THE SECOND DISCUSSION

The Refutation of their Theory of the Incorruptibility of the World and of Time and Motion

Ghazali says:

Know that this is part of the first question, for according to the philosophers the existence of the world, having no beginning, does not end either; it is eternal, without a final term. Its disappearance and its corruption cannot be imagined; it never began to exist in the condition in which it exists’ and it will never cease to exist in the condition in which it exists.

Their four arguments which we have mentioned in our discussion of its eternity in the past refer also to its eternity in the future, and the objection is the same without any difference. They say that the world is caused, and that its cause is without beginning or end, and that this applies both to the effect and to the cause, and that, if the cause does not change, the effect cannot change either; upon this they build their proof of the impossibility of its beginning, and the same applies to its ending. This is their first proof.

The second proof is that an eventual annihilation of the world must occur alter its existence, but ‘after’ implies an affirmation of time.

The third proof is that the possibility of its existence does not end, and that therefore its possible existence may conform to the possibility.’ But this argument has no force, for we regard it as impossible that the world should not have begun, but we do not regard it as impossible that it should last eternally, if God should make it last eternally, for it is not necessary that what begins has also an end, although it is necessary for an act to have a beginning and an initial term. Only Abu Hudhail al-Allaf thought that the world must needs have an end, and he said that, as in the past infinite circular movements are impossible, so they are in the future s but this is wrong, for the whole of the future never enters into existence either simultaneously or successively, whereas the whole of the past is there simultaneously but not successively.’ And since it is clear that we do not regard the incorruptibility of the world as impossible from a rational point of view-we regard indeed its incorruptibility and corruptibility as equally possible-we know only through the Divine Law which of the two possibilities will be realized. Therefore let us not try to solve this problem by mere reason!

I say:

His assertion that the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the world in the past applies also to its eternity in the future is true, and equally the second argument applies to both cases. But his assertion that the third argument is not equally valid for the future and for the past, that indeed we regard the becoming of the world in the past as impossible, but that with the exception of Abu Hudhail al-Allaf, who thought that the eternity of the world was impossible in either direction, we do not regard its eternity in the future as absolutely impossible, is not true. For when it was conceded to the philosophers that the possibility of the world had no beginning and that with this possibility a condition of extension, which could measure this possibility, was connected in the same way as this condition of extension is connected with the possible existent, when it is actualized, and it was also evident that this extension had no initial term, the philosophers were convinced that time had no initial term, for this extension is nothing but time, and to call it timeless eternitys is senseless. And since time is connected with possibility and possibility with existence in motion, existence in motion has no first term either. And the assertion of the theologians that everything which existed in the past had a first term is futile, for the First exists in the past eternally, as it exists eternally in the future. And their distinction here between the first term and its acts requires a proof, for the existence of the temporal which occurs in the past is different from the existence of the eternal which occurs in the past. For the temporal which has occurred in the past is finite in both directions, i. e. it has a beginning and an end, but the eternal which has occurred in the past has neither beginning nor end.’ And therefore, since the philosophers have not admitted that the circular movement has a beginning, they cannot be forced to admit that it has an end, for they do not regard its existence in the past as transitory, and, if some philosopher does regard it as such, he contradicts himself and therefore the statement is true that everything that has a beginning has an end. That anything could have a beginning and no end is not true, unless the possible could be changed into the eternal, for everything that has a beginning is possible. And that anything could be liable to corruption and at the same time could be capable of eternity is something incomprehensible’ and stands in need of examination. The ancient philosophers indeed examined this problem, and Abu Hudhail agrees with the philosophers in saying that whatever can be generated is corruptible, and he kept strictly to the consequence which follows from the acceptance of the principle of becoming. As to those who make a distinction between the past and the future, because what is in the past is there in its totality, whereas the future never enters into existence in its totality (for the future enters reality only successively), this is deceptive, for what is in reality past is that which has entered time and that which has entered time has time beyond it in both directions and possesses totality. But that which has never entered the past in the way the temporal enters the past can only be said in an equivocal way to be in the past; it is infinitely extended, with the past rather than in the past, and possesses no totality in itself, although its parts are totalities. And this, if it has no initial term beginning in the past, is in fact time itself. For each temporal beginning is a present, and each present is preceded by a past, and both that which exists commensurable with time, and time commensurable with it, must necessarily be infinite. Only the parts of time which are limited by time in both directions can enter the past, in the same way as only the instant which is everchanging and only the instantaneous motion of a thing in movement in the spatial magnitude in which it moves can really enter the existence of the moved.’ And just as we do not say that the past of what never ceased to exist in the past ever entered existence at an instant-for this would mean that its existence had a beginning and that time limited it in both directions-so it stands with that which is simultaneous with time, not in time. For of the circular movements only those that time limits enter into represented existence,’ but those that are simultaneous with time do not afterwards enter past existence, just as the eternally existent does not enter past existence, since no time limits it. And when one imagines an eternal entity whose acts are not delayed after its existence-as indeed must be the case with any entity whose existence is perfect-then, if it is eternal and does not enter past time, it follows necessarily that its acts also cannot enter past time, for if they did they would be finite and this eternal existent would be eternally inactive and what is eternally inactive is necessarily impossible. And it is most appropriate for an entity, whose existence does not enter time and which is not limited by time, that its acts should not enter existence either, because there is no difference between the entity and its acts. If the movements of the celestial bodies and what follows from them are acts of an eternal entity, the existence of which does not enter the past, then its acts do not enter past time either. For it is not permissible to say of anything that is eternal that it has entered past time, nor that it has ended, for that which has an end has a beginning. For indeed, our statement that it is eternal means the denial of its entering past time and of its having had a beginning. He who, assuming that it entered past time, assumes that it must have a beginning begs the question. It is, therefore, untrue that what is coexistent with eternal existence, has entered existence, unless the eternal existence has entered existence by entering past time. Therefore our statement `everything past must have entered existence’ must be understood in two ways: first, that which has entered past existence must have entered existence, and this is a true statement; secondly, that which is past and is inseparably connected with eternal existence cannot be truly said to have entered existence, for our expression `entered existence’ is incompatible with our expression `connected with eternal existence’. And there is here no difference between act and existence. For he who concedes the existence of an entity which has an eternal past must concede that there exist acts, too, which have no beginning in the past. And it by no means follows from the existence of His acts that they must have entered existence, just as it by no means follows from the past permanency of His essence that He has ever entered existence. And all this is perfectly clear, as you see.

