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If we were able to take as the finest allegory
of simulation the Borges tale where the cartographers
of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that
it ends up exactly covering the territory
(but where, with the decline of the Empire
this map becomes frayed and finally ruined,
a few shreds still discernible in the deserts
- the metaphysical beauty of this ruined
abstraction, bearing witness to an imperial
pride and rotting like a carcass, returning
to the substance of the soil, rather as an
aging double ends up being confused with
the real thing), this fable would then have
come full circle for us, and now has nothing
but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra.
l
Abstraction today is no longer that of the
map, the double, the mirror or the concept.
Simulation is no longer that of a territory,
a referential being or a substance. It is
the generation by models of a real without
origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory
no longer precedes the map, nor survives
it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes
the territory - precession of simulacra -
it is the map that engenders the territory
and if we were to revive the fable today,
it would be the territory whose shreds are
slowly rotting across the map. It is the
real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist
here and there, in the deserts which are
no longer those of the Empire, but our own.
The desert of the real itself.
In fact, even inverted, the fable is useless.
Perhaps only the allegory of the Empire remains.
For it is with the same imperialism that
present-day simulators try to make the real,
all the real, coincide with their simulation
models. But it is no longer a question of
either maps or territory. Something has disappeared:
the sovereign difference between them that
was the abstraction's charm. For it is the
difference which forms the poetry of the
map and the charm of the territory, the magic
of the concept and the charm of the real.
This representational imaginary, which both
culminates in and is engulfed by the cartographer's
mad project of an ideal coextensivity between
the map and the territory, disappears with
simulation, whose operation is nuclear and
genetic, and no longer specular and discursive.
With it goes all of metaphysics. No more
mirror of being and appearances, of the real
and its concept; no more imaginary coextensivity:
rather, genetic miniaturization is the dimension
of simulation. The real is produced from
miniaturized units, from matrices, memory
banks and command models - and with these
it can be reproduced an indefinite number
of times. It no longer has to be rational,
since it is no longer measured against some
ideal or negative instance. It is nothing
more than operational. In fact, since it
is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it
is no longer real at all. It is a hyperreal:
the product of an irradiating synthesis of
combinatory models in a hyperspace without
atmosphere.
In this passage to a space whose curvature
is no longer that of the real, nor of truth,
the age of simulation thus begins with a
liquidation of all referentials - worse:
by their art)ficial resurrection in systems
of signs, which are a more ductile material
than meaning, in that they lend themselves
to all systems of equivalence, all binary
oppositions and all combinatory algebra.
It is no longer a question of imitation,
nor of reduplication, nor even of parody.
It is rather a question of substituting signs
of the real for the real itself; that is,
an operation to deter every real process
by its operational double, a metastable,
programmatic, perfect descriptive machine
which provides all the signs of the real
and short-circuits all its vicissitudes.
Never again will the real have to be produced:
this is the vital function of the model in
a system of death, or rather of anticipated
resurrection which no longer leaves any chance
even in the event of death. A hyperreal henceforth
sheltered from the imaginary, and from any
distinction between the real and the imaginary,
leaving room only for the orbital recurrence
of models and the simulated generation of
difference.
The divine irreference of images
To dissimulate is to feign not to have what
one has. To simulate is to feign to have
what one hasn't. One implies a presence,
the other an absence. But the matter is more
complicated, since to simulate is not simply
to feign: "Someone who feigns an illness
can simply go to bed and pretend he is ill.
Someone who simulates an illness produces
in himself some of the symptoms" (Littre).
Thus, feigning or dissimulating leaves the
reality principle intact: the difference
is always clear, it is only masked; whereas
simulation threatens the difference between
"true" and "false", between
"real" and "imaginary".
Since the simulator produces "true"
symptoms, is he or she ill or not? The simulator
cannot be treated objectively either as ill,
or as not ill. Psychology and medicine stop
at this point, before a thereafter undiscoverable
truth of the illness. For if any symptom
can be "produced," and can no longer
be accepted as a fact of nature, then every
illness may be considered as simulatable
and simulated, and medicine loses its meaning
since it only knows how to treat "true"
illnesses by their objective causes. Psychosomatics
evolves in a dubious way on the edge of the
illness principle. As for psychoanalysis,
it transfers the symptom from the organic
to the unconscious order: once again, the
latter is held to be real, more real than
the former; but why should simulation stop
at the portals of the unconscious? Why couldn't
the "work" of the unconscious be
"produced" in the same way as any
other symptom in classical medicine? Dreams
already are.
The alienist, of course, claims that "for
each form of the mental alienation there
is a particular order in the succession of
symptoms, of which the simulator is unaware
and in the absence of which the alienist
is unlikely to be deceived." This (which
dates from 1865) in order to save at all
cost the truth principle, and to escape the
specter raised by simulation: namely that
truth, reference and objective caues have
ceased to exist. What can medicine do with
something which floats on either side of
illness, on either side of health, or with
the reduplication of illness in a discourse
that is no longer true or false? What can
psychoanalysis do with the reduplication
of the discourse of the unconscious in a
discourse of simulation that can never be
unmasked, since it isn't false either? 2
What can the army do with simulators? Traditionally,
following a direct principle of identification,
it unmasks and punishes them. Today, it can
reform an excellent simulator as though he
were equivalent to a "real" homosexual,
heart-case or lunatic. Even military psychology
retreats from the Cartesian clarifies and
hesitates to draw the distinction between
true and false, between the "produced"
symptom and the authentic symptom. "If
he acts crazy so well, then he must be mad."
