is nothing to fear, since
the
communists, if they come to power,
will change
nothing in its fundamental capitalist
mechanism.
2 That there isn't any risk of their
ever
coming to power (for the reason that
they
don't want to); and even if they do
take
it up, they will only ever wield it
by proxy.
3 That in fact power, genuine power,
no longer
exists, and hence there is no risk
of anybody
seizing it or taking it over.
4 But more: 1, Berlinguer, am not frightened
of seeing the communists seize power
in Italy
- which might appear evident, but not
so
evident, since:
5 It can also mean the contrary (no
need
for psychoanalysis here): I am frightened
of seeing the communists seize power
(and
with good reason, even for a communist).
All the above is simultaneously true.
This
is the secret of a discourse that is
no longer
only ambiguous, as political discourses
can
be, but that conveys the impossibility
of
a determinate position of power, the
impossibility
of a determinate position of discourse.
And
this logic belongs to neither party.
It traverses
all discourses without their wanting
it.
Who will unravel this imbroglio? The
Gordian
knot can at least be cut. As for the
Moebius
strip, if it is split in two, it results
in an additional spiral without there
being
any possibility of resolving its surfaces
(here the reversible continuity of
hypotheses).
Hades of simulation, which is no longer
one
of torture, but of the subtle, maleficent,
elusive twisting of meaning4 - where
even
those condemned at Burgos are still
a gik
from Franco to Western democracy, which
finds
m them the occasion to regenerate its
own
flagging humamsm, and whose indignant
protestation
consolidates in return Franco's regime
by
uniting the Spanish masses against
foreign
intervention? Where is the truth in
all that,
when such collusions admirably knit
together
without their authors even knowing
it?
The conjunction of the system and its
extreme
alternative like two ends of a curved
mirror,
the "vicious" curvature of
a political
space henceforth magnetized, circularized,
reversibilized from right to lek a
torsion
that is like the evil demon of commutation,
the whole system, the infinity of capital
folded back over its own sur&ce:
transfinite?
And isn't it the same with desire and
libidinal
space? The conjunction of desire and
value,
of desire and capital. The conjunction
of
desire and the law; the ultimate joy
and
metamorphosis of the law (which is
why it
is so well received at the moment):
only
capital takes pleasure, Lyotard said,
before
coming to think that we take pleasure
in
capital. Overwhelming versatility of
desire
in Deleuze: an enigmatic reversal which
brings
this desire that is "revolutionary
by
itself, and as if involuntarily, in
wanting
what it wants," to want its own
repression
and to invest paranoid and fascist
systems?
A malign torsion which reduces this
revolution
of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity
as the other, historical revolution.
All the referentials intermingle their
discourses
in a circular, Moebian compulsion.
Not so
long ago sex and work were savagely
opposed
terms: today both are dissolved into
the
same type of demand. Formerly the discourse
on history took its force from opposing
itself
to the one on nature, the discourse
on desire
to the one on power: today they exchange
their signifiers and their scenarios.
It would take too long to run through
the
whole range of operational negativity,
of
all those scenarios of deterrence which,
like Watergate, try to revive a moribund
principle by simulated scandal, phantasm,
murder - a sort of hormonal treatment
by
negativity and crisis. It is always
a question
of proving the real by the imaginary;
proving
truth by scandal; proving the law by
transgression;
proving work by the strike; proving
the system
by crisis and capital by revolution;
and
for that matter proving ethnology by
the
dispossession of its object (the Tasaday).
Without counting: proving theater by
anti-theater;
proving art by anti-art; proving pedagogy
by anti-pedagogy; proving psychiatry
by anti-psychiatry,
etc., etc.
Everything is metamorphosed into its
inverse
in order to be perpetuated in its purged
form. Every form of power, every situation
speaks of itself by denial, in order
to attempt
to escape, by simulation of death,
its real
agony. Power can stage its own murder
to
rediscover a glimmer of existence and
legitimacy.
Thus with the American presidents:
the Kennedys
are murdered because they still have
a political
dimension. Others - Johnson, Nixon,
Ford
- only had a right to puppet attempts,
to
simulated murders. But they nevertheless
needed that aura of an art)ficial menace
to conceal that they were nothing other
than
mannequins of power. In olden days
the king
(also the god) had to die - that was
his
strength. Today he does his miserable
utmost
to pretend to die, so as to preserve
the
blessing of power. But even this is
gone.