Through this First Existent acts can exist which never began and will never cease, and if this were impossible for the act, it would be impossible, too, for existence, for every act is connected with its existent in existence. The theologians, however, regarded it as impossible that God’s act should be eternal, although they regarded His existence as eternal, and that is the gravest error. To apply the expression `production’ for the world’s creation as the Divine Law does is more appropriate than to use it of temporal production, as the Ash’arites did,’ for the act, in so far as it is an act, is a product, and eternity is only represented in this act because this production and the act produced have neither beginning nor end. And I say that it was therefore difficult for Muslims to call God eternal and the world eternal, because they understood by `eternal’ that which has no cause. Still I have seen some of the theologians tending rather to our opinion.

Ghazali says:

Their fourth proof is similar to the third, for they say that if the world were annihilated the possibility of its existence would remain, as the possible cannot become impossible. This possibility is a relative attribute and according to them everything that becomes needs matter which precedes it and everything that vanishes needs matter from which it can vanish, but the matter and the elements do not vanish, only the forms and accidents vanish which were in them.

I say:

If it is assumed that the forms succeed each other in one substratum in a circular way and that the agent of this succession is an eternal one, nothing impossible follows from this assumption. But if this succession is assumed to take place in an infinite number of matters or through an infinite number of specifically different forms, it is impossible, and equally the assumption is impassible that such a succession could occur without an eternal agent or through a temporal agent. For if there were an infinite number of matters, an actual infinite would exist, and this is impossible. It is still more absurd to suppose that this succession could occur through temporal agents, and therefore from this point of view it is only true that a man must become from another man, on condition that the successive series happens in one and the same matter and the perishing of the curlier men can become the matter of the later. Besides, the existence of the earlier men is also in some respect the efficient cause and the instrument for the later-all this, however, in an accidental way, for those men are nothing but the instrument for the Agent, who does not cease to produce a man by means of a man and through the matter of a man. The student who does not distinguish all these points will not be able to free himself from insoluble doubts. Perhaps God will place you and us among those who have reached the utmost truth concerning what may and must be taught about God’s infinite acts. What I have said about all these things is not proved here, but must be examined by the application of the conditions which the ancients have explained and the rules which they have established for scientific research. Besides, he who would like to be one of those who possess the truth should in any question he examines consult those who hold divergent opinions.’