Nor is it mistaken: in the sense that all
lunatics are simulators, and this lack of
distinction is the worst form of subversion.
Against it, classical reason armed itself
with all its categories. But it is this today
which again outflanks them, submerging the
truth principle.
Outside of medicine and the army, favored
terrains of simulation, the affair goes back
to religion and the simulacrum of divinity:
"l forbade any simulacrum in the temples
because the divinity that breathes life into
nature cannot be represented." Indeed
it can. But what becomes of the divinity
when it reveals itself in icons, when it
is multiplied in simulacra? Does it remain
the supreme authority, simply incarnated
in images as a visible theology? Or is it
volatilized into simulacra which alone deploy
their pomp and power of fascination - the
visible machinery of icons being substituted
for the pure and intelligible Idea of God?
This is precisely what was feared by the
Iconoclasts, whose millennial quarrel is
still with us today. 3 Their rage to destroy
images rose precisely because they sensed
this omnipotence of simulacra, this facility
they have of erasing God from the consciousnesses
of people, and the overwhelming, destructive
truth which they suggest: that ultimately
there has never been any God; that only simulacra
exist; indeed that God himself has only ever
been his own simulacrum. Had they been able
to believe that images only occulted or masked
the Platonic idea of God, there would have
been no reason to destroy them. One can live
with the idea of a distorted truth. But their
metaphysical despair came from the idea that
the images concealed nothing at all, and
that in fact they were not images, such as
the original model would have made them,
but actually perfect simulacra forever radiant
with their own fascination. But this death
of the divine referential has to be exorcised
at all cost.
It can be seen that the iconoclasts, who
are often accused of despising and denying
images, were in fact the ones who accorded
them their actual worth, unlike the iconolaters,
who saw in them only reflections and were
content to venerate God at one remove. But
the converse can also be said, namely that
the iconolaters possesed the most modern
and adventurous minds, since, underneath
the idea of the apparition of God in the
mirror of images, they already enacted his
death and his disappearance in the epiphany
of his representations (which they perhaps
knew no longer represented anything, and
that they were purely a game, but that this
was precisely the greatest game - knowing
also that it is dangerous to unmask images,
since they dissimulate the fact that there
is nothing behind them).
This was the approach of the Jesuits, who
based their politics on the virtual disappearance
of God and on the worldly and spectacular
manipulation of consciences - the evanescence
of God in the epiphany of power - the end
of transcendence, which no longer serves
as alibi for a strategy completely free of
influences and signs. Behind the baroque
of images hides the grey eminence of politics.
Thus perhaps at stake has always been the
murderous capacity of images: murderers of
the real; murderers of their own model as
the Byzantine icons could murder the divine
identity. To this murderous capacity is opposed
the dialectical capacity of representations
as a visible and intelligible mediation of
the real. All of Western faith and good faith
was engaged in this wager on representation:
that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning,
that a sign could exchange for meamng and
that something could guarantee this exchangeGod,
of course. But what if God himself can be
simulated, that is to say, reduced to the
signs which attest his existence? Then the
whole system becomes weightless; it is no
longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum:
not unreal, but a simulacrum, never again
exchanging for what is real, but exchanging
in itself, in an umnterrupted circuit without
reference or circumference
So it is with simulation, insofar as it is
opposed to representation. Representation
starts from the principle that the sign and
the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence
is Utopian, it is a fundamental ax~om). Conversely,
simulation starts from the Utopia of this
principle of equivalence, from the radical
negation of the sign as value, from the sign
as reversion and death sentence of every
reference. Whereas representation tries to
absorb simulation by interpreting it as false
representation, simulation envelops the whole
edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum.
These would be the successive phases of the
image:
1 It is the reflection of a basic reality.
2 It masks and perverts a basic reality.
3 It masks the absence of a basic reality.
4 It bears no relation to any reality whatever:
it is its own pure simulacrum.
In the first case, the image is a good appearance:
the representation is of the order of sacrament.
In the second, it is an evil appearance:
of the order of malefice. In the third, it
plays at being an appearance: it is of the
order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no
longer in the order of appearance at all,
but of simulation.
The transition from signs which dissimulate
something to signs which dissimulate that
there is nothing, marks the decisive turning
pomt. The first implies a theology of truth
and secrecy (to which the notmn of ideology
still belongs). The second inaugurates an
age of simulacra and simulation, in which
there is no longer any God to recognize his
own, nor any last judgement to separate truth
from false, the real from its art)ficial
resurrection, since everything is already
dead and risen in advance.
