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One is absolutely right in not throwing away
subjectivity before acquiring something else.
There's no point in returning to a new kind
of dogmatic metaphysics - sure. After 'Being
and Time' Heidegger keeps on coming back
to Kant and subjectivity -- compare for instance
Jud Evans' (nominalistic) 'world': the same
objective monster as the Being of so many
Heideggerians, while to Kant world is differentiated:
on the one hand the theoretical realm of
a causality, that rules everything and everyone,
on the other a practical world of people.
But Heidegger was taking
subjectivity more serious than anyone, so
he DIDN'T let it go by 'overcoming' it. That's
what the Heideggerians do, who are simply
bourgeois subjectivists in a very late phase.
There is indeed nothing gained by replacing
'subject' by 'Dasein'. Rather everything
is lost, when Da-sein is substantiated. The
hyphen is not a trick, it points exactly
to the how of its being understood (if that
is English): without *being* it oneself,
it's all less than nothing.
And because also this
is not enough he writes: Da-seyn, to discern
it from a metaphysically understood Da-sein.
One could name this heightened subjectivity,
but with the warning that subjectivity is
here not to be understood from that one and
same eternity.
(Like with Hoelderlin's or Trakl's bread
and wine, which in their cases is not just
another variation of the Christian theme.
Or Beethoven's missa solemnis, Berlioz' requiem)
But it's nothing dreamlike.
In fact - in a normal situation I would never
say this - in my subjective life, it has
proven quite effective. Without holding a
mirror in front of the dictatorship of subjectivity
and its representations, I would never have
gotten my self again, nor would those who
are with me. Again, normally I would never
say this, but I don't see any alternative
left than showing the living proofs. And
the others show their proofs, and they're
unmistakably utgaardian: the decomposition
of the only reality left: the bodysubject.
The discrepancy of the words/images used
for justification, and the rottenness that
presents itself, get more and more frightening.
But that at the same
time points to where a solution, or the beginning
of it, might lie: that the lies, not only
Iraq, but the whole god- and earthforlorn
mess that is intensifying, rob away our last
humanity, make it ugly and endlessly usable.
If one has nothing left to resist this ultimate
form of subjectivism, which is a sort of
evil beyond good and evil, if one has lost
any possibility to be (the) Da, one is lost.
But that is not what the intellectual chatterers
want to hear -but look when and how they
run away, there's a lesson in it- and now
is the time to say it a bit more clearly
than Heidegger himself could afford. So I'm
afraid we meet on the crossroads of Verelendung.
The *Verelendung* however is the eternity,
and humans only used for It. (also Bush's
and Kerry's.) But what if there's no one
left to expose them TO?
As Heidegger often writes:
where are the ears to hear? The ears and
the hearing (hoeren) might be missing, but
what never can be left out wholly, insofar
the current type of man is still human, is
the suspicion that there's something missing,
that they still belong to... (ge-hoeren)
And that those who are said to be less civilized,
are in fact superior, and the only way to
fight that is to destroy them, waste them.
Turn them into dwarfs and ants, in order
to crush them, like was done 60 years ago
to the Jews. I like Erdogan, the Turkish
leader. Very calm and dignified, he states
clearly the impossible and suicidal tactics
of Israel.
As to Malthus and eternity:
first the oil seemed to outclass nuclear
energy, the switch of which, as you once
wrote, was simply turned off. But now it
will come back again, so that Heidegger is
right any way. That is not coincidental:
first there is (meaninglessness, then:) will
to will, energy for the sake of energy, and
only then coal, oil, or nuclear energy. It
is essential not to interpret this as essentialism.
It is the essential end of essentialism.
Another kind of essence therefore. Just like
another kind of
(inter)subjectivity, no longer one that can
be constituted, as Husserl still tried.
Rene de Bakker
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Evans Experientialism 