Ghazali says:

The answer to all this has been given above. I only single out this question because they have two proofs for it.

The first proof is that given by Galen, who says: If the sun, for instance, were liable to annihilation, decay would appear in it over a long period. But observation for thousands of years shows no change in its size and the fact that it has shown no loss of power through such a long time shows that it does not suffer corruption.’ There are two objections to this: The first is that the mode of this proof-that if the sun suffers corruption, it must suffer loss of power, and as the consequence is impossible the antecedent must be impossible too-is what the philosophers call a conjunctive hypothetical proposition,’ and this inference is not conclusive, because its antecedent is not true, unless it is connected with another condition. In other words the falsehood of the consequence of the proposition `if the sun suffers corruption, it must become weaker’ does not imply the falsehood of the antecedent, unless either (z) the antecedent is bound up with the additional condition that, if it suffers corruption through decay, it must do so during a long period, or () it is seriously proved that there is no corruption except through decay. For only then does the falsehood of the consequence imply the falsehood of the antecedent. Now, we do not concede that a thing can only become corrupt through decay; decay is only one form of corruption, for it is not impossible that what is in a state of perfection should suddenly suffer corruption.

I say:

He says in his objection here to this argument that there is no necessary relation between antecedent and consequent, because that which suffers corruption need not become weaker, since it can suffer corruption before it has become weaker. The conclusion, however, is quite sound, when it is assumed that the corruption takes place in a natural way, not by violence, and it is assumed besides that the celestial body is an animal, for all animals super corruption only in a natural way-they necessarily decay before their corruption. However, our opponents do not accept these premisses, so far as they concern heaven, without proof. And therefore Galen’s statement is only of dialectical value. The safest way to use this argument is to say that, if heaven should suffer corruption, it would either disintegrate into the elements of which it is composed or, losing the form it possesses, receive another, as happens with the four elements when they change into one another. If, however, heaven passed away into the elements, those elements would have to be part of another world, for it could not have come into being from the elements contained in this world, since these elements are infinitely small, compared with its size, something like a point in relation to a circle.’ Should heaven, however, lose its form and receive another there would exist a sixth element opposed to all the others, being neither heaven, nor earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire. And all this is impossible. And his statement that heaven does not decay ; is only a common opinion, lacking the force of the immediately evident axioms; and it is explained in the Posterior Analytics of what kind these premisses area

Ghazali says:

The second objection is that, if it were conceded to Galen that there is no corruption except through decay, how can it be known that decay does not affect the sun? His reliance on observation is impossible, for observations determine the size only by approximation, and if the sun, whose size is said to be approximately a hundred and seventy times that of the earth, decreased, for instance, by the size of mountains the difference would not be perceptible to the senses. Indeed, it is perhaps already in decay, and has decreased up to the present by the size of mountains or more; but perception cannot ascertain this, for its knowledge in the science of optics works only by supposition and approximation. The same takes place with sapphire and gold, which, according to them, are composed out of elements and which are liable to corruption. Still, if you left a sapphire for a hundred years, its decrease would be imperceptible, and perhaps the decrease in the sun during the period in which it has been observed stands in proportion to its size as the decrease of the sapphire to its size in a hundred years. This is imperceptible, and this fact shows that his proof is utterly futile.

We have abstained from bringing many proofs of the same kind as the wise disdain. We have given only this one to serve as an example of what we have omitted, and the have restricted ourselves to the four proofs which demand that their solution should be attempted in the way indicated above.

I say:

If the sun had decayed and the parts of it which had disintegrated during the period of its observation were imperceptible because of the size of its body, still the effect of its decay on bodies in the sublunary world would be perceptible in a definite degree, for everything that decays does so only through the corruption and disintegration of its parts, and those parts which disconnect themselves from the decaying mass must necessarily remain in the world in their totality or change into other parts, and in either case an appreciable change must occur in the world, either in the number or in the character of its parts. And if the size of the bodies could change, their actions and affections would change too, and if their actions and affections, and especially those of the heavenly bodies, could change, changes would arise in the sublunary world. To imagine, therefore, a dissipation of the heavenly bodies is to admit a disarrangement in the divine order which, according to the philosopher, prevails in this world. This proof is not absolutely strict.