When the real is no longer what it used to
be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There
is a proliferation of myths of origin and
signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity
and authenticity. There is an escalation
of the true, of the lived experience; a resurrection
of the figurative where the object and substance
have disappeared. And there is a panic-stricken
production of the real and the referential,
above and parallel to the panic of material
production. This is how simulation appears
in the phase that concerns us: a strategy
of the real, neo-real and hyperreal, whose
universal double is a strategy of deterrence.
Hyperreal and imaginary
Disneyland is a perfect model of all the
entangled orders of simulation. To begin
with it is a play of illusions and phantasms:
pirates, the frontier, future world, etc.
This imaginary world is supposed to be what
makes the operation successful. But, what
draws the crowds is undoubtedly much more
the social microcosm, the miniaturized and
religious revelling in real America, in its
delights and drawbacks. You park outside,
queue up inside, and are totally abandoned
at the exit. In this imaginary world the
only phantasmagoria is in the inherent warmth
and affection of the crowd, and in that aufficiently
excessive number of gadgets used there to
specifically maintain the multitudinous affect.
The contrast with the absolute solitude of
the parking lot - a veritable concentration
camp - is total. Or rather: inside, a whole
range of gadgets magnetize the crowd into
direct flows; outside, solitude is directed
onto a single gadget: the automobile. By
an extraordinary coincidence (one that undoubtedly
belongs to the peculiar enchantment of this
universe), this deep-frozen infantile world
happens to have been conceived and realized
by a man who is himself now cryogenized;
Walt Disney, who awaits his resurrection
at minus 180 degrees centigrade.
The objective profile of the United States,
then, may be traced throughout Disneyland,
even down to the morphology of individuals
and the crowd. All its values are exalted
here, in miniature and comic-strip form.
Embalmed and pactfied. Whence the possibility
of an ideological analysis of Disneyland
(L. Marin does it well in Utopies, jeux d'espaces):
digest of the American way of life, panegyric
to American values, idealized transposition
of a contradictory reality. To be sure. But
this conceals something else, and that "ideological"
blanket exactly serves to cover over a third-order
simulation: Disneyland is there to conceal
the fact that it is the "real"
country, all of "real" America,
which is Disneyland (just as prisons are
there to conceal the fact that it is the
social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence,
which is carceral). Disneyland is presented
as imaginary in order to make us believe
that the rest is real, when in fact all of
Los Angeles and the America surrounding it
are no longer real, but of the order of the
hyperreal and of simulation. It is no longer
a question of a false representation of reality
(ideology), but of concealing the fact that
the real is no longer real, and thus of saving
the reality principle.
The Disneyland imaginary is neither true
nor false: it is a deterrence machine set
up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the
fiction of the real. Whence the debility,
the infantile degeneration of this imaginary.
It ~s meant to be an infantile world, in
order to make us believe that the adults
are elsewhere, in the "real" world,
and to conceal the fact that real childishness
is everywhere, particularly among those adults
who go there to act the child in order to
foster illusions of their real childishness.
Moreover, Disneyland is not the only one.
Enchanted Village, Magic Mountain, Marine
World: Los Angeles is encircled by these
"imaginary stations" which feed
reality, reality-energy, to a town whose
mystery is precisely that it is nothing more
than a network of endless, unreal circulation:
a town of fabulous proportions, but without
space or dimensions. As much as electrical
and nuclear power stations, as much as film
studios, this town, which is nothing more
than an immense script and a perpetual motion
picture, needs this old imaginary made up
of childhood signals and faked phantasms
for its sympathetic nervous system.
Political incantation
Watergate. Same scenario as Disneyland (an
imaginary effect concealing that reality
no more exists outside than inside the bounds
of the art)ficial perimeter): though here
it is a scandal-effect concealing that there
is no difference between the facts and their
denunciation (identical methods are employed
by the CIA and the Washington Post journalists).
Same operation, though this time tending
towards scandal as a means to regenerate
a moral and political principle, towards
the imaginary as a means to regenerate a
reality principle in distress.
The denunciation of scandal always pays homage
to the law. And Watergate above all succeeded
in imposing the idea that Watergate was a
scandal - in this sense it was an extraordinary
operation of intoxication: the reinjection
of a large dose of political morality on
a global scale. It could be said along with
Bourdieu that: "The specific character
of every relation of force is to dissimulate
itself as such, and to acquire all its force
only because it is so dissimulated";
understood as follows: capital, which is
immoral and unscrupulous, can only function
behind a moral superstructure, and whoever
regenerates this public mocality (by indignation,
denunciation, etc.) spontaneously furthers
the; order of capital, as did the Washington
Post journalists.
But this is still only the formula of ideology,
and when Bourdieu enunciates it, he takes
"relation of force" to mean the
truth of capitalist domination, and he denounces
this relation of force as itself a scandal:
he therefore occupies the same deterministic
and moralistic position as the Washington
Post journalists. He does the same job of
purging and revivihg moral order, an order
of truth wherein the genuine symbolic violence
of the social order is engendered, well beyond
all relations of force, which are only elements
of its indifferent and shifting configuration
in the moral and political consciousnesses
of people.
All that capital asks of us is to receive
it as rational or to combat it in the name
of rationality, to receive it as moral or
to combat it in the name of morality. For
they are identical, meaning they can be read
another way: before, the task was to dissimulate
scandal; today, the task is to conceal the
fact that there is none.
