Evans Experientialism
 Evans Experientialism
| ||||
| ||||
| ||||
| JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS (1557–1638) In Three Web Pages - Page One Introduction - Foreword and Chapters One to Six Johannes Althusius was born in Diedenshausen in Westphalia in 1557. Beyond a record of his birth, little is known about his early life. Upon receiving his doctorate in both civil and ecclesiastical law at Basle in 1586, he accepted a position on the faculty of law at the Reformed Academy at Herborn. The greatest achievement of his Herborn years was the publication of the Politica in 1603. Its success was instrumental in securing for Althusius an offer to become municipal magistrate of Emden in East Friesland, which was among the first cities in Germany to embrace the Reformed articles of faith. Althusius accepted the offer in 1604 and exercised an influence comparable to that of Calvin in Geneva; he guided the city without interruption until his death in 1638. | ||||
Politica. An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, ed. and trans. Frederick S. Carney. Foreword by Daniel J. Elazar (Indianapolis: 1995 Liberty Fund).
Dedicated to the most distinguished and learned
man Martin Neurath, J. U. D., Siegensian
advocate and trial lawyer, my honorable
relative
and likewise to an excellent and learned
man Jacob Tieffenbach, Cambergian advocate,
my honorable relative
I have attempted, most distinguished and
learned men, honorable relatives and
friends,
to restate in an appropriate order
the many
political precepts that have been handed
down in various writings, and to find
out
whether a methodical plan of instruction
according to the precepts of logicians
can
be followed in these matters. This
plan and
goal was conceived and attempted by
me that
I might possibly offer a torch of intelligence,
judgment, and memory to beginning students
of political doctrine. And in order
to perform
this labor with greater effect and
success,
I have consulted those authors of this
science
who seem to me to excel others in political
experience and practical understanding.
In addition to these writers I have also
added some others, even though they
do not
handle the subject professionally.
I have
discovered that as each of these other
teachers
of politics was devoted to this or
that discipline
and profession, so he also brought
from his
own profession many elements that are
improper
and alien to political doctrine. Indeed,
now philosophers, then jurists, and
still
again theologians handle political
questions
and axioms. I have observed that philosophers
have proposed from ethics many moral
virtues
by which they would like the statesman
and
prince to be equipped and informed.
Jurists
have introduced from jurisprudence—a
cognate
area closely related to politics—many
juridical
questions about which they have spoken
with
eminence in legal science and by which
they
would instruct the statesman. Theologians
who have been of this sort have sprinkled
teachings on Christian piety and charity
throughout; indeed, I should even have
said
that they have prescribed a certain
use of
the Decalogue for the instruction of
the
statesman. I have considered that elements
of this sort that are alien and useless
in
this art ought to be rejected and,
by the
dictate of justice, returned to the
positions
they properly hold in other sciences.
I have also noted some things that are missing
in the political scientists. For they
have
omitted certain necessary matters that
I
think were carelessly overlooked by
them;
or else they considered these matters
to
belong to another science. I miss in
these
writers an appropriate method and order.
This is what I especially seek to provide,
and for the sake of which I have undertaken
this entire labor. For I cannot describe
how very beneficial this plan for clear
teaching
is to students, and even to teachers.
Those
who are acquainted with these matters,
and
have learned from experience about
them,
testify that this method is the fountain
and nursery of memory and intelligence,
and
the moulder of accurate judgment.
The political precepts and examples that
I set forth have been selected, for
the most
part, from these same political authors,
and so acknowledged in proper places.
And
thus you have a summary of the things
I reprove
in a freely Socratic fashion in so
many political
thinkers, the things I reject, those
I find
inadequate, and those I approve. Whether
I have done so rightly or not, you
and other
candid men may judge. Certainly I have
attempted
to flee from and avoid those things
I reprove
in others, and to add what I have found
missing
in them. If I have not completely attained
this goal, nevertheless I have tried.
And
this I consider not reprehensible.
Whatever
was praiseworthy in any other place
or time
has been incorporated here. For each
contributes
in this matter, as in others, what
he can.
In the construction of the tabernacle
in
the ancient Jewish church everyone
did not
contribute the same or equal things.
Some
brought stones, some wood, some iron,
some
silver, some gold, some copper, some
precious
jewels, some cotton cloth, some purple
garments,
some hides, and some goats’ hair. This
collection
of gifts was dissimilar and very unequal.
Yet even the least of these gifts should
be praised. For which of them was not
needed
in the construction of the temple?
If in
political science something perchance
new
has been able to come forth by my efforts,
however difficult this may be to accomplish
in my opinion, this too I consider
pleasing
and welcome.
Here is the place to say something concerning
two difficulties encountered in this
enterprise.