Ghazali says:

The philosophers have a second proof of the impossibility of the annihilation of the world. They say: The substance of the world could not be annihilated, because no cause could be imagined for this and the passage from existence to non-existence cannot take place without a cause. This cause must be either the Will of the Eternal, and this is impossible, for if He willed the annihilation of the world after not having willed it, He would have changed; or it must be assumed that God and His Will are in all conditions absolutely the same, although the object of His Will changes from non-existence to existence and then again from existence to non-existence. And the impossibility of which we have spoken in the matter of a temporal existence through an eternal will, holds also for the problem of annihilation. But we shall add here a still greater difficulty, namely, that the object willed is without doubt an act of the wiper, for the act of him who acts after not having acted-even if he does not alter in his own nature-must necessarily exist after having not existed: if he remained absolutely in the state he was in before, his act would not be there. But when the world is annihilated, there is no object for God’s act, and if He does not perform anything (for annihilation is nothing), how could there be an action? Suppose the annihilation of the world needed a new act in God which did not exist before, what could such an act be? Could it be the existence of the world? But this is impossible, since what happens is on the contrary the termination of its existence. Could this act then be the annihilation of the world? But annihilation is nothing at all, and it could therefore not be an act. For even in its slightest intensity an act must be existent, but the annihilation of the world is nothing existent at all; how could it then be said that he who caused it was an agent, or he who effected it its cause?`

The philosophers say that to escape this difficulty the theologians are divided into four sects and that each sect falls into an absurdity.

I say:

He says here that the philosophers compel the theologians who admit the annihilation of the world to draw the consequence that from the Eternal, who produced the world, there proceeds a new act, i. e. the act of annihilation, just as they compelled them to draw this consequence in regard to His temporal production. About this problem everything has been said already in our discussion of temporal production, for the same difficulties as befall the problem of production apply to annihilation, and there is no sense in repeating ourselves. But the special difficulty he mentions here is that from the assumption of the world’s temporal production it follows that the act of the agent attaches itself to non-existence, so that in fact the agent performs a non-existing act and this seemed to all the parties too shocking to be accepted,’ and therefore they took refuge in theories he mentions later. But this consequence follows necessarily from any theory which affirms that the act of the agent is connected with absolute creation-that is, the production of something that did not exist before in potency and was not a possibility which its agent converted from potency into actuality, a theory which affirms in fact that the agent created it out of nothing. But for the philosophers the act of the agent is nothing but the actualizing of what is in potency, and this act is, according to them, attached to an existent in two ways, either in production, by converting the thing from its potential existence into actuality so that its non-existence is terminated, or in destruction, by converting the thing from its actual existence into potential existence, so that it passes into a relative non-existence. But he who does not conceive the act of the agent in this way has to draw the consequence that the agent’s act is attached to non-existence in both ways, in production as in destruction; only as this seems clearer in the case of destruction, the theologians could not defend themselves against their opponents. For it is clear that for the man who holds the theory of absolute annihilation the agent must perform something non-existent, for when the agent converts the thing from existence into absolute non-existence, he directs his first intention to something non-existent, by contrast with what happens when he converts it from actual existence into potential existence; for in this conversion the passage into non-existence is only a secondary fact. The same consequence applies to production, only here it is not so obvious, for the existence of the thing implies the annulment of its non-existence, and therefore production is nothing but the changing of the non-existence of a thing into its existence; but since this movement is directed towards production, the theologians could say that the act of the agent is attached solely to production. They could not, however, say this in regard to destruction, since this movement is directed towards non-existence. They have, therefore, no right to say that in production the act of the agent attaches itself only to production, and not to the annulment of non-existence, for in production the annulment of non-existence is necessary, and therefore the act of the agent must necessarily be attached to non-existence. For according to the doctrine of the theologians, the existent possesses only two conditions: a condition in which it is absolutely non-existent and a condition in which it is actually existent., The act of the agent, therefore, attaches itself to it, neither when it is actually existent, nor when it is non-existent . Thus only the following alternatives remain: either the act of the agent does not attach itself to it at all, or it attaches itself to non-existence,’ and non-existence changes itself into existence. He who conceives the agent in this way must regard the change of nonexistence itself into existence, and of existence itself into non-existence, as possible, and must hold that the act of the agent can attach itself to the conversion of either of these opposites into the other. This is absolutely impossible in respect to the other opposites, not to speak of non-existence and existence.