Watergate is not a scandal: this is- what
must be said at all cost, for this is what
everyone is concerned to conceal, this dissimulation
masking a strengthening of morality, a moral
panic as we approach the primal (mise-en-)scene
of capital: its instantaneous cruelty; its
incomprehensible ferocity; its fundamental
immorality - these are what are scandalous,
unaccountable for in that system of moral
and economic equivalence which remains the
axiom of leftist thought, from Enlightenment
theory to communism. Capital doesn't give
a damn about the idea of the contract which
is imputed to it: it is a monstrous unprincipled
undertaking, nothing more. Rather, it is
"enlightened" thought which seeks
to control capital by imposing rules on it.
And all that recrimination which replaced
revolutionary thought today comes down to
reproaching capital for not following the
rules of the game. "Power is unjust;
its justice is a class justice; capital exploits
us; etc." - as if capital were linked
by a contract to the society it rules. It
is the left which holds out the mirror of
equivalence, hoping that capital will fall
for this phantasmagoria of the social contract
and furfill its obligation towards the whole
of society (at the same time, no need for
revolution: it is enough that capital accept
the rational formula of exchange).
Capital in fact has never been linked by
a contract to the society it dominates. It
is a sorcery of the social relation, it is
a challenge to society and should be responded
to as such. It is not a scandal to be denounced
according to moral and economic rationality,
but - challenge to take up according to symbolic
law.
Moebius: spiralling negativity
Hence Watergate was only a trap set by the
system to catch its adversaries - a simulation
of scandal to regenerative ends. This is
embodied by the character called "Deep
Throat," who was said to be a Republican
grey eminence manipulating the leftist journalists
in order to get rid of Nixon - and why not?
All hypotheses are possible, although this
one is superfluous: the work of the Right
is done very well, and spontaneously, by
the Left on its own. Besides, it would be
naive to see an embittered good conscience
at work here. For the Right itself also spontaneously
does the work of the Left. All the hypotheses
of manipulation are reversible in an endless
whirligig. For manipulation is a floating
causality where positivity and negativity
engender and overlap with one another; where
there is no longer any active or passive.
It is by putting an arbitrary stop to this
revolving causality that a principle of political
reality can be saved. It is by the simulation
of a conventional, restricted perspective
field, where the premises and consequences
of any act or event are calculable, that
a political credibility can be maintained
(including, of course, "objective"
analysis, struggle, etc.) But if the entire
cycle of any act or event is envisaged in
a system where linear continuity and dialectical
polarity no longer exist, in a field unhinged
by simulation, then all determination evaporates,
every act terminates at the end of the cycle
having benefited everyone and been scattered
in all directions.
Is any given bombing in Italy the work of
leftist extremists; or of extreme right-wing
provocation; or staged by centrists to bring
every terrorist extreme into disrepute and
to shore up its own failing power; or again,
is it a police-inspired scenario in order
to appeal to calls for public security? All
this is equally true, and the search for
proof- indeed the objectivity of the fact-
does not check this vertigo of interpretation.
We are in a logic of simulation which has
nothing to do with a logic of facts and an
order of reasons. Simulation is characterized
by a precession of the model, of all models
around the merest fact- the models come first,
and their orbital (like the bomb) circulation
constitutes the genuine magnetic field of
events. Facts no longer have any trajectory
of their own, they arise at the intersection
of the models; a single fact may even be
engendered by all the models at once. This
anticipation, this precession, this short-circuit,
this confusion of the fact with its model
(no more divergence of meaning, no more dialectical
polarity, no more negative electricity or
implosion of poles) is what each time allows
for all the possible interpretations, even
the most contradictory - all are true, in
the sense that their truth is exchangeable,
in the image of the models from which they
proceed, in a generalized cycle.
The communists attack the socialist party
as though they wanted to shatter the union
of the Left. They sanction the idea that
their reticence stems from a more radical
political exigency. In fact, it is because
they don't want power. But do they not want
it at this conjuncture because it is unfavorable
for the Left in general, or because it is
unfavorable for them within the union of
the Left - or do they not want it by definition?
When Berlinguer declares, "We mustn't
be frightened of seeing the communists seize
power in Italy," this means simultaneously:
1 That there is nothing to fear, since the
communists, if they come to power, will change
nothing in its fundamental capitalist mechanism.
2 That there isn't any risk of their ever
coming to power (for the reason that they
don't want to); and even if they do take
it up, they will only ever wield it by proxy.
3 That in fact power, genuine power, no longer
exists, and hence there is no risk of anybody
seizing it or taking it over.
4 But more: 1, Berlinguer, am not frightened
of seeing the communists seize power in Italy
- which might appear evident, but not so
evident, since:
5 It can also mean the contrary (no need
for psychoanalysis here): I am frightened
of seeing the communists seize power (and
with good reason, even for a communist).
All the above is simultaneously true. This
is the secret of a discourse that is no longer
only ambiguous, as political discourses can
be, but that conveys the impossibility of
a determinate position of power, the impossibility
of a determinate position of discourse. And
this logic belongs to neither party. It traverses
all discourses without their wanting it.