The first is that I have experienced
difficulty
in separating juridical matters from
this
science. For as close as the relationship
is of ethics with theology, and of
physics
with medicine, so close—indeed I should
say
even closer—is the relationship of
politics
with jurisprudence. Where the moralist
leaves
off, there the theologian begins; where
the
physicist ends, the physician begins;
and
where the political scientist ceases,
the
jurist begins. For reasons of homogeneity,
we must not leap readily across boundaries
and limits, carrying from cognate arts
what
is only peripheral to our own. Prudence
and
an acute and penetrating judgment are
indeed
required to distinguish among similar
things
in these arts. It is necessary to keep
constantly
in view the natural and true goal and
form
of each art, and to attend most carefully
to them, that we not exceed the limits
justice
lays down for each art and thereby
reap another’s
harvest. We should make sure that we
render
to each science its due (suum cuique)
and
not claim for our own what is alien
to it.
How many juridical questions taken
from the
midst of jurisprudence do you find
in the
political writings of Bodin and Gregorius?
What can the beginning student of politics,
who is not trained in the science of
politics,
make of these questions, and how can
he pass
judgment upon them? I say the same
about
the theological and philosophical questions
that others have added to politics.
How far one may proceed in political science
is sufficiently indicated by its purpose.
This is, in truth, that association,
human
society, and social life may be established
and conserved for our good by useful,
appropriate,
and necessary means. Therefore, if
there
is some precept that does not contribute
to this purpose, it should be rejected
as
heteronomous.
The purpose of jurisprudence is skillfully
to derive and infer right (jus)1 from
fact
(factum), and so to judge about the
right
and merit of fact in human life. Precepts
that go astray from this goal, and
indicate
nothing about the right that arises
from
fact, are alien and irrelevant in this
discipline.
However, the facts about which right
is affirmed
can vary, and are selected from those
that
are proper to several other arts. For
this
reason, the jurist obtains information,
instruction,
and knowledge about these facts not
from
jurisprudence, but from those who are
skilled
in these other arts. From this information
he is then able to judge more correctly
about
the right and merit of a fact. So it
is that
many jurists write and teach about
rights
of sovereignty (jura majestatis),2
even though
these rights are so proper to politics
that
if they were taken away there would
be almost
nothing left to politics, or too little
for
it to exist. Now the political scientist
properly teaches what are the sources
of
sovereignty (capita majestatis), and
inquires
and determines what may be essential
for
the constituting of a commonwealth.
The jurist,
on the other hand, properly treats
of the
right (jus)3 that arises at certain
times
born these sources of sovereignty and
the
contract entered into between the people
and the prince. Both, therefore, discuss
rights of sovereignty: the political
scientist
concerning the fact of them, and the
jurist
concerning the right of them. If the
political
scientist were to discourse on the
right
and merit of these facts that are judged
necessary, essential, and homogeneous
to
social life, he would have overstepped
the
clear boundaries of his art. If the
jurist
were to propound political precepts,
namely,
how an association is to be constituted,
and once constituted then conserved,
what
kind of commonwealth is happier, what
form
of it is more lasting and subject to
fewer
perils and changes, and other such
things,
he would have taught what is professionally
alien to him. Nevertheless, all arts
in their
use and practice are often united,
indeed,
I should have said always united.
I have assigned the rights of sovereignty
and their sources, as I have said,
to politics.
But I have therein attributed them
to the
realm, or to the commonwealth and people.
I know that in the common opinion of
teachers
they are to be described as belonging
to
the prince and supreme magistrate.
Bodin
clamors that these rights of sovereignty
cannot be attributed to the realm or
the
people because they come to an end
and pass
away when they are communicated among
subjects
or the people. He says that these rights
are proper and essential to the person
of
the supreme magistrate or prince to
such
a degree—and are connected so inseparably
with him—that outside of his person
they
cease to exist, nor can they reside
in any
other person. I am not troubled by
the clamors
of Bodin, nor the voices of others
who disagree
with me, so long as there are reasons
that
agree with my judgment. Therefore,
I maintain
the exact opposite, namely, that these
rights
of sovereignty, as they are called,
are proper
to the realm to such a degree that
they belong
to it alone, and that they are the
vital
spirit, soul, heart, and life by which,
when
they are sound, the commonwealth lives,
and
without which the commonwealth crumbles
and
dies, and is to be considered unworthy
of
the name.
I concede that the prince or supreme magistrate
is the steward, administrator, and
overseer
of these rights. But I maintain that
their
ownership and usufruct properly belong
to
the total realm or people. This is
so to
the extent that, even if the people
should
wish to renounce them, it could no
more transfer
or alienate them to another than could
a
man who has life give it to another.
These
rights have been established by the
people,
or the members of the realm and commonwealth.