The theologians perceived the agent in the way the weaksighted perceive the shadow of a thing instead of the thing itself and then mistake the shadow for it. But, as you see, all these difficulties arise for the man who has not understood that production is the conversion of a thing from potential into actual existence, and that destruction is the reverse, i. e. the change from the actual into the potentials It appears from this that possibility and matter are necessarily connected with anything becoming, and that what is subsistent in itself can be neither destroyed nor produced.

The theory of the Ash’arites mentioned here by Ghazali, which regards the production of a substance, subsistent in itself, as possible, but not so its destruction, is an extremely weak one, for the consequences which apply to destruction apply also to production, only, it was thought, because in the former case it is more obvious that there was here a real difference. He then mentions the answers of the different sects to the difficulty which faces them on the question of annihilation.

Ghazali says:

The Mu’tazilites say: the act proceeding from Him is an existent, i. e. extinction, which He does not create in a substratum; at one and the same moment it annihilates the whole world and disappears by itself, so that it does not stand in need of another extinction and thus of an infinite regress.

And mentioning this answer to the difficulty, he says:

This is wrong for different reasons. First, extinction is not an intelligible existent, the creation of which can be supposed. Moreover, why, if it is supposed to exist, does it disappear by itself without a cause for its disappearance? Further, why does it annihilate the world? For its creation and inherence in the essence of the world are impossible, since the inherent meets its substratum and exists together with it if only in an instant; if the extinction and existence of the world could meet, extinction would not be in opposition to existence and would not annihilate it’ and, if extinction is created neither in the world nor in a substratum, where could its existence be in order to be opposed to the existence of the world? Another shocking feature in this doctrine is that God cannot annihilate part of the world without annihilating the remainder; indeed He can only create an extinction which annihilates the world in its totality, for if extinction is not in a substratum, it stands in one and the same relation to the totality of the world.

I say:

The answer is too foolish to merit refutation. Extinction and annihilation are synonymous, and if God cannot create annihilation,

He cannot create extinction either. And even if we suppose extinction to be an existent, it could at most be an accident, but an accident without a substratum is absurd. And how can one imagine that the non-existent causes non-existence? All this resembles the talk of the delirious.

Ghazali says:

The second sect, the Karramites, say that the act of God is annihilation, and annihilation signifies an existent which He produces in His essence and through which the world becomes non-existent. In the same way, according to them, existence arises out of the act of creation which He produces in His essence and through which the world becomes existent. Once again, this theory is wrong as it makes the Eternal a substratum for temporal production . Further it is incomprehensible, for creation and likewise annihilation cannot be understood except as an existence, related to will and power, and to establish another entity besides the will and the power and their object, the world, is inconceivable.

I say:

The Karramites believe that there are here three factors: the agent, the act-which they call creation-and an object, i. e. that to which the act attaches itself, and likewise they believe that in the process of annihilation there are three factors: the annihilator, the act-which they call annihilation-and a non-existent. They believe that the act inheres in the essence of the agent and according to them the rise of such a new condition’ in the agent does not imply that the agent is determined by a temporal cause, for such a condition is of a relative and proportional type, and a new relation and proportion does not involve newness in the substratum; only those new events involve a change in the substratum which change the essence of the substratum, e. g. the changing of a thing from whiteness to blackness. Their statement, however, that the act inheres in the essence of the agent is a mistake; it is only a relation which exists between the agent and the object of the act which, when assigned to the agent, is called `act’ and when assigned to the object is called `passivity’ Through this assumption the Karramites are not obliged to admit that, as the Ash’arites believed, the Eternal produces temporal reality’ or that the Eternal is not eternal, but the consequence which is forced upon them is that there must be a cause anterior to the Eternal, for, when an agent acts after not having acted, all the conditions for the existence of his object being fulfilled at the time he did not act, there must have arisen a new quality in the agent at the time when he acts, and each new event demands a new causes So there must be another cause before the first, and so on ad infinitum.

