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![]() Anselm's Ontological Argument 1033 - 1109 In One Part |
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| Anselm's ontological argument purports to be an a priori proof of God's existence. | ||||
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Anselm's ontological argument purports to
be an a priori proof of God's existence.
Anselm starts with premises that do not depend
on experience for their justification and
then proceeds by purely logical means to
the conclusion that God exists. His aim is
to refute the fool who says in his heart
that there is no God (Psalms 14:1). This
fool has two important features.
He understands the claim that God exists.
He does not believe that God exists. Anselm's
goal is to show that this combination is
unstable. Anyone who understands what it
means to say that God exists can be led to
see that God does exist. On this view, the
atheist is not just mistaken: his position
is internally inconsistent.
What follows is an attempt to clarify the
argument as it is presented in Chapter II
of the Proslogium. The argument in Chapter
III is rather different, and in some ways
more interesting. After you have worked through
this page, you might try to produce a similar
gloss on the second argument. This will not
be easy: the argument is notoriously complicated.
But you might find it a useful exercise nonetheless.
A Running Paraphrase of the Argument
Let's work through the argument as Anselm
presents it.
Anselm writes:
... we believe that thou art a being than
which nothing greater can be conceived. This
is Anselm's definition. We might paraphrase
it as follows:
By "God" we mean an absolutely
unsurpassable being, a being that cannot
conceivably be improved upon. As we've stressed,
you do not need to agree that this is what
the word "God" ordinarily means.
Treat it as a stipulation. Clearly, if Anselm
can establish the existence of a being of
this sort, his conclusion would be of immense
philosophical and theological significance.
Or is there no such nature, since the Fool
has said in his heart, there is no God? This
puts the question: Is there in fact a being
with the properties our definition assigns
to God?
But, at any rate, this very fool, when he
hears of this being of which I speak - a
being than which nothing greater can be conceived
- understands what he hears, and what he
understands is in his understanding; although
he does not understand it to exist. This
begins and ends straightforwardly. The fool
understands the definition of God but denies
that God exists. The first hint of strangeness
comes in what seems to be a parenthetical
remark: "what he understands is in his
understanding". Anselm apparently proposes
to treat the understanding or the mind as
if it were a place, and to speak of things
existing "in the understanding".
Anselm's assumption here is that if I understand
claims about God, then we may say that God
exists in my understanding or in my mind.
For it is one thing for an object to be in
the understanding, another to understand
that the object exists. For when a painter
first conceives of what he will afterwards
perform, he has it in his understanding be
he does not yet understand it to be, because
he has not yet performed it. But after he
has made the painting, he both has it in
his understanding and he understands that
it exists, because he has made it. Anselm
here explains a distinction. It is one thing
for an object to exist in my understanding,
and another for me to understand it to exist.
This is a familiar distinction, even if the
terms are not familiar. Ghosts, trolls, flying
saucers and the like are all things I can
think about. We might say that I have ideas
of these things; Anselm says that they exist
in the understanding. Anselm's point is that
in general there is a difference between
saying that something exists in my understanding
and saying that I understand (or believe)
it to exist. Trolls exist in my understanding;
but I do not understand them to exist.
Hence even the fool is convinced that something
exists in the understanding, at least, than
which nothing greater can be conceived. For
when he hears of this, he understands it.
And whatever is understood, exists in the
understanding. Here Anselm applies the distinction
he has just drawn to the case of God. The
fool understands claims about God. So God
- a being than which none greater can be
conceived - exists in his understanding.
Anselm means this to be an entirely uncontroversial
claim.
And assuredly, that than which nothing greater
can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding
alone: then it can be conceived to exist
in reality, which is greater. Therefore,
if that than which nothing greater can be
conceived exists in the understanding alone,
the very being than which nothing greater
can be conceived is one than which a greater
can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible.
This is the heart of the argument. The trick
is to show that God cannot possibly exist
in the understanding alone. Anselm begins
by contrasting existing in the understanding
with existing in reality. This by itself
is not problematic. Trolls exist in the understanding
alone; Bill Clinton exists both in the understanding
and in reality; and no doubt there are things
that exist in reality that do not yet exist
in the understanding because no human being
has ever managed to frame a thought about
them. The picture seems to be as follows:
In the area marked A we have things that
exist in the understanding alone; in the
area marked B we have things that exist both
in the understanding and in reality; and
in the area marked C we have things that
exist in reality but not in the understanding.