They have originated through the members,
and they cannot exist except in them,
nor
be conserved except by them. Furthermore,
their administration, which has been
granted
to a prince by a precarium or covenant,
is
returned on his death to the people,
which
because of its perpetual succession
is called
immortal. This administration is then
entrusted
by the people to another, who can aptly
be
one or more persons. But the ownership
and
usufruct of these rights have no other
place
to reside if they do not remain with
the
total people. For this reason, they
do not
by their nature become articles of
commerce
for one person. And neither the prince
nor
anyone else can possess them, so much
so
that if a prince should wish to exercise
ownership of them acquired by some
title
or other, he would thereby cease to
be a
prince and would become a private citizen
and tyrant. This is evident from those
matters
that I have stated in Chapters VI and
following,
especially in Chapters XIV, XV, and
XIX.
4 The celebrated Covarruvias agrees
with
me, as do certain others whom I have
acknowledged
in Chapters XIV and XV.
These problems have been the reasons for
my first difficulty. The other difficulty
is no less severe, namely that I have
been
forced at times to set forth theorems
about
contingent circumstances that are nevertheless
alien to this art. For I have described
the
character, attitude, customs, and natural
disposition of the people, prince,
courtiers,
and other subjects as they exist in
various
forms in political life. All these
theorems
are of this sort. And I realize that
they
occur in great numbers ( ? ^ ? ? ?
? ? ?),
and are developed in relation to contingencies
(" ? ^ ? ? ' ? ? ? ? " ?
?). For
there are peoples, and one often encounters
them, who change their character and
customs.
There are princes who, because of education,
training, the goodness of nature, and
the
grace of God, do not copy the temper
and
usage that might and rule customarily
bring
forth in some persons. There are well-constituted
princely courts. There are good and
pious
courtiers, and there are bad ones.
But there
are more of the latter than the former,
as
even David in his time complained in
Psalms
52, 53, and 59. The same can be said
about
the political remedies, advice, and
precepts
adapted to place, time, and person
that I
discuss in various places. But who
can propose
general precepts that are necessarily
and
mutually true about matters so various
and
unequivalent? The statesman, however,
should
be well acquainted with these matters.
And
political science should not omit matters
that the governor of a commonwealth
should
know, and by which he is shaped and
rendered
fit for governing.
I have already considerably digressed from
my purpose of providing reasons for
the labor
I have undertaken. It is a pleasure
to dedicate
to you, most distinguished and learned
relatives
in the Lord, these political meditations
of mine. By this means a testimony
may stand
forth of our friendship and affinity.
If
my desire is for very penetrating and
fair
judges of the things I discuss in this
book,
I rightly choose the two of you for
this
responsibility. You excel in erudition,
excellent
doctrine and precise judgment, not
to mention
other eminent talents with which God
has
equipped you. You are involved with
the affairs
of a commonwealth, and every day handle
most
of the matters I discuss. You are therefore
best able to pass judgment on these
matters.
You can also influence me more freely
and
effectively than can others, and are
able
to recall me to the true way if I have
departed
from right reason in political precepts
and
their applications, or in the manner
of arranging
and ordering them.
May the supremely good and great God grant
that while we dwell in this social
life by
his kindness, we may show ourselves
pleasing
to him and beneficial to our neighbor.
Farewell
to you, and to my relatives and friends.
Most devotedly yours,
Johannes Althusius
Endnotes [1] [The Latin word jus (pl. jura)
as here employed by Althusius means
both
“right” and “law.” For further information
on this word, see page 18, footnote
5.]
[2] [Although this phrase is consistently
translated hereafter as “rights of
sovereignty,”
attention is called to the point that
it
often conveys the additional meaning
of “laws
of sovereignty” or sometimes of “powers
of
sovereignty.” ]
[3] [law.]
[4] [In the 1614 edition, which has been
used in this translation, Chapter VI
becomes
IX, XIV and XV become XVIII and XIX
respectively,
and XIX becomes XXIV.]
Preface to the Third Edition (1614) Dedicated to the illustrious leaders of the
estates of Frisia between the Zuider
Zee
and the North Sea most worthy lords
Since I understand, illustrious leaders,
that my former political treatise has
been
read by many persons, and all copies
have
been sold out, I have brought forth
another
edition. 1 By re-examining the earlier
work,
and recalling it to the forge, I have
intended
to perform a worthwhile service. This
has
been done during the odd hours permitted
me between responsibilities to the
Commonwealth.
2
I call to your attention that these second
meditations have developed into a new
political
work that differs from the earlier
treatise
in form, method, and many other respects.
In this work I have returned all merely
theological,
juridical, and philosophical elements
to
their proper places, and have retained
only
those that seemed to me to be essential
and
homogeneous to this science and discipline.
And I have included among other things
herein,
all in their proper places, the precepts
of the Decalogue and the rights of
sovereignty,
about which there is a deep silence
among
some other political scientists. The
precepts
of the Decalogue are included to the
extent
that they infuse a vital spirit into
the
association and symbiotic life that
we teach,
that they carry a torch before the
social
life that we seek, and that they prescribe
and constitute a way, rule, guiding
star,
and boundary for human society. If
anyone
would take them out of politics, he
would
destroy it; indeed, he would destroy
all
symbiosis and social life among men.