Ghazali says:

The third sect is that of the Ash’arites, who say that accidents pass away by themselves and cannot be imagined to persist, for if they persisted they could not, for this very reason, be imagined ever to pass away. b Substances do not persist by themselves either, but persist by a persistence added to their existence. And if God had not created persistence, substances would have become non-existent through the nonexistence of persistence. This too is wrong, in so far as it denies the evidence of the senses by saying that black and white do not persist and that their existence is continually renewed; reason shrinks from this, as it does, too, from the statement that the body renews its existence at each moment, for reason judges that the hair which is on a man’s head today is identical with, not similar to, the hair that was there yesterday, and judges the same about the black and the white.’ There is yet another difficulty, namely, that when things persist through persistence, God’s attributes must persist through persistence and this persistence persists through persistence and so on ad in finitum.

I say:

This theory of the flux of all existing things is a useless one, although many ancients held it, and there is no end to the impossibilities it implies. How could an existent come into existence, when it passes away by itself and existence passes away through its passing away? If it passed away by itself, it would have to come into existence by itself, and in this case that by which it becomes existent would be identical with that by which it passes away and this is impossible. For existence is the opposite of passing away, and it is not possible that two opposites should occur in the same thing in one and the same connexion. Therefore in a pure existent no passing away can be imagined, for if its existence determined its passing away, it would be non-existent and existent at one and the same moment, and this is impossible. Further, if the existents persist through the persistence of an attribute by itself, will this absence of change in them occur through their existence or through their non-existence? The latter is impossible, so it follows that they persist because of their existence. If, then, all existents must persist because they are existent, and non-existence is something that can supervene upon them, why in Heaven’s name do we need this attribute of persistence to make them persist? All this resembles a case of mental disorder. But let us leave this sect, for the absurdity of their theory is too clear to need refutation.

Ghazali says:

The fourth sect are a group of Ash’arites who say that accidents pass away by themselves, but that substances pass away when God does not create motion or rest or aggregation and disintegration in them, for it is impossible that a body should persist which is neither in motion nor at rest, since in that case it becomes non-existent. The two parties of the Ash’arites incline to the view that annihilation is not an act, but rather a refraining from acting, since they do not understand how non-existence can be an act. All these different theories being false---say the philosophers -it cannot any longer be asserted that the annihilation of the world is possible, even if one were to admit that the world had been produced in time; for although the philosophers concede that the human soul has been produced, they claim the impossibility of its annihilation by means of arguments which are very close to those we have mentioned. For, according to the philosophers, nothing that is self-subsistent and does not inhere in a substratum’ can be imagined as becoming non-existent after its existence, whether it is produced or eternal.’ If one objects against them, that when water is boiled it disappears, they answer that it does not disappear, but is only changed into steam and the steam becomes water again, and its primary matter, i. e. its hyle, the matter in which the form of water inhered, persists when the water has become air, for the hyle only loses the form of water and takes up that of air; the air, having become cold again, condenses into water, but does not receive a new matter, for the matter is common to the elements and only the forms are changed in it.

I say:

He who affirms that accidents do not persist for two moments, and that their existence in substances is a condition of the persistence of those substances, does not know how he contradicts himself, for if the substances are a condition of the existence of the accidents-since the accidents cannot exist without the substances in which they inhere-and the accidents are assumed to be a condition for the existence of the substances, the substances must be necessarily a condition for their own existence; and it is absurd to say that something is a condition for its own existence. Further, how could the accidents be such a condition, since they themselves do not persist for two moments? For, as the instant is at the same time the end of their privation and the beginning of their period of existence, the substance mint be destroyed in this instant, for in this instant there is neither anything of the privative period nor anything of the existent. If there were in the instant anything of the privative period or of the existent, it could not be the end of the former and the beginning of the latter.’ And on the whole, that something which does not persist two moments should be made a condition for the persistence of something for two moments is absurd. Indeed, a thing that persists for two moments is more capable of persisting than one which does not persist for two moments, for the existence of what does not persist for two moments is at an instant, which is in flux, but the existence of what persists for two moments is constant, and how can what is in flux be a condition for the existence of the constant, or how can what is only specifically persistent be a condition for the persistence of the individually persistent? This is all senseless talk. One should know that he who does not admit a Kyle for the corruptible must regard the existent as simple and as not liable to corruption, for the simple does not alter and does not exchange its substance for another substance. Therefore Hippocrates says `if man were made out of one thing alone, he could not suffer by himself’ ,’ i. e. he could not suffer corruption or change. And therefore he could not have become either, but would have to be an eternal existent. What he says here about Avicenna of the difference between the production and the destruction of the soul is without sense.