(For obvious reasons, we cannot give any
concrete examples of the last category.)
At this stage the fool has conceded that
God exists in the understanding: so God belongs
either in A or in B. Anselm now argues that
God cannot exist in the understanding alone.
The argument seems to proceed as follows.
(1) Suppose (with the fool) that God exists
in the understanding alone.
(2) Given our definition, this means that
a being than which none greater can be conceived
exists in the understanding alone.
(3) But this being can be conceived to exist
in reality. That is, we can conceive of a
circumstance in which theism is true, even
if we do not believe that it actually obtains.
(4) But it is greater for a thing to exist
in reality than for it to exist in the understanding
alone.
(5) Hence we seem forced to conclude that
a being than which none greater can be conceived
can be conceived to be greater than it is.
(6) But that is absurd.
(7) So (1) must be false. God must exist
in reality as well as in the understanding.
This reading of the argument is amply confirmed
by the final paragraph: Therefore, if that
than which nothing greater can be conceived
exists in the understanding alone, the very
being than which nothing greater can be conceived
is one than which a greater can be conceived.
But obviously this is impossible. Hence there
is no doubt that there exists a being than
which nothing greater can be conceived, and
it exists both in the understanding and in
reality.
A Reconstruction of the Argument
This is a useful first pass at the argument.
Now let's go over it and try to isolate its
most fundamental assumptions. (I'll highlight
the premises of the reconstructed argument
in red.) Remember the argument's dialectical
context. The aim is to refute the fool -
or less tendentiously, the rational atheist.
So what we want to know about these premises
is whether the fool should accept them. There
is first the definition:
(a) By "God" we mean "a being
than which no greater being can be conceived"
Then there are some assumptions about the
Fool's understanding.
(b) We understand what it means to speak
of a being than which no greater can be conceived.
We understand what these words mean.
(c) We can conceive of such a being's existing
in reality.
Anselm now assumes a principle that he clearly
regards as trivial.
(d) If we understand what it means to speak
of X, then X exists in the understanding.
From (a),(b) and (d) we may now infer:
(e) God exists in the understanding.
(Note: this is not a premise. It is an intermediate
conclusion supported by a quick argument
from premises we have already accepted.)
Anselm now employs a form of reasoning called
reductio ad absurdum. This is a very useful
technique. In a proof of this sort, we begin
by assuming the opposite of what we want
to prove. Then we derive a contradiction
or an absurdity from this supposition. And
from this we conclude that our original assumption
was false. The general form of such an argument
is as follows:
Suppose P From P it follows that Q But Q
is absurd (self-contradictory). Therefore
P is false. For Anselm the target of his
reduction is the proposition that God exists
in the understanding alone. So let us suppose
that this is the case:
(f) Suppose that God exists in the understanding
but not in reality.
From (f) and (c) we may now infer
(g) God in fact exists in the understanding
alone, but he may be conceived to exist in
reality as well as in the understanding.
At this point Anselm wields what is perhaps
his most controversial premise. It is hard
to know exactly how to formulate it. But
something like the following seems to be
what Anselm has in mind.
(h) If something exists in the understanding
alone, but can be conceived to exist in reality,
then that thing can be conceived to be greater
than it actually is.
The idea seems to be: if we compare two things
that are alike in all respects except that
one exists in the understanding alone and
the other exists in reality, then the one
that exists in reality is clearly greater,
better, more perfect. We will have to discuss
the cogency of this assumption in class.
But suppose for now that it is granted. We
may then argue as follows. From (g) and (h)
it follows that
(I) God can be conceived to be greater than
it actually is.
But this is absurd. For given our definition
(a), this just means that
(j) A being that cannot be conceived to be
greater than it is can be conceived to be
greater than it is.
From which it follows that our supposition
(f) is false. We may therefore conclude
(k) God exists in reality.
Now you should ask: Is this a valid argument as it stands? Are the assumptions plausible? Would the fool be willing to grant them? Would you be willing to grant them? If you think that the argument is not a good one, you are under an obligation to say where it goes wrong. It might go wrong in several places. See how many "mistakes" you can find. |
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