For
what would human life be without the
piety
of the first table of the Decalogue,
and
without the justice of the second?
What would
a commonwealth be without communion
and communication
of things useful and necessary to human
life?
By means of these precepts, charity
becomes
effective in various good works.
He who takes the rights of sovereignty away
from politics destroys the universal
association.
3 For what other bond does it have
than these
alone? They constitute it, and they
conserve
it. If they are taken away, this body,
which
is composed of various symbiotic associations,
is dissolved and ceases to be what
it was.
For what would the rector, prince,
administrator,
and governor of a commonwealth be without
the necessary power, without the practice
and exercise of sovereignty?
By no means, however, do I appropriate those
matters that are proper to theology
or jurisprudence.
The political scientist is concerned
with
the fact and sources of sovereignty.
The
jurist discusses the right that arises
from
them. The former interprets the fact,
and
the latter the right and merit of it.
Since
the jurist receives information, instruction,
and knowledge about matters from those
arts
to which such matters belong, and about
the
right and merit of fact from his own
science,
it is not surprising that he receives
knowledge
of some matters from political science.
Therefore
insofar as the substance of sovereignty
or
of the Decalogue is theological, ethical
or juridical, and accords with the
purpose
and form of those arts, so far do those
arts
claim as proper to themselves what
they take
for their use from the Decalogue and
the
rights of sovereignty. And so far also
I
do not touch the subject matter of
the Decalogue
or of sovereignty, but rather consider
it
to be alien and heterogeneous to political
science. I claim the Decalogue as proper
to political science insofar as it
breathes
a vital spirit into symbiotic life,
and gives
form to it and conserves it, in which
sense
it is essential and homogeneous to
political
science and heterogeneous to other
arts.
So I have concluded that where the
political
scientist ceases, there the jurist
begins,
just as where the moralist stops the
theologian
begins, and where the physicist ends
the
physician begins. No one denies, however,
that all arts are united in practice.
I have rightly selected examples for political
science from excellent and praiseworthy
polities,
from the histories of human life, and
from
past events, and have employed them
in that
art that ought to be the guide of an
upright
political life, the moulder of all
symbiosis,
and the image of good social life.
I more
frequently use examples from sacred
scripture
because it has God or pious men as
its author,
and because I consider that no polity
from
the beginning of the world has been
more
wisely and perfectly constructed than
the
polity of the Jews. We err, I believe,
whenever
in similar circumstances we depart
from it.
Moreover, I have attributed the rights of
sovereignty, as they are called, not
to the
supreme magistrate, but to the commonwealth
or universal association. Many jurists
and
political scientists assign them as
proper
only to the prince and supreme magistrate
to the extent that if these rights
are granted
and communicated to the people or commonwealth,
they thereby perish and are no more.
A few
others and I hold to the contrary,
namely,
that they are proper to the symbiotic
body
of the universal association to such
an extent
that they give it spirit, soul, and
heart.
And this body, as I have said, perishes
if
they are taken away from it. I recognize
the prince as the administrator, overseer,
and governor of these rights of sovereignty.
But the owner and usufructuary of sovereignty
is none other than the total people
associated
in one symbiotic body from many smaller
associations.
These rights of sovereignty are so
proper
to this association, in my judgment,
that
even if it wishes to renounce them,
to transfer
them to another, and to alienate them,
it
would by no means be able to do so,
any more
than a man is able to give the life
he enjoys
to another. For these rights of sovereignty
constitute and conserve the universal
association.
And as they arise from the people,
or the
members of the commonwealth or realm,
so
they are not able to exist except in
them,
nor to be conserved except by them.
Furthermore,
their administration, which is granted
by
the people to a single mortal man—namely,
to a prince or supreme magistrate—reverts
when he dies or is discharged to the
people,
which is said to be immortal because
its
generations perpetually succeed one
after
the other. This administration of the
rights
of sovereignty is then entrusted by
the people
to another. And so it remains with
the people
through a thousand years, or as many
years
as the commonwealth endures. I discuss
this
point extensively in Chapters IX, XVIII,
XIX, XXIV, and XXXVIII.
To demonstrate this point I am able to produce
the excellent example of your own and
the
other provinces confederated with you.
For
in the war you undertook against the
very
powerful king of Spain you did not
consider
that the rights of sovereignty adhered
so
inseparably to him that they did not
exist
apart from him. Rather, when you took
away
the use and exercise of them from those
who
abused them, and recovered what was
your
own, you declared that these rights
belong
to the associated multitude and to
the people
of the individual provinces. You did
this
with such a courageous spirit, with
such
wisdom, fidelity, and constancy, that
I cannot
find other peoples to compare with
your example.