Who will unravel this imbroglio? The Gordian
knot can at least be cut. As for the Moebius
strip, if it is split in two, it results
in an additional spiral without there being
any possibility of resolving its surfaces
(here the reversible continuity of hypotheses).
Hades of simulation, which is no longer one
of torture, but of the subtle, maleficent,
elusive twisting of meaning4 - where even
those condemned at Burgos are still a gik
from Franco to Western democracy, which finds
m them the occasion to regenerate its own
flagging humamsm, and whose indignant protestation
consolidates in return Franco's regime by
uniting the Spanish masses against foreign
intervention? Where is the truth in all that,
when such collusions admirably knit together
without their authors even knowing it?
The conjunction of the system and its extreme
alternative like two ends of a curved mirror,
the "vicious" curvature of a political
space henceforth magnetized, circularized,
reversibilized from right to lek a torsion
that is like the evil demon of commutation,
the whole system, the infinity of capital
folded back over its own sur&ce: transfinite?
And isn't it the same with desire and libidinal
space? The conjunction of desire and value,
of desire and capital. The conjunction of
desire and the law; the ultimate joy and
metamorphosis of the law (which is why it
is so well received at the moment): only
capital takes pleasure, Lyotard said, before
coming to think that we take pleasure in
capital. Overwhelming versatility of desire
in Deleuze: an enigmatic reversal which brings
this desire that is "revolutionary by
itself, and as if involuntarily, in wanting
what it wants," to want its own repression
and to invest paranoid and fascist systems?
A malign torsion which reduces this revolution
of desire to the same fundamental ambiguity
as the other, historical revolution.
All the referentials intermingle their discourses
in a circular, Moebian compulsion. Not so
long ago sex and work were savagely opposed
terms: today both are dissolved into the
same type of demand. Formerly the discourse
on history took its force from opposing itself
to the one on nature, the discourse on desire
to the one on power: today they exchange
their signifiers and their scenarios.
It would take too long to run through the
whole range of operational negativity, of
all those scenarios of deterrence which,
like Watergate, try to revive a moribund
principle by simulated scandal, phantasm,
murder - a sort of hormonal treatment by
negativity and crisis. It is always a question
of proving the real by the imaginary; proving
truth by scandal; proving the law by transgression;
proving work by the strike; proving the system
by crisis and capital by revolution; and
for that matter proving ethnology by the
dispossession of its object (the Tasaday).
Without counting: proving theater by anti-theater;
proving art by anti-art; proving pedagogy
by anti-pedagogy; proving psychiatry by anti-psychiatry,
etc., etc.
Everything is metamorphosed into its inverse
in order to be perpetuated in its purged
form. Every form of power, every situation
speaks of itself by denial, in order to attempt
to escape, by simulation of death, its real
agony. Power can stage its own murder to
rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy.
Thus with the American presidents: the Kennedys
are murdered because they still have a political
dimension. Others - Johnson, Nixon, Ford
- only had a right to puppet attempts, to
simulated murders. But they nevertheless
needed that aura of an art)ficial menace
to conceal that they were nothing other than
mannequins of power. In olden days the king
(also the god) had to die - that was his
strength. Today he does his miserable utmost
to pretend to die, so as to preserve the
blessing of power. But even this is gone.
To seek new blood in its own death, to renew
the cycle by the mirror of crisis, negativity
and anti-power: this is the only alibi of
every power, of every institution attempting
to break the vicious circle of its irresponsibility
and its fundamental nonexistence, of its
deja-vu and its deja-mort.
Strategy of the real
Of the same order as the impossibility of
rediscovering an absolute level of the real,
is the impossibility of staging an illusion.
Illusion is no longer possible, because the
real is no longer possible. It is the whole
political problem of the parody, of hypersimulation
or offensive simulation, which is posed here.
For example: it would be interesting to see
whether the repressive apparatus would not
react more violently to a simulated hold
up than to a real one? For a real hold up
only upsets the order of things, the right
of property, whereas a simulated hold up
interferes with the very principle of reality.
Transgression and violence are less serious,
for they only contest the distribution of
the real. Simulation is infinitely more dangerous
since it always suggests, over and above
its object, that law and order themselves
might really be nothing more than a simulation.
But the difficulty is in proportion to the
peril. How to feign a violation and put it
to the test? Go and simulate a theft in a
large department store: how do you convince
the security guards that it is a simulated
theft? There is no "objective"
difference: the same gestures and the same
signs exist as for a real theft; in fact
the signs mclme neither to one side nor the
other. As far as the established order is
concerned, they are always of the order of
the real.
Go and organize a fake hold up. Be sure to
check that your weapons are harmless, and
take the most trustworthy hostage, so that
no life is in danger (otherwise you risk
committing an offence). Demand ransom, and
arrange it so that the operation creates
the greatest commotion possible. In brief,
stay close to the "truth", so as
to test the reaction of the apparatus to
a perfect simulation. But you won't succeed:
the web of art)ficial signs will be inextricably
mixed up with real elements (a police officer
will really shoot on sight; a bank customer
will faint and die of a heart attack; they
will really turn the phoney ransom over to
you). In brief, you will unwittingly find
yourself immediately in the real, one of
whose functions is precisely to devour every
attempt at simulation, to reduce everything
to some reality: that's exactly how the established
order is, well before institutions and justice
come into play.