To seek new blood in its own death,
to renew
the cycle by the mirror of crisis,
negativity
and anti-power: this is the only alibi
of
every power, of every institution attempting
to break the vicious circle of its
irresponsibility
and its fundamental nonexistence, of
its
deja-vu and its deja-mort.
Strategy of the real
Of the same order as the impossibility
of
rediscovering an absolute level of
the real,
is the impossibility of staging an
illusion.
Illusion is no longer possible, because
the
real is no longer possible. It is the
whole
political problem of the parody, of
hypersimulation
or offensive simulation, which is posed
here.
For example: it would be interesting
to see
whether the repressive apparatus would
not
react more violently to a simulated
hold
up than to a real one? For a real hold
up
only upsets the order of things, the
right
of property, whereas a simulated hold
up
interferes with the very principle
of reality.
Transgression and violence are less
serious,
for they only contest the distribution
of
the real. Simulation is infinitely
more dangerous
since it always suggests, over and
above
its object, that law and order themselves
might really be nothing more than a
simulation.
But the difficulty is in proportion
to the
peril. How to feign a violation and
put it
to the test? Go and simulate a theft
in a
large department store: how do you
convince
the security guards that it is a simulated
theft? There is no "objective"
difference: the same gestures and the
same
signs exist as for a real theft; in
fact
the signs mclme neither to one side
nor the
other. As far as the established order
is
concerned, they are always of the order
of
the real.
Go and organize a fake hold up. Be
sure to
check that your weapons are harmless,
and
take the most trustworthy hostage,
so that
no life is in danger (otherwise you
risk
committing an offence). Demand ransom,
and
arrange it so that the operation creates
the greatest commotion possible. In
brief,
stay close to the "truth",
so as
to test the reaction of the apparatus
to
a perfect simulation. But you won't
succeed:
the web of art)ficial signs will be
inextricably
mixed up with real elements (a police
officer
will really shoot on sight; a bank
customer
will faint and die of a heart attack;
they
will really turn the phoney ransom
over to
you). In brief, you will unwittingly
find
yourself immediately in the real, one
of
whose functions is precisely to devour
every
attempt at simulation, to reduce everything
to some reality: that's exactly how
the established
order is, well before institutions
and justice
come into play.
In this impossibility of isolating
the process
of simulation must be seen the whole
thrust
of an order that can only see and understand
m terms of some reality, because it
can function
nowhere else. The simulation of an
offence,
if it is patent, will either be punished
more lightly (because it has no "consequences")
or be punished as an offence to public
office
(for example, if one triggered off
a police
operation "for nothing")
- but
never as simulation, since it is precisely
as such that no equivalence with the
real
is possible, and hence no repression
either.
The challenge of simulation is irreceivable
by power. How can you punish the simulation
of virtue? Yet as such it is as serious
as
the simulation of crime. Parody makes
obedience
and transgression equivalent, and that
is
the most serious crime, since it cancels
out the difference upon which the law
is
based. The established order can do
nothing
against it, for the law is a second-order
simulacrum whereas simulation is a
third-order
simulacrum, beyond true and false,
beyond
equivalences, beyond the rational distmctions
upon which function all power and the
entire
social stratum. Hence, failing the
real,
it is here that we must aim at order.
This is why order always opts for the
real.
In a state of uncertainty, It always
prefers
this assumption (thus in the army they
would
rather take the simulator as a true
madman).
But this becomes more and more difficult,
for it is practically impossible to
isolate
the process of simulation; through
the force
of inertia of the real which surrounds
us,
the inverse is also true (and this
very reversibility
forms part of the apparatus of simulation
and of power's impotency): namely,
it is
now impossible to isolate the process
of
the real, or to prove the real.
Thus all hold ups, hijacks and the
like are
now as it were simulation hold ups,
in the
sense that they are inscribed in advance
in the decoding and orchestration rituals
of the media, anticipated in their
mode of
presentation and possible consequences.
In
brief, where they function as a set
of signs
dedicated exclusively to their recurrence
as signs, and no longer to their "real"
goal at all. But this does not make
them
inoffensive. On the contrary, it is
as hyperreal
events, no longer having any particular
contents
or aims, but indefinitely refracted
by each
other (for that matter like so-called
historical
events: strikes, demonstrations, crises,
etc. 5), that they are precisely unverifiable
by an order which can only exert itself
on
the real and the rational, on ends
and means:
a referential order which can only
dominate
referentials, a determinate power which
can
only dominate a determined world, but
which
can do nothing about that indefinite
recurrence
of simulation, about that weightless
nebula
no longer obeying the law of gravitation
of the real - power itself eventually
breaking
apart in this space and becomnig a
simulation
of power (disconnected from its aims
and
objectives, and dedicated to power
effects
and mass simulation).