And this among other reasons leads me to
dedicate these political meditations
to you.
It even leads me to refer very often
in them,
when illustrations of political precepts
are used, to examples chosen from your
cities,
constitutions, customs, and deeds,
and from
other confederated Belgic provinces.
I am
also moved to do this by the favor,
warmth,
and disposition that you, together
with your
confederates, have expressed often
towards
this Commonwealth that I have served
for
a number of years, and indeed, even
toward
me when not many years ago you saw
fit to
call me—with very fair provisions—to
profess
the juristic science at your illustrious
and much celebrated academy at Franeker.
Wherefore I think it only just that
I acknowledge
and openly proclaim your kindness in
this
preface and dedication, and publicly
commend
for the imitation of others those virtues
through which, by the grace of God,
you not
only defended and conserved your commonwealth
from tyranny and disaster, but also
made
it even more illustrious. For the success
of your admirable deeds, and those
of your
allies, is so abundant that it overflows
into neighboring countries, indeed,
into
all of Germany and into France. It
is even
experienced by the nations of the Indies
and many other realms plagued by Spanish
arms that have been sustained and defended
by you and the other provinces united
with
you. Since the published annals and
histories
speak of these things to the eternal
glory
of your name, I choose to pass over
them
in silence rather than to mention only
a
small part of them.
May the supremely good and great God grant
that while we live in this political
life
and this symbiosis by his grace, we
may make
ourselves useful and beneficial to
men, and
so attain the purpose that has been
the concern
of this discipline. With this prayer
I close
this preface.
With reverent and humble respect and honor
for your illustrious splendor
Johannes Althusius
[1] [This preface was prepared originally
for the second edition (1610) and retained
in the third and later editions.]
[2] [City of Emden.]
[3] [ consociatio universalis: the commonwealth;
an association inclusive of all other
associations
(families, collegia, cities, and provinces)
within a determinate large area, and
recognizing
no superior to itself.]
I The General Elements of Politics
[§ 3] The end of political “symbiotic” man
is holy, just, comfortable, and happy
symbiosis,
2 a life lacking nothing either necessary
or useful. Truly, in living this life
no
man is self-sufficient (? ^ ? ? "
?
?), or adequately endowed by nature.
[§ 4]
For when he is born, destitute of all
help,
naked and defenseless, as if having
lost
all his goods in a shipwreck, he is
cast
forth into the hardships of this life,
not
able by his own efforts to reach a
maternal
breast, nor to endure the harshness
of his
condition, nor to move himself from
the place
where he was cast forth. By his weeping
and
tears, he can initiate nothing except
the
most miserable life, a very certain
sign
of pressing and immediate misfortune.
3 Bereft
of all counsel and aid, for which nevertheless
he is then in greatest need, he is
unable
to help himself without the intervention
and assistance of another. Even if
he is
well nourished in body, he cannot show
forth
the light of reason. Nor in his adulthood
is he able to obtain in and by himself
those
outward goods he needs for a comfortable
and holy life, or to provide by his
own energies
all the requirements of life. The energies
and industry of many men are expended
to
procure and supply these things. Therefore,
as long as he remains isolated and
does not
mingle in the society of men, he cannot
live
at all comfortably and well while lacking
so many necessary and useful things.
As an
aid and remedy for this state of affairs
is offered him in symbiotic life, he
is led,
and almost impelled, to embrace it
if he
wants to live comfortably and well,
even
if he merely wants to live. Therein
he is
called upon to exercise and perform
those
virtues that are necessarily inactive
except
in this symbiosis. And so he begins
to think
by what means such symbiosis, from
which
he expects so many useful and enjoyable
things,
can be instituted, cultivated, and
conserved.
Concerning these matters we shall,
by God’s
grace, speak in the following pages.
[§ 5] The word “polity” has three principal
connotations, as noted by Plutarch.
4 First
it indicates the communication of right
(jus)5
in the commonwealth, which the Apostle
calls
citizenship. 6 Then, it signifies the
manner
of administering and regulating the
commonwealth.
Finally, it notes the form and constitution
of the commonwealth by which all actions
of the citizens are guided. Aristotle
understands
by polity this last meaning. 7
[§ 6] The symbiotes are co-workers who, by
the bond of an associating and uniting
agreement,
communicate among themselves whatever
is
appropriate for a comfortable life
of soul
and body. In other words, they are
participants
or partners in a common life.