In this impossibility of isolating the process
of simulation must be seen the whole thrust
of an order that can only see and understand
m terms of some reality, because it can function
nowhere else. The simulation of an offence,
if it is patent, will either be punished
more lightly (because it has no "consequences")
or be punished as an offence to public office
(for example, if one triggered off a police
operation "for nothing") - but
never as simulation, since it is precisely
as such that no equivalence with the real
is possible, and hence no repression either.
The challenge of simulation is irreceivable
by power. How can you punish the simulation
of virtue? Yet as such it is as serious as
the simulation of crime. Parody makes obedience
and transgression equivalent, and that is
the most serious crime, since it cancels
out the difference upon which the law is
based. The established order can do nothing
against it, for the law is a second-order
simulacrum whereas simulation is a third-order
simulacrum, beyond true and false, beyond
equivalences, beyond the rational distmctions
upon which function all power and the entire
social stratum. Hence, failing the real,
it is here that we must aim at order.
This is why order always opts for the real.
In a state of uncertainty, It always prefers
this assumption (thus in the army they would
rather take the simulator as a true madman).
But this becomes more and more difficult,
for it is practically impossible to isolate
the process of simulation; through the force
of inertia of the real which surrounds us,
the inverse is also true (and this very reversibility
forms part of the apparatus of simulation
and of power's impotency): namely, it is
now impossible to isolate the process of
the real, or to prove the real.
Thus all hold ups, hijacks and the like are
now as it were simulation hold ups, in the
sense that they are inscribed in advance
in the decoding and orchestration rituals
of the media, anticipated in their mode of
presentation and possible consequences. In
brief, where they function as a set of signs
dedicated exclusively to their recurrence
as signs, and no longer to their "real"
goal at all. But this does not make them
inoffensive. On the contrary, it is as hyperreal
events, no longer having any particular contents
or aims, but indefinitely refracted by each
other (for that matter like so-called historical
events: strikes, demonstrations, crises,
etc. 5), that they are precisely unverifiable
by an order which can only exert itself on
the real and the rational, on ends and means:
a referential order which can only dominate
referentials, a determinate power which can
only dominate a determined world, but which
can do nothing about that indefinite recurrence
of simulation, about that weightless nebula
no longer obeying the law of gravitation
of the real - power itself eventually breaking
apart in this space and becomnig a simulation
of power (disconnected from its aims and
objectives, and dedicated to power effects
and mass simulation).
The only weapon of power, its only strategy
against this defection, is to reinject realness
and referentiality everywhere, in order to
convince us of the reality of the social,
of the gravity of the economy and the finalities
of production. For that purpose it prefers
the discourse of crisis, but also - why not?
- the discourse of desire. "Take your
desires for reality!" can be understood
as the ultimate slogan of power, for in a
nonreferential world even the confusian of
the reality principle with the desire principle
is less dangerous than contagious hyperreality.
One remains among principles, and there power
is always right.
Hyperreality and simulation are deterrents
of every principle and of every objective;
they turn against power this deterrence which
is so well utilized for a long time itself.
For, finally, it was capital which was the
first to feed throughout its history on the
destruction of every referential, of every
human goal, which shattered every ideal distinction
between true and false, good and evil, in
order to establish a radical law of equivalence
and exchange, the iron law of its power.
It was the first to practice deterrence,
abstraction, disconnection, deterritorialization,
etc.; and if it was capital which fostered
reality, the reality principle, it was also
the first to liquidate it in the extermination
of every use value, of every real equivalence,
of production and wealth, in the very sensation
we have of the unreality of the stakes and
the omnipotence of manipulation. Now, it
is this very logic which is today hardened
even more against it. And when it wants to
fight this catastrophic spiral by secreting
one last glimmer of reality, on which to
found one last glimmer of power, it only
multiplies the signs and accelerates the
play of simulation.
As long as it was historically threatened
by the real, power risked deterrence and
simulation, disintegrating every contradiction
by means of the production of equivalent
signs. When it is threatened today by simulation
(the threat of vanishing in the play of signs),
power risks the real, risks crisis, it gambles
on remanufacturing artificial, social, economic,
-political stakes. This is a question of
life or death for it. But it is too late.
Whence the characteristic hysteria of our
time: the hysteria of production and reproduction
of the real. The other production, that of
goods and commodities, that of la belle epoque
of political economy, no longer makes any
sense of its own, and has not for some time.
What society seeks through production, and
overproduction, is the restoration of the
real which escapes it. That is why contemporary
"material" production is itself
hyperreal. It retains all the features, the
whole discourse of traditional production,
but it is nothing more than its scaled-down
refraction (thus the hyperrealists fasten
in a striking resemblance a real from which
has fled all meaning and charm, all the profundity
and energy of representation). Thus the hyperrealism
of simulation is expressed everywhere by
the real's striking resemblance to itself.