Ghazali says, answering the philosophers:

The answer is: So far as concerns the different sects you have mentioned, although we could defend each of them and could show that your refutation on the basis of your principle is not valid, because your own principles are liable to the same kind of objection, we will not insist on this point, but we will restrict ourselves to one sect and ask: How will you refute the man who claims that creation and annihilation take place through the will of God: if God wills, He creates, and if He wills, He annihilates, and this is the meaning of His being absolutely powerful, and notwithstanding this He does not alter in Himself, but it is only His act that alters? And concerning your objection that, inasmuch as an act must proceed from the agent, it cannot be understood which act can proceed from Him, when He annihilates, we answer: What proceeds from Him is a new fact, and the new fact is non-existence, for there was no non-existence; then it happened as something new, and this is what proceeds from Him. And if you say: Non-existence is nothing, how could it then proceed from Him? we reply: If non-existence is nothing, how could it happen? Indeed, `proceeding from Him’ does not mean anything but that its happening is related to His power. If its happening has an intelligible meaning, why should its relation to His power not be reasonable?

I say:

All this is sophistical and wrong. The philosophers do not deny that a thing becomes non-existent when a destroying agent destroys it; they only say that the destroying act does not attach itself to it, in so far as the thing becomes non-existent, but in so far as it changes from actual being to potential being, and non-existence results from this change, and it is in this way that non-existence is related to the agent. But it does not follow from the fact that its non-existence occurs after the act of the agent that the agent performs it primarily and essentially. For when it was conceded to Ghazali during the discussion of this problem that the non-existence of the corrupting thing will necessarily occur after the act of the corrupting agent, he drew the conclusion that its non-existence would follow essentially and primarily from the act, but this is impossible. For the agent’s act does not attach itself to its non-existence in so far as it is non-existent, i. e. primarily and essentially. And therefore , if the perceptible existences were simple, they could neither be generated nor destroyed except through the act of the agent being attached to their nonexistence essentially and primarily. But the act of the agent is only attached to non-existence accidentally and secondarily through its changing the object from actual existence into another form of existence in an act followed by non-existence, as from the change of a fire into air there follows the non-existence of the fire. This is the philosophical theory of existence and non-existence.

Ghazali says:

And what is the difference between you and the man who denies absolutely that non-existence can occur to accidents and forms, and who says that non-existence is nothing at all and asks how then it could occur and be called an occurrence and a new event? But no doubt non-existence can be represented as occurring to the accidents, and to speak of it as occurring has a sense whether you call it something real or not. And the relation of this occurrence, which has a reasonable sense, to the power of the Omnipotent, also has an intelligible meaning.’

I say:

That non-existence of this kind occurs is true, and the philosophers admit it, because it proceeds from the agent according to a second intention and accidentally; but it does not follow from its proceeding or from its having a reasonable meaning that it happens essentially or primarily, and the difference between the philosophers and those who deny the occurrence of non-existence is that the philosophers do not absolutely deny the occurrence of non-existence, but only its occurring primarily and essentially through the agent. For the act of the agent does not attach itself necessarily, primarily, and essentially to non-existence, and according to the philosophers non-existence happens only subsequently to the agent’s act in reality. The difficulties ensue only for those who affirm that the world can be annihilated in an absolute annihilation.

Ghazali says:

Perhaps the philosophers will answer: This difficulty is only acute for those who allow the non-existence of a thing after its existence, for those may be asked what the reality is that occurs. But according to us philosophers the existing thing does not become non-existent, for we understand by the fact that the accidents become non-existent the occurrence of their opposites, which are existing realities, and not the occurrence of mere non-existence which is nothing at all, and how could what is nothing at all be said to occur? For if hair becomes white, it is simply whiteness that occurs, for whiteness is something real; but one cannot say that what occurs is the privation of blackness.’