[§ 7] This mutual communication, 8 or common
enterprise, involves (1) things, (2)
services,
and (3) common rights (jura) by which
the
numerous and various needs of each
and every
symbiote are supplied, the self-sufficiency
and mutuality of life and human society
are
achieved, and social life is established
and conserved. Whence Cicero said,
“a political
community is a gathering of men associated
by a consensus as to the right and
a sharing
of what is useful.” 9 By this communication,
advantages and responsibilities are
assumed
and maintained according to the nature
of
each particular association. [§ 8]
(1) The
communication of things (res) is the
bringing
of useful and necessary goods to the
social
life by the symbiotes for the common
advantage
of the symbiotes individually and collectively.
[§ 9] (2) The community of services (operae) is the contributing by the symbiotes
of their labors and occupations for
the sake
of social life. [§ 10] (3) The communion
of right (jus) is the process by which
the
symbiotes live and are ruled by just
laws
in a common life among themselves.
This communion of right is called the law
of association and symbiosis (lex consociationis
et symbiosis), or the symbiotic right
(jus
symbioticum)10, and consists especially
of
self-sufficiency (? ^ ? ? " ?
? ), good
order (? ? ? ' ? ), and proper discipline
( ^ ? ? ? ). It includes two aspects,
one
functioning to direct and govern social
life,
the other prescribing a plan and manner
for
communicating things and services among
the
symbiotes.
The law of association in its first aspect
is, in turn, either common or proper.
[§
11] Common law (lex communis), which
is unchanging,
indicates that in every association
and type
of symbiosis some persons are rulers
(heads,
overseers, prefects) or superiors,
others
are subjects or inferiors. [§ 12] For
all
government is held together by imperium
and
subjection; in fact, the human race
started
straightway from the beginning with
imperium
and subjection. God made Adam master
and
monarch of his wife, and of all creatures
born or descendant from her. 11 Therefore
all power and government is said to
be from
God. 12 And nothing, as Cicero affirms,
“is
as suited to the natural law (jus naturae)13
and its requirements as imperium, without
which neither household nor city nor
nation
nor the entire race of men can endure,
nor
the whole nature of things nor the
world
itself.” 14 If the consensus and will
of
rulers and subjects is the same, how
happy
and blessed is their life! “Be subject
to
one another in fear of the Lord.” 15
[§ 13] The ruler, prefect, or chief directs
and governs the functions of the social
life
for the utility of the subjects individually
and collectively. He exercises his
authority
by administering, planning, appointing,
teaching,
forbidding, requiring, and diverting.
Whence
the ruler is called rector, director,
governor,
curator, and administrator. Petrus
Gregorius
says that just as the soul presides
over
the other members in the human body,
directs
and governs them according to the proper
functions assigned to each member,
and foresees
and procures whatever useful and necessary
things are due each member—some useful
privately
and at the same time to all or to the
entire
body, others useful publicly for the
conservation
of social life—so also it is necessary
in
civil society that one person rule
the rest
for the welfare and utility of both
individuals
and the whole group. 16 Therefore,
as Augustine
says, to rule, to govern, to preside
is nothing
other than to serve and care for the
utility
of others, as parents rule their children,
and a man his wife. 17 Or, as Thomas
Aquinas
says, “to govern is to lead what is
governed
to its appropriate end.” 18 And so
it pertains
to the office of a governor not only
to preserve
something unharmed, but also to lead
it to
its end. 19 The rector and moderator
so endeavors
and proceeds that he leads the people
by
method, order, and discipline to that
end
in which all things are properly considered.
[§ 14] Government by superiors considers
both the soul and the body of inferiors:
the soul that it may be formed and
imbued
with doctrine and knowledge of things
useful
and necessary in human life, the body
that
it may be provided with nourishment
and whatever
else it needs. The first responsibility
pertains
to education, the second to sustentation
and protection. [§ 15] Education centers
on the instruction of inferiors in
the true
knowledge and worship of God, and in
prescribed
duties that ought to be performed towards
one’s neighbor; education also pertains
to
the correction of evil customs and
errors.
By the former, inferiors are imbued
with
a healthy knowledge of holy, just,
and useful
things; by the latter, they are held
firm
in duty. [§ 16] The responsibility
for sustentation
of the body is the process by which
inferiors
are carefully and diligently guided
by superiors
in matters pertaining to this life,
and by
which advantages for them are sought
and
disadvantages to them are avoided.
20 [§
17] Protection is the legitimate defense
against injuries and violence, the
process
by which the security of inferiors
is maintained
by superiors against any misfortune,
violence,
or injury directed against persons,
reputations,
or properties, and if already sustained,
then avenged and compensated by lawful
means.
[§ 18] The inferior, or subject, is one who
carries on the business of the social
life
according to the will of his chief,
or prefect,
and arranges his life and actions submissively,
provided his chief does not rule impiously
or unjustly.
[§ 19] Proper laws (leges propriae)21 are
those enactments by which particular
associations
are ruled. They differ in each specie
of
association according as the nature
of each
requires.
[§ 20] The laws by which the communication
of things, occupations, services, and
actions
is accomplished22 are those that distribute
and assign advantages and responsibilities
among the symbiotes according to the
nature
and necessities of each association.