Power, too, for some time now produces nothing
but signs of its resemblance. And at the
same time, another figure of power comes
into play: that of a collective demand for
signs of power - a holy union which forms
around the disappearance of power. Everybody
belongs to it more or less in fear of the
collapse of the political. And in the end
the game of power comes down to nothing more
than the critical obsession with power: an
obsession with its death; an obsession with
its survival which becomes greater the more
it disappears. When it has totally disappeared,
logically we will be under the total spell
of power - a haunting memory already foreshadowed
everywhere, manifesting at one and the same
time the satisfaction of having got rid of
it (nobody wants it any more, everybody unloads
it on others) and grieving its loss. Melancholy
for societies without power: this has already
given rise to fascism, that overdose of a
powerful referential in a society which cannot
terminate its mourning.
But we are still in the same boat: none of
our societies know how to manage their mourning
for the real, for power, for the social itself,
which is implicated in this same breakdown.
And it is by an art)ficial revitalization
of all this that we try to escape it. Undoubtedly
this will even end up in socialism. By an
unforeseen twist of events and an irony which
no longer belongs to history, it is through
the death of the social that socialism will
emerge - as it is through the death of God
that religions emerge. A twisted coming,
a perverse event, an unintelligible reversion
to the logic of reason. As is the fact that
power is no longer present except to conceal
that there is none. A simulation which can
go on indefinitely, since -unlike "true"
power which is, or was, a structure, a strategy,
a relation of force, a stake - this is nothing
but the object of a social demand, and hence
subject to the law of supply and demand,
rather than to violence and death. Completely
expunged from the political dimension, it
is dependent, like any other commodity, on
production and mass consumption. Its spark
has disappeared; only the fiction of a political
universe is saved.
Likewise with work. The spark of production,
the violence of its stake no longer exists.
Everybody still produces, and more and more,
but work has subtly become something else:
a need (as Marx ideally envisaged it, but
not at all in the same sense), the object
of a social "demand," like leisure,
to which it is equivalent in the general
run of life's options. A demand exactly proportional
to the loss of stake in the work process.
6 The same change in fortune as for power:
the scenario of work is there to conceal
the fact that the work-real, the production-real,
has disappeared. And for that matter so has
the strike-real too, which is no longer a
stoppage of work, but its alternative pole
in the ritual scansion of the social calendar.
It is as if everyone has "occupied"
their work place or work post, after declaring
the strike, and resumed production, as is
the custom in a "self-managed"
job, in exactly the same terms as before,
by declaring themselves (and virtually being)
in a state of permanent strike.
This isn't a science-fiction dream: everywhere
it is a question of a doubling of the work
process. And of a double or locum for the
strike process - strikes which are incorporated
like obsolescence in objects, like crises
in production. Then there are no longer any
strikes or work, but both simultaneously,
that is to say something else entirely: a
wizardry of work, a trompe l'oeil, a scenodrama
(not to say melodrama) of production, collective
dramaturgy upon the empty stage of the social.
It is no longer a question of the ideology
of work - of the traditional ethic that obscures
the "real" labour process and the
"objective" process of exploitation-
but of the scenario of work. Likewise, it
is no longer a question of the ideology of
power, but of the scenario of power. Ideology
only corresponds to a betrayal of reality
by signs; simulation corresponds to a short-circuit
of reality and to its reduplication by signs.
It is always the aim of ideological analysis
to restore the objective process; it is always
a false problem to want to restore the truth
beneath the simulacrum.
This is ultimately why power is so in accord
with ideological discourses and discourses
on ideology, for these are all discourses
of truth - always good, even and especially
if they are revolutionary, to counter the
mortal blows of simulation.
Notes
1 Counterfeit and reproduction imply always
an anguish, a disquieting foreignness: the
uneasiness before the photograph, considered
like a witch's trick - and more generally
before any technical apparatus, which is
always an apparatus of reproduction, is related
by Benjamin to the uneasiness before the
mirror-image. There is already sorcery at
work in the mirror. But how much more so
when this image can be detached from the
mirror and be transported, stocked, reproduced
at will (cf. The Student of Prague, where
the devil detaches the image of the student
from the mirror and harrasses him to death
by the intermediary of this image). All reproduction
implies therefore a kind of black magic,
from the fact of being seduced by one's own
image in the water, like Narcissus, to being
haunted by the double and, who knows, to
the mortal turning back of this vast technical
apparatus secreted today by man as his own
image (the narcissistic mirage of technique,
McLuhan) and that returns to him, cancelled
and distorted -endless reproduction of himself
and his power to the limits of the world.
Reproduction is diabolical in its very essence;
it makes something fundamental vacillate.
This has hardly changed for us: simulation
(that we describe here as the operation of
the code) is still and always the place of
a gigantic enterprise of manipulation, of
control and of death, just like the imitative
object (primitive statuette, image of photo)
always had as objective an operation of black
image.
2 There is furthermore in Monod's book a
flagrant contradiction, which reflects the
ambiguity of all current science. His discourse
concerns the code, that is the third-order
simulacra, but it does so still according
to "scientific" schemes of the
second-order - objectiveness, "scientific"
ethic of knowledge, science's principle of
truth and transcendence. All things incompatible
with the indeterminable models of the third-order.