I say:

This answer on behalf of the philosophers is mistaken, for the philosophers do not deny that non-existence occurs and happens through the agent, not, however, according to a primary intention as would be the consequence for one who assumes that a thing can change into pure nothingness; no, non-existence, according to them, occurs when the form of the thing that becomes non-existent disappears, and the opposite form appears. Therefore the following objection which Ghazali makes is valid.

Ghazali says:

This is wrong for two reasons. The first is: Does the occurrence of whiteness imply the absence of blackness? If they deny it, this is an affront to reason, and if they admit it, it may be asked: Is what is implied identical with that which implies? To admit this is a contradiction, for a thing does not imply itself, and if they deny it, it may be asked: Has that which is implied an intelligible meaning? If they deny it, we ask, `How do you know, then, that it is implied, for the judgement that it is implied presupposes that it has a sensible meaning?’ If they admit this, we ask; `Is this thing which is implied and has a sensible meaning, i. e. the absence of blackness, eternal or temporal?’ The answer `eternal’ is impossible; if they answer `temporal’, how should what is described as occurring temporally not be clearly understood? And if they answer `neither eternal nor temporal, this is absurd, for if it were said before the occurrence of whiteness that blackness was non-existent, it would be false, whereas afterwards it would be true.’ It occurred, therefore, without any doubt, and this occurrence is perfectly intelligible and must be related to the Omnipotent.

I say:

This is an occurrence which is perfectly intelligible and must be related to the Omnipotent, but only accidentally and not essentially, for the act of the agent does not attach itself to absolute non-existence, nor to the non-existence of anything, for even the Omnipotent cannot bring it about that existence should become identical with nonexistence. The man who does not assume matter cannot be freed from this difficulty, and he will have to admit that the act of the agent is attached to non-existence primarily and essentially. All this is clear, and there is no need to say more about it. The philosophers, therefore, say that the essential principles of transitory things are two: matter and form, and that there is a third accidental principle, privation, which is a condition of the occurrence of what becomes, namely as preceding it: if a thing becomes, its privation disappears, and if it suffers corruption, its privation arises.’

Ghazali says:

The second objection is that according to the philosophers there are accidents which can become non-existent otherwise than through their contrary, for instance, motion has no contrary, and the opposition between motion and rest is, according to the philosophers, only the opposition of possession and non-possession, i. e. the opposition of being and not-being, not the opposition of one being to another being,’ and the meaning of rest is the absence of motion, and, when motion ceases, rest does not supervene as its contrary, but is a pure non-existence.’ The same is the case with those qualities which belong to the class of entelechies, like the impression of the sensible species on the vitreous humour of the eyes and still more the impression of the forms of the intelligibles on the soul; they become existent without the cessation of a contrary, and their non-existence only means the cessation of their existence without the subsequent occurrence of their opposites, and their disappearance is an example of pure nonexistence which arises. The occurrence of such a non-existence is an understandable fact, and that which can be understood as occurring by itself, even if it is not a real entity, can be understood as being related to the power of the Omnipotent. Through this it is clear that, when one imagines an event as occuring through the eternal Will, it is unessential, whether the occurring event is a becoming or a vanishing.

I say:

On the contrary, when non-existence is assumed to proceed from the agent as existence proceeds from it, there is the greatest difference between the two. But when existence is assumed as a primary fact and non-existence as a secondary fact, i. e. when non-existence is assumed to take place through the agent by means of a kind of existence, i. e. when the agent transforms actual existence into potential existence by removing the actuality-which is a quality possessed by the substrate-then it is true. And from this point of view the philosophers do not regard it as impossible that the world should become non-existent in the sense of its changing into another form, b for non-existence is in this case only a subsequent occurrence and a secondary fact. But what they regard as impossible is that a thing should disappear into absolute nothingness, for then the act of the agent would have attached itself to non-existence, primarily and essentially.

Throughout this discussion Ghazali has mistaken the accidental for the essential, and forced on the philosophers conclusions which they themselves regard as impossible. This is in general the character of the discussion in this book. A more suitable name, therefore, for this book would be `The Book of Absolute Incoherence’, or `The Incoherence of Ghazali’, not `The Incoherence of the Philosophers’, and the best name for my book `The Distinction between Truth and Incoherent Arguments’.