[§ 21]
At times the communication regulated
by these
laws is more extensive, at other times
more
restricted, according as the nature
of each
association is seen to require, or
as may
be agreed upon and established among
the
members.
[§ 22] On the basis of the foregoing considerations,
I agree with Plutarch that a commonwealth
is best and happiest when magistrates
and
citizens bring everything together
for its
welfare and advantage, and neither
neglect
nor despise anyone who can be helpful
to
the commonwealth23 The Apostle indeed
advises
us to seek and promote advantages for
our
neighbor, even to the point that we
willingly
give up our own right, by which we
guard
against misfortune, to obtain a great
advantage
for the other person. 24 For “we have
not
been born to ourselves, inasmuch as
our country
claims a share in our birth, and our
friends
a share.” 25 [§ 23] The entire second
table
of the Decalogue pertains to this:
“you shall
love your neighbor as yourself”; “whatever
you wish to be done to you do also
to others,”
and conversely, “whatever you do not
wish
to be done to you do not do to others”;
“live
honorably, injure no one, and render
to each
his due.” 26 Of what use to anyone
is a hidden
treasure, or a wise man who denies
his services
to the commonwealth?
[§ 24] In light of these several truths,
the question of which life is to be
preferred
can be answered. Is it the contemplative
or the active? Is it the theoretical
and
philosophical life or the practical
and political
life? Clearly man by nature is a gregarious
animal born for cultivating society
with
other men, not by nature living alone
as
wild beasts do, nor wandering about
as birds.
[§ 25] And so misanthropic and stateless
hermits, living without fixed hearth
or home,
are useful neither to themselves nor
to others,
and separated from others are surely
miserable.
For how can they promote the advantage
of
their neighbor unless they find their
way
into human society? 27 How can they
perform
works of love when they live outside
human
fellowship? How can the church be built
and
the remaining duties of the first table
of
the Decalogue be performed? Whence
Keckermann
rightly says that politics leads the
final
end of all other disciplines to the
highest
point, and thus builds public from
private
happiness. 28
[§ 26] For this reason God willed to train
and teach men not by angels, but by
men.
29 For the same reason God distributed
his
gifts unevenly among men. He did not
give
all things to one person, but some
to one
and some to others, so that you have
need
for my gifts, and I for yours. And
so was
born, as it were, the need for communicating
necessary and useful things, which
communication
was not possible except in social and
political
life. God therefore willed that each
need
the service and aid of others in order
that
friendship would bind all together,
and no
one would consider another to be valueless.
[§ 27] For if each did not need the
aid of
others, what would society be? What
would
reverence and order be? What would
reason
and humanity be? Every one therefore
needs
the experience and contributions of
others,
and no one lives to himself alone.
Thus the needs of body and soul, and the
seeds of virtue implanted in our souls,
drew
dispersed men together into one place.
These
causes have built villages, established
cities,
founded academic institutions, and
united
by civil unity and society a diversity
of
farmers, craftsmen, laborers, builders,
soldiers,
merchants, learned and unlearned men
and
so many members of the same body. Consequently
while some persons provided for others,
and
some received from others what they
themselves
lacked, all came together into a certain
public body that we call the commonwealth,
and by mutual aid devoted themselves
to the
general good and welfare of this body.
And
that this was the true origin first
of villages,
and then of larger commonwealths embracing
wide areas, is taught by the most ancient
records of history and confirmed by
daily
experience. [§ 28] Opposed to this
judgment
is the life and teaching of recluses,
monks,
and hermits, who defend their error
and heresy
by an erroneous appeal to Luke 1:80;
10:41;
Hebrews 11:38; I Kings 19:8. But scripture
places this kind of life among its
maledictions.
Deuteronomy 28:64, 65; Psalms 107 and
144;
Code X, 32, 26. Note also that a wandering
and vagabond life was imposed upon
Cain in
punishment for his fratricide. Genesis
4:14.
Contrary examples of pious men embracing
active political life are to be found
throughout
sacred scripture.
[§ 29] From what has been said, we further
conclude that the efficient cause of
political
association is consent and agreement
among
the communicating citizens. The formal
cause
is indeed the association brought about
by
contributing and communicating one
with the
other, in which political men institute,
cultivate, maintain, and conserve the
fellowship
of human life through decisions about
those
things useful and necessary to this
social
life. [§ 30] The final cause of politics
is the enjoyment of a comfortable,
useful,
and happy life, and of the common welfare—
that we may live with piety and honor
a peaceful
and quiet life, that while true piety
toward
God and justice among the citizens
may prevail
at home, defense against the enemy
from abroad
may be maintained, and that concord
and peace
may always and everywhere thrive. The
final
cause is also the conservation of a
human
society that aims at a life in which
you
can worship God quietly and without
error.