3 "It's the feeble 'definition' of TV
which condemns its spectator to rearranging
the few points retained into a kind of abstract
work. He participates suddenly in the creation
of a reality that was only just presented
to him in dots: the television watcher is
in the position of an individual who is asked
to project his own fantasies on inkblots
that are not supposed to represent anything."
TV as perpetual Rorshach test. And furthermore:
"The TV image requires each instant
that we 'close' the spaces in the mesh by
a convulsive sensuous participation that
is profoundly kinetic and tactile."
4 "The Medium is the Message" is
the very slogan of the political economy
of the sign, when it enters into the third-order
simulation - the distinction between the
medium and the message characterizes instead
signification of the second-order.
5 The entire current "psychological"
situation is characterized by this shortcircuit.
Doesn't emancipation of children and teenagers,
once the initial phase of revolt is passed
and once there has been established the principle
of the right to emancipation, seem like the
real emancipation of parents. And the young
(students, high-schoolers, adolescents) seem
to sense it in their always more insistent
demand (though still as paradoxical) for
the presence and advice of parents or of
teachers. Alone at last, free and responsible,
it seemed to them suddenly that other people
possibly have absconded with their true liberty.
Therefore, there is no question of "leaving
them be." They're going to hassle them,
not with any emotional or material spontaneous
demand, but with an exigency that has been
premeditated and corrected by an implicit
oedipal knowledge. Hyperdependence (much
greater than before) distored by irony and
refusal, parody of libidinous original mechanisms.
Demand without content, without referent,
unjust)fied, but for all that all the more
severe - naked demand with no possible answer.
The contents of knowledge (teaching) or of
affective relations, the pedagogical or familial
referent having been eliminated in the act
of emancipation, there remains only a demand
linked to the empty form of the institution-
perverse demand, and for that reason all
the more obstinate. "Transferable"
desire (that is to say non-referential, un-referential),
desire that has been fed by lack, by the
place left vacant, "liberated,"
desire captured in its own vertiginous image,
desire of desire, as pure form, hyperreal.
Deprived of symbolic substance, it doubles
back upon itself, draws its energy from its
own reflection and its disappointment with
itself. This is literally today the "demand,"
and it is obvious that unlike the "classical"
objective or transferable relations this
one here is insoluble and interminable.
Simulated Oedipus.
Francois Richard: "Students asked to
be seduced either bodily or verbally. But
also they are aware of this and they play
the game, ironically. 'Give us your knowledge,
your presence, you have the word, speak,
you are there for that.' Contestation certainly,
but not only: the more authority is contested,
vilified, the greater the need for authority
as such. They play at Oedipus also, to deny
it all the more vehemently. The 'teach',
he's Daddy, they say; it's fun, you play
at incest, malaise, the untouchable, at being
a tease - in order to de-sexualize finally."
Like one under analysis who asks for Oedipus
back again, who tells the "oedipal"
stories, who has the "analytical"
dreams to satisfy the supposed request of
the analyst, or to resist him? In the same
way the student goes through his oedipal
number, his seduction number, gets chummy,
close, approaches, dominates- but this isn't
desire, it's simulation. Oedipal psychodrama
of simulation (neither less real nor less
dramatic for all that). Very different from
the real libidinal stakes of knowledge and
power or even of a real mourning for the
absence of same (as could have happened after
1968 in the universities). Now we've reached
the phase of desperate reproduction, and
where the stakes are nil, the simulacrum
is maximal - exacerbated and parodied simulation
at one and the same time- as interminable
as psychoanalysis and for the same reasons.
The interminable psychoanalysis.
There is a whole chapter to add to the history
of transference and countertransference:
that of their liquidation by simulation,
of the impossible psychoanalysis because
it is itself, from now on, that produces
and reproduces the unconscious as its institutional
substance. Psychoanalysis dies also of the
exchange of the signs of the unconscious.
Just as revolution dies of the exchange of
the critical signs of political economy.
This short-circuit was well known to Freud
in the form of the gift of the analytic dream,
or with the "uninformed" patients,
in the form of the gift of their analytic
knowledge. But this was still interpreted
as resistance, as detour, and did not put
fundamentally into question either the process
of analysis or the principle of transference.
It is another thing entirely when the unconscious
itself, the discourse of the unconscious
becomes unfindable - according to the same
scenario of simulative anticipation that
we have seen at work on all levels with the
machines of the third order. The analysis
then can no longer end, it becomes logically
and historically interminable, since it stabilizes
on a puppetsubstance of reproduction, an
unconscious programmed on demand - an impossible-to-break-through
point around which the whole analysis is
rearranged. The messages of the unconscious
have been short-circuited by the psychoanalysis
"medium." This is libidinal hyperrealism.
To the famous categories of the real, the
symbolic and the imaginary, it is going to
be necessary to add the hyperreal, which
captures and obstructs the functioning of
the three orders.
6 Athenian democracy, much more advanced
than our own, had reached the point where
the vote was considered as payment for a
service, after all other repressive solutions
had been tried and found wanting in order
to insure a quorum.
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