The only weapon of power, its only
strategy
against this defection, is to reinject
realness
and referentiality everywhere, in order
to
convince us of the reality of the social,
of the gravity of the economy and the
finalities
of production. For that purpose it
prefers
the discourse of crisis, but also -
why not?
- the discourse of desire. "Take
your
desires for reality!" can be understood
as the ultimate slogan of power, for
in a
nonreferential world even the confusian
of
the reality principle with the desire
principle
is less dangerous than contagious hyperreality.
One remains among principles, and there
power
is always right.
Hyperreality and simulation are deterrents
of every principle and of every objective;
they turn against power this deterrence
which
is so well utilized for a long time
itself.
For, finally, it was capital which
was the
first to feed throughout its history
on the
destruction of every referential, of
every
human goal, which shattered every ideal
distinction
between true and false, good and evil,
in
order to establish a radical law of
equivalence
and exchange, the iron law of its power.
It was the first to practice deterrence,
abstraction, disconnection, deterritorialization,
etc.; and if it was capital which fostered
reality, the reality principle, it
was also
the first to liquidate it in the extermination
of every use value, of every real equivalence,
of production and wealth, in the very
sensation
we have of the unreality of the stakes
and
the omnipotence of manipulation. Now,
it
is this very logic which is today hardened
even more against it. And when it wants
to
fight this catastrophic spiral by secreting
one last glimmer of reality, on which
to
found one last glimmer of power, it
only
multiplies the signs and accelerates
the
play of simulation.
As long as it was historically threatened
by the real, power risked deterrence
and
simulation, disintegrating every contradiction
by means of the production of equivalent
signs. When it is threatened today
by simulation
(the threat of vanishing in the play
of signs),
power risks the real, risks crisis,
it gambles
on remanufacturing artificial, social,
economic,
-political stakes. This is a question
of
life or death for it. But it is too
late.
Whence the characteristic hysteria
of our
time: the hysteria of production and
reproduction
of the real. The other production,
that of
goods and commodities, that of la belle
epoque
of political economy, no longer makes
any
sense of its own, and has not for some
time.
What society seeks through production,
and
overproduction, is the restoration
of the
real which escapes it. That is why
contemporary
"material" production is
itself
hyperreal. It retains all the features,
the
whole discourse of traditional production,
but it is nothing more than its scaled-down
refraction (thus the hyperrealists
fasten
in a striking resemblance a real from
which
has fled all meaning and charm, all
the profundity
and energy of representation). Thus
the hyperrealism
of simulation is expressed everywhere
by
the real's striking resemblance to
itself.
Power, too, for some time now produces
nothing
but signs of its resemblance. And at
the
same time, another figure of power
comes
into play: that of a collective demand
for
signs of power - a holy union which
forms
around the disappearance of power.
Everybody
belongs to it more or less in fear
of the
collapse of the political. And in the
end
the game of power comes down to nothing
more
than the critical obsession with power:
an
obsession with its death; an obsession
with
its survival which becomes greater
the more
it disappears. When it has totally
disappeared,
logically we will be under the total
spell
of power - a haunting memory already
foreshadowed
everywhere, manifesting at one and
the same
time the satisfaction of having got
rid of
it (nobody wants it any more, everybody
unloads
it on others) and grieving its loss.
Melancholy
for societies without power: this has
already
given rise to fascism, that overdose
of a
powerful referential in a society which
cannot
terminate its mourning.
But we are still in the same boat:
none of
our societies know how to manage their
mourning
for the real, for power, for the social
itself,
which is implicated in this same breakdown.
And it is by an art)ficial revitalization
of all this that we try to escape it.
Undoubtedly
this will even end up in socialism.
By an
unforeseen twist of events and an irony
which
no longer belongs to history, it is
through
the death of the social that socialism
will
emerge - as it is through the death
of God
that religions emerge. A twisted coming,
a perverse event, an unintelligible
reversion
to the logic of reason. As is the fact
that
power is no longer present except to
conceal
that there is none. A simulation which
can
go on indefinitely, since -unlike "true"
power which is, or was, a structure,
a strategy,
a relation of force, a stake - this
is nothing
but the object of a social demand,
and hence
subject to the law of supply and demand,
rather than to violence and death.
Completely
expunged from the political dimension,
it
is dependent, like any other commodity,
on
production and mass consumption. Its
spark
has disappeared; only the fiction of
a political
universe is saved.