[§ 31] The material of politics is
the aggregate
of precepts for communicating those
things,
services, and right that we bring together,
each fairly and properly according
to his
ability, for symbiosis and the common
advantage
of the social life.
[§ 32] Moreover, Aristotle teaches that man
by his nature is brought to this social
life
and mutual sharing. 30 For man is a
more
political animal than the bee or any
other
gregarious creature, and therefore
by nature
far more of a social animal than bees,
ants,
cranes, and such kind as feed and defend
themselves in flocks. Since God himself
endowed
each being with a natural capacity
to maintain
itself and to resist whatever is contrary
to it, so far as necessary to its welfare,
and since dispersed men are not able
to exercise
this capacity, the instinct for living
together
and establishing civil society was
given
to them. [§ 33] Thus brought together
and
united, some men could aid others,
many together
could provide the necessities of life
more
easily than each alone, and all could
live
more safely from attack by wild beasts
and
enemies. It follows that no man is
able to
live well and happily to himself. Necessity
therefore induces association; and
the want
of things necessary for life, which
are acquired
and communicated by the help and aid
of one’s
associates, conserves it. For this
reason
it is evident that the commonwealth,
or civil
society, exists by nature, and that
man is
by nature a civil animal who strives
eagerly
for association. If, however, anyone
wishes
not to live in society, or needs nothing
because of his own abundance, he is
not considered
a part of the commonwealth. He is therefore
either a beast or a god, as Aristotle
asserts.
31
[§ 34] Furthermore the continuous governing
and obedience in social life mentioned
earlier
are also agreeable to nature. For,
as Petrus
Gregorius adds, “to rule, to direct,
to be
subjected, to be ruled, to be governed”
are
natural actions proceeding from the
law of
nations (jus gentium). “Anything else
would
be considered no less monstrous than
a body
without a head, or a head without members
of the body lawfully and suitably arranged,
or even lacking them altogether. For
it is
especially useful to the individual
member
who cannot meet his own needs to be
aided
and upheld by another. The better member
is said to be the one who meets his
own needs,
and is also able to help others. The
greater
the good he communicates with others,
the
better and more outstanding the member
is.
[§ 35] Then, this world has so great
and
so admirable a diversity [ … ] that
unless
it be held together by some order of
subordination,
and regulated by fixed laws of subjection
and order, it would be destroyed in
a short
time by its own confusion. Nor can
the diverse
parts of it endure if each part seeks
to
perform its own function indifferently
and
heedlessly by itself. Power set over
against
equal power would bring all things
to an
end by continuous and irreconcilable
discord,
and would involve in its ruin things
that
do not belong to it, and that it does
not
know how to govern.” 32 As long as
each part
decides to live according to its own
will,
it may disregard the rule of discipline.
33 Finally, the conservation and duration
of all things consist in this concord
of
order and subjection. [§ 36] “Just
as from
lyres of diverse tones, if properly
tuned,
a sweet sound and pleasant harmony
arise
when low, medium, and high notes are
united,
so also the social unity of rulers
and subjects
in the state produces a sweet and pleasant
harmony out of the rich, the poor,
the workers,
the farmers, and other kinds of persons.
If agreement is thus achieved in society,
a praiseworthy, happy, most durable,
and
almost divine concord is produced.
[ … ]
[§ 37] But if all were truly equal,
and each
wished to rule others according to
his own
will, discord would easily arise, and
by
discord the dissolution of society.
There
would be no standard of virtue or merit,
and it follows that equality itself
would
be the greatest inequality,” as Petrus
Gregorius
rightly asserts. 34 Hence, when this
harmony
of rulers and subjects ceases, and
there
are no longer servants and leaders,
such
a situation is considered to be among
the
signs of divine wrath.
[§ 38] I add to this that it is inborn to
the more powerful and prudent to dominate
and rule weaker men, just as it is
also considered
inborn for inferiors to submit. So
in man
the soul dominates the body, and the
mind
the appetites. So the male, because
the more
outstanding, rules the female, who
as the
weaker obeys. [§ 39] Thus, the pride
and
high spirits of man should be restrained
by sure reins of reason, law, and imperium
less he throw himself precipitously
into
ruin.
Endnotes Also to be noted is that Althusius will have
nothing to do, here or elsewhere, with
Gregorius’
often repeated division of the corporeal
world into four elements (earth, water,
air,
and fire), and therefore omits them
from
the quotation rather than attributing
the
diversity of the world to them, as
Gregorius
does. Although these four elements
recur
throughout his De republica, Gregorius’s
best discussion of them is found in
his legal
work, Syntagtma juris universi, I,
1–9 Finally,
the sentence immediately after this
quotation
is in large part borrowed, following
Gregorius,
from Cassiodorus, Variarum, 16.]
II-III The Family |
POLITICA (1614)