Likewise with work. The spark of production,
the violence of its stake no longer
exists.
Everybody still produces, and more
and more,
but work has subtly become something
else:
a need (as Marx ideally envisaged it,
but
not at all in the same sense), the
object
of a social "demand," like
leisure,
to which it is equivalent in the general
run of life's options. A demand exactly
proportional
to the loss of stake in the work process.
6 The same change in fortune as for
power:
the scenario of work is there to conceal
the fact that the work-real, the production-real,
has disappeared. And for that matter
so has
the strike-real too, which is no longer
a
stoppage of work, but its alternative
pole
in the ritual scansion of the social
calendar.
It is as if everyone has "occupied"
their work place or work post, after
declaring
the strike, and resumed production,
as is
the custom in a "self-managed"
job, in exactly the same terms as before,
by declaring themselves (and virtually
being)
in a state of permanent strike.
This isn't a science-fiction dream:
everywhere
it is a question of a doubling of the
work
process. And of a double or locum for
the
strike process - strikes which are
incorporated
like obsolescence in objects, like
crises
in production. Then there are no longer
any
strikes or work, but both simultaneously,
that is to say something else entirely:
a
wizardry of work, a trompe l'oeil,
a scenodrama
(not to say melodrama) of production,
collective
dramaturgy upon the empty stage of
the social.
It is no longer a question of the ideology
of work - of the traditional ethic
that obscures
the "real" labour process
and the
"objective" process of exploitation-
but of the scenario of work. Likewise,
it
is no longer a question of the ideology
of
power, but of the scenario of power.
Ideology
only corresponds to a betrayal of reality
by signs; simulation corresponds to
a short-circuit
of reality and to its reduplication
by signs.
It is always the aim of ideological
analysis
to restore the objective process; it
is always
a false problem to want to restore
the truth
beneath the simulacrum.
This is ultimately why power is so
in accord
with ideological discourses and discourses
on ideology, for these are all discourses
of truth - always good, even and especially
if they are revolutionary, to counter
the
mortal blows of simulation.
Notes
1 Counterfeit and reproduction imply
always
an anguish, a disquieting foreignness:
the
uneasiness before the photograph, considered
like a witch's trick - and more generally
before any technical apparatus, which
is
always an apparatus of reproduction,
is related
by Benjamin to the uneasiness before
the
mirror-image. There is already sorcery
at
work in the mirror. But how much more
so
when this image can be detached from
the
mirror and be transported, stocked,
reproduced
at will (cf. The Student of Prague,
where
the devil detaches the image of the
student
from the mirror and harrasses him to
death
by the intermediary of this image).
All reproduction
implies therefore a kind of black magic,
from the fact of being seduced by one's
own
image in the water, like Narcissus,
to being
haunted by the double and, who knows,
to
the mortal turning back of this vast
technical
apparatus secreted today by man as
his own
image (the narcissistic mirage of technique,
McLuhan) and that returns to him, cancelled
and distorted -endless reproduction
of himself
and his power to the limits of the
world.
Reproduction is diabolical in its very
essence;
it makes something fundamental vacillate.
This has hardly changed for us: simulation
(that we describe here as the operation
of
the code) is still and always the place
of
a gigantic enterprise of manipulation,
of
control and of death, just like the
imitative
object (primitive statuette, image
of photo)
always had as objective an operation
of black
image.
2 There is furthermore in Monod's book
a
flagrant contradiction, which reflects
the
ambiguity of all current science. His
discourse
concerns the code, that is the third-order
simulacra, but it does so still according
to "scientific" schemes of
the
second-order - objectiveness, "scientific"
ethic of knowledge, science's principle
of
truth and transcendence. All things
incompatible
with the indeterminable models of the
third-order.
3 "It's the feeble 'definition'
of TV
which condemns its spectator to rearranging
the few points retained into a kind
of abstract
work. He participates suddenly in the
creation
of a reality that was only just presented
to him in dots: the television watcher
is
in the position of an individual who
is asked
to project his own fantasies on inkblots
that are not supposed to represent
anything."
TV as perpetual Rorshach test. And
furthermore:
"The TV image requires each instant
that we 'close' the spaces in the mesh
by
a convulsive sensuous participation
that
is profoundly kinetic and tactile."
4 "The Medium is the Message"
is
the very slogan of the political economy
of the sign, when it enters into the
third-order
simulation - the distinction between
the
medium and the message characterizes
instead
signification of the second-order.
5 The entire current "psychological"
situation is characterized by this
shortcircuit.
Doesn't emancipation of children and
teenagers,
once the initial phase of revolt is
passed
and once there has been established
the principle
of the right to emancipation, seem
like the
real emancipation of parents. And the
young
(students, high-schoolers, adolescents)
seem
to sense it in their always more insistent
demand (though still as paradoxical)
for
the presence and advice of parents
or of
teachers. Alone at last, free and responsible,
it seemed to them suddenly that other
people
possibly have absconded with their
true liberty.
Therefore, there is no question of
"leaving
them be." They're going to hassle
them,
not with any emotional or material
spontaneous
demand, but with an exigency that has
been
premeditated and corrected by an implicit
oedipal knowledge. Hyperdependence
(much
greater than before) distored by irony
and
refusal, parody of libidinous original
mechanisms.
Demand without content, without referent,
unjust)fied, but for all that all the
more
severe - naked demand with no possible
answer.
The contents of knowledge (teaching)
or of
affective relations, the pedagogical
or familial
referent having been eliminated in
the act
of emancipation, there remains only
a demand
linked to the empty form of the institution-
perverse demand, and for that reason
all
the more obstinate. "Transferable"
desire (that is to say non-referential,
un-referential),
desire that has been fed by lack, by
the
place left vacant, "liberated,"
desire captured in its own vertiginous
image,
desire of desire, as pure form, hyperreal.
Deprived of symbolic substance, it
doubles
back upon itself, draws its energy
from its
own reflection and its disappointment
with
itself. This is literally today the
"demand,"
and it is obvious that unlike the "classical"
objective or transferable relations
this
one here is insoluble and interminable.
Simulated Oedipus.
Francois Richard: "Students asked
to
be seduced either bodily or verbally.
But
also they are aware of this and they
play
the game, ironically. 'Give us your
knowledge,
your presence, you have the word, speak,
you are there for that.' Contestation
certainly,
but not only: the more authority is
contested,
vilified, the greater the need for
authority
as such. They play at Oedipus also,
to deny
it all the more vehemently. The 'teach',
he's Daddy, they say; it's fun, you
play
at incest, malaise, the untouchable,
at being
a tease - in order to de-sexualize
finally."
Like one under analysis who asks for
Oedipus
back again, who tells the "oedipal"
stories, who has the "analytical"
dreams to satisfy the supposed request
of
the analyst, or to resist him? In the
same
way the student goes through his oedipal
number, his seduction number, gets
chummy,
close, approaches, dominates- but this
isn't
desire, it's simulation. Oedipal psychodrama
of simulation (neither less real nor
less
dramatic for all that). Very different
from
the real libidinal stakes of knowledge
and
power or even of a real mourning for
the
absence of same (as could have happened
after
1968 in the universities). Now we've
reached
the phase of desperate reproduction,
and
where the stakes are nil, the simulacrum
is maximal - exacerbated and parodied
simulation
at one and the same time- as interminable
as psychoanalysis and for the same
reasons.
The interminable psychoanalysis.
There is a whole chapter to add to
the history
of transference and countertransference:
that of their liquidation by simulation,
of the impossible psychoanalysis because
it is itself, from now on, that produces
and reproduces the unconscious as its
institutional
substance. Psychoanalysis dies also
of the
exchange of the signs of the unconscious.
Just as revolution dies of the exchange
of
the critical signs of political economy.
This short-circuit was well known to
Freud
in the form of the gift of the analytic
dream,
or with the "uninformed"
patients,
in the form of the gift of their analytic
knowledge. But this was still interpreted
as resistance, as detour, and did not
put
fundamentally into question either
the process
of analysis or the principle of transference.
It is another thing entirely when the
unconscious
itself, the discourse of the unconscious
becomes unfindable - according to the
same
scenario of simulative anticipation
that
we have seen at work on all levels
with the
machines of the third order. The analysis
then can no longer end, it becomes
logically
and historically interminable, since
it stabilizes
on a puppetsubstance of reproduction,
an
unconscious programmed on demand -
an impossible-to-break-through
point around which the whole analysis
is
rearranged. The messages of the unconscious
have been short-circuited by the psychoanalysis
"medium." This is libidinal
hyperrealism.
To the famous categories of the real,
the
symbolic and the imaginary, it is going
to
be necessary to add the hyperreal,
which
captures and obstructs the functioning
of
the three orders.
6 Athenian democracy, much more advanced
than our own, had reached the point
where
the vote was considered as payment
for a
service, after all other repressive
solutions
had been tried and found wanting in
order
to insure a quorum.
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